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Abstract
This thesis traces the growth of Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand from the 
beginning of the direct French colonisation of Vietnam in 1885 to the victory of the 
Chinese Communists in 1949. Although Thailand's relative importance to the 
Vietnamese resistance movement did not increase at a constant rate during this period, but 
rather fluctuated in response to several factors, there was nevertheless an overall increase 
in Thailand's significance to the Vietnamese struggle against the French. This was most 
prominent during the immediate postwar period.
Arranged chronologically, the present work is divided into six chapters that draw upon 
a large body of Vietnamese and Thai vernacular sources to detail the development of 
Vietnamese resistance work in Thailand during the period under study. The first chapter 
is divided into two time frames. The first part considers Thailand's importance to 
Vietnamese anticolonialists during the period between 1885 and 1925. Particular 
attention is paid to the extensive base building undertaken by scholar-patriots in Thailand 
in the early 1920s. The second section examines Vietnamese resistance programmes in 
Thailand in terms of their importance to the development of Vietnamese communism 
during the period between 1925 and 1940. Three major topics discussed in this section 
include: the role the Vietnamese played in the formation and leadership of the Siamese 
Communist Party, the part played by Vietnamese communists in promoting a Thai 
revolution via this Party, and the negative effects this had on Vietnamese resistance 
activities in Thailand.
The second chapter discusses two trends in Thai politics that worked in the 
Vietnamese favour during WWII. The first stemmed from international events and 
internal Thai political changes that saw Phibun Songkhram adopt sympathetic policies 
toward the Vietnamese in a bid to gain their support during the brief 1940-41 Franco-Thai 
border war. The second, and most important development, resulted from the direct 
cooperation which emerged between Viet Minh and Seri Thai resistance leaders at the end 
of the Pacific War. These wartime Seri Thai contacts proved to be invaluable to the Viet 
Minh in the postwar period, one of the major factors explaining the ability of the 
Vietnamese to administer a wide-range of programmes in Thailand after the war.
The last four chapters consider Thailand's unprecedented strategic importance to the 
Vietnamese in the immediate postwar period, with the discussion equally divided between
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the period prior to the outbreak of full-scale war in Indochina in December 1946 and the 
interval running from that point to 1949. Beginning at the end of WWII, chapter three 
side-tracks momentarily to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the complex 
strategic situation facing the Vietnamese, as the French moved to retake Indochina after 
WWÜ. Having done this, chapter four then shows how the Vietnamese responded to 
French actions in terms of expanding their military and diplomatic activities in Thailand 
during the same period. Chapter five focuses on the role played by Vietnamese 
representatives in Bangkok in the creation of the Southeast Asia League. This discussion 
serves as a vehicle to understanding better how Thailand became a key diplomatic outlet 
for the Ho Chi Minh-led government following the outbreak of war in Indochina. The 
last chapter examines Thailand's military significance to the Vietnamese between 1947 
and 1949. The first part of this chapter deals with the period prior to the November 1947 
military coup in Bangkok, when the conditions for Vietnamese resistance operations were 
most favourable. The second section shows that while Phibun's return to power in 1948 
changed the rules guiding the operation of Thai-based Vietnamese programmes, Thailand 
nonetheless remained a key link to the Vietnamese until 1949. In this year, Thailand's 
importance effectively came to an end as Phibun began to crack-down stringently on 
Vietnamese activities in Thailand and the victory of the Chinese Communists opened 
more important northern bases and provided the Vietnamese with key access to Chinese 
diplomatic and military support.
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A Note on Transliterations
In transliterating Thai names, titles, and places into English, I have used the Library of 
Congress system. However, because of the type of font I have used in my footnote text, 
I have had to omit some of the recommended diacritical marks, meaning that there is no 
distinction in the transliterations between long and short vowels and some infrequent 
diphthongs are not marked according to the Congress system. Secondly, in the cases 
where there are long-standing English spellings of certain Thai proper nouns, I have 
honoured that spelling in the text rather than reproduce it in an unfamiliar Library of 
Congress form.
As for Vietnamese transliterations, I have reproduced names, titles, and places in their 
original quoc ngir (Vietnamese romanised script) spelling. The only exceptions to this 
have been such common words as "Hanoi," "Saigon," "Ho Chi Minh City," and "Viet 
Minh." Because these words appear so often in the text, rather than running the risk of 
distracting non-Vietnamese speaking readers with an excess of unfamiliar diacritic marks, 
I have left them in their English-written form.
Concerning English spelling, I have followed the British/Australian style throughout 
this thesis.
(x)
Map I
Indochina
China
VIETNAM
LAOS
South China Sea
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
Gulf of Thailand Q
VIETNAM
(xi)
Map II
Territories Ceded to France at the Turn of the Century
(xii)
Map III
Vietnamese Resistance Bases in Siam, 1919-1925
ChinaVIETNAM
Dien Bien Phü
LAOS
Hi Ttah
* N ongK hii T h , Uihien 
)ong On . i
Nikhon Phinon? i \ *
I • Bin Hin .------------- 1
I Kaisaman
UdanTham
Ncrvg Boa
Bin Chik Thai Phanom
Sakhon Nakhoc hink(i^ u n  A * Savannakhet
S outh  C h in a  Sea
SIAM
CAMBODIA
VIETNAM
Map IV
Post WWII Vietnamese Operations Along Thai—Cambodian Border
China
Sout h Chi na Sea
Gul f  of  Thai l and
Map V
Strategic Situation in Indochina, 1949
i. l/A * Saii'ticro
L A O S
I Cl U S
0 J> /  A
Introduction
Ambassador Leonard Unger: I think that there is no question that over the years, say, 
four or five years, a particularly strong interest has been the permission that we were 
given for military reasons to use the bases in Thailand. . . . [I]t was primarily the use 
of the bases which made that area, that geography, of exceeding importance to us.
Now, this was not anything that raised a serious difficulty with the Thais, who were 
sympathetic with what we were trying to do at that time. But this did make Thailand 
and its geography in that sense of exceedingly great importance to the United States.
Senator Symington: Because we were in Vietnam?
Ambassador Unger: Because we were in Vietnam.1
US Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger, to 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1969
US officials attending Ambassador Unger's testimony to the Senate committee that day 
in 1969 would have been surprised to learn that in an address to cadres in Udon Thani 
about twenty years earlier, a special representative of the Indochinese Communist Party 
(ICP) described Thailand's strategic significance to the Vietnamese in almost identical 
terms. Indeed, half a world away from this Senate hearing, many of the same 
Vietnamese leaders helping to direct the war effort against the US in the late 1960s would 
have understood very well what Unger meant when he referred to Thailand's "exceeding 
importance." Several of these Vietnamese had spent years building bases in Thailand 
during the resistance against the French. It must have been a grim, though not entirely 
surprising, irony to learn that many of the B-52s bombing Vietnam at the time were 
taking off from northeastern Thai airbases, many located in the same areas where the 
Vietnamese had set up resistance posts forty years earlier. Although the US took 
advantage of Thailand's geographical position in earnest in the 1960s, it was the 
Vietnamese who first recognised the favourable strategic location of Thailand in relation 
to Vietnam.
Surprisingly, this has been generally ignored in the existing scholarship on Thai- 
Vietnamese relations and in studies of the Vietnamese resistance against the French. 
While a number of scholars of Vietnam have contributed greatly to our understanding of
Testimony of Ambassador Leonard Unger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee' in Symington 
Hearings, Part 3— Kingdom of Thailand, p. 855 quoted by R. Sean Randolph, The United States and 
Thailand, Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985, (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
California, 1986), p. 66.
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China's significance to the Vietnamese during this period,2 there has been no parallel, in 
depth examination of Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand.3
From the beginning of the direct French colonisation of Vietnam, Thailand had figured 
into the Vietnamese struggle against the French. The list of resistance leaders working 
from Thailand at one time or another during this period reads like a Who's Who in the 
Vietnamese anticolonial pantheon. Phan Dinh Phiing, one of the first in this long line, 
singled Thailand out in the late 1880s as a possible sanctuary and a source of arms. 
While he did not know it at the time, these two interests remained major priorities 
throughout the course of Vietnamese resistance work in Thailand for the next six decades. 
The famous scholar-patriot, Phan Boi Chau, recognised this and made three trips to 
Thailand, including a year-long stay in the central part in 1910. Less known, however, is 
Dang Thüc Hua, one of Chau's travelling companions who remained in Thailand for 
over twenty years building a network of bases among Vietnamese communities there. 
Benefiting from the work over which he presided were a number of young Vietnamese 
students who arrived in Thailand to study and work in the 1920s. Several of these 
youths went on to become famous revolutionaries and architects of the ICP. Even 
veteran leaders, such as Ho Tung Mau and Ho Chi Minh, spent considerable time in 
Thailand in the late 1920s strengthening resistance bases and training cadres. Following 
WWII, Thailand's importance increased even more as the French tried to retake their 
Indochinese colony after having lost it during the war. Younger partisans, such as Trän 
Vän Giäu, Nguyen Duc Qüy, and Hoang Van Hoan arrived in Thailand after the war 
to administer to an unprecedented level of Vietnamese diplomatic and military activities in 
Thailand.
To all these Vietnamese strategists mentioned above, Thailand's favourable 
geographical position in relation to Vietnam was foremost in their minds when working in 
Thailand. Shaped like a slim "S", narrow at the middle and slightly wider its ends, 
Vietnam runs south from China, sharing a long, hilly frontier with Laos before cradling 
its way west around Cambodia to the Gulf of Thailand. Because of this configuration, at
For example, King C. Chen broke new ground in Vietnam and China, 1938-1954, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1969). David G. Marr provides a good account of the importance of China to 
Vietnamese anticolonialists between 1885 and 1925 in Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). Distinguished studies have recently added to our
knowledge of China's importance to the Vietnamese Revolution during WWII and up to 1954. See: 
David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power (forthcoming); Greg Lockhart, Nation in Anns: The 
Origins o f the People's Anny of Vietnam, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin in association with the Asian
Studies Association of Australia, 1989); and Stein Tpnnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945: 
Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War,' (Doctorate, International Peace Research 
Institute, December 1990 (soon to be published)).
A notable exception to this would be Thadeus Flood’s short article, 'Vietnamese Refugees in Thailand: 
Minority Manipulation in Counter-insurgency,' Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 9, No. 3, 
(July-September 1977), pp. 31-47. Despite Flood's brief treatment of Vietnamese anticolonial activities in 
Thailand (which he points out in his opening), he nonetheless must be credited as one o f the first scholars 
to bring to our attention the possible extent of Vietnamese anticolonial activities in Thailand in relation 
to the resistance against the French, making use of Thai and Vietnamese (in Chinese translation) 
primary sources.
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almost any given point along the western border of that "S", the distance from that point 
to an opposite location on the eastern Thai border is relatively small. In fact, the present 
day northeastern Thai border is located a little over a 100 kilometres from northern central 
Vietnam. Until the Franco-Thai treaties at the turn of this century, this geographical 
proximity was all the more the case considering that the Thais held suzerainty over most 
of Laos and administered large parts of western Cambodia. This was also the case from 
May 1941 to December 1946 when the Thai border was expanded eastward to re- 
incorporate sizable portions of western Cambodia and smaller enclaves in Laos which had 
been forfeited to the French earlier. Although this geopolitical feature may seem obvious, 
it was a recurring theme which underpinned the importance of Thailand to the Vietnamese 
at almost every stage of the resistance against the French.
It is in this context that the present work sets out to trace the growth of Vietnamese 
resistance activities in Thailand from the time the French established direct colonial rule 
over Vietnam in 1885 to the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 and Bangkok's clamp- 
down on Vietnamese activities in Thailand at about the same time. It is the aim of this 
thesis to show that although Thailand's importance to the Vietnamese resistance fluctuated 
at different times during this period, there was nonetheless an overall increase in its 
significance to the Vietnamese in the struggle against the French. Explaining Thailand's 
attractiveness throughout this period was a combination of its close proximity to Vietnam 
and simultaneous position outside direct French colonial control. Added to this were the 
overseas Vietnamese enclaves concentrated in northeast Thailand. These areas provided 
resistance leaders with strategically located, Vietnamese-speaking communities on which 
they could anchor their resistance work.
As a corollary, this thesis will also argue that there was a strategic equation between 
Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand and those in China. While Vietnamese 
anticolonial programmes existed simultaneously in both countries, as a rule resistance 
work in China took long-term precedence over Vietnamese projects in Thailand. 
However, this was not the case when Vietnamese activities in China were suppressed and 
could no longer function effectively. During these times, most prominently in the late 
1920s, early 1930s, and in the immediate post-WWII period, the centre of gravity of 
Vietnamese resistance work on the outskirts of Indochina shifted to Thailand. One of the 
main reasons for this inter-play was, once again, a matter of geography. Because the 
French could suppress Vietnamese resistance activities in Indochina effectively prior to 
WWII, Vietnamese leaders had to look abroad—beyond French Indochina—to find 
relatively safe, but still geographically close places to build rear bases. For those who 
looked to Japan for possible support, they were not only confronted by an ocean, but 
early on they were disappointed by Tokyo's refusal to allow Vietnamese anticolonial 
activities to be based from Japan. While Vietnamese revolutionaries later found support
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in France and the Soviet Union, these were obviously not places near Vietnam where 
supply posts could be set up. To the south and east of Indochina was the South China 
Sea. This left only two options for Vietnamese strategists looking to build effective 
foreign bases just outside Indochina: go west to Thailand or north to China. They went 
both ways. Not surprisingly, activists in these two areas remained in contact with each 
other through a number of cadres who travelled between these two points. This linkage 
was a noteworthy component of the Vietnamese resistance against the French.
In addition, this thesis will also show that at key points in the resistance, Thai 
officialdom facilitated Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand by permitting 
anticolonialists to administer their projects largely unimpeded. Although the degree of 
Thai support was informed by a need to maintain acceptable relations with the French and 
could vary according to domestic Thai political changes, Thai backing at these times 
ranged from turning a blind-eye to Vietnamese activities to large-scale support of their 
fight against the French.
Chapter 1 traces the growth of Vietnamese resistance activities in Siam from 1885 to 
the outbreak of WWII.4 Focusing on the 1885 to 1925 period, the first part of this 
chapter examines why Vietnamese anticolonialists paid any attention to Siam at all; 
discusses the wide network of resistance bases built by scholar-patriots in Thailand in the 
early 1920s; and identifies the major figures involved in this process and the events, both 
in Vietnam, Siam, and elsewhere, that informed their work. The second section of this 
chapter looks at how the success of this base building process in Siam by 1925 
contributed to Thailand's emergence as an important rear area for Vietnamese 
revolutionary activities in the late 1920s and for the Vietnamese communists in the 1930s. 
A combination of deteriorating resistance conditions in southern China and increased 
French repression in Vietnam also made Thailand's significance all the greater during this 
period. Lastly, this chapter looks at the Vietnamese role in the formation of the Siamese 
Communist Party; the failure of this Party to promote a Siamese revolution; and how its 
attempts to do so negatively effected Vietnamese resistance organisations in Thailand and 
undermined their ability to aid the Vietnamese revolution from the west.
During this period, "Siam" (Prathet Sayam) was the term used to refer to what came to be called 
"Thailand” (Prathet Thai) in 1939. While there are several reasons for this name change, presided over by 
Phibun Songkhram and Wichit Wathakan, it was clearly linked to Bangkok's irredentist designs on 
Indochina in the late 1930s and was part of wider attempt to incorporate "Thai peoples" throughout the 
region into a larger national ("Thai") entity. Because this "Thailand" in 1939 was very different from its 
territorially smaller and less defined 19th century court-centred predecessor known as "Siam," it is 
important to make this distinction in the first chapter. For a discussion of Thai nationalism during this 
period, see: Scot Barm£, 'Luang Wichit Wathakan: Official Nationalism and Political Legitimacy Prior 
to World War H,' (MA Thesis, Australian National University, December 1989), pp. 4-9 and 111-33, as 
well as Preecha Juntanamalaga, Thai or Siam?' Journal o f  the Siam Society, Vol. 36, Nos. 1 and 2, 
(March-June 1988), pp. 69-82. After WWTI, Pridi Phanomyong changed the name of the country back to 
"Siam," only to see it changed yet again upon Phibun's second return to power in the late 1940s. Rather 
than run the risk of confusing the reader by trying to incorporate these changes into the text, I will, from 
chapter 2 (1939), use the term "Thailand." Nevertheless, readers should bear in mind the different 
meanings manifested in these two terms and their usage in Thai history.
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Chapter 2 examines the WWII period and shows how two trends in Thai politics 
during this time contributed to a revitalisation of Vietnamese resistance programmes in 
Thailand. The first was a result of changing international events and internal Thai politics 
at the outset of WWII that saw Phibun Songkhram adopt sympathetic policies toward and 
relax strict regulations of the Vietnamese in Thailand in a bid to gain their support during 
the brief 1940-41 Franco-Thai border war. An even more important development came at 
the end of the Pacific War, when Viet Minh adherents in Thailand cooperated directly 
with their Seri Thai counterparts in anti-Japanese guerilla operations. The wartime link 
between the Viet Minh and the Seri Thai was a major factor explaining the rapid 
expansion of Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand in the postwar period, especially 
as the Viet Minh's Seri Thai allies assumed ranking positions in postwar Thai politics.
Chapter 3 takes up the postwar period by briefly side-tracking from an exclusive 
discussion of Vietnamese resistance projects in Thailand to outline the complex strategic 
environment confronting the newly independent Vietnamese government in the immediate 
wake of WWII. Because French attempts to retake Indochina after the war directly 
informed Vietnamese operations in Thailand, this chapter reviews French diplomatic and 
military actions in Indochina during the last half of 1945 and the events leading up to the 
outbreak of full-scale war in Indochina in December 1946. Chapter 4 examines how the 
Vietnamese responded to these French moves in terms of strengthening their position in 
Thailand through the procurement and transportation of arms back to Vietnam, the 
expansion of military activities from Thailand, the building of closer cooperation with the 
Lao and Cambodian resistance groups operating there, and through increased diplomatic 
activity. In chapter 5, we will explore in greater detail the diplomatic value of Thailand by 
examining the leading role played by Ho Chi Minh’s Bangkok-based officials in the 
creation of the Southeast Asia League.
In our final chapter, we take the story up to the victory of the Chinese Communist in 
1949, an event which effectively ended Thailand's importance to the Vietnamese fight 
against the French. In the first part of this chapter, we refocus on the military and 
strategic significance of Thailand to Vietnam in the period between the outbreak of full- 
scale war in Indochina in December 1946 and the November 1947 military coup d'etat in 
Bangkok. In the second part of this chapter, we see that the November coup changed the 
terms defining the administration of Vietnamese resistance operations in Thailand. To 
deal with these changing circumstances, in mid-1948 the ICP dispatched a special 
representative to Thailand to reorganise the leadership and administration of resistance 
activities there. With full access to bases in southern China still over a year away and 
because Thai suppression of the Vietnamese was not yet that severe, Thailand continued 
to serve as a key diplomatic and military link to the Vietnamese. By 1949, however, a 
combination of the Chinese Communist victory and Phibun's increased suppression of
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the Vietnamese in Thailand saw the priorities of Vietnamese resistance activities on the 
outskirts of Indochina switched abruptly from Thailand to China. While small-scale 
projects continued in Thailand during the 1950s, our story will end with the Chinese 
Communist victory. From that point, Thailand's importance was rendered insignificant 
by comparison to the access the Vietnamese now had to rear bases and aid from Mao 
Zedong's China, a factor which made a major contribution to the Vietnamese defeat of the 
French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.
A Note on Sources
In preparing this study, I have tried to draw upon a large corpus of Vietnamese and, to 
a lesser degree, Thai vernacular sources. During a year-long stay in Vietnam in 1988- 
1989,1 was fortunate enough to interview the former President of the DRV delegation in 
Bangkok (1946-1950), the late Nguyen Dire Qüy; the former head of the People's 
Committee of the South in September 1945 and one of the Viet Minh’s post-WWII 
representatives stationed in Thailand, Tran Van Giau; and Hoang Nhat Tan, a Viet 
Minh adherent who worked in Thailand after WWII and the son of former veteran 
Communist Party member and longtime activist in Thailand, Hoang Vän Hoan. In 
Washington, D.C., I was able to interview a former Viet Minh military official who also 
worked in Thailand in the late 1940s, Trän Vän Dinh.
Because of the time restrictions of this degree, it was impossible to conduct research at 
all the major sites containing documents relating to the subject at hand. Thus, in an effort 
to make the best use of both the large body of untapped Vietnamese published sources 
and the interviews I conducted in Vietnam, I have focused the present work on the 
Vietnamese view of the importance of Thailand during the long struggle against French 
colonialism. A number of important Thai and Lao (in Thai translation) sources have 
helped me to avoid relying too heavily on the Vietnamese side. In addition, I have made 
every attempt to cross-check these sources with published works which have drawn upon 
French archival documents relevant to this thesis topic.5 It must be mentioned that this is 
not a study of Thai-Vietnamese relations, the Vietnamese minority in Thailand, or a 
history of Thai policy towards Vietnamese immigration. I discuss these subjects in the 
text only in so far as they influenced Vietnamese strategic interests in Thailand.
Two works citing extensive French sources include: Geoffrey Charles Gunn, Political Struggles in Laos 
(1930-1954): Vietnamese Communist Power and the Lao Struggle for National Independence,
(Bangkok: Editions Duang Kamol, 1988) and Daniel H6mery, Revolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir 
colonial en Indochine, (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1975). Helpful Lao sources were found in a collection 
of short historical essays, printed in Thai: Suphot Dantrakun, Caw Suphanouvong: Phunam Patiwat
[Prince Souphanouvong: A Revolutionary Leader], (Nonthaburi: Sathaban Withiyasat Sangkhom, 2533 
[1990]).
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Methodologically, there have been some problems in the use of sources which must be 
brought to the reader's attention. In chapter 1, in particular, I have had to rely heavily on 
memoir sources. This can be a danger, for oftentimes those writing their memoirs do so 
decades later and may not always recall the complexity or order of events as they actually 
occurred at the time. In addition, there is a tendency to omit certain events which the 
writer may want to downplay for personal or political reasons and, on the other hand, to 
overstate the historical importance of certain events in which the writer was involved. In 
addition, because the majority of the memoirs cited in chapter 1 were written by 
Vietnamese communist cadres who worked in Thailand for decades, there is a clear 
political bias that must be taken into account. Throughout this study, I have made every 
effort to use these sources critically, cross-checking them wherever possible with other 
accounts. However, the fact remains that this collection of memoirs represents the bulk 
of the source material presently available to historians studying the inner-workings of the 
Vietnamese resistance in Thailand prior to WWII. Both communist and non-communist 
interviewees have helped fill in some gaps which the published accounts did not mention. 
Of particular value has been the recently published memoir outside of Vietnam of Hoang 
Van Hoan, Giot Nir&c trong Bien Ca (Höi K y Cäch Mang), [A Drop in the Ocean (A 
Memoir of Revolution)]. Hoan defected to China in 1979, after serving as a former 
Vietnamese Communist Politburo member, the first DRV ambassador to China, and a 
longtime communist cadre who had held ranking positions in Vietnamese revolutionary 
organisations in Thailand in the late 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Albeit a memoir by a 
former Vietnamese communist leader, Giot Nir&c gives an inside account of Vietnamese 
revolutionary organisations in Thailand that goes far beyond any work published in 
Vietnam discussing the same topic. Thus, this is an important source against which we 
can compare other accounts.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that while the sources available for a discussion of 
Vietnamese resistance work between 1947 and 1949 are sufficient to sketch in the major 
developments in chapter 6, they are inadequate to provide a comprehensive, detailed 
examination of the period. For example, a lack of information has made it very difficult 
to document Vietnam’s relations with the Cambodian and Lao resistance groups operating 
from Thailand between 1947 and 1949. Although Hoang Vän Hoan dedicates a 
considerable portion of his memoir to describing his role in both reorganising Vietnam's 
relations with its Lao and Cambodian counterparts and revamping Vietnamese resistance 
work in Thailand in 1948 and 1949, published Vietnamese communist sources are silent 
when it comes to discussing Vietnamese activities in Thailand during this time. 
Moreover, interviewees were less than forthcoming in discussing breaks which occurred 
within the Vietnamese leadership in Thailand during this period. While I present the 
notable resistance developments that Hoan says occurred in Thailand during this time,
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trying always to cross-check his version with those of interviewees, I am not prepared to 
rely only on Hoan for a complete accounting of this period. However, based upon my 
research and conversations with some of those Vietnamese who worked in Thailand after 
WWII, I will conjecture as to some possible reasons why there was a break within the 
Vietnamese leadership in Thailand in the postwar period.
Thirdly, some may object in certain sections of this work to my reliance on interviews 
of Vietnamese individuals who worked in Thailand during the period under study. This 
is a valid criticism, for it is certainly true that when people recount historical events in 
which they were directly involved to a number of interviewers, their recollections tend to 
be altered each time. However, in an area where very little research has been done, few 
works published, and access to Vietnamese archives limited, the accounts of those 
interviewed provide us with an important source of information heretofore unavailable. 
In addition, I was encouraged by the fact that those I interviewed in Vietnam appeared 
surprised that I was interested in learning more of their activities in Thailand, suggesting, 
perhaps, that they had not been interviewed by others about their work in Thailand until I 
showed up on their doorstep. Because the interviewees provided so much new material 
related to the topic at hand, I have drawn considerably from their accounts in certain parts 
of this work in the hope that this information will at least stimulate further research and 
benefit others working on related topics.
In view of the fact that very little research has been done on this subject, I have been 
acutely aware of the need to provide readers with a solid factual basis. As a result, much 
of this thesis is descriptive, concerned with incorporating a large body of new source 
material into the text that follows. Although I have tried to point out trends and recurrent 
themes wherever possible, I have had to leave the more interesting theoretical questions to 
others. It is my hope that they will be able to draw upon new material found herein and 
elsewhere to provide us with a better understanding of this topic.
Chapter 1
Crossing the Mekong
A hard rain fell as the funeral procession moved slowly along the road toward Ban 
Chik. Five-hundred Vietnamese, a collection of former students, Party cadres, and 
overseas nationals, solemnly accompanied the body of Dang Thüc Hira to the overseas 
Vietnamese cemetery in this remote village, located just outside of the northeastern 
Siamese town of Udon Thani.1 The date was February 1931. Twenty-two years earlier, 
this Vietnamese scholar-patriot had left his native birthplace of Nghe An province to 
work with the famous anticolonialist, Phan Boi Chau. Arriving in Siam in 1909, he 
dedicated the rest of his life to training youths and building bases among the overseas 
Vietnamese communities there. Despite harsh living conditions and ever present French 
spies, HCra saw his work among the Vietnamese in Siam as part of a long-term plan by 
which durable rear bases could be provided for the Vietnamese resistance against the 
French. As he was fond of reminding his students in Siam in the 1920s: "When the 
revolution is being built up, its leadership must be abroad; but when the revolutionary 
movement breaks out, the leadership must be inside the country."2
While Hira never returned to his native homeland, his long work in Siam laid the 
foundation for what became important rear areas for the Vietnamese resistance over the 
next three decades. He played a key part in bringing youths out of Vietnam to study and
The account of Hüa's funeral comes from a collaborative article written by one of his close confidants in 
Siam, Nguyen Tai [who witnessed Hüa's death] and Hoang Trung Thurc, 'Dang Thüc Hüa: Mot Tam 
Gmmg Yeu Nurcrc Ben Bi Bat Khuat' [Dang Thüc Hüa: An Unshakeable Patriotic Model], Nghien Ciru 
Lieh Sir [Historical Research; hereafter, cited as NCLS], No. 76, (July 1965), p. 59 [this article will 
hereafter be referred to as 'Mot Tam Guromg']; Nguyen Tai’s memoir, ’May Chuyen Ve Cu Dang-Thüc - 
Hüa' [Stories about Elder Dang Thüc Hüa], NCLS, No. 79, (November 1965), p. 46 [Hereafter, cited as 
'May Chuyen’]; and a biography of Quynh Anh (Hüa's younger cousin) by Son Tung, Con Ngircn va 
Con Diromg [The People and the Way], (Hanoi: NXBPN, 1976), pp. 129-30. 'May Chuyen' consists of 
five historical recollections recorded by Tai of Hüa's activities in Siam as recounted to him by Hüa in the 
late 1920s. Hoang Trung Thtrc is the pen name of Hoang Nhat Tan, the son of the former veteran 
Communist Party leader and long-time activist in Siam, Hoang Van Hoan. Interview with Hoang Nhat 
Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi. Quynh Anh spent forty years working in Siam, first as an adherent of the early 
Vietnamese anticolonialist movement and later as an ICP member. She actually worked with Hüa from 
1913 until his death in 1931, and thus provides us with an important firsthand account of Vietnamese 
activities in Siam during the early years.
Hüa borrowed this phrase from a Korean revolutionary. An Chung-gen, as cited in 'Mot Tam Guomg,' p. 
59 and Le Manh Trinh, Cuoc Van Dong Ciru Quoc cua Viet Kieu & Thäi-Lan (Gop vao Tai Lieu Lieh Sir 
Cäch Mang Viet-Nam [The National Salvation Activities of the Overseas Vietnamese in Thailand (A 
Contribution to the Historical Research of the Vietnamese Revolution)], (Hanoi: NXBST, 1961), p. 21, 
fn. 1 [Hereafter cited as CVDCQ].
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he provided shelter to resistance leaders coming from China and Vietnam. Crossing the 
Mekong to build upon Hira's work in Siam in the late 1920s were a number of the future 
leaders :>f the Vietnamese revolution, including Ho Chi Minh himself.
In this chapter, Hira will serve as our springboard into a wider discussion of 
Vietnamese anticolonial activities in Siam during the height of French colonialism in 
Indochina (1885-1940). Although HCra's influence over the direction of Vietnamese 
programmes in Siam diminished by the late 1920s, the fruits of his work continued to 
benefit the next generation of resistance leaders working in Siam, the Vietnamese 
communists. Following the break between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists in 
1927, major Vietnamese activists in southern China shifted their attention to the more 
favourable conditions available in northeastern Siam. Over the course of the next three 
years, Siam became an important rearbase and laboratory for Vietnamese revolutionaries, 
with Ho Chf Minh working there and presiding over the formation of the Siamese 
Comminist Party in 1930. As we shall see, this Party had the dual tasks of promoting a 
revolution among the Siamese masses and aiding the Vietnamese resistance from bases 
situated along the Siamese side of the Mekong River. In many respects, the communists 
had Hiri to thank for their ability to assist the Vietnamese revolution from Siam during 
the turbulent years of the early 1930s, for the bases from which they worked were the 
same ores Hira had put together a decade earlier.
Part I: Siam and the Vietnamese Anticolonial Movement
1.1. Vietnamese Immigration to Siam
If Hira were to tell us why he dedicated so much of his life to working in Siam, he 
would probably begin with a discussion of Siam's large overseas Vietnamese population. 
Vietnamese immigrants first began arriving in Siam in large numbers during the late 18th 
century in order to escape social and political dislocation in Vietnam. The earliest wave, 
often referred to by the Siamese as the "old Vietnamese," came at the end of the 18th 
century and the beginning of the 19th. The majority were southerners and Catholics 
who, in the midst of civil unrest during the Tay San rebellion (1771-1802), followed or 
were forcibly moved by Nguyen Änh to Siam where Rama I (r. 1782-1809) allowed 
them to live in Lopburi and areas which now constitute the greater Bangkok metropolitan 
area, such as Samsen and Bangpho.3 In 1802, with the help of troops supplied by Rama 
I, Nguyen Änh broke the Tay-son leaders' hold on Vietnam, unified the country, and 
proclaimed himself Emperor of Vietnam under the title of Gia Long (r. 1802-1820).
3 CVDCQ, p. 14; Dao Trinh Nhät, Liromg Ngoc Quyen vä Cupc Kh&i Nghla Thäi-Nguyen 1917 [Lircmg 
Ngoc Quyen and the Thai Nguyen Uprising of 1917], (Saigon, NXB Tan Viet, 1957), pp. 4 1 4 2  and 'Mot 
Tim Gucmg,' p. 54.
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While Siamese troops went to Vietnam on Anh's behalf, a large number of Änh’s 
Vietnamese troops who had accompanied him to Siam earlier preferred to remain there in 
the service of the Siamese King.4 Other Vietnamese immigrants stayed to take up jobs as 
traders, doctors, lawyers, bureaucrats, and many married Siamese.5 Eventually, through 
inter-marriage and assimilation, the sons and daughters of these immigrants lost much of 
their identification with what it meant to be Vietnamese, preferring instead to adopt the 
local customs and languages prevalent in the areas in which they resided in Siam.6
With Vietnam unified, another group of Vietnamese newcomers trickled into Siamese 
territories during the mid-19th century as the Siamese and Vietnamese courts resumed 
their long-standing rivalry for influence over Cambodia. Between the 1830s and 1850s, 
these arrivals included prisoners-of-war captured by Siamese armies in Cambodia and 
southern Vietnam.7 Joining this group were refugees who fled anti-Christian 
persecutions in Vietnam under Emperors Minh Mang (r. 1820-1841), Thieu Tri (r. 
1841-1847), and Tu Due (r. 1848-1883). Led by French priests more often than not, 
these Vietnamese were concentrated in southeastern coastal towns, mainly Trat and 
Chanthaburi.8 Over time, some families made their way into central Siam, locating along 
the Chao Phraya river in towns such as Paknampho (Nakhon Sawan).9
A larger intake of Vietnamese occurred because of stipulations in the 1893 Franco- 
Siamese Treaty. In the early 1890s, the French were working to force King 
Chulalongkorn (r. 1868-1910) to part with his claims over Cambodian and Lao 
territories. The Siamese, fearing a fate similar to Vietnam's, seriously considered 
fighting the French for control of the territories, but in the end did not have the 
wherewithal to undertake such action. Following a naval clash with the French at the
Bui Quang Tung, 'Contribution a l'etude des colonies vietnamieimes en Thailand,' France-Asie, No. 148, 
(1958), p. 448, fh. 6; Peter A. Poole, The Vietnamese in Thailand: A Historical Perspective, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 24; and May Chuyen, p. 30. During the 19th century, effective 
Siamese militia units were filled with men of non-Siamese origin, mostly Vietnamese, Cambodians, 
Mons and Lao, who usually were prisoners of war or volunteer immigrants who had offered their services 
to the king. See: Noel Alfred Battye, The Military, Government and Society in Siam, 1868-1910:
Politics and Military Reform during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn,' (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, 
1974), p. 20.
'Mot Tam Giromg,' p. 54; CVDCQ, p. 14; and Tung Lam, Cuoc Don Cäch Mang Curomg De [The 
Revolutionary Life of Ctrcmg De], (Saigon: Tön That Le, 1957), p. 28.
M ot Tam Gwmg,' p. 54 and Tung Lam, op. c it, pp. 26 and 28. It would not be entirely correct to say 
that these Vietnamese learned Siamese. There were a variety of ethnic groups living in the frontier 
regions of northeastern Siam during this period, with Lao and Khmer being two languages widely 
spoken besides Siamese.
See: Flood op. c it , p. 32; Bui Quang Tung, op. c it, p. 440; and Ian Hodges, The Testimonies of 
Vietnamese Prisoners in the Third Reign: An Essay in Thai Historiography,' (Honours Thesis,
Australian National University, 1987).
Flood, op. cit., p. 32; Dao Trinh Nhat, Luomg Ngoc Quyen, p. 42; CVDCQ, p. 14; 'Mot Tam Gircmg,' p. 
54; Siam, (Hanoi: L'Eveil Economique de L'Indochine, ndc.), p. 44 and Charles Mayniard, Le second 
empire en Indo-chine, (siam-cambodge-annam): L'ouverture de Siam au commerce et la convention du 
Cambodge, (Paris: Societe D'Editions Scientifiques, 1891), pp. 291-92 and 358-59.
Flood, op. cit., p. 32 and Georges Bourdarel, trans., Memoires de Phan Boi Chau,' France-Asie, Vol. 22, 
Nos. 3 4 , (1968), p. 117, fn. 120. This is a French translation of Phan Böi Chau's Men Bieu [Chronicles], 
the quoc ngfr version.
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mouth of the Chao Phraya River in 1893 (more commonly referred to as the "Paknam 
Incident"), the court acquiesced to certain French territorial demands. Under the terms of 
the October 1893 Franco-Siamese Treaty, the court relinquished claims to most of Laos 
east of the Mekong River. About a decade later, the Lao enclaves of Luang Prabang and 
Pakse were turned over to the French in another treaty, followed by yet a third treaty in 
1907 in which claims to the rice-rich provinces of Battambang, Siemreap, and Sisiphon 
in Cambodia were forfeited to the French. As for Vietnamese immigration to Siam, the 
1893 treaty allowed the French to occupy the southeastern Siamese port town of 
Chanthaburi pending implementation of the treaty. During the French administration of 
this town, a large number of Vietnamese were brought in to fill bureaucratic positions. 
After Chanthaburi was returned to the Siamese in 1903, many of these Vietnamese chose 
to remain there with the permission of Siamese authorities. In another clause of the 1893 
treaty, Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodians were given the status of "French subjects," and 
thus were able to travel freely within twenty-five kilometres of the Siamese border. 
Changes were also made to allow these individuals to reside and work in Siam, with the 
only requirement being a poll tax of four baht each year. Because of these privileges and 
the better employment opportunities sometimes available in Siam, a large, though 
undetermined, number of Vietnamese from Laos crossed into northeast Siam at the turn 
of the century.10
Another related wave of immigration to Siam occurred in response to the French 
colonial expansion into Vietnam. According to Vietnamese sources, this group consisted 
of several thousand families, located mostly in the northeastern provinces of Nong Khai, 
Nakhon Phanom, Udon Thani, Sakhon Nakhon, and Ubon Ratchathani.11 Many of 
these families, as we shall see, were led from northern central Vietnam to Siam by 
Vietnamese anticolonialists who failed to block French military advances.12 The majority 
were from Nghe-Tlnh provinces and settled either in the Bangkok area or in the 
northeast at the turn of the century.13 Of those in the northeast, many were farmers who 
supplied urban centres throughout the region with vegetables and pork. Others became 
barbers, carpenters, bricklayers, or construction workers. Some of the earliest roads 
linking districts in northeast Siam were built partly by the hands of overseas 
Vietnamese.14 Added to this group were those who continued to be attracted to French- 
led Catholic communities in northeastern Siam, such as Tha Hae, a small village near the 
Mekong River, and Tha Bo, another village with a large Vietnamese population across
to
it
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Battye, op. cit, p. 365; CVDCQ, pp. 14-15; and ’Mot Tam Giromg,' p. 54. During this time, one Siamese 
Baht was equivalent to seven or eight French Indochinese piastres.
'May Chuyen,' p. 30 and 'Mot Tam Girorng,' p. 54.
Dao Trinh Nhät, Liromg Ngoc Quyen, p. 42 and May Chuyen,' p. 30.
Tung Lam, op. cit., p. 26 and 'May Chuyen,' p. 30. According to Prince Cirirng De, there were around 
fifteen thousand Vietnamese living in the Bangkok area. See: Tung Läm, op. cit, p. 28. I have been 
unable to confirm this, but it seems much too high a number.
CVDCQ, p. 15 and 'Mot Tam Gurorng,' p. 54.
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from Vientiane.15 By the outbreak of WWII, the number of Vietnamese living in Siam 
numbered somewhere between twenty to thirty thousand, with the majority concentrated 
in the northeast.16
1.2. The Can Vtromg Movement and Siam
The brittle state of Vietnamese society and politics during the 19th century left Vietnam 
vulnerable to superior French firepower. Encouraged by dreams of wealth in southern 
China and given a pretext for intervention because of Hue's persecutions of French 
Catholic missionaries, the French began to seize territory in Vietnam in the 1850s, 
capturing Saigon in 1859 and establishing protectorates in southern Vietnam and 
Cambodia by 1863. By 1885, the French had established a protectorate over all of 
Vietnam and reached an agreement with China whereby the Ch'ing court agreed to end its 
tributary relationship with Vietnam, pull its troops out of northern Vietnam, and end its 
support of the Vietnamese resistance. The Vietnamese monarchy was subsequently 
subordinated to a French governor-general, colonial administration of Vietnam was 
expanded, and monopolies in salt, alcohol, and opium were soon implemented.
With the Chinese out of the way, the French turned their attention to destroying 
Vietnamese resistance. Attacks were launched in northern Vietnam and in 1885 the 
young emperor, Ham Nghi, fled to the countryside where a number of scholar-patriots 
were gathering to fight the French. In that same year, the Can Vtrcyng (Save the King) 
Edict was proclaimed, calling for resistance against the French and appealing to scholars, 
in particular, to lead this fight.17 Some Vietnamese mandarins chose collaboration, while 
others resigned their positions in the bureaucracy and returned to their native villages. 
Yet there were those who resisted. And of these many took to mountainous regions in 
northern central Vietnam, setting up bases in remote jungle areas, particularly in western 
Nghe-Tinh provinces. It was from this area, a little over 100 kilometres from the present 
day northeastern Thai border, that early resistance fighters first began to take note of the 
possible importance of Siam in the struggle against the French.
While many of these scholars had grown up in an era when the court in Hue viewed 
its Siamese counterpart as an adversary vying for influence over Cambodia and Laos, the 
French colonisation of what became known as "Indochina" fundamentally changed the 
pre-colonial relationship between these two. Under French rule, Vietnam ceased to be a 
regional power competing with the Siamese court; instead, the French now posed the
Poole, op. cit, p. 28; CVDCQ, pp. 14-15; 'Mot Tam Guxmg,’ p. 54; and Battye, op. cit., p. 365.
Poole, op. cit, p. 30 and 'May Chuyen,’ p. 30. Nguyen Tai says that Hvra told him in the late 1920s that in 
reality the Vietnamese population in Siam did not reach thirty thousand. See: 'May Chuyen,' p. 30.
Marr, op. cit, pp. 50-51. Marr’s book, together with Tran Vän Giau, Su Phät Then cua Tir Tu6mg & Viet 
Nam tir The Ky XIX den Cach Mang Thing Tam, Tap I, II [The Development of Ideology in Vietnam 
from the 19th Century to the August Revolution, Volumes I and II], (Hanoi: NXBKHXH, 1975), provide 
two detailed historical accounts of Vietnamese anticolonialism during this period.
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unprecedented threat to Bangkok. As Vietnamese scholar-patriots were launching hit- 
and-run attacks on colonial troops in the early 1890s, the French were moving westward 
into Siamese vassals, pressuring Bangkok to forfeit its claims to these territories. In the 
end, by taking vast territories claimed by the Siamese monarchy in Laos and Cambodia at 
the turn of the century, the French left Siamese leaders bitter and, as we shall see, they 
unwittingly fostered a new view of the Vietnamese resistance movement on the part of 
Siamese elites that would persist well into the 20th century.
Although it is true that the first generation of Vietnamese anticolonialists, those of the 
Can Virong movement, never really developed strong bases in or garnered much support 
from Siam, they nevertheless recognised that Siamese leaders could be possible allies and 
arms suppliers and that the loose nature of Siam's eastern frontier could act as a potential 
sanctuary from French attacks. The scholar-patriot, Phan Dinh Phting (1847-1896), 
was one of the first Vietnamese anticolonial leaders to single out the importance of Siam 
as a possible source of support against the French. A native of Ha Tinh province and a 
leading figure in the Can Vircmg movement, Phting left the Nguyln court in the 1880s 
to fight the French out of mountain bases in Nghe-Tinh. However, Phung quickly 
realised that to engage the French, weapons and equipment had to be procured, a factor 
which forced the Can Vircmg movement's leaders to look abroad for assistance. With 
the French in control of most of Indochina, Phung's main choices came down to the two 
peripheral countries outside French colonial rule: China and Siam. No doubt many 
scholar-patriot leaders felt more at home in the Confucian world of China than in the more 
alien, Buddhist-Indie culture of Siam. Nonetheless, as Phung explained to his 
followers, because of China's own problems with the West, the Vietnamese could no 
longer rely on the Ch'ing court for support. Remembering a sister of Gia Long who had 
married Rama I, he suggested that the Siamese court might be an alternative source of 
aid .18
To this end, Phung entrusted reliable cadres to make the journey to Siam to negotiate 
the purchase of weapons and equipment.19 A secret route, linking Can Vircmg bases in 
Nghe-Tlnh to Siam via Laos, was established to take these arms back to Vietnam.20
Dao Trinh Nhät, Phan Dinh Phung: Nhä Länh Dao 10 Näm Khäng Chien (1886-1895) b  Nghe-Tinh 
[Phan Dinh Phüng: A Leader in the 10 Year Resistance (1886-1895) in Nghe-Tinh], (4th ed.; Saigon: 
TVXB, 1957), pp. 74-75 and p. 75, fn. 1.
Ibid., pp. 89, 134, and 159; 'Mot Tarn Gi/cmg, p. 59; and Pham Vän Sonn, Viet-Nam Cäch Mang Can Su  
(1885-1914) [The History of the Modem Vietnamese Revolution (1885-1914)], (Saigon: Nhä Sach Khai- 
Tri, 1963), p. 147.
Dao Trinh Nhät, Phan Dinh Phüng, pp. 129 and 134; Sonn Tiing, op. cit., p. 27; and Trän Huy Lieu, Vän 
Tao, and Nguyen Khäc Dam. Tai Lieu Tham Khäo Lieh Sir Cäch Mang Can Dai Viet Nam, K hbi Nghia 
Yen-The Khcri Nghia cua Cäc Dan Toe Mien Nüi, Tap I  [Research Materials on the History of the 
Modem Vietnamese Revolution: The Yen The Uprising and Those of the Upland Minorities, Volume I], 
(4th edition; Hanoi: NXBVSD, 1957), p. 127. One known route to Siam originated from the mountains 
of Vu Quang in northwestern Vietnam. David Marr has shown that during this period a Vietnamese 
command headquarters was in operation in Vu Quang. Marr, op. c it, p. 64. This link to Siam may have 
been formed around 1888, for Quynh Anh says that her father, a scholar who took up arms against the
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Although Phüng reportedly spent some time in Siam himself,21 it seems that a young 
woman by the name of Co Tam was one of his chief arms buyers in Siam. Tam did 
much of her buying in Tha Uthen (a district in the present day northeastern province of 
Nakhon Phanom) which soon became a refuge for patriots fleeing Vietnam during this 
early period of the resistance. In the end, though, it appears that the quantity of arms 
provided by Tam was limited to a total of four or five shipments which ended when she 
mysteriously disappeared in the Lao jungle.22
Siamese military forces also lent a hand to Can Vtrong forces working out of the 
mountainous regions of northwestern Vietnam, such as Htrcmg Scm, Vu Quang, and 
Dien Bien Phü, in the late 1880s. According to one Vietnamese source, during armed 
altercations with French units around Htrong Son in 1885 and 1886, Phung's adherents 
were "cooperating and coordinating their activities closely" with Siamese military forces 
against the French.23 It will be remembered that the Siamese court still considered most 
of present day Laos and parts of western Cambodia to be under its suzerainty prior to 
October 1893. A recent study has shown that King Chulalongkom, worried about 
French designs on Black Tai areas in northwestern Tonkin, dispatched a military 
expedition to the area between 1885 and 1887 to bring order to his Lao tributaries and 
among the Tai-speaking peoples in Sipsongchuthai. In late 1885, this Siamese military 
force crossed the present day border between Laos and northwestern Vietnam into the 
plains of Dien Bien Phu as the French were moving towards Son La and Lai Chau 24 
Siamese military commanders were thus in a position to contact Can Virong leaders who 
had set up base in nearby areas and shared the Siamese desire to prevent French colonial 
expansion westward. In one instance, a Siamese military contingent and Phung's forces 
were reported to have engaged French forces at the Ai Lao (Lao) pass and Quy Hop in 
northwestern Tonkin, as well as to have driven an undetermined French force out of the 
present day northeastern Thai border town of Khemmarat.25 In another instance, a 
Vietnamese resistance leader drew upon the anti-French views of Siamese General Phaya 
Suris, stationed in the Dien Bien Phü area, to gain assistance against the French.26 This 
cooperation was further augmented by the Siamese military's willingness to help Can
21
22
23
24
25
26
French, was involved in establishing secret routes to Siam in the northwest at this time. See: Son Tung, 
op. cit., pp. 26-27.
Flood, op. c it , p. 32.
Dao Trinh Nhat, Phan Dinh Phimg, pp. 168-70. See also: Marr, op. c it, pp. 62 and 65.
CVDCQ, p. 9 and Dao Trinh Nhat, Phan Dinh Phimg, p. 167.
Andrew D.W. Forbes, The Struggle for Hegemony in Late Nineteenth Century Laos: The Third Siamese 
Military Expedition to the North-East (1885-87),' (Proceedings of the International Conference of Thai 
Studies, The Australian National University, 3-6 July 1987), pp. 2, 5, and 11 and Pham Van Son, op. c it,
p. 211.
CVDCQ, p. 9. Pham Van Son shows that Siamese and French forces clashed in Quy Hcrp, the Ai Lao 
Pass, and Khemmarat between 1887 and 1893. See: Pham Van Son, op. c it, pp. 326-29. Concerning 
Siamese-Vietnamese cooperation against the French in Khemmarat, Le Manh Trinh may be referring to 
the clash between the Siamese and French in this area in June 1893. See: Battye, op. c it, p. 352.
Pham Van Son, op. c it, pp. 211, 321, and 327. The Vietnamese anticolonialist whom the Siamese aided 
was Dieu Van Tri.
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Vircmg leaders in the matter of purchasing arms.27 When Phiing's death in 1896 
brought an effective end to the Can Vircmg movement, Siam was seen as a natural 
sanctuary for a number of his followers who had been overpowered by the French.28
1.3. Phan Boi Chau Travels to Siam (1908-1911)
Siam continued to figure in the resistance activities of the next generation of 
anticolonial leaders. Chief among these was Phan Boi Chau (1867-1940). A native of 
Nghe-An province, Chau grew up in the midst of the French colonisation of Vietnam and 
saw the Can Viromg movement crushed. Steeped in a classical Confucian education, 
Chau, perhaps more than any other figure of his time, realised that the survival of 
Vietnam itself was at stake under the French.
In 1904, Chau and other anti-colonialists formed the Duy Tan Hoi (Reformation 
Association). Like the Can Vircmg movement before it, this organisation sought to re­
establish Vietnam's independence and drive out the French. Chau was appointed to 
travel abroad to solicit foreign assistance. Impressed by Japan's growing military and 
economic might, Chau went there to seek aid for the resistance movement against the 
French. While the Japanese allowed Vietnamese students to study there, after a short 
time it became clear that Japan's relations with France took precedence over supporting 
the Vietnamese resistance. In 1909, two years after Japan recognised France’s "territorial 
rights" in Asia, Chau and many of his students were forced to leave Japan. In the face of 
deportation, Chau wrote in his memoir decades later that he "had to focus on two 
countries: China and Siam," the same two countries Phan Dinh Phiing had considered 
a generation earlier in terms of possible sources of foreign assistance.29
Encouraging Chau's interest in Siam were King Chulalongkom's travels to Europe 
and his personal interest in Siamese-Vietnamese relations, which, Chau wrote, 
Chulalongkom "considered to be as close as lips and teeth."30 In mid-1908, shortly after 
the Siamese court had been forced by the French to relinquish claims to Cambodian 
territories, Chau arrived in Bangkok for the first time. With the help of a Japanese legal 
adviser to the Siamese government, a meeting was arranged between Chau and 
Chulalongkom, who was reported to have been happy to meet the scholar-patriot. Chau 
claims in his memoir that he subsequently received support from ranking officials in the
CVDCQ, p. 9. The quantity o f arms donated or sold to the Vietnamese resistance remains unknown, but 
it was probably limited.
Some o f those to go into exile in Siam were: De Dat, Linh Muc, and Ngo Quäng (Than Son). See: 
Pham Van Scm, op. cit, p. 167; 'Mot Tam Guxmg,' p. 59; Scm Tung, op. cit, p. 55; and CVDCQ, p. 9. 
Phan Boi Chau, Men Bieu, tire 'Tir Phe Phan" [A Chronicle or "A Self-Criticism"], Translated into 
Vietnamese from Chinese by Ton Quang Phiet and Pham Trong Diem, (Hanoi: NXBVSD, 1957), p. 124 
for the quote [Hereafter, cited as NB]. Shortly after Chau’s group was required to leave Japan, the Duy 
Tan identified six areas which deserved further attention. Listed among these was the need to make 
contact with the Siamese government. NB, p. 99.
NB, p. 125.30
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the backing of a Siamese prince (an uncle of the 
King) who agreed to Chau's proposal allowing for his students from Japan to reside in 
Siam.31 Although the arrival of the Vietnamese students in Siam was temporarily delayed 
by developments in Vietnam and Chau's return to Hong Kong, Chau says that his trip 
"marked the beginning of contact with Siam."32
In March 1909, Dang Thüc HCra arrived in Hong Kong with 2,500 piastres for Chau 
and informed him of armed uprisings in Vietnam and the need for more weapons if these 
efforts were to be effective.33 Chau sent Hira and another anticolonialist, Dang Tir 
Kinh, to Japan to buy arms. These two men purchased rifles and brought them back to 
Hong Kong for storage until a way could be determined to transport them back to 
Vietnam. Trying the China route first, Chau found the shipping costs charged by 
Chinese merchants prohibitive, and thus left with Hira in m id-1909 bound for Siam. 
Back in Bangkok after a brief stopover in Singapore in June, Chau held discussions with 
the King's uncle, who agreed to provide a boat to Chau to transport the Hong Kong- 
based weapons back to Vietnam. However, this plan fell through when the Siamese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs "strongly opposed" this support on the grounds that it would 
disrupt Franco-Siamese relations.34 Chau returned to Hong Kong empty handed, 
donated the arms to Sun Yat-sen's representatives, and travelled back to Bangkok in 
September 1910.35
In Bangkok for the third time, Chau met with the King's uncle again, explaining the 
situation in Vietnam and expressing the hope that the "Siamese government would 
secretly support" the Vietnamese resistance.36 The Prince reportedly agreed to this and, 
to this end, put Chau in touch with his brother, a Major General in the Siamese infantry. 
According to Chau's account, the general agreed to his plan for the formation of a 
farming camp which would be self-sustaining and would provide a refuge to those 
students deported from Japan. The general also approved a plan whereby an appointed 
Vietnamese representative would be allotted funds by the Siamese of five baht per 
month.37 The government arranged for Chau and his supporters to reside in Ban Tham, 
a village in a fertile agricultural area apparently located on the Menam River in central
3 1 According to Chau, the decision to allow the Vietnamese to reside in Siam was done according to the 
wishes of Chulalongkom. See: NB, p. 125. French historian, Georges Bourdarel, has suggested that the 
uncle of the King to whom Chau is referring may have been Bhanurangsri (1860-1928), who was then 
Minister of Defence. Georges Bourdarel, op. cit., p. 118, fh.
32  N B ,p . 126.
33 Mot Tam Giromg,' p. 53 and NB, pp. 126-28.
34 NB, p. 128. This was most probably Prince Devawongse [Dewawong], the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
According to Curcmg De, the Siamese court agreed to transport the Vietnamese arms to Vietnam under 
the misconception that Japan was aiding the Vietnamese resistance. When Bangkok learned that the 
Japanese had actually deported Chau, they reversed their decision. The Siamese felt that they could not 
support the Vietnamese unless the Japanese did. Tung Läm, op. cit., p. 45.
33 NB, pp. 127-28 and 135-36. See also: 'Mot Tam Guang,' p. 53.
36 N B ,p . 136.
37 Ibid., pp. 136-37.
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Siam, a six day walk from Bangkok. The General also supplied the Vietnamese with the 
necessary farming tools to get started, while Siamese regional authorities gave Chau's 
group written permission to cultivate the land.38 In the meantime, Chau continued to ship 
small arms caches to Vietnam from Siam.39
Ban Tham was a unique experiment. For one of the first times, Vietnamese scholars 
were engaged in the difficult work of tilling the land, planting crops, and making a living 
by the fruits of their own labour, no different from the surrounding peasant communities. 
By 1911, approximately fifty Japanese-deported Vietnamese students were planting 
paddy in Ban Tham.40 Joining them were older patriots, remnants of the Phan Dinh 
Phiing era. Farming camps were set up, whereby members worked together in the 
planting and harvesting of crops and shared profits derived from their work. The Ban 
Tham community also raised its own pigs, chickens, and built its own homes. In certain 
ways, Ban Tham was not only a sanctuary for intrepid anticolonialists, but it also served 
as a rudimentary re-training camp, bringing Confucian-trained scholars into closer contact 
with the living conditions of the common peasant.41
For Chau, the "Ban Tham experience" also offered him the chance to reflect on the 
previous decade and to put pen to paper. It was in Siam that he made some of his first 
efforts to employ popular Vietnamese literary forms rather than the elite Chinese ones 
which were largely inaccessible to the Vietnamese common man. While Chau did not 
write in quoc ngür (the romanised Vietnamese script), he did experiment with such 
Viemamese styles as tuong (Vietnamese drama), chbo (traditional operetta), and thcr bon 
chir (a Vietnamese poetic form). Chau also wrote three important poems in Siam—  
namely, Ca A i  Doan (Love of Community Ballad), Ca A i  Chung (Love of Race 
Ballad), and Ca A i  Quoc (Patriotic Ballad). These poems were translated into quoc
Sources for the discussion of Ban Tham come from the following: CVDCQ, p. 19; NB, pp. 135-40; 'Mot 
Tam Gircmg,' p. 53; and Le Trong Khänh and Dang Huy Van, 'Cuoc Khcri Nghla Cua Viet Nam Quang 
Phuc Hoi b  Mien Nam Trung Bo Näm 1916' [The Uprising of the Vietnamese Restoration Association in 
Southern Central Vietnam in 1916], NCLS, No. 22, (January 1961), p. 34, fh. 4. The main leaders at Ban 
Tham were: Dang Tu Kinh, Ho Vlnh Long, Le Hong Chung, Ngö Qu&ng (Than Sonn), and Dang
Thüc HCra. Dang Tvr Kinh was the uncle of the scholar-patriot, Dang Thai Than. I have been unable to 
locate Ban Tham on any map. Considering (as we shall see) that new camps were soon opened in 
Paknampho and Ban Dong, Ban Tham was possibly located somewhere nearby in Nakhon Sawan or 
Phichit provinces.
NB, p. 113. At this time, Siam was one of the best ways of getting arms to patriots in Nghe-Tlnh 
provinces. See: Tung Läm, op. c it , p. 45.
Mot Tam Guromg,' p. 53. In 1910, Prince Curbng De arrived in Siam where he resided for a few months. 
Unlike the others, he stayed in the Bangkok area with a wealthy overseas Vietnamese named Men La 
and reportedly had many contacts within the Siamese royal family. For more details, see: Tung Läm, op. 
cit., pp. 28 and 4 6 4 8  and NB, p. 171, fh. 2.
Due to often harsh living conditions, a number of these students died from malaria or dysentery while in 
Siam. For more details, see: Dang Doan BSng [compiler], Viet Nam Nghia Liet Sir [An Historical List 
of Vietnamese Martyers], trans. from Chinese to Vietnamese by Ton Quang Phiet, (Hanoi: NXBVH,
1959 and 1972 editions), pp. 179 and 183 of the 1959 edition.
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ngir, put to music, and disseminated widely among the Vietnamese communities in Siam 
for the next decade.42
It is interesting to note that Siam seems to have remained a reference point for Chau in 
one of his subsequent writings. In a 1918 short story, entitled Chan Tirang Quän Tai 
Sinh Sinh [The True Nature of the Regenerating Army], Chau describes a dream in 
which he meets the King of Hell. In his audience with the King, Chau explains that he is 
a wanderer, without a name, known only as he "who knows how to cry." After listening 
to the wanderer's story, the King asks him to observe the judgement he is about to make 
on those who have committed sins against their nation and people. As the King prepares 
to pass the sentences, one of the convicted asks that he be banished to Siam for three 
hundred years to track elephants. The King of Hell answered in a thundering voice that 
Siam is a close friend and a people of the same race. Banishment there, he insists, would 
only be a favour.43
In 1912, learning of the success of the Chinese revolution, Chau left Siam for China in 
the hope of gaining support for the Vietnamese resistance movement. In a meeting in 
Canton during this year the Duy Tan was disbanded in favour of creation of a new 
republican organisation, known as the Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi (Vietnam Restoration 
Association). This organisation, modelled on the Chinese Kuomingtang and administered 
by Chau, called for expulsion of the French and the formation of a democratic republic. 
One of Chau's associates, Tran Huu Luc (Nguyen Thuc Ducmg), was sent to Siam to 
set up a subsidiary branch, as well as to recruit Vietnamese emigres into the Quang Phuc 
army and to raise funds to finance the force. More of a militant than an organiser, Luc 
advocated resuming armed action against the French and also suggested the formation of 
frontier posts along the Sino-Vietnamese and Lao-Vietnamese frontiers.44 
Foreshadowing things to follow, in 1912 Luc also began work in Siam along the 
northeastern frontier, creating what he referred to as the "Western Road" (Dircrng 
Tay)A5 He argued that in this area there must be people to build rear bases and travel to 
Vietnam to work. Also encouraging this orientation toward Siam was monetary 
assistance which Luc and his colleagues received from the German and Austrian 
legations in Bangkok at the outbreak of WWI.46 With this money, the Vietnamese could
42  CVDCQ, pp. 87-88 and Phan Böi Chau, Nguc Trung Thir [Prison Notes], Trans, by Dao Trinh Nhat, 
(Saigon: Tan Viet Xuat Ban, 1950), p. 66. See Appendix I for a translation of Ca Ai Doan. Copies of 
Chau's works written in Siam were also smuggled back to Vietnam. See, for example, Phan Böi Chau, 
Tubng Tnmg N& Vwcmg/Truyen Pham Hong Thai [Drama of the Trung Monarch/Story of Pham Hong 
Thai], (Hanoi: NXBVH, 1967).'
43 Phan Böi Chau, Chan Tirfrng Quin Tai Sinh Sinh [The True Nature of the Regenerating Army], trans. 
from Chinese into Vietnamese by Chutmg Thau, (Hanoi: NXBVH, 1968), p. 71.
4 4  NB, pp. 110-11; 'Mot Tam Giromg,' p. 55; CVDCQ, p. 18; and Dang Dban Bang (1959 edition), op. cit, 
pp. 140-41.
43 Dang Dban Bang (1959 edition), op. cit, p. 141.
4 ^  CVDCQ, p. 19 and Marr, op. cit., p. 229. Writing from prison in China in 1915, Phan Böi Chäu was in 
contact with Dang Tür Kinh in Siam. With a letter of introduction to Chau’s earlier connexion to the 
Prince in the Siamese royal family, Chäu dispatched a special envoy, Mai Son, to Siam to meet with the
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purchase arms to send back to Vietnam via northeast Siam. In the end, though, Luc's 
work in Siam yielded few results.47 In 1915, he was arrested by Siamese authorities in 
the northeast through the assistance of a certain Vietnamese spy named Hung.48 And 
although Luc and a surprisingly large number of other anticolonialists worked in Siam at 
the turn of the century, hardly any attempted to build durable bases among the large 
overseas Vietnamese population there.49
1.4. Däng Thuc Hfra's Work in Siam
The task of working among Vietnamese nationals was left to Dang Thuc Hua, 
undoubtedly the most important individual Chau left behind to work in Siam. Bom to a 
scholarly family in Nghe-An in 1870, Hua came of age during the French conquest of 
Vietnam. Like Chau, these events had a profound impact on him. His grandfather, a 
counsellor to the court in Hue, committed suicide upon the French occupation of the city, 
while his father resigned his post in the civil service and turned in his seals as the young 
Hua watched from his side.50
In 1900, Hua passed his bachelor degree (tu täi), but refused to join the bureaucracy. 
Instead, he contacted scholar-patriots working in Nghe-Tlnh and garnered funds to help 
Phan Boi Chau finance students studying in Japan. In 1908, a fierce French crack­
down on Vietnamese resistance activities led Hua to leave Vietnam to begin a 
revolutionary life abroad. With 2,500 piastres he left for Hong Kong to make contact 
with Chau and buy weapons for the resistance. As we have already noted, in 1909 Hua 
met Chau in Hong Kong, and from there the two travelled to Siam where Hua (taking the 
name Tu Ngo) took part in creating the Ban Tham camp.
Prior to the outbreak of WWI, Hua began travelling throughout Siam in an effort to 
expand anticolonial work among Vietnamese communities. The precise reasons leading 
him to pay more attention to working among the Vietnamese Emigre communities are not 
clear. It is possible that this interest may have developed during his work at Ban Tham.
Prince concerning the need to contact diplomats in the Austrian and German Legations in Bangkok. 
The Prince arranged a meeting between Kinh and Son and Austrian and German representatives, who 
provided some "unofficial" funds to Chau's adherents to buy arms. See: NB, pp. 171-72.
47  NB, pp. I l l  and 161; Dang Doan Bang [1959 edition], op. cit, pp. 138 and 14041 and Dang Doan 
Bang, [1972 edition], op. cit, p. 131.
48  NB, p. I l l  and Dang Doan Bäng [1959 edition], op. cit., pp. 3 and 141. Hung was most probably a 
reference to Do Hung, a spy working in the French legation in Siam whom we shall meet again. Lure 
was later executed by the French.
49  At the turn of the century, two scholar-patriots, Tang Bat Ho and Nguyen Dürc Hau, sent arms back to 
Vietnam and tried, unsuccessfully, to develop a resistance plan based on the overseas Vietnamese in 
Siam. See: Däng Doan Bang [1972 edition], op. cit, p. 26 and 'Mot Tam Girong,' p. 53. A sample of 
some o f the other notable anticolonialists who were present in Siam for varying periods of time included: 
Däng Doan Bang, Liru Vinh Phuc, Nguyen Thanh Hien, Nguyen Due Cong (Bäu Thu), Phan Lai 
Luomg, Nguyen Quynh Läm, Dinh Doän Te, Phan Bä Ngoc, Pham Dircmg Nhän, Däng Höru Quy, Läm 
Dure Mau, and Liromg Lap Nham. See: Däng Doan Bäng [1972 edition], op. cit, pp. 34, 103, 128, 151, 
155, 17Ö, 180, 182-83, and 185 and Dao Trinh Nhat, Luong Ngoc Quyen,, pp. 4149 .
50  'Mot Tam Gircmg,' p. 52.
Crossing the Mekong 21
Whatever the case, Hira took the initiative in investigating Vietnamese living conditions, 
talking with families, and gaining a better understanding of their needs and thinking. 
Such work soon earned him the name Co Di, which can roughly be translated as "man on 
the move."51 However, his activities also attracted the attention of Siamese regional 
authorities who arrested him in the northeast shortly after Chau left for China. On 
learning of Htra's imprisonment in Bangkok, French authorities immediately demanded 
his transfer to Indochina. Luckily, through contacts among Vietnamese living in 
Bangkok, Htra was able to gain the intervention of an un-named Siamese official of royal 
blood, who required the French to identify him from among a group of Siamese elders. 
Unrecognisable because of his now sun-darkened skin and weathered facial features, 
Hua narrowly escaped French detection and was subsequently released from jail.52
In 1912, Hira sent a letter to cadres in the Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi branch in his 
native village in Nghe An, instructing them to send qualified cadres to work in Siam and 
money with which to purchase weapons. One of the first cadres sent was Hira's younger 
cousin, Quynh Anh (Nho).53 Arriving in the central Siamese town of Paknampho in 
1913, Quynh Anh learned from Hira that this town had become the main headquarters of 
Vietnamese resistance activities in Siam, charged with the following tasks: 1) the rearing 
and instruction of youths; 2) the development of efficient agriculture to sustain youths 
coming out of Indochina to study; and 3) the raising of enough money to purchase 
weapons to send back to Vietnam.54 As Quynh Anh recounted to her biographer in the 
early 1970s, before she had arrived in Paknampho, Hira and others had already begun 
forming what were referred to as "farming camps" (trai cay) and youth "training 
centres" (trai cäc em).55 Youngsters from patriotic families in Vietnam and from emigre 
families in Laos and Siam sent their children to these centres to study under scholar- 
patriots living in exile there.56 In these classes, the aim was to preserve the Vietnamese
51
52
53
54
55
56
Ibid., p. 53 and CVDCQ, p. 21, fn. For security reasons, cadres who arrived to work in Siam were 
eventually given new names. See: Son Tung, op. cit., p. 39.
'Mot Tam Giromg,' p. 55, especially fh. 1; Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 52, reproducing extracts of a 
section of chapter 2 of Hoat Dong Cäch Mang cua Viet Kieu b  Thai-lan, [The Revolutionary Activities of 
the Overseas Vietnamese in Thailand, a book which I have been unable to locate; Hoan's references to 
this book will be cited hereafter as "Hoan, extracts"]-, CVDCQ, p. 20; and 'May Chuyen,' p. 26. 
Eventually, Hfra's dark skin earned him the Siamese name: "Thao Dam," literally, Black Elder. Quynh 
Anh says that upon arriving in Siam in 1913 she could hardly recognise Hua because of the changes in 
his facial features and skin colour.
Som Tung, op. cit., pp. 38-39. Quynh Anh was a close friend of Ho Chf Mirth's older sister, Nguyen Thi 
Thanh, who was a member of the Quang Phuc Höi and had had a hand in arranging Anh's trip to Siam. 
Ibid., pp. 36 and 39.
Som Tung, op. cit, pp. 51-52. It is unclear why the centre of Vietnamese resistance activities in Siam 
shifted to Paknampho. It may have been the fact that living conditions were easier there or that French 
surveillance was too great in Ban Tham, while Paknampho may have offered a more secret location. See: 
Ibid., pp. 53-58.
Som Tung, op. cit, pp. 52-53, cited in consultation with Hoang Van Hoan, extracts, p. 48 and 'Mot Tam 
Guromg,' p. 53. The First farming camp was under Dang Tu Kinh's direction and it consisted of twenty 
members. The second had ten members under the guidance of Hong Chung. Quynh Anh was entrusted 
to oversee the education of youths coming to Siam to study.
There were only about ten to twelve youngsters actually studying in the youth camps during this time. 
'Mot Tam Guomg,' p. 55.
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language among youths; to teach the youngsters a trade; and, above all, to instil in them a 
spirit of patriotism.57
In addition to this, twice a year Hua travelled to northeastern Siam. To Hua, this was 
the backdoor to Indochina from where anticolonial adherents in Siam could contact their 
counterparts in Vietnam and China, as well as an area in which he could work among the 
large Vietnamese communities settled there.58 During his travels throughout Siam during 
this time, HCra did help some Vietnamese families to improve their living conditions and 
to retain an identification with the anti-colonial movement. Between roughly 1911 and 
1914, there is evidence showing that Hua was partially successful in winning over the 
patriotic sympathy of some Vietnamese families in Paknampho in central Siam, in 
Lampang in the north, and in Tha Uthen and Pak Hin Bun in the northeastern province of 
Nakhon Phanom.59
Yet Hua's successes prior to WWI were clearly limited. He and his associates did not 
develop what could truly be called resistance bases or even a clear-cut policy for working 
among the emigre population. At best, Hua and his colleagues saw Siam as a safe place 
where activists could temporarily re-group and youngsters could be schooled.60 There 
was little organisation, with many cadres leaving on a whim, and few arms were actually 
sent back to Vietnam. At a leadership level, Hua's work was seriously eroded by 
infighting and an ideological split that manifested itself among anticolonialists based in 
central Siam during the mid-1910s. After the dissolution of the Duy Tan Hoi in 1912 and 
its replacement with the Chinese-modelled Quang Phuc Hoi, disagreements emerged 
between those who followed the new republican line of the Quang Phuc Hoi and those 
who still believed in putting a monarch back on the throne. According to Nguyen Tai 
and Hoang Trung Thuc, Hua and a number of other like-minded anti-colonialists61 
residing in Siam espoused the new line of the Quang Phuc Hoi, while another group 
associated with Dang Tu Kinh62 advocated the continued support of Cucmg De and 
reliance on Japan. This split was apparently a divisive issue among scholar-patriots in 
Siam at the time. Tai and Thuc said that in 1914 and 1915 ideological differences
57
58
59
60
61
62
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 48; 'Mot Tam Gucmg,' p. 55; and Son Tung, op. tit., pp. 52-55.
'Mot Tam Guong,' pp. 55-56 and CVDCQ, p. 21, fn. 1. One resistance leader in China with whom Hua 
was in contact was Ho Ngoc Läm. CVDCQ, p. 21, fn. 1. From Quynh Anh's account, certain 
Vietnamese families living in the Siamese border towns of Pak Hin Bun and Tha Uthen, located along 
the Mekong River across from Vientiane, served as "rest stops" for Vietnamese activists coming from 
Indochina to work in Siam. Thereafter, many cadres made the 200 kilometres trip (three weeks by foot) to 
the Vietnamese headquarters in Paknampho. Som Tung, op. tiL, p. 46 4 8 .
'Mot Tam Gucmg,' p. 55 and Son Tung, op. tit., pp. 4648 .
Hua was not alone in his work in Siam during this early period. Helping him in one way or another 
were anticolonialists, such as Dang Tu Kinh, Tran Hfru Luc, Le Hong Chung, Ho Vinh Long, Ngo 
Quang, Hoang Trong Mau (the father of Ho Tirng Mau), and Luomg Lap Nham. See: 'Mot Tam
Guong,' p. 54.
This group reportedly included: Tran Höu Luc, Hoang Trong Mau, Luang Lap Nham and Ngö Quang. 
'Mot Tam Guong,' p. 55.
Tai and Thuc say this group included: Dang Tu Kinh, Le Hong Chung, and Ho Vinh Long. Ibid., p. 
55.
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between these two groups were often "fierce at times" (nhieu lan diin ra kich liet), 
although the writers fail to explain what, exactly, this meant.63
The WWI years did not make HCra’s work any easier. Because the Siamese 
government opposed the Germans, the French were able to pressure Bangkok to clamp- 
down on Vietnamese anticolonial activities in Siam. Hfra was dealt his first major blow 
at the opening of the war when the Siamese succumbed to French pressure by closing 
Ban Tham. The situation was further exacerbated in late 1914, when his youth training 
classes in Paknampho had to be moved to a new site in Ban Dong, a small hamlet in 
Phichit district situated along the Me Nam River.64 Arriving to work with these scholar- 
patriots in Ban Dong in 1915 (before going on to China) were some of the future leaders 
of the ICP— namely, Ho Tung Mau (Ich), Dang Xuän Thanh, and Le Hong Son.65 
However, few other cadres or students seem to have arrived in Ban Dong during this 
time.66 In late 1915 or early 1916, the Siamese government, almost certainly under 
French pressure again, required the Vietnamese to vacate Ban Dong.67 Because of 
stepped up French surveillance and the dislocation caused by these abrupt moves, living 
conditions deteriorated drastically. Hua was almost captured by the French again, while 
many of his students and colleagues were reduced to selling bread, gleaning rice, and 
even living hand-to-mouth in the forests in some instances.68 In mid-1916, after a 
meeting with associates to discuss the sad turn of events in Vietnam,69 Hira sold the 
farming camps in Phichit, took some of his students, and left for southern China where 
he resided for the next three years.70
63
64
65
66
67
68 
69
70
Ibid., p. 55 for the quote and Ibid., p. 55; 'May Chuyen,' p. 29; and Scm Tung, op. cit., p. 73-81 for 
evidence of the rift between Kinh and Htira. Even within the pro-Quang Phuc Hoi faction in Siam there 
were differences of opinion between those who, like Tran HQru Luc, advocated resuming armed uprisings 
against the French in Indochina and those who considered such action to be premature, such as Hira. 
'Mot Tarn Guorng,' p. 55. Le Manh Trinh does not mention this split directly; however, he claims that 
HCra did not support the "adventurist" policy of Tran HQru Luc and Luomg Lap Nham who continued to 
advocate armed action against the French in Vietnam. CVDCQ, pp. 18-19.
Hoang Van Hoan, extracts, p. 48 and Son Tung, op. cit., pp. 59-60. The land in Ban Dong was 
reportedly very fertile, possibly better than that of Ban Tham. This might be one reason explaining why 
Ban Dong remained a resistance post into the early 1930s. Ibid., p. 59.
Trinh Chi, ed., NhOmg Ngirfri Cong Sin  [Some Vietnamese Communists], (npc. NXBTN, 1976), pp. 71- 
72 and 81 and Son Tung, op. cit, pp. 94 and 98.
Son Tung, op. cit, pp. 60-61.
'Mot Tam Guorng,' p. 56; Scm Tung, op. cit., pp. 59 and 62-64; CVDCQ, pp. 18-19; and 'May Chuyen,' p. 
29,'fn. 1.
Le Trong Khänh, op. cit, p. 35; M ot Tam Guorng,' p. 56; and Son Tung, op. cit, pp. 63-64.
Hua explained that many leading scholar-patriots had died following a failed uprising in May 1916. Hua 
said that these events were now negatively effecting the state of Vietnamese activity in Siam as the 
French increased their pressure on the Siamese to clamp-down on anticolonialists in Siam. Son Tung, 
op. cit, pp. 63-64. For more details of the 1916 uprising, see: Marr, op. cit, pp. 232-33.
'Mot Tam Guorng,' p. 56 and Son Tung, op. cit, pp. 65-66. In the face of these difficult circumstances, a 
number of Hua's associates appear to have become disgruntled with the direction of his resistance ideas. 
Although Vietnamese communist sources are conspicuously trief concerning this matter, an unspecified 
number of cadres refused to obey his orders. Some patriots opposed Hfira's efforts to sell their land in 
Phichit to finance the trip to China and to underwrite continued resistance activities. See: 'Mot Tam
Guorng,' p. 56 and Som Tung, op. cit, p. 65.
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In m id-1919, Vö Tung (Sau Tung), a young activist whom Hua had come to trust in 
China, arrived in Ban Dong to begin rebuilding Vietnamese communities into "self-help" 
groups.71 He explained to Quynh Anh (who had remained in the area and whom he soon 
married) that her cousin would soon come back to Siam to administer "a different 
direction" in Vietnamese activities in Siam.72 Returning to Ban Dong in late 1919, Hua 
found that most of his pre-war work in Siam had disintegrated: there was no leadership, 
no links to resistance posts in Vietnam, and many cadres had simply lost heart.73 Hua 
discussed the sad state of affairs with Dang Tu Kinh, stressing the need to revive 
activities among the overseas Vietnamese. However, the prewar ideological differences 
between these two remained. Quynh Anh, a witness to these events and probably our 
most reliable source, told her biographer decades later that Hua organised an important 
meeting at the end of 1919 to assess the situation and plot a new course for the 
Vietnamese resistance in Siam. Anh said that this meeting (which she attended 
personally) brought an end to the influence of the Quang Phuc Hoi in Siam and called 
for "a complete reorganisation" of Vietnamese activities there. Hua said that during his 
stay in China he had met with Vietnamese leaders who had been in Japan and Vietnam, 
including Phan Boi Chau (although the details of their meeting(s) are hardly mentioned 
by available Vietnamese communist sources). During his three years in China, Hua said 
that he realised that the Duy Tan Hoi and Quang Phuc Hoi had never had any clear goals 
or appropriate organisational programmes. Relying on Anh as our source, Hua singled 
out for particular criticism the reliance of the resistance movement on other countries to 
help the Vietnamese, arguing that the Vietnamese did not have one notable resistance base 
anywhere. Hua then recounted, choked with emotion, the tragedy surrounding the failed 
uprisings in Vietnam during WWI and the deaths of several of his fighting friends at the 
hands of the French.74
At this point Dang T u Kinh registered his disagreement with Hua. According to the 
accounts of both Anh and Tai, Kinh told those gathered at the meeting that Prince 
Curing De had instructed him to form a provisional government which would receive
Scm Tung, op. cit, pp. 70-71. Vö Tung had been in Paknampho for a short stint in 1914. Ibid., p. 73.
72 Ibid., p. 70.
'Mot Tam Gurcmg,' p. 56 and Son Tung, op. cit, p. 73.
74 Scm Tung, op. cit., pp. 74-SI, cited in consultation with Hoang Van Hoan, extracts, pp. 49-50; 'Mot Tam 
Gtrcmg,' p. 56; and May Chuyen, pp. 29-30. In a meeting(s) with Chau in China during WWI, Hura is 
reported to have told him that he would return to Siam to preserve bases there. Chau agreed with this 
policy and Htira returned to Siam accordingly. See: 'Mot Tam Gucmg,' p. 56 and Hoan, extracts, p. 49. 
While Chau would subsequently fade from the resistance scene, Hfra returned to Siam, more convinced 
than ever, of the necessity of building bases in Siam. It is possible that Hura was dissatisfied with the 
inability o f some leaders, not excluding Chau, to plot a clear course for the future of the Vietnamese 
resistance. This would be supported by a similar experience of Le Hong Scm (later a ranking ICP 
member), who had been sent from Siam to China by Dang Tur Kinh to work with Phan Boi Chau during 
WWI. After having been dispatched by Chau to meet Cucmg De in Japan in 1920, Scm soon realised 
that Chau's policy was ill-suited for the new needs of the revolution. See: Trinh Chi, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 
Finally, in what appears to be a criticism of some Vietnamese leaders in China, Htira (as recollected by 
Anh) said in the above 1919 meeting that he had not realised "the [poor] quality of some of these 
individuals [in China] in whom we have heretofore trusted." Scm Tung, op. cit, p. 74.
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the backing of the Japanese. Kinh argued that if they supported the Prince, then scholars 
in Vietnam would follow suit. In Tai's extract of a conversation he had with Dang Thuc 
Hira in 1926 concerning this same 1919 meeting, Hira asked Kinh if he had made any 
links with the overseas Vietnamese during his work in Siam. Kinh allegedly replied that 
the overseas Vietnamese were not intellectuals, but rather they were wanderers, of little or 
no value to the resistance.75
Kinh's interruption appears to have played into Hira's hands. Hua rejected out-of- 
hand Kinh’s reliance on the Japanese. In a long address, Hua emphasised that the 
Japanese were no different in their colonial designs from the European powers, citing the 
annexation of Korea as his main example and detailing at great length how the Japanese 
had betrayed the Vietnamese.76 Hua then took the opportunity to outline a new policy 
for Vietnamese resistance activities in Siam, one which stressed the need to improve the 
living conditions of the overseas Vietnamese as a means of building rear-guards in 
Siam.77 As Anh recalled, Hua ended his address to this meeting by advocating a policy 
of regrouping the Vietnamese in Siam into stable resistance bases, saying that "wherever 
there are Vietnamese, there we must have a presence."78 Hua targetted those areas in 
Siam which had dense and relatively prosperous Vietnamese communities and instructed 
cadres to propagate greater patriotism; to help families maintain Vietnamese customs and 
traditions; and to strive to create better living conditions for them as a means of winning 
their support. He said that many of those Vietnamese coming to Siam had fled French 
repression, military service, or debts. "There is no reason why they cannot not join us in 
the fight against the French to save our nation," Hua argued. In the end, Hua emerged 
from the dispute with Kinh in full control of Vietnamese resistance activities in Siam.79
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'Mot Tam Gucmg,' p. 56, cited with reference to Scm Tung, op. cit, pp. 75-76 and 'May Chuyen,' p. 29. 
There is no doubt that Nguyen Tai treats Hua very sympathetically in his memoir, calling him "an 
outstanding figure in the history o f the modem Vietnamese revolution." In 'Mot Tam Guong,' p. 56, 
Hoang Trung Thuc and Tai tell us little about Kinh other than his incorrect views about the resistance 
and the role of the Vietnamese. Quynh Anh, on the other hand, is the only one of our sources to have 
actually attended this meeting and witnessed the debate between Hua and Kinh. Her recollection of 
Kinh's argument does not contradict Tai's and Thuc's, however, she does not treat Kinh as a resistance 
misfit, but rather as an individual who happened to hold views counter to those expressed by Hua. Anh is 
a more reliable source concerning this matter.
Son Tung, op. cit, pp. 76-78.
'May Chuyen,' p. 30. Quynh Anh's recollection of Hua's words on this subject are almost identical. See: 
Scm Tung, op. cit, pp. 80-81.
Scm Tung, op. cit., p. 81.
'Mot Tam Gucmg,' p. 56; Som Tung, op. cit, p. 75, especially fh. 1; and Hoang Vän Hoan, extracts, p. 
49. Kinh subsequently took a low profile in Siam and faded from all important decision-making 
responsibilities. In contrast to other sources, Anh makes a point of mentioning that at the end of this 
meeting Kinh was upbeat, talkative, and, as he lit up a cigarette, relieved. This might suggest that the 
split between Kinh and Hira had been bridged satisfactorily and perhaps with some degree of consensus. 
Scm Tung, p. 81. It is possible that Nguyen Tki, Hokig Trung Thuc, and Hoang Van Hoan, all of 
whom worked closely with Htira, have not given us the full picture of Kinh and his role in the Vietnamese 
resistance in Siam. It has been reported incorrectly that Kinh died at the hands of the French during 
WWI. See: Marr, op. cit., p. 229, fh. 53. Kinh died in 1928. See: Dang Tu Kinh, Kinh Dang Hucmg 
Hon Liet Si Pham Hong Thai [Respects to the Memory o f the Martyr Pham Hong Thai (written in 1924)] 
in Phan Boi Chau, Tuong Tnmg, p. 147.
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During a trip to the northeast in late 1919, Hua dispatched two representatives to Ha 
Tinh and Nghe An to exchange information with and deliver letters to leaders in 
Vietnam concerning the need to establish Siam as both an intermediary point for cadres on 
the road to China and as a training ground for patriotic youths coming out of Vietnam. 
That same year he brought twelve youths to the Phichit area to begin training.80 In the 
meantime, Hua began his postwar base building in Ban Dong, with the aim of making 
this hamlet a model for the subsequent construction of bases in Siam.81 New houses 
were built, gardens planted, animals raised, and goods produced for yearly consumption, 
sale, and trade. The amount of land under cultivation was expanded and subsidiary crops 
were planted in a communal fashion, reviving the earlier farming camp idea. Anh was in 
charge of re-establishing youth classes in Ban Dong aimed at instilling a community spirit 
and making sure that youths were taught quoc ngirß2 Students read smuggled 
newspapers and political documents, studied foreign languages, such as English, French, 
and Chinese, and learned martial arts. During the early 1920s, Ban Dong became the 
headquarters of the Vietnamese resistance in Siam and the main political training centre 
for young revolutionaries there.83
1.5. The Birth of the Post WWI Bases in Northeast Siam
Regrouping the Vietnamese scattered throughout the rest of Siam was no easy task. 
Vietnamese communities stretched from Bangkok to Chiang Mai in the north and to 
Nakhon Phanom in the northeast. Not all of these Vietnamese could speak their mother 
tongue and some were opposed to making sacrifices for principles in which they may not 
have had any interest, economically or politically. In fact, Hua found the "old 
Vietnamese" in the Samsen area of Bangkok and in communities along the southeastern 
coast unsuitable for his work because they were unable to speak Vietnamese.84 
Alternatively, he targetted those Vietnamese who had fled the French in the late 19th 
century and were mainly concentrated in northeast Siam (see section 1.1). This group 
remained largely anti-French and consisted of several thousand families, located mostly in 
the frontier provinces of Udon Thani, Nakhon Phanom, Sakhon Nakhon, Nong Khai, 
and Ubon Ratchathani.85
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Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 52 and 'Mot T in  Guong,' pp. 56-57.
Son Tung, op. cit., p. 81. Quynh Anh, one of those in charge of building the Ban Dong base, had the 
friendly support of a local Siamese official named Kamnankut, who was a canton chief in Hattaku, a 
small town near Ban Dong. Ibid., p. 69 and Hoang Vän Hoan, extracts, p. 51.
Son Tung, op. cit, p. 81. See also: 'May Chuyen,' p. 30. One of the main problems concerning the 
schooling o f youths was making sure they could speak Vietnamese. There were about 20-30 youngsters 
in the training camps year round at this time.
Son Tung, op. cit, pp. 89-91 and 96.
'May Chuyen,' pp. 30 and 37.
Ibid., p. 30.
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According to what Hua told Nguyen Tai in 1926, his post-WWI strategy for 
building bases in northeast Siam depended on selecting reliable cadres who had the 
abilities to go out among overseas Vietnamese and gain their trust. In dispatching these 
partisans, Htra instructed them to take advantage of the professions of the overseas 
Vietnamese in the northeast, many of whom specialised in carpentry, masonry, 
bricklaying, and construction. With a view to linking Vietnamese enclaves into a larger, 
more coherent resistance plan, Htra directed his supporters to exploit the "the extremely 
favourable road system" that connected Nakhon Phanom and Nong Khai provinces along 
the Mekong River to the larger provincial capitals of Sakhon Nakhon, Udon Thani, and 
Ubon Ratchathani. These, in turn, were intermediary points linked by roads to Bangkok 
and the resistance headquarters in Phichit.86 To HCra and his associates, this road system 
would facilitate the effective organisation of the large Vietnamese emigre communities in 
the northeast.
In 1921, Hira went to work on this plan, spending the next four years working in 
northeast Siam.87 There, he devoted his energy to building more patriotic, cohesive and 
mutually supportive communities—bases we can begin call them—modelled on the "Ban 
Dong experiment" and orientated towards backing the Vietnamese anticolonial 
movement.88 In 1922, he paid particular attention to the matter of constructing liaison 
bases along the Mekong River in Nakhon Phanom province. These bases were to act as 
contact points with revolutionary outposts in Vietnam and receiving centres for youths 
coming from Vietnam. Wat Pa, a hamlet along the Mekong River outside of the town of 
Nakhon Phanom, was one of the first of these bases. It consisted of eighteen to twenty 
mainly Buddhist families and was put under the direction of Ngoet Vinh, an overseas 
Vietnamese who was fluent in Siamese and reportedly had good connexions with local 
Siamese authorities. Vinh also worked among the one hundred Catholic Vietnamese 
families in Nong Saen (opposite Thakhek), but the presence of French priests seems to 
have complicated resistance efforts in this village considerably.89
Hfra appointed another Vietnamese national with good relations with Siamese 
authorities to set up a base in Ton-Phung, a remote Siamese village located five
Ibid., pp. 30-31 and Son Tung, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
'Mot Tam Giromg,' p. 57.
Son Tung, op. cit., pp. 83-84 and 'Mot Tam Gircmg,' p. 57. These communities ranged from collections 
of a few, dispersed Vietnamese families to hamlets, and, in some cases, small villages.
'May Chuyen,' p. 31; Son Tung, op. cit, p. 83; and Hohng Van Hoan, extracts, p. 51. Nguyen Tai will 
only say that the French in Nong Saen were "a great threat." Other Vietnamese communist sources 
discussing activities in Siam during this time skip over the question of Christian influence among the 
Vietnamese in Siam. It seems likely that French priests, who had worked in these Catholic communities 
for decades, had considerable influence among the Vietnamese Catholics and were no doubt aware of 
anti-French resistance efforts to win over their constituencies in Siam. As far as we know, Nong Saen 
never became an important resistance base in Siam. While I have no direct evidence, it is worth 
considering that the Vietnamese resistance found it difficult to organise anti-French activities among 
Christian Vietnamese communities in Siam.
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kilometres outside of Nakhon Phanom. Through an old Quang Phuc Hoi connexion, 
Hura's representatives bought the homes of the few Siamese families residing there and 
gained permission from local Siamese authorities to till the land legally. After setting up 
this base, HCra then returned to Phichit to bring two cadres back to the area to set up 
another base in Ban Mai, a hamlet situated a short distance north of Nakhon Phanom. 
Ban Mai was said to have become an intermediary contact point connected to outposts in 
Vietnam, with Wat Pa and Ton Phung serving as its support camps.90
In Sakhon Nakhon province, Hü’a dispatched two partisans to the provincial capital of 
the same name to work among the one hundred or so Vietnamese nationals living in the 
area. After making connexions with Vietnamese carpenters, bricklayers, and sawyers, 
over the next three years H ira's men presided over the formation of a separate Vietnamese 
hamlet outside of this sleepy frontier town.91 From there, cadres continued developing 
bases along the road from Sakhon Nakhon to Udon, with considerable successes in the 
villages of Ban Han and Nong Han. On the road from Sakhon Nakhon to Nakhon 
Phanom, the resistance found its way into Thahae and Kusaman. And along the Mekong 
River families were won over to the resistance in Tha Uthen, Na Kae, That Phanom, 
Mukdahan, and Nong Khai.92 In these small river towns, it does not appear that separate 
Vietnamese hamlets were actually set up; instead, patriotic families appear to have opened 
their doors to cadres and students coming from Indochina as a rest stop until they could 
be transferred on to the larger bases.
The administration of these Mekong bases/families was problematic, for they were 
located hundreds of kilometres from the resistance headquarters in Ban Dong. As a 
result, Hira had to form an intermediary base somewhere between Ban Dong and the 
Mekong bases. The northeastern provincial capital of Udon was the natural selection. 
Because of its large, industrious Vietnamese population and its position as the political 
and economic centre of northeast Siam (linked by roads to Nakhon Phanom, Sakhon 
Nakhon, and Bangkok), Udon could serve as the inter-change between the Ban Dong 
headquarters and increasingly important peripheral bases positioned along the 
northeastern Thai frontier. However, this was much easier said than done, for gaining 
the support of Udon's Vietnamese communities proved difficult. Many of the 
Vietnamese there retained little linguistic or ethnic identification with Vietnam, and the 
younger generation saw little to be gained from supporting the Vietnamese resistance.93
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'May Chuyen,' p. 31; Scm Tung, op. cit, p. 84; and Hoang Van Hoan, extracts, pp. 51-52.
'May Chuyen,' p. 31. Many of the Vietnamese here had come from Ha Tlnh and Quang Binh provinces 
fifty years earlier. There were also survivors of Phan Dinh Phung partisans here. Ibid., p. 32.
'Mot Tam Girong,' p. 54 and 'May Chuyen,' p. 32. Kusaman was an intermediate stopover for cadres 
travelling between Sakhon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom. Vietnamese hamlets situated in this area were 
also favourable to Hura plans, for they were located along a favourable road network which facilitated 
Vietnamese trading activities. See: 'May Chuyen,' p. 35.
Son Tung, op. cit., pp. 84-85 and 'May Chuyen,' p. 32.
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Beginning in 1923, HCra, his trusted colleague, Vö Tung, and others began meeting 
with Vietnamese families in Udon, targeting elders in their conversations and asking 
mothers to teach Vietnamese to their children. Htra sent one of his Udon-bom students 
to work there, but the young man's efforts were not taken seriously by influential, older 
V ietnam ese.94 Undeterred, in 1924 Htra dispatched several of his best adherents to 
begin work creating a small overseas Vietnamese hamlet outside of Udon called Nong 
Bua. The following year he sent carpenters and bricklayers to start construction there and 
gained permission from Siamese authorities to farm the land legally. It was only then that 
"several" Vietnamese families reportedly began to move to Nong Bua.95
On closer inspection, it appears that the decision to set up a separate base in Nong Bua 
may have been both a calculated move on Hua's part designed to attract Vietnamese over 
to the resistance more effectively and a reflection of the difficulties involved in winning 
over the support of the Vietnamese in Udon (and elsewhere). To give reluctant 
Vietnamese families an economic incentive to join this newly opened hamlet, Htra 
recruited Vietnamese carpenters and bricklayers to build houses and he also gained 
permission from Siamese authorities to till the land legally. The first point would have 
ensured basic security needs, while the latter point would have allayed the fears of 
prospective Vietnamese inhabitants worried that deedless land might one day be arbitrarily 
confiscated by the Siamese. Often Htia's hamlets in Nong Bua (and in other areas) were 
located near fertile land, close to large lakes teeming with fish, or in locations with 
favourable trading opportunities. In short, by convincing Vietnamese nationals that better 
living conditions could be had in these Vietnamese hamlets, Htra could build a more 
efficient and economically productive Vietnamese community and, at the same time, gain 
their implicit participation in the Vietnamese resistance movement. Once Vietnamese 
families moved into these "strategic hamlets," it was much easier to win their support 
through propaganda and political re-orientation. According to Tai, by 1925 the number 
of Vietnamese families living in Nong Bua had grown to around 40, and by 1929 the 
number reached 100. In 1925, Htra expanded his work to another base called Dong On, 
located ten kilometres outside of Udon.96 These were the first noteworthy attempts by 
Vietnamese anticolonial leaders to make the Udon area a part of wider resistance 
programmes (see Map HI and Chart 1, next page).
'May Chuyen,' p. 32 and Scm Tung, op. c it, p. 85.
Scm Tung, op. ciL, pp. 84-85 and 'May Chuyen,' p. 32.
'May Chuyen,' p. 30 specifically and section IV, 'Living among the Masses,’ pp. 3640 , for a revealing 
discussion of Hura's work among Vietnamese emigres in Siam. See also: Son Tung, pp. 84-85 and 'Mot 
Tam Guromg,' p. 57.
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Chart I
Vietnamese Resistance Bases in Thailand, 1919-1925
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By 1924, these bases/families in the northeast had become relatively stable and a 
system of meeting and escorting students to training camps had become established.97 
The hard work of Hira and his associates goes far to explaining the increasing number of 
youths and cadres travelling to Siam between 1920 and 1925, among whom were such 
important future revolutionary leaders as Ho Tung Mau, Le Tan Anh, Pham Hong 
Thai (Chau), Dang Thai Thuyen (Dang Canh Tan), and Le Hong Phong (Doän).98 
Although the majority of these revolutionaries were in transit, usually on their way to 
China, almost all of them spent some time in Siam tending to resistance matters, as well 
as studying, working, and living among overseas Vietnamese communities. In fact, Le 
Hong Phong and Pham Hong Thai spent several months in Ban Dong in the home of 
Quynh Anh. It was in Ban Dong that these two Vietnamese leaders were said to have 
had their first taste of real manual labour.99 After residing in Siam for a period of time, 
Thai, Phong, Le Tan Anh, and Ho Tung Mau travelled to China where they had a 
hand in setting up the Täm Täm Xä (The Heart to Heart Association).100 Two 
Vietnamese communist studies of resistance activities in Siam have argued that Hira's 
two-pronged policy of building up bases among the overseas Vietnamese and 
encouraging the dispatch to and training of youths in Siam contributed to the development 
of the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cäch Mang Dong Chi Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary 
Youth League; hereafter referred to as Thanh Nien) in both China and Siam.101
'Mot Tam Gurcmg,' p. 57. Cadres travelling to Siam were met at contact points along the Mekong, such 
as in Ban Mai, and thereafter taken to holding centres/families in Nakhon Phanom province until it was 
clear they were genuine patriots. From there, Hira's partisans escorted them to Nong Bua and Dong On 
for preliminary instruction and language training in French, English, and Chinese, with each student 
responsible for learning at least one foreign language. Those judged promising were moved on to the 
main base in Ban Dong where they began political studies. Sources: Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 39- 
40; May Chuyen, pp. 26 and 31; and Son Tung, op. cit, p. 89. Siamese was not mentioned as a foreign 
language.
98 Trinh Chi, op. cit., p. 39; Hoang Van Hoan, extracts, p. 53; M ot Tam Gucmg,' p. 57; Sort Tung, op. cit., 
pp. 89-97, especially pp. 89 and 92-93; and CVDCQ, p. 22. Le Manh Trinh says that during this time the 
Siamese route to southern China was most favourable, "especially for those coming from Nghe-Tinh." 
CVDCQ, p. 22. Thai and Phong came from the same area in Nghe An as Quynh Anh and Hua. Dang 
Canh Tan was the son of Dang Thai Than, a fighting friend of Phan Böi Chau's. See: Dang Doan 
Bäng, op. cit, p. 75; Som Tung, op. cit, p. 96; and Marr, op. cit., p. 150, fn. 107.
Son Tung, op. cit, pp. 90 and 90-97 more generally. To make ends meet, these two had to work for 
Chinese and Siamese neighbours, tilling the soil and tending livestock.
100 Trinh Chi, op. cit, p. 39 and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 52-53 and 57. This association was linked to
bases in Siam, sending materials and policy decisions to cadres there. For more details, see Huynh Kim 
Khänh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 65-66. For a 
detailed discussion of Thanh Nien, one should consult Huynh Kim Khänh, op. cit, pp. 63-89 and 
Alexander Woodside, Community and Revolution in Modem Vietnam, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1976), p. 168.
101 Hoang Van Hoan, extracts, p. 53 and Nguyen Tai and Hoang Trung Thurc [Hoang Nhat Tan], M ot 
Tam Girong,' p. 59.
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Part II: Siam and Vietnamese Communism
II. 1. The Development of the Thanh Nien Branch in Siam
In 1925, less than a year after Pham Hong Thai died in a failed attempt to kill French 
Governor-General Merlin in Canton, Ho Chi Minh presided over the formation of the 
Thanh Nien in Canton. This organisation was a departure from earlier anticolonial 
organisations, such as the Duy Tan Hoi and the Quang Phuc Hoi. Based in Canton and 
under Ho's direct leadership, Thanh Nien placed a greater emphasis on organisation and 
political and social issues. Young Vietnamese revolutionaries studied political 
propaganda, agitation, organisation, and the importance of forming mass bases as the 
foundation of a revolution. Aware of the strategic importance of Siam and the overseas 
Vietnamese there in relation to the Vietnamese revolution, upon forming the Thanh Nien 
in 1925, Ho immediately dispatched partisans to Siam to set up subsidiary branches.102
In Siam, the news of Thai's death had been met with great sadness, with Vö Tung 
and Dang Thai Thuyen organising a memorial in Ban Dong to commemorate the death 
of their martyred friend.103 Interestingly, at about the same time, Ho Tung Mau (Ich) 
returned to Ban Dong to work with these cadres.104 Quynh Anh, who shared her home 
with Mau during this period, told her biographer that his revolutionary work in Siam (no 
doubt in conjunction with Tung and Thuyen's) accelerated the pace of resistance 
activity among the Vietnamese communities in Siam through the creation of such 
organisations as the Youth Cooperative Association (Hoi Thanh Nien Hcrp Täc Xa).105 
Considering that Mau was one of the earliest and most respected members of the Thanh 
Nien in China, his arrival in Ban Dong at this juncture could not have been unrelated to 
the transformation of the Youth Cooperative Association into the first Thanh Nien branch 
in Siam in 1926. This cell was under the direct leadership of the General Bureau (Tong 
Bo) in Canton (and later from Hong Kong).106 A second branch was subsequently 
formed in the Udon area, probably in Nong Bua and/or Dong On. Throughout 1927 and
102 Le Manh Trinh, In Canton and Thailand,' in Days with Ho Chi Minh, (Hanoi: FLPH, 1962), p. 115 and 
Hoang Van Hoan, extracts, pp. 53-54. See also: Yevgeny Kobelev, Ho Chi Minh, trans. from Russian to 
English by Vic Schneierson and Sergei and Ivan Chulaki, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), p. 92. 
Le Manh Trinh says that after each political training class in Qu4ng Chau was finished, "one or two 
delegates" were sent to Siam to work among the Vietnamese there. If we can believe Trinh, even those 
students who were not appointed to work in Siam had to travel through Siam before returning to 
Indochina during this time. CVDCQ, p. 23.
103 Son Tung, op. cit., p. 93. See also: CVDCQ, p. 23.
104 Som Tung, op. c it, pp. 94-95 and 98.
103 Ibid., p. 95. Its headquarters was in the home of Quynh Anh.
106 Som Tung, op. cit., p. 95; Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 43; and CVDCQ, pp. 23 and 43, cited in
consultation with the Siamese source, Wichan Champisi, Yuan Opphayop kap Khwammankhong khong 
Chat [Vietnamese Refugees and National Security], (Bangkok: Samnakngan Odianstor, 2519 [1976]),
p. 31. See also: Le Manh Trinh, Thau Chin & Xiem [Thao Chin in Siam]' in Bäc Ho: Hoi K fr  [Memories 
of Uncle Ho], (npc. Van Hoc, 1960), p. 97.
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1928, Thanh Nien cells were extended to bases in Sakhon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom 
as well.107
According to Anh, her husband, Vo Tung (Ltru Khai Hong), became the Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Thanh Nien in Siam, while she became a member of the 
Central Com m ittee.108 Considering the leading role played by Dang Thüc Hua in 
resistance activities in Siam up to this point, the failure of his cousin to mention him as a 
ranking member in the Thanh Nien branch probably indicates his diminishing importance 
in decision-making and the consolidation of the Vietnamese leadership in Siam in the 
hands of a younger generation.109 Whatever the case, from the evidence available the 
Thanh Nien in Siam sought to organise the education and political orientation of the 
overseas Vietnamese, with special emphasis on the need for better "linking up" (dokn 
k it)  and instilling greater levels of patriotism. Women's and Farmer's Associations were 
formed and better contact with resistance outposts in Vietnam was targetted. Because the 
majority of the Vietnamese population was concentrated in northeast Siam, the 
headquarters of the Thanh Nien was soon moved from Ban Dong to the Udon area, yet 
another symbol Udon's growing pre-eminence in Vietnamese resistance activities in 
Siam.
Despite Dang Thüc Hira's diminishing influence in leadership decisions, his close 
links to Vö Tung and Quynh Anh and his respected work among the Vietnamese 
throughout Siam made him a valuable asset to the Thanh Nien leadership in terms of 
conveying its programmes to the Vietnamese in Siam.110 That Hüa remained an strategic 
bridge for the Thanh Nien to Vietnamese nationals was clear in Udon on 26 August 1926, 
when he was selected to announce to hundreds of Vietnamese the establishment of Thanh 
Nien's first Hoi Viet Kieu Than A f  (The Overseas Vietnamese Friendship Association; 
hereafter, referred to as HVK). Addressing the first Congress of the Overseas 
Vietnamese, Hfra explained to his compatriots the importance of establishing this self- 
help association in order to look after their living conditions and the education of their 
young. Nguyen Täi, a young activist fresh from Vietnam, had the task of copying 
extracts of Hifa's speech to distribute to Vietnamese communities in Siam. He 
remembers Hifa's opening in his memoir as follows:
107 CVDCQ, p. 23 and Son Tung, op. cit.f p. 95. An ICP history claims that three Thanh Nien cells were 
formed in Siam. Ban Nghien CCru Lieh Sir Ding Trung l/omg, NhOmg Su Kien Lieh Sur Ding, Tap I 
(1920-1945) [Some Events in the History of the Party, Volume I], (Hanoi: NXBST, 1976), p. 128.
108 Son Tung, op. cit., p. 95. Mäu's residence in Ban Dong might partially explain why the Thanh Nien 
was first established in Ban Dong. Besides Tung and Anh, others who probably held leadership positions 
in the Thanh Nien included: Ho Tung Mau, Le Manh Trinh, Dang Thai Thuyen, Vö Van Kieu, Hoang 
Van Ho an, and Le Ngön. See: 'Mot Tam Guomg,' p. 54.
109 In 'Mot Tam Gucmg,' Nguyen Tai and Hoang Trung Thvrc (Hoang Nhat Tan) confirm that Hua was not 
given "an executive committee position" because of his "old age.” 'Mot Tam Gucmg,' p. 54.
110 Le Manh Trinh says in his memoir that because of Htira's good connexions among the overseas 
Vietnamese, the next group of Vietnamese activists found their work in Siam easier. Trinh made no 
mention of a leadership role for Hua. CVDCQ, p. 22, in. 1. Htira died on his way back to Udon in 1931 
at the age of 61.
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We are gathered here today to establish the Hoi Than Ai. Than AT has the meaning of 
intimate mutual assistance with the aim of arranging conditions for the making of an 
adequate living, providing our children with places to study, and, even more 
importantly, devising careful plans for our national revolution.111
Htia went on to review the fighting history of the Vietnamese people, drawing his 
audience's attention to the need to drive out the French and praising the recent heroism of 
Pham Hong Thai. In addition to outlining how the HVK would teach Vietnamese and 
educate their youths, Hira urged the Vietnamese to respect Siamese laws and customs 
and he advocated the idea of securing permission from Siamese authorities to construct 
Vietnamese schools. Before ending, he returned to economic matters by explaining that 
because the Siamese were expanding construction in the Udon area, more jobs were 
available to Vietnamese bricklayers and carpenters. Htia urged families to move to his 
hamlets in Nong Bua and Dong On as a means of increasing mutual cooperation and 
strengthening his resistance bases.
By the end of the decade, the HVK in Udon was said to have numbered around 
600.112 Though the Udon area bases had become the centre of Vietnamese activities in 
Siam, in other areas where there were large Vietnamese communities, such as Sakhon 
Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom, this organisation was also to be found.113 Direct 
members, as the HVK referred to them, usually came from these areas where working 
branches of the HVK could be sustained financially. Members actually paid fees and 
participated in HVK activities. Indirect members, on the other hand, tended to be "old 
Vietnamese" or those who lived in distant, scattered areas. Such members were not 
required to pay dues, but were still considered "sympathetic members" of the HVK.114
The dissemination of information was another way by which Thanh Nien hoped to 
win over the support of the Vietnamese in Siam. Quoc ngir was taught to children and 
adults alike. In 1927, Dang Thai Thuyen took charge of publishing a Vietnamese 
newspaper in Ban Dong called Dong Thanh (Unity; 1927-1928). This quoc ngir paper
111 Quoted in 'May Chuyen,’ p. 33 (italics in the original) and cited in consultation with the Anh's version in 
Som Tung, p. 107. From a comparison of these two, it is clear that Anh/Son Tung (1976) did not quote 
from 'May Chuyen' (1965). It is unclear whether Tai was using extracts from his notes of Htira's speech 
when compiling his memoir. Nevertheless, except for a very few words, both Tai and Quynh Anh/Som 
Tung give virtually identical reproductions of HCra's opening words. Evidence that Tai was responsible 
for copying down extracts of Htira’s address comes from Anh in Som Tung, op. tit., p. 107 and Nguyen 
Tai, May Chuyen, p. 32. This Congress was convened by orders of the Thanh Nien. See: Som Tung, op. 
tit., p. 106.
112 ’Mot Tam Giromg,' p. 57; CVDCQ, p. 25; Som Tung, op. tit ,  p. 109; and 'May Chuyen,’ pp. 32, 34-35, 
and 39.
1 1
At the end of 1926, bases in Sakhon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom were home to a HVK branch each. 
Unlike Sakhon Nakhon, it was more difficult to conduct resistance work in Nakhon Phanom, for it was 
located directly across from Thakhek and thus more vulnerable to French surveillance. Htira also says that 
the Vietnamese in Sakhon Nakhon had better links with the Siamese than anywhere else, but it is unclear 
why this was the case. May Chuyen, pp. 32 and 34-35.
114 CVDCQ, pp. 25-26 and Hoang Vän Hoan, op. tit., pp. 4445 .
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reported on living conditions of the Vietnamese in Siam, published revolutionary poetry 
and short stories, and reported on regional and international events. Copies of papers 
printed in Vietnam and by the Thanh Nien in Canton were also distributed among cadres 
working in Siam.115
As a reserve to the Thanh Nien, the Hoi Hop Täc (Cooperative Associations; 
hereafter, referred to as HHT) was created to give revolutionary training to youths sent 
from Vietnam. It was often in the HHTs in Siam that many young revolutionaries had 
their first taste of communal labour. From transplanting paddy in rice fields to building 
new homes, manual labour was designed by the Thanh Nien to link theoretical 
knowledge to concrete practice. In these cooperatives, five or six youths were assigned 
to a construction or farming team, each group collectively responsible for their plot of 
land, tools, or buffaloes. A minimum subsistence income was distributed to the members 
with the rest going to the communal fund of the HHT. This money was used to fund the 
transportation of cadres, the building of schools, and the dissemination of propaganda. 
Those students who successfully completed their work in the HHT were then admitted 
into the Thanh Nien in Siam, Canton, or sent back to Vietnam.116
In other instances, Hua discussed with his students the history and mistakes of the 
resistance movement thus far and stressed the link between "the people" (dan) and the 
"nation" (n(rac).n l  He regularly sent youths out to work among nearby Siamese and 
Vietnamese communities as both a means of teaching them the importance of 
"investigation" (dieu tra) and a way by which they could better understand the living 
conditions and needs of the common people.118 To an ICP member reflecting later on the 
time he spent working in a HHT in Siam, labour played an important part in the political 
conditioning of the students in the HHT, for most of these youths came from relatively 
well-off families and were students who had rarely used their hands.119 By the end of 
1929, there were over one-hundred members in the HHT in Siam.120 It would not be an
11 5 For more details see: Flood, op. cit, p. 33; 'Mot Tam Gwmg,' p. 57; CVDCQ, p. 28; and Son Tung, op. 
cit., pp. 96 and 98. I was unable to locate this paper in Vietnam.
116 Flood, op. cit., p. 33; CVDCQ, pp. 24-25; and Hoäng Vän Hoan, op. cit, p. 44. Nong Bua, Ban Dong, 
Sakhon Nakhon, and Nakhon Phanom each had a branch of the HHT. Hoäng Vän Hoan, op. cit, pp. 
55, 58, and 59.
112 May Chuyen, p. 43 specifically and pp. 40-42, 4243 , 4344 , 44, and 4 5 4 6  for different discussions of 
Hijra’s methods for training young revolutionaries.
118 'May Chuyen,' p. 45 specifically and pp. 4 0 4 6  for a discussion of Hura's education methods from a student 
who studied directly under him. Alexander Woodside makes a similar point and provides a translation of 
one of Htira's lectures to his students, as recalled by Nguyen Tai. See: Woodside, op. cit, pp. 238-39, 
citing 'May Chuyen,' p. 45.
119 CVDCQ, p. 24. Hoang Van Hoan makes this point as well, saying that as a young intellectual he had
no real knowledge of the importance of labour and the masses until he arrived in Siam and began 
teaching and working with the students and living among the overseas Vietnamese. See: Hoang Van
Hoan, op. cit., pp. 4243 .
120 Hoang Van Hoan, op. ciL, p. 44. At the end of 1926 another group of young Vietnamese revolutionaries 
arrived in Ban Dong: Phüng Chi Kien (Vö Van Nhir) and Vö Vän Kieu (Dinh). After that came Dang 
Thi Hcrp and Nguyen Tai. See: May Chuyen, p. 26 and Scm Tung, op. cit, p. 101. Hoang Sam (Ky), 
later a Major General in the Vietnamese People's Army, was a level I student studying in Udon during 
the academic year of 1929-1930. In August 1935 he was deported from Siam. See: 'May Chuyen,’ p. 32
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overstatement to say that the HHT was one example of how Siam served as a safe 
sanctuary in which the Vietnamese resistance could administer "revolutionary 
laboratories."
Through Siam, Thanh Nien's influence also found its way into Vietnamese 
communities in Laos. In 1927, a representative was sent there to set up branches of the 
Thanh Nien and the HVK.121 Efforts were also made to link bases in Siam more closely 
with Vietnamese communities in Laos as a means to building better liaison with 
revolutionary outposts in Vietnam. A Vietnamese base in Savannakhet was linked to its 
counterpart in the Siamese town of Mukdahan, as was Thakhek to Nakhon Phanom and 
Vientiane to Nong Khai. From the evidence available, this was one of the earliest efforts 
by the Vietnamese to organise and integrate the Vietnamese in Laos into wider 
revolutionary plans.122 Conspicuously absent was a similar interest on the part of 
Vietnamese in Siam in organising bases in Cambodia (see chapter 4).
II.2. The Importance of Siam Increases (1928-1930)
Toward the end of 1927, Thanh Nien operations in China were disrupted by the 
violent dispute between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists. The Kuomingtang's 
repression of the Chinese Communists jeopardised the activities of the General Bureau of 
the Thanh Nien in Canton, with a number of Vietnamese cadres captured during this 
period. Once again, as Vietnamese activities in China came under more pressure, the 
strategic attention of Vietnamese resistance leaders shifted to Siam. A recent Soviet 
biography of Ho Chi Minh says that Siam was an attractive alternative to Ho at this 
point, because reports from cadres there indicated "that a lot could be done among the 
Vietnamese" and that the local authorities "were not too particular as to what the 
Vietnamese were doing."123 Chinese communists were also thinking in similar terms, 
with many cadres going there to set up propaganda offices and to administer 
revolutionary activities among the overseas Chinese.124 As for the Vietnamese, between 
1927-1928 the growing importance of Siam was signalled by the dispatch by Ho Chf 
Minh of several trusted associates to work in Siam. And above all, Ho's arrival in Siam
and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 90. For a translation of a poem written by an overseas Vietnamese 
member o f a cooperative team in Sakhon Nakhon, see Appendix II.
121 CVDCQ, pp. 23-24 and 28; Le Manh Trinh, In Canton,'p. 116; and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 45. 
Vientiane was the site of one known Thanh Nien cell.
122 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 45 and CVDCQ, p. 38. Hoan says in his memoir that the links between 
Siam and Vietnam were strengthened because of the work of a certain Vö Mai, a cadre in charge of 
linking bases in Vietnam to those abroad. See: Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 4546 .
123 Kobelev, op. cit, p. 92. According to Kobelev, in July 1926 Ho informed the Comintern that a peasant 
league had been organised for overseas Vietnamese residing in Siam. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
124 Weng Tocirakan and Thida Thawonset, Pa Taek: Khwampencing khong Kanprachum Samakcha 4
PKT  [The Broken Forest: The Truth about the 4th Congress o f the Thai Communist Party], (Bangkok: 
Samnakngan Matichon, 2526 [1983]), p. 141 and Sitthan Rakprathet, Khwamnmrang Phakkhommunit 
Prathet Thai [An Understanding of the Thai Communist Party], (Bangkok: Borisat Phithak Pracha, 2519 
[1976]), pp. 24-25. Thida and Weng both joined the CPT in 1976 and participated in the 4th congress in 
1982.
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in 1928 and lengthy residence there for over a year pointed up the increased importance of 
Siam to the Vietnamese resistance.
One young activist sent to work in Siam by the Thanh Nien branch in central Vietnam 
was Hoang Vän Hoan, one of Hö's students from the Canton class of 1926.125 In late 
May 1928, Hoan crossed the Mekong into Siam. He was assigned to work in Nong On 
where he met his other Canton classmate, Le Manh Trinh (Tien).126 In mid-1928, Ho 
Chi Minh arrived in Siam for the first time.127 After giving training courses in Ban 
Dong, Ho, now travelling under the alias of Thao Chin, made his way by foot to Udon 
where he met with a number of his young associates from Canton.128 In a move which 
consolidated the leadership of Vietnamese resistance activities in Siam under a central 
authority, Ho presided over the formation of the Udon Provincial Committee (Tinh uy 
Udon). This committee consisted of the following key figures: Dang Thai Thuyen 
(Dang Canh Tan), Vo Van Kieu (Dinh or Bun Dinh), Trän Vän Chan (Täng), 
Nguyln Vän Du (Hai), and Hoang Van Hoan (Nghla). Dang Thai Thuyen was the 
secretary of the committee. According to Hoan, Vö Tung and Le Manh Trinh were not 
members of this committee, because they were active in Phichit.129 As forDäng Thuc 
Hira, he was dispatched to northern Siam to set up new bases, symbolising both his 
continued usefulness to this committee and his less important role in leadership matters.
Dissatisfied with the progress of the Thanh Nien organisation in Udon thus far, Ho 
intensified his efforts to establish closer links with Vietnamese nationals. While Le 
Manh Trinh does not go into details, he says that the Thanh Nien had not been 
understood thoroughly by the Vietnamese and some cadres were disappointed by its 
failure to influence the Siamese masses, citing the inability of revolutionary leaders to 
speak Siamese.130 Hoang Vän Hoan, who worked closely with Ho in Siam, explained 
that many youths thought their residence in Siam was only temporary and that they would 
soon be dispatched to China or Vietnam to begin revolutionary work. Thus, few paid 
attention to studying Siamese or making contact with the local Siamese.131
123 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 455.
126 Ibid., pp. 34-36. Mai Van Quang and Duong Tri Trung were two students from Nghe-Tlnh who studied 
under Hoan and would later play important roles in the next generation of Vietnamese activities in Siam.
127 Hoang Van Hoan says that Hb arrived in Siam around August 1928. See: Hoäng Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 
55. Quynh Anh says that her husband and Hb Chi Minh arrived at her home in Ban Dong in June 1928. 
See: Som Tung, op. c it, pp. 110-16, especially p. 110. Le Manh Trinh says that Hb arrived in Ban Dong 
in the autumn of 1928. Le Manh Trinh, 'In Canton,' p. 116.
128 Wichan Champisi, op. cit., pp. 30-31; 'Mot Tam Guong,' p. 58, fh. 1; Hoäng Vän Hoan, op. c it, p. 55; 
and Son Tung, op. c it, p. 115. During the ten days Hb was said to have stayed in Ban Dong, he 
explained to trusted cadres the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. See: S<m Tung, op. cit, p. 115. From 
the evidence available, Hb appears to have used at least six secret names while in Siam: Thao Chin, Öng 
Tin, Tho, Nam Son, Vuong (his Canton alias), and Le Thuy.
129 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 43.
130 Le Manh Trinh, In  Canton,'p. 118.
131 Hoang Van Hoan, op. c it, p. 56. Hoan's account is corroborated by Le Manh Trinh in 'In Canton,' p. 
118.
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In a meeting with members of the Thanh Nien immediately upon his arrival in Udon, 
Ho discussed these faults with cadres and argued that besides training cadres for the 
coming revolution, political work should be increased among the Siamese. Secondly, he 
opened the membership of the HHT to overseas Vietnamese.132 Thirdly, he suggested 
that the name of the overseas Vietnamese paper, Dong Thanh, be changed to Than Ai 
(Fraternity) and that more articles be published with the aim of increasing the 
revolutionary spirit among the Vietnamese communities in Siam (see picture on previous 
page). In training young revolutionaries, Ho promoted the learning of quoc ngü and 
used historical plays, poems, short stories, and songs as mediums to raise the patriotic 
spirit of his compatriots in Siam. Fourthly, he pushed Hira’s policy of opening more 
schools to train Vietnamese youths. With permits from the Siamese government 
forthcoming, schools were in operation in Udon, Sakhon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, and 
Ban Dong by the end of the decade. Fifthly, Ho stressed the importance of maintaining 
Siamese support and sympathy by respecting the customs, traditions, and laws of the 
Siamese. In this connexion, he urged Vietnamese, especially the leadership, to learn the 
Siamese language and script. Ho took the initiative in learning Siamese and was said to 
have made considerable progress after a few months.133
The address of a Vietnamese representative to Siamese officials attending the opening 
of a Vietnamese school in Udon in May 1929 reflects a number of Ho's changes at work. 
A French agent, who was also present at this meeting, reported the Vietnamese delegate's 
words as follows:
History tells us that the Vietnamese and Siamese have enjoyed a close relationship for a 
long time. This is the reason that since the invasion of our country by the French, our 
compatriots have taken refuge in your territory. If some of them occasionally 
contravene your police regulations, it is because they are not aware of the regulations 
and that is a matter of regret.. .  For several years we have been meeting not only with 
a view to mutual help, but also with a view to clarifying for each other our obligations 
as Vietnamese citizens and proteges in your country. If you were not satisfied with our 
conduct, you would not have authorised the construction of this school. We hope that 
you remain aware of our loyal and noble feelings towards you and that you do not listen 
to shameful accusations which would only spoil our friendly relations.134
132 CVDCQ, pp. 33-34; Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 56-57; and Le Manh Trinh, 'In Canton,' pp. 118-21.
133 Le Manh Trinh, 'In Canton,' pp. 118 and 120; CVDCQ, p. 33; and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 56-57. 
For more details of Ho's activities in northeastern Siam, see: Tran Läm, 'Adventure in the Forest, in 
Days, pp. 132-38.
134 TNA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fl.FI. 39/12, The Opening of Vietnamese School in Udon.' I am 
grateful to Matthew Copeland for bringing these documents to my attention and allowing me to use 
them here. Translations are also by Copeland. Considering Ho's presence in Udon during this time and 
his involvement in setting up a school in Nong Bua, it is not impossible that he had some sort of 
influence in the drafting of the abovementioned speech.
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Such Vietnamese diplomacy could be effective. As the Siamese official attending this 
meeting told the Vietnamese, "None of us is ignorant of the fact that the Vietnamese and 
the Siamese have always enjoyed excellent relations with each other." "That is why," he 
continued, "You prefer our hospitality to that of any other country. We think of you as 
our brothers and we treat you accordingly."135
While in Siam, Ho also paid attention to the importance of Laos. Working out of 
Sakhon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom, Ho built liaison centres in Laos hooked to bases 
in Vietnam. During a trip to Nong Khai, Ho and Hoan summoned two cadres from 
Vientiane to discuss the state of work among the Vietnamese in Laos, with special 
reference to the matter of establishing closer links between bases on both sides of the 
Mekong. Ho was particularly instrumental in strengthening links between Mukdahan to 
Savannakhet.136 One Vietnamese writer familiar with H'o's activities in Siam has made 
the insightful observation that while Ho was in China he carried out resistance work from 
the north of Vietnam and while he was in Siam he did the same, but from the western 
flank.137 This recurrent north/west dichotomy between China and Siam in Vietnamese 
resistance thinking, first evident among anticolonialists in the late 1880s, was at work 
again as the Vietnamese resistance prepared to enter a new stage of development.
II.3. The Formation of the Siamese Communist Party
In May 1929, the Thanh Nien's General Bureau convened the First National Congress 
in Hong Kong. A split occurred during this meeting during which delegates from 
northern Vietnam called for the dissolution of Thanh Nien and the formation of a 
Communist Party. The Central Committee opposed this line, supported by the two 
delegates from Siam, Vö Tung and Däng Thai Thuyen.138 With no breakthrough 
forthcoming, these two suggested that the opinion of Ho be determined first.139 
Following the Congress, two separate communist parties were set up. While the views
1 Ibid. Such Siamese support was not limited to regional authorities. Parts of the Siamese press also took a 
sympathetic view of the Vietnamese anticolonial movement. In 1926, the liberal Thai political journal, 
Khro Lek (Iron Armour), translated and published the lively court proceedings of the 1925 trial of Phan 
Boi Chau in Hanoi. In the introduction, the editor of Khro Lek gave his readers a brief background of the 
scholar-patriot's trial and the fervour it had caused in Vietnam, pointing out that the accused had once 
resided in Thailand and was a figure whose case against the French "would act as a vehicle for greater 
knowledge" for the Thais. See: 'Khadi Khrukkhrom nai Prathet Indocin khong Farangset' [A
Controversial Case in French Indochina], Khro Lek [Iron Shield], 18 January 2469 [1926]. The trial 
proceedings can be found in issues between 18 January and 27 January 1926.
0 6  CVDCQ, p. 39. Ho also travelled with Dang Thai Thuyen (Ty) during his work in Siam. For a 
fascinating account o f Ho and Thuyen's work in Siam, see: Trän Läm, op. cit., pp. 134-38. Ho no doubt 
had the large Vietnamese population in Laos in mind when establishing closer links between resistance 
organisations in Siam, Laos, and Vietnam. We shall return to this topic.
137 Trän Dän Tien, NhOmg Mau Chuyen ve Don Hoat Dong cua Ho Chü Tich [Stories of the Activities of 
President Ho], (Hanoi: NXBST, 1975), p. 71. Recent scholarship has provided new evidence suggesting 
that Trän Dän Tien was, in fact, Ho Chi Minh. If this is the case, the importance of this observation 
takes on added significance.
138 Huynh Kim Khänh, op. cit., pp. 116-19.
139 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 60.
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of the leadership in Siam concerning this split remain unknown, on learning of the 
decision taken in Hong Kong, Ho advised the Thanh Nien headquarters in Siam not to 
publicise the break until the groups could be unified. Sometime during the latter half of 
1929, Ho left Siam.140
Under pressure from the Communist International to create one party, Ho Chi Minh 
convened a meeting in Hong Kong in February 1930, from which the Vietnamese 
Communist Party was formed. The next month, Ho returned to Bangkok, where he met 
with Chinese communists and thereafter travelled to Udon to meet with members of the 
Provincial Committee.141 He explained to the committee the international situation, the 
recent unification of the communist parties, and relayed the Comintern's desire to 
establish a Siamese Communist Party.142 Ho made it clear that the Comintern had issued 
instructions calling for the participation on the part of all cadres in the proletarian 
revolution in whichever country they might reside. For this reason, Ho said, Vietnamese 
cadres in Siam now had the responsibility of helping the Siamese people make a 
revolution. Ho advised the Udon Provincial Committee to select appropriate members to 
become communists and help establish the Siamese Communist Party, separate from the 
Vietnamese Communist Party.143 In another meeting, Ho argued that Siam was still a 
feudal country and a semi-colony. It had not reached the stage of a socialist revolution, 
for it first had to pass through a democratic period, and then, with the help of 
international communism, it would reach the stage of a socialist revolution.144 This was 
the first time that Vietnamese resistance leaders had paid any real attention to the matter of 
Siamese internal affairs apart from maintaining amiable relations with regional authorities 
in order to safeguard their own patriotic activities in Siam.
In meetings with the leaders of the Udon Provincial Committee, Ho outlined concrete 
steps to be taken toward the creation of a Siamese Communist Party (hereafter referred to 
as the SCP). He specifically suggested that the Udon Committee become a Communist 
Provincial Committee. This was done sometime in March or April 1930, with Vö Vän 
Kieu taking over as secretary of the Committee following Dang Thai Thuyen's 
arrest.145 Ho instructed the Udon Committee to help branches of the Thanh Nien in Laos 
make the transition over to communism as well. In April 1930, Ho and Trän Vän 
Chan, on behalf of the Vietnamese communists, travelled to Bangkok to meet with their
140 Ibid., p. 60. Hoan says that Ho left Siam in September 1929.
141 Quynh Anh told her biographer that her husband, Vö Tung, and Dang Canh Tan were to attend the 
meeting on behalf of Thanh Nien branches in Siam and Laos, respectively. However, after failing to 
arrive in time, they returned to Bangkok in March 1930 where they were immediately arrested by Siamese 
authorities tipped off by the French. They were turned over to the French and given prison terms in Ban 
Me Thuot, where Dang Thai Thuyen later died at the hands of the French. Scm Tung, op. c it, p. 117 and 
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 60-61.
142 Hoang Van Hoan, op. c it, p. 61.
143 Ibid., pp. 62 and 63.
144 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
145 Interview with Hoang Nhai Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi.
42 Chapter 1
Chinese counterparts, with no mention made of meeting Siamese representatives. On 20 
April, a meeting was held among these groups during which H'6 participated as a 
representative of the Comintern. Under instructions from the Comintern, this meeting 
formally proclaimed the establishment of the SCP and appointed a Bangkok-based 
provisional Central Committee, actually referred to as the Central Executive Committee of 
the Siamese Party, or the Siamese Commission (uy Xiem) as it was called for short by 
Vietnamese cadres. Tran Vän Chan participated in this commission as a member of the 
Udon committee along with Ngo Chmh Quoc, an overseas Vietnamese bom in Siam 
who was probably a confidant of Ho.146 After having nearly escaped capture by the 
French thanks to a tip-off from an apparent double agent working for French intelligence 
in Siam, Ho went undercover disguised as a Buddhist monk before leaving Siam to help 
set up the Malayan Communist Party.147
Meanwhile, Trän Vän Chan returned to Udon to report to the provincial committee 
on the formation of the SCP and the new responsibilities of the party in northeast Siam. 
According to decisions made by the Siamese Commission, the Udon Communist 
Provincial Committee would now be responsible for activating the revolution in northeast 
Siam. At another meeting, discussed again was the importance of making a Siamese 
revolution. Some un-named members of the Provincial Committee had reservations 
about the idea of Vietnamese helping the Siamese to make a revolution, but were 
overruled by those advocating communist international support for the oppressed, even if 
it meant inviting repression.148
14^ Rood, op. cit, p. 34, citing confidential Thai communist sources, and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 63- 
64.
147 For Ho’s near escape, see Tran Dan Tien, op. cit, p. 71. For his exit from Siam, see: Hoang Van Hoan, 
op. cit, pp. 64 and 90; 'NhOmg N6t Co Bin ve Tinh Hlnh Thai Lan' [Some Basic Views on the Situation 
in Thailand], (Hanoi: Uy Ban Lien Lac Van Hoa vcri Nirorc Ngoai, 10 July 1968), p. 37; and Rood, op. 
cit, p. 34. Wichan Champisi, citing the dissertation of Siamese Police Colonel Thawat Phithak on the 
Vietnamese in Siam, says that upon returning to Siam for the second time Ho had a Vietnamese contact 
working in the French Legation in Bangkok. In one case, Ho, using the alias Le Thuy, allegedly 
avoided arrest during a demonstration in Bangkok through the assistance of a Vietnamese Legation 
officer who sheltered him in the delegation, with other French officers apparently unaware of Ho's true 
identity. See: Wichan Champisi, op. cit, pp. 30-31. Hoang Van Hoan reveals in his memoir that Dang 
Nguyen Hung, a revolutionary who had travelled to Siam with Le Hong Phong and Ho Tung Mau in the 
early 1920s, later left the resistance to enter an American Christian missionary school in Siam and 
enlisted as a warrant officer in a Siamese Infantry School. He then worked for the French Legation as a 
spy for Do Hung. Allegedly penniless, he quit the Legation in Bangkok to arrive in southern China to 
join the Vietnamese resistance. Because Hoan and other communist and non-communist revolutionaries 
were in contact with Dang Nguyen Hung in southern China in the 1930s and allocated him some 
resistance work, it suggests that he may have helped them in some way earlier in order to have gained 
any work at all from them. Considering his 1920s links to individuals who soon became major 
Vietnamese revolutionaries, it is possible that he had assisted Vietnamese activists in Siam even while 
working as a spy. Nevertheless, veteran revolutionaries in the 1930s were troubled by his spy past and 
questioned the depth of his commitment to the resistance. See: Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 89, 101, 
108, and 110-11.
148 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 65 and Wichan Champisi, op. cit, p. 33. In September 1930, Siamese 
authorities, prodded by the French, arrested over one hundred Vietnamese in Phichit province, although 
many of them were subsequently released. See: 'Bac Ho: Hoi Ky [Uncle Ho: Reminiscences] in Dau 
Nguon: Hoi Ky ve Bäc Ho [The Source: Memories of Uncle Ho], (Hanoi: NXBVH, 1975), p. 108; 
CVDCQ, p. 4243; Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 65-66; and Som Tung, op. cit, p. 118-19.
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In October 1930, as the Vietnamese Communist Party was being renamed the 
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) under Comintern instructions, the Provincial 
Committee convened a congress of Vietnamese members from Udon Thani, Sakhon 
Nakhon, and Nakhon Phanom provinces to determine the party's future policy. During 
this congress, a representative of the Siamese Commission introduced the establishment 
of the SCP and announced that the Udon Provincial Committee was now a Party Branch 
(Dang Bo) of the SCP responsible for northeast Siam.149 To prepare to undertake this 
task, a subsequent special meeting was held by the Provincial Committee to discuss the 
problem of Vietnamese activities in Siam. One result was an increased intake into the 
SCP of youths from Thanh Nien's HHT, who were instructed to learn Siamese in order 
to link more closely with the Siamese masses. Evidently, a number of Vietnamese 
students even entered Siamese schools during this time. As one of those proficient in 
Siamese, Hoang Van Hoan was assigned to run a Communist Youth League. In 1931, 
Hoan's influence increased even more when he replaced the secretary of the Udon 
Provincial Committee, Vo Van Ki'eu, following the latter's death.150
II.4. The Tasks of the SCP in Siam (1930-1939)
I 1.4.1. The Work of the SCP among the Siamese
Although the SCP was largely a Vietnamese and Chinese creation, it did try to attract 
Siamese members. Hoang Van Hoan says that a Siamese cadre, referred to by the 
Vietnamese as Van, "was influenced by the Party" and helped in the dissemination of 
propaganda against the Bangkok government in the early 1930s.151 According to the 
memoir of an overseas Vietnamese cadre who worked in Siam, five to seven Siamese 
were actually admitted into the SCP at some point. One such Siamese cadre was a certain 
Nai Horn, who was sent to Moscow for training but was held up for unknown reasons in 
China and returned subsequently to work in Laos. Another member, Nai Thum, went to 
the Soviet Union but remained idle upon his return to Siam. A third Siamese member, 
known as Su Riu, was a Siamese communist working in France.152
A communist letter intercepted by the British from the Siamese Executive Commission 
(which appears to be the same Siamese Commission which Hoan describes) to the
149 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 65-66 and Weng Tocirakan, op. cit, p. 142. Members from Phichit could
not attend because of strong suppression of their activities at this time. So far, there is evidence of four 
ICP Party Sections in Siam: one each in Ban Dong, Nong Bua, Phichit and Khon Kaen, with other
branches probably in Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, and Sakhon Nakhon. See: 'May Chuyen,' p. 46 and 
Son Tung, op. cit., pp. 124 and 133. Quynh Anh became a member of the ICP in Khon Kaen in April 
1934.
150 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 66.
151 Ibid., p. 89.
1 S91J L This information comes from a memoir of an unnamed overseas Vietnamese in Siam which was made 
available to the author by Hoang Nhat Tan during an interview on 5 May 1989, Hanoi. The author of 
this memoir was an associate of Hoang Van Hoan’s who had begun his work in Siam in the early 1920s.
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Malayan Communist Party indicates that the SCP had a number of serious internal 
problems. With the SCP's total membership put at 325, the Commission administered 
two provincial committees, four divisional committees, five branches, and three special 
cells. There were few links with the peasants in rural areas, with the one exception being 
a provincial committee, but even it was said "not to be functioning as it should." 
Moreover, of the 325 members most were industrial and estate workers who were said to 
have been "of weak quality," unable to carry out their tasks effectively.153 In another 
captured communist document, some members were criticised for their "egotism, respect 
for the upper class, romanticism, thinking only of one's . . . country, self, . . . and 
opportunism."154 As for the leaders, they were said to "talk too much and work too 
little."155 Perhaps most divisive was the Party's predominantly non-Siamese character. 
Apart from its handful of Siamese members and another fifty-five Vietnamese ones, the 
rest were all Chinese. One document cited this as the main reason explaining why "the 
movement among the natives has not been carried out."156 In November 1932, a Party 
paper had this problem in mind when it reminded members of the internationalist line of 
the Party.157 Besides these challenges, there were also fears that the "central committee" 
had been penetrated by Siamese spies who, as one document read, were "working to trick
Propaganda among the Siamese masses was the chief way by which the Party hoped 
to promote a Siamese revolution. One of those in charge of this task was Hoang Vän 
Hoan, whose language skills in both Siamese and Chinese probably account for his 
appointment as a propagandist. Hoan tells us in his memoir that he spent much of his 
time translating documents and pamphlets, written by Chinese members, into Siamese, to 
commemorate International Women's Day, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, 
and other important dates.159 The SCP had access to printers with which leaflets were 
printed in Siamese, Vietnamese, Chinese, and English and distributed throughout the
153 TNA, fl.Pl.39/13-30, Communists 2473-2480 [1930-1937] Box 2, 'Siamese Executive Commission to the 
Malayan Communist Party,' 20 September 1932. While there was a peasant organisation under one of 
the provincial committees, it was "not functioning as it should." A summary of some of these captured 
communist documents can also be found in GB, PRO, FO 1558/1558/40, 'Annual Report, 1932: Mr. 
Dormer to Sir John Simon,’ 24 January 1933, pp. 11-12.
154 TNA, fl.Pl. 39/25, 9 V.'Under-secretary of Ministry of Interior to Under-secretary of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,' 16 September 1932.
155 TNA, fl.Pl.39/26, 'Communist-Banishment o f Chinese Citizens, 2475-2476 [1932-1933], Party Monthly 
Paper,' 15 November 1932.
156 TNA, n.PH.39/25, 9 tf, 'Under-secretary of Ministry of Interior to Under-secretary of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,' 16 September 1932. This is supported by un-named Thai Communist Party sources cited by 
Flood, op. cit, p. 34.
157 TNA, f l .PI.39/26, 'Communist-Banishment o f Chinese Citizens, 2475-2476 [1932-1933], Party Monthly 
Paper,' 15 November 1932. Quynh Anh confirmed that the SCP did have a secret Party paper. Sam Tung, 
op. cit., p. 124.
1 5 8 TNA, n.PI.39/25, 8 '1, ’Under-secretary of Ministry of Interior to Under-secretary of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,' 16 September 1932. See also: Flood, op. cit., p. 34.
159 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 72-73 and 75. Hoan worked selling newspapers in Bangkok in order to 
cover his living expenses in the early 1930s.
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country, particularly in the Bangkok area where the working class was concentrated. The 
SCP's propaganda efforts targetted such groups as rice millers, tramway workers, 
rickshaw drivers, railway workers, many of whom were forming unions or striking for 
better conditions in the early 1930s.160 According to a British source, on 30 September 
1932 a large number of leaflets, signed by the Communist Party and the Communist 
Youth Party of Siam, were spread throughout Bangkok and outlying towns. These 
leaflets called for the overthrow of the People's Party and attacked the monarchy. It was 
reported that a Vietnamese by the name of Le Hang Phong [Le Hong Phong?] was 
probably behind this. He was said to have been in Bangkok earlier, but had eluded 
police.161
At the end of 1933, Ngö Chrnh Quoc, one of the Vietnamese members of the Siamese 
Commission, was arrested by Siamese authorities in Bangkok and handed over to the 
French. Replacing him as a central committee provisional member was Hoang Vän 
Hoan, who now joined Trän Vän Chan as the second known Vietnamese communist on 
this commission. In 1934 or 1935, when the secretary of the Commission became ill, 
Chan reportedly took over the leadership of the Commission.162 While it is clear from 
Siamese, Vietnamese, and Western sources that the SCP sought to promote a revolution 
among the Siamese masses, results were anything but successful. Most importantly, the 
June 1932 change of government in Siam that ended the absolute monarchy was a major 
political development which the SCP leadership was following closely. And although 24 
June encouraged many communists in the hope that Siam would soon join in the 
movement towards socialist revolution, the People's Party (PP), led by Pridi 
Phanomyong, was the SCP's most formidable competitor. As the SCP informed the 
Malayan Communist Party, the new government "is now a dictatorship of the PP" which 
is working to prevent a revolution of the masses and had not abolished regressive taxes 
and licenses.163 The Communists were also worried that the PP had dispatched spies to
160 There are many examples of political agitation and the distribution of communist handbills, pamphlets, or
handouts by the SCP. See: TNA, fl.W.39/26, ’Communists-Banishment of Chinese Citizens, 22475-2476 
[1932-1933], Documents Prepared for 21 January Lenin Remembrance Day' and 'Handbill for the 
Tramwaymeris Association,' 15 December 1932; Bangkok Times W eekly Mail [Hereafter, BTW M] 24 
April 1936; 21 July 1936; 16 April 1937; 9 September 1935; 16 September 1935; 14 October 1935; 20 April 
1936. For the strikes, see: The New Siam: Railwaymen on Strike,' BTWM, 27 April 1934. For Western 
sources, see the following dispatches: GB, PRO, F. 1931/1931/40, 'Annual Report, 1934: Sir J. Crosby to 
Sir John Simon,' 30 January 1935, pp. 11-12; F. 1909/1909/40, 'Annual Report, 1935: Sir J. Crosby to Mr. 
Eden,' 24 February 1936, pp. 14-16; F. 1558/1558/40, 'Annual Report, 1932: Mr. Dormer to Sir John 
Simon,' 24 January 1933, pp. 11-12; and US, DOS, 892.00 B/6, 'Legation in Bangkok (Potter) to 
Secretary of State,' 5 October 1932, pp. 1-5.
161 GB, PRO, F. 1558/1558/40, 'Annual Report, 1932: Mr. Dormer to Sir John Simon,’ 24 January 1933, pp. 
11-12. The French had similar suspicions that Le Hong Phong might have been behind the 
dissemination of such pamphlets in Siam in 1932. Gunn, op. c it, pp. 4849 .
162 Hoang Van Hoan, op. c it, pp. 72 and 455. See also: Gouvernement General de L'Indochine, Direction 
des Affaires Politiques et de la Sürete Generale, Contribution a lbistoire des mouvements politiques de 
l'indochine frangaise, Le "Döng-Diromg C öngSin  Ding" ou "Partie Communist Indochinois" (1925- 
1933), pp. 4344 .
163 TNA, n .P l.39/13-30, Communists 2473-2480 [1930-1937] Box 2, 'Siamese Executive Commission to the 
Malayan Communist Party,' 20 September 1932.
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prevent a revolution among the masses and win them over to the PP's side.164 Another 
document prepared for a Lenin's day celebration on 21 January 1933 said that the new 
government was no different from the monarchy, "although it is employing crafty 
techniques to trick the people, to make sure that they do not start to believe in socialism..
. . In consequence, we feel that the PP is more oppressive than ever."165
Immediately after 24 June, the SCP attempted to take advantage of potential social 
tension to promote a revolution against the new liberal leaders. The SCP instructed its 
members to "be careful of the propaganda work of the People's Party . . . [and to] use 
some of our people to get inside the People's Party and steal their people over to our 
side."166 According to captured Party documents, instructions had been given to cadres 
to investigate the state of worker preparedness for a planned political demonstration set 
for 1 August 1932. On this day, strikes and boycotts would be launched to "get all 
labourers together to end oppression." Communist cadres infiltrated labour groups to 
explain the 1 August demonstration, attended factory meetings to address the workers, 
and sought to win over the support of Bangkok's rickshaw drivers and rice millers. 
Handbills were printed by the SCP propaganda machine calling for the overthrow of the 
PP and the increasingly powerful military group which was consolidating its power. 
Workers were urged to strike for pay raises, shorter working weeks, and representation 
in management decisions.167 In the northeast, the communist leaders of the ICP cell in 
Khon Kaen organised Vietnamese and Siamese to demonstrate against high taxes, the end 
result being the arrest and incarceration of many cadres, including Quynh Anh.168
In the end, internal problems appear to have undermined the SCP's ability to effect any 
changes among the workers in Bangkok. Some cadres were opposed to the 1 August 
"uprising," with a certain member's disagreement with the Party singled out as a display 
of irresponsibility, weakness, and indiscipline.169 However, while the 1 August 
demonstration accomplished little, it did unwittingly attract the attention of the 
increasingly powerful anti-communist military group in the Siamese government. 
Communist documents report that from the day their handbills went out announcing the 1
164 Ibid.
165 TNA, n.W.39/26, 'Communists-Banishment of Chinese Citizens, 2475-2476 [1932-1933], 'Documents 
prepared for 21 January Lenin Remembrance Day.
166 TNA, fl.W.39/13-30, 'Communists 2473-2480 [1930-1937],' Box 2.
167 TNA, n.PI.39/25, 8 Ü,'Under-secretary of Ministry of Interior to Under-secretary of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,' 16 September 1932 and Hokng Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 75. See also: Sitthan Rakprathet, op. cit., 
p. 26. According to the British Minister at Bangkok, the Javanese revolutionary, Tan Malaka, was on 
his way to Siam "with money and instructions," when he was arrested in Hong Kong. GB, PRO, FO 
1558/1558/40, 'Annual Report, 1932: Mr. Dormer to Sir John Simon,' 25 January 1933, p. 12.
168 Som Tung, op. cit., pp. 138-55.
169 TNA, fl.W.39/25, 2 U.'Under-secretary of Ministry of Interior to Under-secretary of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,' 16 September 1932.
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August event, Siamese authorities were armed heavily, "under the impression that the 
people will begin an uprising."170
But no uprising ever occurred. An article published in a Party paper in November 
1932 summed up the reasons preventing the SCP from making any significant inroads 
among the Siamese masses:
Our party is called the communist Party of Siam, but in truth our Party has but 
Chinese. . . . The basis by which we can change Siam comes down to a method by 
which we can bring Siamese into the Party. This is not a new problem. The same 
measure was discussed at our meeting last year . . .  where we decided that the first step 
was for members to study Siamese in preparation for contacting Siamese. It was 
decided to seek results in six months, but from that time to the present it has been a 
year and not a single branch has announced progress . . . The Party has investigated 
political developments in Siam and has come to the conclusion that if we do not have 
Siamese friends join with us, we will be unable to perform our task of changing Siam .
. . We’ve been unable to influence events, like the strike of the rickshaw pullers, the 
student strike at Assumption College, or the tramways movement. The Party has been 
unable to get them to follow our suggestions and fight according to our plan.171
Hoang Vän Hoan, who was a member of the Siamese Commission, claims that one 
important obstacle blocking the SCP's capacity to promote a Siamese revolution was that 
there was no clear policy guiding the Commission's work. In addition, despite the large 
Chinese population in Bangkok, Hoan says that Chinese cadres had very little influence 
among the Siamese people. As for the Vietnamese, they were said to have had more 
influence among the Siamese in the northeast. However, because the efforts of the 
resistance had previously arranged the overseas Vietnamese in specific areas in the 
northeast, readily known to Siamese authorities, it was easier for the police to make 
sweeping arrests.172 A 1968 Vietnamese communist document analysing the history of 
the Siamese Communist Party states that while the SCP made very little headway among 
the Siamese masses during its lifetime, it did cause the "great worry" of the post-1932 
Siamese government. This source confirms that at the outset the SCP increased its 
political activity among Siamese workers, paying particular attention to the formation of
170 TNA, n.W.39/25, Communists 2473-2480 [1930-1937], 'Bolshevik Central Office of Siam to Officials of 
the Siam Commission,' 31 July 1932. It was reported that Siamese military officials were dressed in full 
combat gear by the 1 August date.
171 TNA, n.W.39/26, Communists-Banishment of Chinese Citizens, 2475-2476 [1932-1933], 'Party Monthly 
Paper,’ 15 November 1932 for the quote. In 1935, Hoan told his superiors that upon its founding in 1930 
the SCP was primarily a Chinese and Vietnamese creation. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 93. Without 
elaborating, Flood cites Thai Communist sources as saying that the "historic conditions peculiar to 
Thailand" kept the "political consciousness among Thais low." Rood, op. cit, p. 34.
172 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 75-76, 90-91, and 93.
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trade, tramway workers, and rickshaw driver unions.173 One reason cited for the failure 
of the SCP to effect change among the Siamese masses was the success of the military 
government in promoting a "narrow nationalist line among the workers" which cut the the 
workers off from the Communist Party. As for the peasant class, the "democratic 
bourgeoisie" (that is, the PP) were allied with them, using such tools as the press and 
nationalism to win them over.174 According to this source, the SCP's activities
were limited to the dissemination of Marxist propaganda among the workers and the 
different working classes. Though it was called a Party, it was really only a group of 
loosely bound Marxist groups, not yet an official, united Party with a clear 
revolutionary fighting programme.175
Besides trying to mold a Siamese revolution, the Vietnamese were also used by 
competing Siamese political factions following the 1932 change of government. In one 
case, Mom Chao Setsiri, the brother of Prince Boworadet (the leader of the unsuccessful 
royalist counter coup in 1933) and Prince Sitthiphon, had a group of Vietnamese in 
Tambon Bang Phut under their direction. Setsiri was sending money to Cambodians and 
Vietnamese to buy "tools" and was reported to have had access to large quantities of 
ammunition as well.176 Through his wife, Setsiri was related to another shady figure 
named Seng Khamen, an individual of Mon or Khmer blood. Seng, who had links to the 
Siamese police, had numerous contacts with Vietnamese in the Bangkok area and was 
said to have had some sort of an agreement with them. A leader of one of the Vietnamese 
groups informed Seng that his group felt that the People's Party was "dishonest and 
acting incorrectly" and that if his Vietnamese group were to cooperate with Seng, then 
money would have to be given out for businesses, farming, and channelled into other 
occupational development areas for the Vietnamese.177 Another report said that a certain
173 'Nhümg Net,' p. 37.
174 Ibid., p. 38.
175 Ibid., p. 37, cited with reference to the Thai Communist source, Weng Tocirakan, op. cit., pp. 14243.
Weng, perhaps wanting to understate the importance of the SCP, says it was not truly a party, but a 
"flop." However, there is evidence suggesting that the SCP may have had difficulty in organising itself 
as a genuine "Party." In February 1932, the Comintern asked the French, Indian, Chinese, and Malayan 
communist parties "to assist communists in Siam to organise a Communist Party in correct accordance 
with the policies of International Communism." See: Dang Cong S&n Viet-Nam Ban Chap Hanh Trung 
LTcmg, Van Kien Ding: 1930-1945, Tap I  [Party Documents: 1930-1945, Volume I], (Hanoi: Ban
Nghien Cfru Lieh Sir Ding Trung l/omg Xuät Bin, 1977), p. 291 [hereafter cited as VKD, Vol. I]. On 
20 August 1935, Pravda printed a speech by a Siamese communist known as "Rashi," who said that the 
Siamese party was not yet a "section of the C[ommunist] International]," but hoped to be. See: US, 
DOS, Division of Biographies Information, Office of Librarian and Intelligence, 'Far Easterners in the 
Comintern Structure,' No. 5226, 7 December 1950.
176 TNA, ff.7.0201.16/25, Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, [hereafter, cited as OPMC], 'Change of 
Government, Secret Reports-Report of Nai Chumcharoen,' 27 November 1932. I am grateful to Matthew 
Copeland for allowing me to use these documents here. A forthcoming PhD thesis by Copeland will add 
much to our understanding of the intricacies surrounding Siamese politics during this period and the 
intellectual trends informing the changes of 1932-1933, in particular.
177 TNA, OPMC, ff.7.0201.16/25, 'Change of Government, Secret Reports, Unsigned Report,’ 27 December 
1932.
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Nai Thai, a Vietnamese leader in Tambon Ban Phut, told his group that the new 
"government has failed to act correctly and has been dishonest."178
The SCP was dealt a devastating blow in April 1933 when the Siamese government 
passed strict anti-communist legislation. There were various politically-motivated reasons 
explaining the promulgation of this tough law, but the propaganda efforts by Chinese and 
Vietnamese communists calling for the overthrow of the new government certainly did 
not help, fuelling the anti-communist line being taken by an increasingly powerful 
Siamese military elite.179 Continuing in the tradition of the severe anti-bolshevik laws 
first put into place by the monarchy in 1927, the 1933 anti-communist legislation meted 
out heavy sentences of up to ten years for political agitation or unrest caused "by words 
or writings or printed documents or by any means whatever [which] advocate 
communism."180 Between 1933 and the outbreak of WWII, the Siamese, spurred on by 
the French legation in Bangkok, stepped up their surveillance and arrests of Vietnamese, 
especially in the northeast. While some of those arrested may not have been actual 
communists, a large number were. By the end of the decade, the maximum security gaol 
north of Bangkok, Ban Khwang, was home to key members of the SCP leadership, 
including Trän Vän Chan and Quynh Anh.181
Ironically, to many of those Vietnamese communists confined to Ban Khwang during 
the 1930s, incarceration proved a valuable learning experience. More than one 
Vietnamese jailed during this period has referred to this prison as the "University of Ban 
Khwang." It provided opportunities for the Vietnamese to learn new languages, to 
increase solidarity, to discuss their political mistakes, and to plot a future course of
178 TNA, OPMC, fl.1.0201.16/25, 'Change of Government, Secret Reports-Report of Nai Chumcharoen, 27 
December 1932. A "Nai Thongdi" was mentioned as another leader of the Vietnamese.
179 Suphot Dantrakun, Prasert Thrapsunthon, (Bangkok: Borisat Klet Thai, introduction dated 1981), pp. 27- 
28 and 34 and Sitthan Rakprathet, op. cit, pp. 26-27. While the Siamese monarchy adopted a tougher 
lines toward the Vietnamese in the early 1930s, Vietnamese activists still found that the court could be 
helpful in some cases. Benjamin Batson has provided a very good discussion of the court's attitude 
toward Vietnamese anticolonialists working in Siam in the early 1930s. See: Benjamin A. Batson, 
'Siam's Political Future: Documents from the End of the Absolute Monarchy.’ SEADP, No. 96, (July 
1974), pp. 62-63.
180 'People's Assembly Dissolved,' BTWM, 3 April 1933. See also: GB, PRO, FO. 1909/1909/40, 'Annual 
Report, 1935: Sir J. Crosby to Mr. Eden,' 24 February 1936, pp. 14-16. In April 1930, the Siamese King 
made a trip to Indochina during which the French asked the monarch to crack-down on the Vietnamese 
in Siam. For details of cooperation between French intelligence and Siamese police to monitor 
Vietnamese resistance activities, see: Daniel Hemery, op. cit, pp. 160-61, fh. 31; Benjamin A. Batson, 
The End o f the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 169-70; and 
CVDCQ, p. 101, for a copy of an ICP document revealing communist fears that the French would create 
fabrications to convince the King of the importance of suppressing Vietnamese activists in Siam.
181 Interview with Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi; CVDCQ, pp. 45-46; Son Tung, op. cit, p. 153; and 
Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC. In 1934, it was reported that the British 
Acting Consul-General in Bangkok was informed by the Director-General of the Siamese Criminal 
Investigation Division (CID) that the communists in Siam "need not be taken seriously." The CID was 
reportedly more interested in keeping an eye on "undesirables" (i.e. the Chinese) arriving from abroad. 
GB, PRO, FO 1931/1931/40, 'Annual Report, 1934: Sir J. Crosby to Sir John Simon,' 30 January 1935, p. 
12.
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action.182 Yet life in Siamese prisons could also be brutal. In one instance, a Vietnamese 
by the name of Trän Bä Giao was sent to Ban Khwang where he demanded 
improvements in living conditions. He was said to have died at the hands of Siamese 
prison authorities.183 In June 1935, the Bangkok Times Weekly Mail reported that a 
skirmish had broken out in a Sakhon Nakhon gaol between prison authorities and 72 
Vietnamese prisoners, armed with sticks, who were demanding certain basic human 
rights from the prison authorities. One Vietnamese prisoner was killed.184
Siamese repression such as this posed serious problems to Vietnamese cadres in 
charge of bringing about a Siamese revolution. In 1934, the ICP's Overseas Office in 
Hong Kong sent the communist paper, The Bolshevist, to cadres in Siam calling for 
continued class struggle with no compromises. In May of that year, Trän Vän Chan 
travelled to Hong Kong to participate in a meeting of the ICP's Overseas Office. Before 
leaving, Hoan claims the two discussed the need to ask for advice concerning the 
difficulty of promoting a "Siamese revolution." According to Hoan's account, when 
Chan returned to Siam, he had little to say other than the need to continue the revolution 
in Siam according to the Bolshevist line. This went on until mid-1935, with Hoan 
claiming in his memoir later that he had suspected at the time that Chan had not reported 
the problems of the SCP to the Overseas Office.185
The ICP's First Party Congress in Macao in March 1935 did little to address Hoan's 
concerns. During this Congress, the ICP continued the international line calling for 
increased efforts to promote a revolution in Siam.186 As a 31 March letter to the SCP 
from an ICP Central Committee delegate at the Macao Congress read in part:
We ask that the SCP lead the revolutionary struggle of the Siamese working masses 
enthusiastically and develop it fully. . . . The revolutionary activities in every region 
are a part of the world revolution. All are class brothers in the capitalist, colonial, and 
semi-colonial regions. You have our warmest support in the revolutionary struggle of 
the courageous worker-peasants and among the working Siamese masses.187
182 Quynh Anh, who was jailed in Ban Khwang during the 1930s, recounted interesting stories to her 
biographer concerning the social structure o f this prison, including the relationship between Vietnamese 
communists and those Siamese nobles who been jailed for their role in the unsuccessful 1933 royalist 
counter coup led by Prince BoworadeL See: Son Tung, op. cit., pp. 143-55.
183 See: CVDCQ, p. 47.
184 'Affair in a Gaol: Communist Prisoners Make Trouble,' BTWM, 13 June 1935.
185 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 76-77 and 91.
186 'Nghi Quyet ve Cong tac Phan De Lien Mirth, 28 March 1935' [Resolution on the Work of the Alliance
against Imperialism], VKD, Vol. I, pp. 558-60. Two un-named representatives from the SCP participated
in this congress, according to one DRV historian. A certain Tran To Chan attended the congress on
behalf of the Indochinese Assistance Section. See: T.C., 'Nhln Lai Cäc Cer Sb  Bf Mat cua Ccr Quan
Länh Dao D ing Cong Sin Dong Durtmg: 1930-1935' [Another Look at the Secret Bases of the Office of 
the Leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party: 1930-1935], NCLS, No. 37, (April 1962), p. 24. See 
Huynh Kim Khänh, op. cit, chapters 3 and 4, for a discussion o f the development of Vietnamese 
communism during this pteriod and its relationship to international communism.
187 Thu Gui cho Tnmg LTorng Ding Cong S in  Xiem,' [Letter to the Central Committee of the Siamese 
Communist Party], VKD, Tap I, p. 655. See Ap>pjendix IH for a translation of this document in its
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To some SCP leaders concerned with the large-scale arrests of Vietnamese leaders and 
its effect on their capacity to aid the Vietnamese revolution, the Macao line must have 
seemed out of touch with reality. In early 1935, Hoan left Siam for China citing genuine 
health reasons, but also with the secret intention of meeting with ICP leaders to discuss 
the problem of having Vietnamese cadres promote a Siamese revolution. In China, Hoan 
explained to Ha Huy Tap (a ranking representative of the ICP's Overseas Office) that 
despite the large Vietnamese population in Siam, the number of "active" revolutionaries 
was relatively quite small. He reiterated that because Vietnamese communities were 
concentrated in certain, known locations in the northeast, it was easy for the Siamese 
police to make arrests. According to Hoan, "almost all of the Party's main cadres" were 
arrested by Siamese authorities during this time. Hoan cited the Phichit incident in 
September 1930, when hundreds of Vietnamese were rounded up and revolutionary 
bases there were destroyed for good. Lastly, and probably most importantly to the ICP 
leadership, he pointed out that if things continued to deteriorate at this rate, the capacity of 
the SCP to aid the Indochinese revolution, which really meant the Vietnamese one, would 
be severely undermined.188
11.4.2. The SCP's Assistance to the Indochinese Revolution
Hoan's last point is important. In 1930-1931, worker strikes, peasant demonstrations 
and boycotts were common in Vietnam. Beginning in the last half of 1930, autonomous 
"red villages" (sometimes called "soviets") were set up in the Nghe-Tinh area under the 
encouragement of local ICP branches. The French struck back by sanctioning a violent 
crack-down on the villages in this area and the communist leadership in particular.189 
Despite calls by some communists for an uprising against the French, by mid-1931 not 
only had the soviet movement been crushed, but the ICP apparatus itself had suffered 
badly with a large number of its leaders either killed or imprisoned. Many of those able 
to escape found their way to Siam.
As these cadres were bringing news of the repression to Udon, Le Tan Anh arrived 
in Siam from China. Anh was a close associate of Hö's, who had first come to Siam in 
the early 1920s and had had a hand in the formation of the Thanh Nien in Canton. In 
meetings between Anh, ICP members who had recently fled Vietnam, and members of 
the Udon Committee, it was decided that a committee should be created to assist the 
Indochinese revolution from Siam during this difficult time. In charge of this committee
entirety. That the ICP continued to push the Siamese revolution, even though it was aware of the 
stringent Siamese crack-down on Vietnamese activities in Siam, see: 'Ctiru Te Do Dong Duong Van
Dong, 28 March 1935' [Red Aid for Indochinese Activities], VKD, 1930-1945, Vol. I, p. 559.
188 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 93-94. Hoan says that Tap told him that Tran Van Chan had not informed 
him of this matter in Hong Kong a year earlier.
189 A discussion of the Soviet Nghe-Tinh matter and its repression by the French can be found in Huynh 
Kim Khänh, op. cit, pp. 151-71, especially pp. 156-57.
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would be members of the SCP and some of those revolutionaries who had fled to Siam. 
As an individual who actually participated in these events, Hoan says the tasks of this 
body were divided into the following three parts: 1) to provide safe housing and 
recovery centres for those cadres seeking shelter in Siam; 2) to open training centres for 
those cadres still lacking in theoretical studies and revolutionary experience; and 3) to 
create conditions to allow cadres to return to Vietnam as quickly as possible to rebuild 
bases in Vietnam. The Siamese Commission supported the Provincial Committee's 
moves to support the ICP and gave the Provincial Committee this specific responsibility, 
citing it as the international duty of the SCP to help the Indochinese revolution.190
To achieve the three abovementioned goals, in early 1932 the Udon committee 
instructed Le Manh Trinh and Nguyln Vän Du to organise what soon became known 
as the Indochinese Assistance Section (Dong Duong Vien Tro Bo).191 Le Manh 
Trinh writes in his memoir that numerous overseas Vietnamese families agreed to shelter 
and care for cadres fleeing to Siam. Vietnamese fishermen and farmers donated food and 
equipment, while carpenters employed their countrymen as assistants. In another case, 
Vietnamese in Nakhon Phanom developed a longer term assistance programme by renting 
land from local Siamese which was specifically set aside for sustaining those cadres 
coming to Siam to escape French repression.192 According to Hoan's account, after a 
while the Indochinese Assistance Section was able to provide shelter to cadres seeking 
refuge in Siam as well as to gamer funds for their travel requirements. Money, 
reportedly amounting to five thousand baht during this time, was contributed by 
Vietnamese communities in Siam to finance the care of these cadres. Secondly, because a 
majority of those seeking refuge in Siam lacked revolutionary training, centres were set 
up in such places as Ban Mai to give instruction in revolutionary theory. In fact, the 
political programme and regulations of the ICP were reportedly brought to Siam for the 
first time during this period and were used in training sessions.193 As Trinh puts it, the 
overseas Vietnamese bases in Siam "became a University for those comrades" fleeing 
French repression in Indochina.194 He goes on to say that the assistance provided by the 
SCP to the Indochinese revolution during this time— specifically, 1932-1934— was 
important in that it was one of the major links between surviving revolutionary outposts 
in Vietnam and the ICP leadership positioned abroad until formation of the ICP's 
Overseas Commission in Hong Kong in 1934.195
190 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 67-68 cited in consultation with Weng Tocirakan, op. cit, p. 142.
191 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 68 is the main source, with reference to Gunn, op. cit., pp. 56-57; T.C., op.
cit., pp. 23-24 and CVDCQ, pp. 4 3 4 5 .
192 CVDCQ, p. 44.
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 69. The political programme was brought to Siam by Le Loc and Tran Xu,
who were members of the Ha Tinh provincial committee. The Udon Provincial Committee was also able
to provide cadres with research materials that either had not reached parts of Vietnam or were extremely 
hard to come by.
194 CVDCQ, p. 45.
195 Ibid., p .45 .
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Before cadres went back to Indochina to resume their activities, a meeting was held in 
Ban Mai in 1933, with the participation of Nguyln Van Du, Le Manh Trinh, Le Loc, 
Trän Xu, Bui Khiromg, and Hoang Van Hoan. According to Hoan's account, 
Nguyen Vän Du reported that the Siamese Commission "had agreed to form the Central 
Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party in order to administer the affairs of the 
Indochinese Party directly." It remains unclear what the exact status of this Committee 
was.196 It consisted of Nguyln Vän Du (the secretary), Le Manh Trinh, Le Loc, Trän 
Xu, and Bui Khircrng.197 Without attribution, American historian, Milton Sacks, says 
that there was not one single representative from Tonkin attending the Ban Mai meeting, 
and, contrary to Comintern directions, the Central Committee it created was located in 
Siam. Sacks says the Committee aimed to rebuild the Party in northern Vietnam and to 
set up a training camp at Ban Mai.198 Not until after the meeting ended, Hoan wrote 
decades later, did he understand that the Bangkok Commission's policy was only that it 
would assist those who had come to Siam to make contact with the ICP and not, 
presumably, to form a Central Committee on Siamese soil. Upon learning of Hai's 
undisciplined action, the Siamese Commission criticised him and expelled him from his 
post in the Indochinese Assistance section. As for the Section, it had to be reorganised 
after a number of its members were captured by the French in 1933 and 1934.199
Lastly, the strengthening of bases in Laos was another responsibility of the 
Indochinese Assistance Section. Since 1930 the Udon provincial committee had helped 
the branch of Thanh Nien in Vientiane make the change over to communism.200 When 
the French stepped up their repression in Indochina in the early 1930s, the Indochinese 
Assistance Section dispatched representatives to Laos to work among Vietnamese miners 
in Boneng and Phong Chiu. Links were also formed with overseas Vietnamese bases in 
Thakhek, Savannakhet, and Pakse. By September 1934, the Indochinese Assistance 
Section was in charge of Party bases in Vientiane, Phongchiu, Boneng, Thakhek,
19 ^  Citing Thai Communist Party sources, Flood has written that this meeting "set up a provisional Executive 
Committee." Flood, op. c it, p. 44, fh. 27.
197 Hoang Van Hoan, op. c it, p. 70, with reference to French sources cited by Gunn, op. cit, p. 53. French 
intelligence reported that this meeting was held in April 1933 and that resolutions were passed calling for 
better links with the Party in Ann am and Cochinchina. A "Provisional Executive Committee" of the ICP 
was elected, consisting of Nguyen Duy Tieu, Le Khanh Du, Le Manh Trinh, Hai Di Bay, and Tran Xu 
[as spelled by the French]. See: Gunn, op. cit., p. 54.
*98 Milton Sacks, ’Marxism in Vietnam’ in Frank N. Träger, Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study o f  Four 
Countries, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 133.
199 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 70-71. Le Loc, Tran Xu, Bui Khircmg, and a number of others were later 
captured by the French when they returned to work in Indochina. Hokng Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 70-71 
and Gunn, op. cit., p. 54. According to Hoan, the new members of the Indochinese Assistance Section 
were: Le Manh Trinh, Ba Doc (Ngö Tuan), and Tai (probably Nguyen Tai). Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, 
pp. 70-71. Another possible member was Hoang Luän. T.C., op. c it , pp. 23-24.
200  Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 71, cited in consultation with a Lao source, Sichana Sisan, 'Kan Surop thi
Thakhek' [The Struggle in Thakhek] in Suphot Dantrakun, Caw Suphanouvong: Phunam Patiwat
[Prince Souphanouvong: A Revolutionary Leader], trans. from Lao into Thai, (Nonthaburi: Sathaban
Withiyasat Sangkhom, 2533 [1990]), p. 14, which confirms that an ICP cell was set up in Vientiane 
during this time.
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Savannankhet and Pakse and brought about the creation of the provisional Lao Regional 
Committee (X(r uy Ai-lao Lam th&i).201
In contrast, from the evidence available Vietnamese communists in Siam made few, if 
any, efforts to build party cells among Vietnamese emigres in western Cambodia, a factor 
which would have important ramifications for post-WWII Vietnamese interests in 
Cambodia. In part, this difference reflected the strategic fact that up to this point the 
orientation of resistance activities in northeast Thailand had been toward northern Vietnam 
and southern China as opposed to southern Vietnam. The geographical location of major 
Lao towns in northern Indochina, positioned between northeast Siam and northern 
Vietnam, made Laos (and its large urban-based Vietnamese communities) relatively more 
important than those in Cambodia during the same period. In addition, the location of 
almost all the important Vietnamese resistance bases in northeast Siam were in Udon, 
Nong Khai, Sakhon Nakhon, and Nakhon Phanom frontier provinces, all of which were 
opposite Laos and not Cambodia. As far as we know, there were no notable bases in the 
pre-W Wn period in provinces bordering Cambodia, such as Ubon Ratchathani, Surin, or 
Prachin Buri (see Map III). Although some of the top leaders of the ICP worked out of 
southern Vietnam during the 1930s, it appears that Vietnamese revolutionary leaders in 
Siam made no significant policy changes allowing for the building of bases among 
Vietnamese communities in Cambodia or for the establishing of contact with Vietnamese 
communist cadres active in southern Vietnam during the 1930s.202 The orientation of 
Vietnamese activities toward the north was also related to the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of the top cadres working in northeast Siam prior to WWII were from Nghe-An 
or Ha-Tinh provinces.203
But despite northeast Thailand's proximity to northern Vietnam, valuable Vietnamese 
revolutionary resources were being diverted to promoting a Siamese revolution. It seems 
likely that, to at least some Vietnamese leaders in Siam, this was a disturbing trend. To 
them, the importance of supporting the Vietnamese revolution from Siam probably took 
precedence over promoting a Siamese revolution during the early 1930s, despite the
2 °1 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 71 for the Vietnamese source and Gunn, op. cit, pp. 57, 60, and 63-65 and 
MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in
Laos, 1930-1988, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 14 and 16-17, citing French
sources.
202  Responding to questions about ICP activities in northeast Thailand during the 1930s, Tran Van Giau 
made no mention of links between communist cadres in southern Vietnam and those working in 
northeast Thailand. Interview: Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. From bases in southern 
Vietnam, the ICP did make efforts to build Party bases in Cambodia in the 1930s. See: Ben Kieman, 
How Pol Pot Came to Power, (London, Verso, 1985), pp. 7-18 and Thanh Dam, 'Nhän Dän Campuchia 
Chong De Quoc Phap' [The Cambodian People against French Imperialism] in Tuyet Dao, ed., Tim Hieu 
Dat Nir&c Campuchia Anh Hung [A Study of the Heroic Cambodian Land], (Hanoi: UBKHXH, July 
1979), pp. 67-71.
203 The following leaders who worked in Siam all came from Nghe-Tlnh provinces: Phan Dinh Phiing,
Tran Hüru Lure, Phan Boi Chau, Dang Thüc Hua, Quynh Anh, Dang Tu Kinh, Pham Hong Thai, Le 
Hong Phong, Ho Tung Mau, Ho Chi Minh, Dang Thai Thuyen, Hoang Van Hoan, and Nguyen Tai. 
Vö Tung was from Quang Ngäi. As we shall see later, the leadership makeup in Siam changed after
wwn.
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dominant international proletarian line in the ICP in 1935. This might have been more the 
case among cadres in northeast Siam who were no doubt more attuned to the needs of the 
Vietnamese revolution and less interested in promoting a revolution among workers in 
Bangkok. As we have shown, not until 1930 did Vietnamese revolutionaries in Siam pay 
any real attention to effecting a revolution in Siam. Before that, Vietnamese resistance 
concerns had focused on anti-French activities. Moreover, a number of the senior leaders 
in the Udon Provincial Committee had been trained by Ho Chi Minh in Canton and had 
been working to assist the Vietnamese revolution from safe bases in Siam well before 
1930. They were usually well-informed of developments in Vietnam and were in 
frequent contact with cadres going to-and-from there. It is hard to believe that a majority 
of these cadres would have compromised their work for the Vietnamese revolution in 
favour of promoting a Siamese one, especially when one considers the social unrest 
which was high throughout Vietnam during this period and the difficulties involved for a 
non-Siamese minority to preside over such a major Siamese social transformation. Hoan 
says that communist cadres imprisoned in Ban Khwang in 1936-1937 raised this topic for 
debate, but their prison-based conclusions were considered as unofficial by un-named 
SCP members on the "outside."204 At best, we can conclude from Hoan's trip to China 
to meet with leaders in 1935 that there was some degree of opposition to the idea of the 
Vietnamese promoting a Siamese revolution, with one of the major concerns being its 
negative effects on their ability to aid the Vietnamese revolution.
What remains largely a mystery is: 1) who, exactly, was in charge in the Commission 
in Bangkok (Chinese or Vietnamese cadres)?; 2) what was the extent of the influence of 
the "international" line over SCP leaders in the Bangkok and northeastern areas?; 3) what 
was the relationship between Udon and Bangkok communist organisations and to what 
degree could the northeastern leaders make decisions independently of the Bangkok 
Commission? Until more evidence comes to light, these questions remain 
unanswered.205
Returning to Hoan's report to ranking ICP cadres in China in 1935, it is unclear what 
steps the ICP took in response. However, judging from the subsequent shift in the 
SCP's line away from supporting a Siamese revolution, it is possible that the ICP's new 
strategy—put forth in mid-1936 and stressing the importance of a broad-based political 
and social front for national liberation—had a part in this change.206 By 1936, the
204 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 76.
205 Relying on French Surete reports, Geoffrey Gunn has concluded that during 1936-1937 there "was a split 
engendered between the SCP at the Centre and the Northeast Regional Committee of the SCP" over the 
importance of Indochinese affairs. Gunn, op. cit.f p. 84. Citing a Surete report, Gunn claims that before 
his arrest in 1936 Tran Van Chan "had actually succeeded in provoking a split between the SCP Party 
centre and the Northeast Region Committee." Gunn, op. c it, p. 85. Without providing hardly any more 
details, Gunn fails to show how Chan provoked this split and from the paucity of evidence available, I am 
not prepared to make such a bold conclusion until more information comes to light, especially from 
Vietnamese, Thai, and/or Chinese sources.
206 For a discussion of this period, see: Huynh Kim Khänh, op. c it, pp. 218-25.
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Overseas Office of the ICP is said to have lost most of its links with the Siamese 
Commission because the majority of the SCP's bases in Siam had been destroyed and its 
leadership imprisoned.207 While Trinh does not go into details, he writes in his memoir 
that from 1935 Vietnamese organisations in Siam "were dissolved one by one."208 
Meanwhile, with the victory of the Popular Front (1936-1939) in France in 1936, 
political repression was relaxed in Indochina. Vietnamese opposition papers were sold 
openly in Laos, calling on the overseas Vietnamese to help China fight Japan. Trinh said 
that during this liberal period the headquarters of the Vietnamese resistance in Siam was 
transferred to the Lao town of Thakhek.209
In 1938, the Siamese Commission allegedly decided that the "Siamese revolution" 
would have to be realised through the work of the Siamese. From that point on, Hoan 
says, it was decided that "foreign nationals could only participate in their own patriotic 
organisations;" the Vietnamese could not be expected to carry out this responsibility.210 
By 1938-1939, it seems that the inappropriate, Comintern-inspired emphasis on the 
importance of promoting a Siamese revolution had indirectly undermined the Vietnamese 
capacity to assist its own revolution from Siam by bringing about the incarceration of 
most of the Vietnamese communist leadership in Siam. As for the SCP's influence 
among the Siamese, it had very little success and its predominantly non-Siamese 
character, together with the Siamese suppression of Chinese and Vietnamese activities 
during the 1930s, contributed to its final disintegration and "refounding" as the Thai 
Communist Party in 1942.
207 Hoang Van Hoan, op. c it, p. 114 and Flood, op. c it, p. 34, quoting un-named Thai communist sources.
208 CVDCQ.pp. 50-51.
209 Ibid., pp. 4 8 4 9 . For more details concerning the activities of the ICP in Laos during the Popular Front 
period, see: Brown and Zasloff, op. c it, pp. 17-19, in particular, and Flood, op. ciL, p. 34.
210  Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 283.
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The War Years
While most of the 1930s saw Vietnamese resistance work in Siam deteriorate 
markedly, a small, though important, revitalisation of Vietnamese activities began during 
WWIL For Vietnamese revolutionaries still active in Siam at this time, the war created 
favourable conditions in two ways. On the one hand, following the fall of France to 
Germany in June 1940, Siamese leaders accelerated their plans to recover Indochinese 
territories lost to the French at the turn of the century. Japan certainly provided Bangkok 
with the backing it needed to pressure France to relinquish these territories in 1941; 
however, the Siamese government led by Phibun Songkhram also made policy changes 
designed to win over the support of the Lao, Cambodians, and Vietnamese. Although the 
new line taken by Phibun toward the Vietnamese was clearly intended to promote Siam’s 
irredentist interests, these changes nevertheless had the effect of loosening up regulations 
governing Vietnamese immigration to Siam and contributed to creating conditions 
favourable to rebuilding Vietnamese resistance activities in Siam.
The second and most important factor resulting in a restrengthening of Vietnamese 
resistance activities in Siam during WWII was Siamese-Vietnamese cooperation against 
the Japanese at the end of the Pacific War. While Phibun would plot a course of firm 
alignment with the Japanese, his counterpart, Pridi Phanomyong, opposed such close 
cooperation. As we shall document in this chapter, a shared opposition to Japanese 
occupation facilitated direct collaboration between H'6's Viet Minh and Pridi's Seri Thai. 
This wartime cooperation carried into the postwar period and was an important factor in 
the large-scale expansion of Vietnamese activities in Siam after WWII. In order to better 
understand how these two trends in Siamese politics contributed to a regeneration of 
Vietnamese resistance work in Siam during the war years, we will first discuss the 
Phibun government's changes toward the Vietnamese in relation to the Franco-Siamese 
border war of 1940-41. Thereafter, we will turn to an examination of the anti-Japanese 
links which led to collaboration between the Seri Thai and Viet Minh.
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Part I: The Franco-Siamese Dispute, 1940-41
1.1. Siam, Japan, and the Growth of Irredentism during the 1930s
The closer relationship which developed between Siam and Japan in 1940 had as its 
roots a decade of increasing economic and military cooperation. As the Japanese 
extended their influence throughout Asia during the 1930s, Siamese leaders paid close 
attention, assessing the changing balance-of-power in Asia and judging its effect on 
Siamese national interests. Japanese promises of "Asia for the Asiatics" and an "Asiatic 
League" found increasing sympathy among Siamese leaders unhappy with their unequal 
relationship with the European powers. In fact, planners of the 1932 change of 
government looked to Japan as a source of support. In June 1933, with the French and 
British openly sympathetic to the absolute monarchy, a young Phibun Songkhram 
secretly asked the Japanese Minister at Bangkok for arms and support of another coup to 
consolidate his faction's hold on power. While the Minister did not openly back the plan, 
his promise of economic assistance in the event of a successful coup earned Japan 
increased respect among many of Siam's subsequent leaders. In a meeting in Bangkok 
after the successful June 1933 coup, Phibun and others informed the Japanese Minister 
that they hoped Japan would support Siam's economic development. The Minister 
assured them of this, and subsequent events in the 1930s saw a remarkable strengthening 
in the economic and diplomatic relationship between these two countries.1
Coinciding with Siam's closer relationship with Japan was the growth of a Siamese 
nationalist movement increasingly focused on regaining territories in Indochina that the 
French had taken decades earlier. As we saw in chapter 1, in the Franco-Siamese treaties 
of 1893, 1904, and 1907 the Siamese court forfeited its claims to vast Lao and 
Cambodian territories. The hope of one day recovering these territories remained an 
important priority for Siamese leaders who sought to replace the absolute monarchy. 
Praiyun Phamonmontri, a Siamese leader who studied with Phibun and Pridi in Europe 
during the 1920s, wrote in his memoir that discussions among young Siamese leaders in 
France during the 1920s focused both on ways by which the Siamese system of 
government could be changed and how the territories lost to France in Indochina could be 
recovered.2 Indeed, soon after the 1932 change of government, Siam's new statesmen
Edward Thadeus Flood, 'Japan's Relations with Thailand: 1928-1941,' (PhD Thesis, University of
Washington, 1967), pp. 60-63 [Hereafter cited as 'Japan's Relations']. For evidence of the closer 
economic and political relationship between Bangkok and Tokyo, see: Ibid., pp. 98-106 and William L. 
Swan, 'Japanese Economic Relations with Siam: Aspects of Their Historical Development, 1884 to 1942,' 
(PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 1986), Table 16b, p. 57, and especially chapter 5 [Hereafter 
cited as 'Japanese Economic Relations'].
Praiyun Phamonmontri, Chi wit Ha Phaendin khong Khaophacao [My Life Through Five Reigns], 
(Bangkok: Bannakit, 2518 [1975]), pp. 302-03.
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began increasing their military preparedness with an eye on the territories lost to the 
French decades earlier. In 1934, it was reported by Prince Purachat that Siamese leaders 
had actually made secret military plans by which the territories would be retaken.3 This 
trend was given an added boost in 1936 when the Ministry of Defence published a map of 
Siam showing the "lost provinces" as a part of the country. Despite protests from the 
French and British, this map was circulated widely among the military and introduced in 
some schools.4 In 1935, Bangkok's Minister to Paris added to the polemic when he 
reportedly referred to the "lost" Lao and Cambodian provinces as "the Siamese Alsace- 
Lorraine."5 Meanwhile, a close associate of Phibun and Director of the Siamese Fine 
Arts Department, Wichit Wathakan, put his cultural and historical expertise behind the 
irredentist movement by publishing a number of popular plays and articles extolling the 
common heritage and racial affinity of the Thai, Lao, and Cambodians.6
Upon returning from a trip to Indochina in mid-1939, Wichit used French maps 
showing the large "Thai" populations throughout the region as evidence supporting his 
case for a change in the name of the country from Prathet Scry am (Siam) to Prathet Thai 
(Thailand). In doing this, Wichit hoped to promote the notion of a "Greater Thai 
Dominion" (Mafia Aanacak Thai), a concept which was designed to link together all the 
Thai ethnic peoples under Bangkok's political leadership, including those outside of 
Siam's established borders.7 In 1939, Phibun announced that "Siam" would now be 
called "Thailand."8
1.2. The Beginning of the Franco-Thai Dispute
Worried by the growing irredentist movement in Thailand during the late 1930s, at a 
time when war was becoming more likely in Europe, the French proposed the signing of 
a mutual non-aggression pact in an attempt to maintain their existing hold on Indochina. 
In accepting the offer, Phibun informed Paris that one of the points he wished to see 
negotiated was the matter of revising France's claim to the whole of the Mekong River. 
On 12 June 1940, the Franco-Thai Non-Aggression Pact was signed. According to the 
Thais, there was an oral understanding that subsequent talks would include a discussion 
of the need to re-establish the Mekong River as the border between French Laos and 
Thailand, meaning that the French-held enclaves west of the Mekong, Luang Prabang and 
Pakse, would have to be returned to Bangkok. This was to be done by the time the non-
3 Banne, op. c it ,  p. 112.
4 GB, PRO, FO 1067/1067/40, 'Annual Report, 1936: Sir J. Crosby to Mr. Eden,' 21 January 1937, pp. 10- 
11 and GB, PRO, FO 371/20299, 'Sir J. Crosby to Mr. Eden,' 11 April 1936.
5 GB, PRO, FO 371/20302, 'Annual Report 1935.'
6 Barme, op. c it , pp. 111-14 and Wichit Wathakan, Thai and Khmer Same Race: Luang Vichitr Refutes 
Saigon Radio Allegation,' Bangkok Chronicle, 22 November 1940, p. 1 [hereafter cited as BC].
Pridi Phanomyong, Khwampenma khong Chire Prathet Say am' kap Prathet Thai' [Origins of the Terms 
'Siam' and Thailand'], (Bangkok: Pramot Phumgsunthon, 1974), pp. 6-7.
8 As noted in the Introduction, from this point we will use the term "Thailand" throughout the rest of the 
text in order to avoid possible confusion by making numerous name changes.
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aggression pact was ratified. However, on 20 June France fell to Germany and the 
newly formed Vichy government took a much less flexible line towards Thailand.9
This hardening French position came as Japan loomed on Indochina's northern 
border. Phibun, who had staked much of his political future on the success of returning 
parts of Indochina to Thailand, became increasingly frustrated at the stubborn French 
position, fearing that unless progress were made soon, Indochina would fall to the 
Japanese before Thailand had time to make a claim to any territories. In early August, he 
informed the Japanese that the Thais were considering the need to take advantage of 
Japanese pressure on Indochina in order to realise Thai irredenta. By the end of 
September, public calls for return of the territories and French intransigence left Phibun 
with limited options. On 28 September, as Japanese military forces moved into 
Indochina, Phibun informed Tokyo that he had decided to rely on Japan. In exchange for 
Japanese assistance in recovering Indochinese territories from the French, Phibun said 
that Thailand would allow Japanese troops to cross Thai territory if necessary.10
One of the first signs of increased Japanese support for the Thais was in the supply of 
arms. In November and December, the Japanese dramatically increased their military 
assistance to the Thais, providing them with tanks, heavy guns, machine guns, and even 
24 bombers.11 With the Japanese now supplying the arms and equipment which Phibun 
needed to pressure the French to make concessions on border territories, Phibun turned 
his attention to preparing for possible armed conflict with the French in Indochina. As 
part of these preparations, Phibun sought to gain the support of the peoples of Indochina.
Part II: Phibun's Attempts to Garner Vietnamese Support
Phibun Songkhram was one of the first contemporary Thai leaders to voice public 
support of Vietnamese independence. Although his motives for promoting such backing 
derived from a desire to regain Indochinese territories and was but a side-show to his 
more important dealings with Japan, his new policies toward the Vietnamese nevertheless 
resulted in more favourable conditions for the Vietnamese resistance in Thailand. Like 
many leading Vietnamese nationalists, Phibun had studied in France and had respect for 
French cultural and political achievements. However, when it came to colonial France's 
mission civilatrice, Phibun shared much of the antipathy that Vietnamese anticolonialists 
held for the French. In this connexion, it is worth mentioning an incident, recorded by
E. Thadeus Flood, The 1940 Franco-Thai Border Dispute and Phibun Songkhram's Commitment to 
Japan,’ Journal o f  Southeast Asian History, Vol. 10, No. 2, (September 1969), pp. 307-15 [Hereafter, 
referred to as The 1940 Franco-Thai Border Dispute'] and 'Japan's Relations,' pp. 276-78.
The 1940 Franco-Thai Border Dispute,’ pp. 315-18 and 320-25 and 'Japan's Relations,' pp. 279, 284-96, 
317-25, and 337-38.
'Japan's Relations,' pp. 356-60, especially pp. 357-58 for evidence of the sharp increase in Japanese 
military assistance.
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Praiyun in his memoir, when Phibun and Praiyun were returning to France after 
completing a trip to Germany sometime in the 1920s. Arriving at the border, they were 
stopped by a French border official who, in Praiyun's recollection, "contemptuously 
asked if it weren't true that our country was a colony of the French Government in 
Indochina." Although the two were able to convince the official otherwise, the 
Frenchman persisted, telling them that Thailand "was an abyss, full of fleas, and how 
could we know any better." To be "civilised," the official concluded, Thailand "should 
be a colony of France." Enraged, Phibun is said to have warned the Frenchman: 
"Beware, for one day your worthless flea [Thailand] will bite France so that it rots 
through and through."12
II.l. Phibun's Line toward the Vietnamese
In 1940, Phibun intended to "bite" hardest in Indochina. Indeed, as plans were being 
outlined for recovering the "lost territories" during the 1930s, Phibun and others were re­
evaluating Bangkok's policy toward the peoples of Indochina living along the Mekong 
River. One of the first signs of a changing view came in June 1937, when the Minister of 
the Interior, Thamrong Nawasawat, wrote Phibun, then Minister of Defence, that the 
government had begun a new policy toward Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodians 
immigrating to Thailand. Thamrong informed Phibun that concerning the movement of 
Indochinese into Thailand, border officials had been instructed by the Ministry of the 
Interior "not to interfere with their entry or request papers." Thamrong informed Phibun 
that "the authorities have also been told to offer their assistance where available, without 
appearing too obvious or guaranteeing anything."13
In November, Phibun sent a letter to the Prime Minister, Phya Phahon, informing him 
that border authorities had reported an increase in the number of Vietnamese crossing into 
Thai frontier areas during the last two to three years. According to these reports, the 
Vietnamese and other Indochinese were seeking refuge in Thailand in order to escape 
high taxes and the repressive French government in Indochina. Phibun explained that the 
increase in the number of Vietnamese along the border was good for Thailand, for it 
would "increase our border population" opposite French Indochina.14 Phibun concluded 
his memo to the Prime Minister recommending that because the French were "trying to 
encourage their [the Indochinese refugees] return, we should encourage more to come [to
Praiyun, op. cit., p. 103.
TNA, ?(.l. 0201.37.6/1-11, 'Letter from Minister of Interior Thamrong Nawasawat to the Defence 
Minister Phibun,' 7 June 1938. In August 1937, the Thai Legation in Indochina reported to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs that the French resident at Battambang told local officials to offer a five year tax
moratorium to returning refugees. See: TNA, Pi.7. 0201.37.6, Head of Siamese Legation in Indochina to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,' 13 August 1937.
TNA, Pf.l. 0201.37.6/11, Office of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, 'Phibun to Phahon,' 8 November 
1937.
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Thailand]."15 To this end, Phibun suggested a tax amnesty for those refugees coming to 
the Thai side.16
One of the clearest indications of a changed view of Indochinese affairs came soon 
after the fall of France, when Thai newspapers stepped up their support of the 
Indochinese peoples' claims to independence. Many papers made virulent attacks on 
French colonial rule and promised Thai support for those fighting the French. New 
words were used in print. Phrases, such as "oppressed," "enslaved," and "the yoke of 
slavery," were splashed across frontpages. In line with the accelerating irredentist 
movement, it was reported that the "summons" from Thailand's Indochinese "brethren" 
fighting against the French was likely to come almost immediately.17
Amidst this increased nationalist fervour, Phibun made one of the first significant 
references to the Vietnamese in a 21 October speech, broadcast nationally:
Apart from our Thai brethren, a tribute should be paid to our Asiatic brethren, namely, 
the Annamese [Vietnamese], both inside and outside Thailand, who support the Thai 
Government in its readjustment of the border line, very sympathetically.18
Phibun's intent was to take advantage of a common Asian heritage and to play off anti- 
French sentiments, especially among the large Vietnamese communities living in 
northeast Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, many of whom were located in the areas which 
the Thais sought to recover. With France's compromised position clearly in mind, 
Phibun continued:
So when that time comes our Thai brethren in the Khmer regions, Laos and also the 
Annamese will be free and will be able to re-establish their countries anew, 
independently. And all our Thai brethren [that is, the Lao and Cambodians] will then 
be living together under the protection of our Constitution and under our Thai King.
As for the Annamese, when they have become independent, they will be ruled by their 
King as in the days gone by before the French came and destroyed their independence.19
Phibun's language referring to pre-colonial days would lend some credence to an 
interesting observation put forward by Thai historian, Chamvit Kasetsiri. According to 
this thesis, despite Phibun's own strong nationalist convictions, he and some of his 
military associates had little faith in the possibility of other, similarly motivated
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 See, for example, the Bangkok Times, Prachamit and the Bangkok Chronicle from October to December
1940.
18 'Premier Addresses Thai Nation: No Stepping Back from the Course Which Has Been Set,' Bangkok 
Times, 21 October 1940.
19 Ibid., p. 3.
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movements developing in Indochina, ones which might have been opposed to Bangkok's 
territorial ambitions. Chamvit has suggested that in "many respects Phibun's policy can 
be seen as a revival of the traditional policy of the early Bangkok kings— attempting to 
exert Siamese imperial control over Laos and Cambodia . .  ."20 More evidence will have 
to be uncovered to test this proposition properly. However, it is possible that Phibun 
was less than willing to aid Vietnamese nationalist groups unless they were ones under 
his direct control. This might partially explain why, in July 1940, Phibun privately told 
the British Minister, Josiah Crosby, that although he had personally met Vietnamese 
nationalists to discuss their requests for military assistance, he had turned them down, 
even though he was convinced they were nationalists and not communists.21 Of course 
Phibun may have said this for Crosby's consumption and the possibility that he might 
have provided some secret military assistance to the Vietnamese cannot be ruled out. But 
whatever the case, the changes Phibun made in his attempts to gamer Vietnamese support 
for his irredentist plans softened the previously tough line Bangkok had taken towards 
Vietnamese activities during most of the 1930s (see chapter l).22
II.1-1. Bangkok's New View of the Vietnamese
One way by which the Phibun-led government tried to incorporate Vietnamese into its 
fight against the French was in the recruitment of disenchanted Vietnamese soldiers 
defecting from the French colonial army. The French policy of forcibly conscripting 
Vietnamese soldiers to man the Thai-Cambodian front throughout 1940 was met with 
strong opposition.23 In November, Vietnamese soldiers in Saigon opposed a French 
order sending them to the front.24 The Thais, who had a consul in Saigon, seem to have 
been aware of such protests by the Vietnamese, and sought to exploit this dissatisfaction 
to their own advantage. In October, Phibun told Crosby that he was sure that the "revolt 
of the native population in Indochina was imminent," citing an unspecified revolt of 250 
Vietnamese troops in Indochina.25 To foster such anti-French actions, Bangkok stepped 
up its propaganda efforts in western Indochina and began anti-French radio broadcasts in 
Vietnamese, urging Vietnamese soldiers to desert their French units.26 It seems that one
20
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of the first significant defections came in late October when an undetermined number of 
Vietnamese colonial soldiers (probably numbering from 50 to 100) crossed the Mekong 
into Thailand. In November, more Vietnamese troops were reported to have arrived in 
Thailand from Vientiane with a "large quantity of arms and ammunition." These troops, 
allegedly "disgusted" with the French, presented themselves to Thai officials in the 
northeast. Interestingly, Thai military officials met these defectors and organised a 
special train to transport them back to Bangsue, a Thai military camp outside of 
Bangkok.27
One Vietnamese soldier to defect to the Thais during this period and an individual who 
would play an important role in subsequent resistance activities in Thailand was Vü Huri 
Binh, a former warrant officer in the French Garde Indigene in Vientiane. Fluent in Lao 
and Thai, Binh was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Royal Thai Army (RTA).28 
Because of his former service in the French colonial army in western Indochina, he was 
familiar with French operations and provided the RTA with valuable intelligence on 
French positions there.29 His fluency in Thai and anti-French views also made him a 
potential liaison between the Bangkok government and the large Vietnamese communities 
situated along the Mekong. During his time in Thailand, Binh reportedly made 
connections with senior Thai military leaders, including Field Marshal Phin Chunhawan, 
an important Thai military leader who later aided the Viet Minh.30 One Vietnamese 
scholar who worked in Thailand after WWII and is knowledgeable with the period 
indicated that Binh's anti-French views and language skills attracted the personal attention 
of Phibun Songkhram, who met Binh sometime in the early 1940s (probably in late 
1940).31
Army, ndc.), p. 13. Sometime in 1940, the Japanese reportedly brought Circmg De to Bangkok and 
allowed him to set up another Restoration Association (Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi). This organisation 
attempted to win over the support of the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand. The Native Soul, a pro- 
Japanese newspaper, was published and disseminated among the Vietnamese communities in support of 
the Japanese Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere and urged the Vietnamese in Thailand to join the Thais 
against the French as a means of recovering Vietnam's independence. According to Trinh, Curbmg Des 
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and Revolution, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1970), p. 433, fn. 15 [Hereafter, cited as The
Birth’].
29 Interview with Tran Van Dinh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC.
30 Ibid.
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Besides working in the Thai army, Binh also worked with Vietnamese leaders of 
surviving communist cells in northeast Thailand.32 One of Binh's most important tasks 
in this connexion was to mitigate the negative effects of Japanese repression on the 
overseas Vietnamese communities in the northeast. Although he was not a communist 
member in 1940, his Thai connections were probably useful to communists in the 
northeast. It is worth noting here that a large number of those Vietnamese who had been 
imprisoned by Thai authorities at the Ban Khwang gaol during the 1930s (see chapter 1) 
were mysteriously freed by the Thais between 1942-1944, including veteran communist 
leaders of the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand, NguySn Chan and Quynh Anh.33
By freeing these Vietnamese leaders from prison, the Thais unknowingly contributed 
to a rebuilding of Vietnamese resistance activities in northeast Thailand. Chan, who had 
long worked among the emigre communities, immediately resumed his work in northeast 
Thailand, revamping Vietnamese organisations which had deteriorated during the 
1930s.34 In his work, Chan stressed the need to increase "mutual help" (tircrng te), the 
study of quoc ngir, and to bring about greater "dokn kit" (linking up together) among 
the Vietnamese in Thailand.35 Whether or not Binh was instrumental in effecting the 
release of these Vietnamese is unknown; however, the possibility cannot be ruled out.
In another instance, the Thais gave Vietnamese activities in Thailand an added boost— 
both symbolically and in real terms—when authorities arrested and held without bail D6 
Hung, the Vietnamese intelligence officer who worked at the French legation in 
Bangkok. Besides being suspected of spying on sensitive Thai military operations, 
Hung had been the pointman for French surveillance of Vietnamese resistance activities 
in Thailand for over twenty-eight years. He had provided the Surety with information 
leading to the arrests of key ICP members in Thailand during the 1930s, including Vo 
Tung and Dang Thai Thuyen. On 14 March 1941, D6 Hung was sentenced to death 
but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment upon a plea of guilty.36
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32 Interview with Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi.
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I 1.1-2. The Free Khmer and Free Indochina Parties
In late November 1940, Bangkok's widening interest in Indochinese affairs was 
underscored by the formation of a heretofore unprecedented Thai Department of 
Indochina Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior. The sudden need for this department 
was indicated by the great haste with which the government rushed the bill through the 
National Assembly on the 21st. There was little debate and it was accepted in principle 
unanimously on the very same day. In discussing the bill with members of the 
Assembly, a spokesman explained that one reason for the establishment of this 
Department would be to make a "study and investigation of administrative and other 
conditions in Indo[c]hina." He said that the "other reasons for the establishment of the 
Department. . . were well known to the members and . . . there was no need to mention 
them again."37 One assumes Bangkok had preparations to win over the support of 
peoples in Indochina in mind as well.
On 19 December 1940, as armed incidents proliferated between French and Thai 
forces along the Indochina border, the Bangkok Chronicle announced in a front page 
headline that "Annamites, Laos, and Khmers are Thai brethren." This article reported that 
according to a statement by the Thai Ministry of Defence, Vietnamese refugees coming 
into Thailand would no longer be considered foreigners, but rather "Thai brethren from 
Annam [Vietnam]."38 The next day, it was reported that the Cambodians, under the 
leadership of a Thai-speaking Cambodian, Phra Phiset Phanit, were organising a "Free 
Khmer Party" (Phak Khmer Issarak) to oust the French from Indochina and to restore 
Cambodian independence. This movement was said to have had the support of "many 
well known [Thai] personalities."39 On the 22nd, a meeting was held in Bangkok during 
which Phanit was selected the leader of the Free Khmer Party.40 According to Phanit, 
this organisation was established, funded, and supervised by the Thais.41 Before 
concluding his inaugural address to the Khmer Issarak on the 22nd, Phanit thanked the 
Thai government and the Premier for "the right to hold the meeting, the right to organise
37 'New Indochina Affairs Dept, in Interior Ministry Shortly, Assembly Passes Urgent Bill,' BC, 22 
November 1940, p. 1 and BC, 26 November 1940.
38 'Annamites, Laos, and Khmers are Thais' Brethren,' BC, 19 December 1940, p. 1. A frontpage article in 
Prachamit informed the Thai public that they should not refer to their "Thai brothers" fighting for 
independence from the French as "rebel groups" (phuak kabot), because this term implied negative 
connotations and illegitimacy. Prachamit insisted that these resistance fighters be referred to as 
"revolutionaries" (phuak patiwat). See: Prachamit, 20 December 1940. See also: 'Annamites, Lao, and 
Khmers Are Thai's Brethren,' BC, 19 December 1940, p. 1.
'Khmers Here Organise for Independence,' BC, 20 December 1940, p. 1 for the quote and cited in 
conjunction with 'Phra Phiset Phanit pen Phunam Damnenkan' [Phra Phiset Phanit is the Leader of the 
Movement], Prachamit, 20 December 1940 and 'Khmers at Mass Meeting Start Freedom Drive,' BC, 23 
December 1940.
40  The Unit Organization, p. 14 and 'Khmers At Mass Meeting Start Freedom Drive,’ BC, 23 December 
1940.
41 Interview with Phra Phiset Phanit by Steven Heder, 3 June 1981, Bangkok, Thailand. I am grateful to 
Steven Heder for providing me with a copy of the transcript of his interview with Phanit.
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the Independent Khmer Party [Khmer Issarak] and in giving them every help in 
accordance with the policy in which H.E. the Premier [Phibun] firmly believed."42
Meanwhile, on the 21st, Bangkok had created yet another anti-French organisation 
known as the the Independent Indochina Party. Though its exact function remains 
unclear, this party was reportedly designed to give "active support and assistance in the 
campaign for the restoration of independence now carried out by the people at Lang-som 
[sic] in North Annam and at Saigon in South Annam."43 By singling out the Vietnamese 
cities of Langson and Saigon as specific destinations for Thai aid, Bangkok had the recent 
Vietnamese uprisings at these two locations in mind and perhaps sought to win over 
increased Vietnamese support by mentioning them. As noted above, Thai leaders were 
certainly following events in Indochina closely, convinced that revolt was imminent. 
Interestingly, one of the tasks of the Independent Indochina Party was to "supply arms to 
soldiers and civilians in Indochina who may need them to fight for their cause."44 
Unfortunately, it has been difficult to verify how much aid the Thais actually provided to 
the Vietnamese through this organisation.
II.1-3. Changes in Immigration Laws
Meanwhile, because of Franco-Thai border skirmishes in late 1940, a large number of 
Indochinese refugees began to cross into northeast Thailand. Responding to this influx, 
on 20 December the Ministry of the Interior sent circulars to border officials in northeast 
Thailand concerning the government's decision to relax immigration laws on Lao, 
Cambodians, and Vietnamese entering the country. This change was made, the Ministry 
said, "in order to be in consonance with the Government's policy in its justifiable request 
for territorial concessions from French Indochina."45 By exempting Vietnamese 
immigrants from having to pay fees for issuing or renewing alien registration papers, the 
Ministry made it easier for them to cross into Thailand. As an announcement described 
Bangkok's new view of the Vietnamese:
According to Article II, a special concession in regard to alien registration fee is granted 
to the Annamites [Vietnamese]. This is because the Annamites are a race inhabiting 
the Golden Peninsula, just like the Thai nation. In former days Annam was an 
independent country in the Golden Peninsula. Later on, she lost her independence 
unjusdy and became a French colony. The Ministry of the Interior considers the 
Annamites to be inhabitants of a former independent country, so, from now on, in the
42  'Khmers At Mass Meeting Start Freedom Drive,' BC, 23 December 1940.
43 Independent Indochina Party Will Be Established Here Soon,' BC, 21 December 1940, p. 1.
44 BC, 21 December 1940, p. 1. According to Thadeus Flood, the French alleged that Thai agents played a 
role in the Langson affair. See: 'Japan's Relations,' op. c it, p. 368.
45 'Suanyuan Chai Chatyuan lae Yunai Bangkhapyuan’ [The Vietnamese are now Considered Vietnamese 
Nationals under Vietnamese Authority], Prachamit, 22 December 1940, p. 1 for the quote and cited with 
reference to 'Indo-China Brethren Exempted from Aliens Registration Fee Here.' BC, 23 December 1940.
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census or in any dealings with them, the authorities shall treat the Annamites as being 
of the Annamite race and nationality and as Annamite subjects [and not French].46
On 29 December, the Thai Broadcasting Station issued an official communique 
reiterating Bangkok's recognition of a future independent Vietnam, free of the French:
We would like to see the entire Annamite people getting back their independence soon.
Now in Thailand we regard the Annamite as independent people in every way. We no 
longer regard them as French subjects with French nationality. We treat them as 
Annamite subjects with Annamite nationality.47
In exchange for these changes, however, Bangkok hoped to maintain the support of the 
large Vietnamese communities in northeast Thailand and western Indochina in the fight 
against the French. As the Ministry of the Interior put it, changes in Vietnamese 
immigration were made
so that they may fully understand that the Thai Government sympathizes with them . .
. and that they should return the good wishes by cooperating with the Thai Government 
in every way. But the most important point is that they shall in no way perform any 
action that may benefit the French and be detrimental or dangerous to Thailand.48
By early 1941, some thirteen thousand Indochinese refugees were reported to have 
arrived in Thailand.49 In response, the Thai government dispatched the head of the 
Department of Indochina Affairs to northeast Thailand and urged Thai citizens to help 
their "brethren" by contributing to a "refugee fund." Interestingly, some of the main 
contributors to this fund were high-level members of the Ministry of Defence.50
II. 1-4. The Establishment of the Free Indochina Army
Coinciding with this support, on 5 January 1941 the Thai High Command announced 
a Free Indochina Army (FLA) would soon be formed. According to official Thai Radio, 
numerous letters had been received by the Thai government from Vietnamese expressing 
"their desire to restore the independence of Vietnam and urging Thailand to organise such
46 BC, 21 December 1940, p. 1 and Prachamit, 22 December 1940. It will be recalled that since the 1893 
Treaty the Thais were obligated to recognise the Vietnamese coming into Thailand as "French subjects." 
See chapter 1, section I.
47 'Statement by the Thailand Broadcasting Station,' December 29, 1940 in GB, PRO, FO, Telegram No. 
383 (222/334/40), December 30, 1940 in CRS A981/1; France 4, AA.
48 Prachamit, 22 December 1940. The Thai fear that the Vietnamese might do something to benefit the 
French was almost certainly a reference to possible Vietnamese spies working in northeast Thailand for 
French intelligence. See: CVDCQ, p. 50.
49 'Influx of Refugees Continues, Over 13,00 Until February 8,’ BC, 10 February 1941, p. 1. See also: 
'Chanthaburi and Aranyafprathet] Crowded by Refugees,' BC, 6 February 1941, p. 1.
50 'Further Contributions to Refugees Aid Fund,' BC, 12 February 1941. This group included: Police
General Adun Decharat, Colonel Luang Chawengsak Songkhram, Phya Sundon Phiphit, Colonel Phra 
Ramnarong, and Prince Sakon Worawan [Voravan].
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a force to aid the purpose." Referring to Vietnamese soldiers in the French colonial army, 
a report in a Thai daily explained that many soldiers serving the French in Indochina did 
not want to fight the Thais. In fact, they were said to have wanted to join the Thai army 
but did not know if the Thais would admit them.51
On the 6th, the governor of the northeastern province of Ubon Ratchathani, Police 
Colonel Phra Klaklang Samon, called a special meeting of Vietnamese representatives in 
the area to explain how the government planned to help them recover their independence 
and how legal changes would contribute to this. In a speech to this gathering, the colonel 
announced that the the Thai government would help the Vietnamese in Indochina recover 
their independence by fostering the creation of an independence army. Secondly, 
Bangkok would relax regulations on Vietnamese activities in and immigration to 
Thailand. Lastly, the Colonel explained that the "Thai government now trusts the 
Vietnamese and is happy to admit them into the army and police in order to conquer the 
French."52 The potential importance of these changes to the state of the Vietnamese 
resistance in Thailand is obvious; however, it remains unknown whether surviving 
Vietnamese resistance organisations in northeast Thailand realised this or could even take 
advantage of it at the time considering the damage the resistance leadership had suffered 
during the 1930s.
On the 15th, Thai Radio announced that the FIA had been successfully organised and 
was ready for action "in collaboration with the Thai Armed Forces" to regain Indochina's 
independence.53 The government urged the Vietnamese to join at provincial offices or 
military outposts along the frontier.54 From the evidence available, it was the Thai 
Ministry of Defence that presided over the formation of the FIA, both arming and training 
it.55 The FIA's membership was comprised of Vietnamese (some of whom later joined 
the Viet Minh) and Cambodians, with no Lao members, according to Phra Phiset 
Phanit.56 The FIA went into battle with the Thai Army in early 1941, allegedly outfitted 
with at least one machine-gun battalion.57 It remains unknown who or exactly how many 
Vietnamese actually joined the Free Indochina Army. It is likely that it was a relatively
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the Vietnamese to Form an Independence Force], Prachamit, 17 January 1941.
'New Indochina Army Ready to Join the Fight,' BC, 15 January 1941, p. 1. See also: 'Khmers Eager to 
Fight the French Not Thai Forces,' BC, 25 January 1941.
'Phira Sanong Khamkho khong Chaw Yuan' [In Response to Requests from the Vietnamese], Prachamit, 
7 January 1941, p. 1 and 'Indo-China Army Here,' BC, 6 January 1941, p. 1.
M. Sivaram, Mekong Clash and Far East Crisis: A Survey o f  the Thailand-Indochina Conflict and the 
Japanese Mediation and Their General Repercussions on the Far East Situation (Bangkok: Thai
Commercial Press, August 1941), p. 92 and Interview with Phra Phiset Panit by Steven Heder, 3 June 
1981, Bangkok.
Interview with Phra Phiset Panit by Steven Heder, 3 June 1981, Bangkok.
TCongthahan Indocinissara Tangkhim Laew' [The Free Indochina Army is Formed], Prachamit, 16 
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small number, probably not exceeding more than a few hundred overseas Vietnamese 
volunteers and soldiers who had deserted the French colonial army.
II. 1-5. The Indochina Communist Party's View o f the Franco-Thai Conflict
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that in November 1940 the 7th 
Central Committee Plenum of the ICP opposed the Franco-Thai war.58 Most worrisome 
were French efforts to conscript Vietnamese by force to send them to the front to fight the 
Thais. As we have noted, many Vietnamese were adamantly against the idea of fighting 
for the French. The slogan, "Don't Go to the Front to Die for the Thai and French 
Colonialists," was popular among Vietnamese soldiers during this time.59 Secondly, the 
ICP leadership seems to have been worried by Thai irredentist designs on western 
Indochina. In the opening of the "Declaration of the Viet Minh Independence League" in 
May 1941, the Thai government was referred to as the "lackey of the Japanese" which 
had been given "ten percent of Indochina."60 As this document said in part:
The French have given 70,000 square kilometres of Indochinese territory to the 
Siamese. They see us as a gift to be sold. Thus, our people have become the beasts of 
burden for the French, the servants of the Japanese, and the slaves of the Siamese 61
Ho Chi Minh himself expressed unhappiness at the loss of territory to the Thais. In a 
June 1941 letter to the Vietnamese people, Ho criticised the French for deciding that they 
could "take our land" (dat dai cua ta) and give parts of it to Thailand.62
While it is extremely difficult to gauge the inner-thinking of the ICP concerning this 
matter, it is not impossible that the ICP may have been informed through representatives 
in Thailand that although Phibun shared their antipathy for the French, he would not 
militarily support an alternative Vietnamese resistance outside of his control. If we can 
believe Phibun's words to Crosby, we know that sometime before m id-1940 Phibun had 
turned down a request for military aid from a group of what he called "Vietnamese
Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam, Ba Mum Näm Dau Tranh cua Düng, Tap I [Thirty Years of Struggle by the 
Party, Volume I] (npc., Ban Tuyen Giäo Trung ITcmg vä Ban Nghien Ctiru Lieh sir Dang, ndc.), pp. 61- 
62.
59 Tran Huy Lieu, Vol. 10, op. tit., pp. 18-19.
60 Tuyen Ngön cua Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh' [Declaration of the Viet Minh] in Tran Huy Lieu, Vol. 
10, op. tit ,  p. 40.
61 Ibid., p. 48.
62 Thu cua cu Nguyen Af Quoc Gui ve Nucrc Näm 1941 (6 June 1941)' [A Letter from Nguyen Af Quoc to
His Homeland, 1941; also known as 'Kfnh Cäo Dong Bao' [A Respectful Letter to My Countrymen]], 
translated into Vietnamese from Chinese and printed in Nen Doc Lap [Independence], (Thuan Hoa: Hoi 
Tan Van Hoa, ndc.), as reproduced by Trän Huy Lieu, Vol. 10, op. tit., p. 61 and cited with reference to 
another translation by Minh Tranh and Hoang Luang in 'Doc Lai Thu "Kmh Cäo Dong Bao" cua 
Nguyen Af Quoc (viet ngäy 6-6-1941)’ [Another Reading of the Letter, "A Respectful Letter to My 
Countrymen," by Nguyen Af Quoc], NCLS, No. 249, (February 1990), p. 49. Both these translations use 
the Vietnamese phrase: "dat dai cua ta" ["our land"]. However, another translation of this same letter, 
reproduced in Ho Chi Minh, Tuyen Tap [Ho Chf Minh, The Collected Works], (Hanoi: NXBST, 1980), 
pp. 321-23, specifically p. 321, leaves out the "cila ta" ["our's"], reading: ". . . dat cho Xiem" [". . . land
given to Siam"].
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nationalists." Another, and perhaps more plausible, possibility is that because of the 
remote location of the ICP's leadership in northern Vietnam and southern China during 
this time, the ICP may have had little, if any, contact with cadres in northeast Thailand, 
and was thus unaware of the potentially favourable conditions created by Phibun's 
abovementioned policies. Nevertheless, for those anti-French Vietnamese living outside 
of the ICP's purview along the Mekong, the Thai-created Free Indochina Army and other 
anti-French changes offered natural alternatives through which they could fight the 
French. In addition, the loosening of regulations governing Vietnamese activities in Siam 
allowed those remaining Vietnamese cadres in the northeast, such as Nguyen Chan, to 
begin rebuilding resistance organisations.
II.2. Japanese Mediation and the Outbreak of the Pacific War
In the end, it was Japan that reined in Thai irredentist ambitions in Indochina. Most 
disturbing to the Japanese was the possibility of full-scale war between France and 
Thailand in January 1941. Since late 1940, both the French and Thais had violated each 
others' air space, with both sides exchanging threats to bomb each others' cities. On 16 
January 1941, the Thais launched a ground attack against French forces in Cambodia. 
This attack was largely successful, with many Vietnamese defecting to the Thais as their 
army pushed twenty-five miles into Cambodia. However, the French struck back the 
next day with a surprise attack on the Thai navy, handing the Thais a major set-back.63
At this point, the Japanese accelerated their mediation of the conflict, informing the 
Thais that they would pressure the French to halt the fighting in exchange for an 
"understanding with the Thai regarding a Japan-Thai pact."64 The complex details 
concerning this matter have been covered by Flood.65 What is important here is to 
recognise that throughout the mediation negotiations of early 1941, the Japanese sought 
to bring an end to the conflict in a way that promoted their interests in Southeast Asia, and 
that Thai and Japanese interests did not always coincide. On 11 March, after weeks of 
intense negotiations, an agreement was signed under Japanese auspices in Tokyo. 
According to this agreement, France was obligated to return to Thailand all territories lost 
under the 1904 Treaty (Pakse and Luang Prabang), the provinces of Battambang, 
Siemreap, and Sisiphon up to the Tonle Sap, but not the town of Siemreap or Angkor 
Wat. While the French conceded that the deep-water channel would form the riverine 
border, the Thais, under Japanese pressure, had to demilitarise all areas turned over to 
them.66
'Japan's Relations,' pp. 397422, especially p. 416.
64 Quoted in Ibid., p. 423.
65 See Flood's dissertation, 'Japan's Relations,' chapters 11, 12, and 13.
66 Ibid., pp. 553-54.
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By relying on Japan in the Franco-Thai dispute, Phibun soon found himself under 
increasing pressure from Tokyo to align with Japan as the Pacific War drew nearer. In 
November his attempts to keep Thailand neutral became more difficult as the Japanese 
prepared to move against British colonies in Malaya, Singapore, and Burma. On the 
28th, Phibun told his cabinet that in the event war were to break out between Japan and 
the Allies, Thailand should join Japan, for Thailand would regain more territory in 
Indochina and would suffer less if the Japanese were victorious. After a mysterious trip 
to the northeast, Phibun returned to Bangkok on the morning of 8 December to consider a 
Japanese ultimatum. In a cabinet meeting that morning, Thai troops were ordered not to 
resist the Japanese. The Japanese informed the Thai cabinet that they were expected to 
allow Japanese forces to cross Thai territory. In the end, as Japanese troops crossed 
through Thailand to attack Burma, Malaya, and Singapore, the Thais opted to cooperate 
with Japanese military operations rather than join a formal military alliance.67
However, Phibun subsequently decided to move even closer to Japan. After imposing 
martial law and reshuffling his cabinet, to include easing Pridi out of the Cabinet and 
giving him a powerless seat in the Council of Regency, a Japanese-Thai military alliance 
was signed in the sacrosanct temple of Wat Phra Kaew in Bangkok on the 21st. Four 
days later, Thailand declared war on both the United States and Great Britain.
Part III: Seri Thai-Viet Minh Cooperation
III.l. The Origins of the Seri Thai and Viet Minh: A Brief Review
Phibun's firm alignment with the Japanese was not supported by all Thais. In fact, 
Bangkok's Ambassador in Washington, Seni Pramot, refused to hand Phibun's 
declaration of war over to the US, insisting that it did not represent the will of the Thai 
people. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Pridi and a number of his close associates began to 
organise an underground resistance movement to work against the Japanese. Directing 
affairs from his post as Regent, this resistance group eventually developed into what 
became known as the Khabuan Kan Seri Thai (The Free Thai Movement). Designed to 
attract a wide section of Thai society, this resistance organisation was created to fight the 
Japanese and regain Thailand's independence.68 In 1942, the US State Department was 
informed that the Seri Thai was "an underground revolutionary group which at a
See: William L. Swan, Thai-Japanese Relations at the Start of the Pacific War. New Insight into a
Controversial Period,' Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, (September 1987), pp. 275, 279- 
81, and 281-85 and 'Japanese Economic Relations,' pp. 146-59.
Vichitr Lulitanond, 'An Open Letter from a Free Thai: The Free-Thai Movement and the Communist 
Party o f Thailand,' in appendix IV of Pridi Banomyong [Phanomyong], Political and Military Tasks o f  
the Free-Thai Movement to Regain National Sovereignty and Independence, Letter to Phra Bisal- 
Sukhumvit, (Amarm Press, June 1979), p. 71.
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propitious moment would seize power and free the country from the Japanese yoke and 
the control of its present leaders."69 Pridi explained in a speech to the Thai public at the 
end of the war that the Seri Thai movement "was not set up as a group or a political party, 
but rather a[s a] cooperation of the Thai people struggling to regain our national 
independence status as it existed before the Japanese invasion on December 8th 1941 
[sic]."70
In Vietnam, Vietnamese nationalist leaders also sought the broad support of 
Vietnamese society during WWII. In February 1941, Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam 
and in May he presided over the creation of the Viet Minh, short for Viet Minh Doc Lap 
Dong Minh (The League for the Independence of Vietnam). This resistance organisation 
was formed with the aim of attracting a wide range of supporters, regardless of class, in 
the fight against the Japanese and in the struggle for independence. Earlier ICP stress on 
"class struggle" and "proletarianism" was abandoned in favour of a policy emphasising 
broad-based cooperation. As the Viet Minh's most important guide-line read:
Policy: Unite all the social classes, revolutionary parties, and patriotic peoples' groups 
in order to drive out the Japanese and French bandits, thereby making Vietnam entirely 
independent through the formation of a Democratic Republic of Vietnam 71
Significantly, the Viet Minh's political programme also noted the importance of 
cooperating with Asian neighbours in the fight against the Japanese.72 And from mid- 
1944 onwards, the Viet Minh headquarters singled out the importance of "linking closely 
with fellow Southeast Asian revolutions" and organisations to create favourable 
conditions for a successful uprising for national independence 73
III.2. Changes in Overseas Vietnamese Organisations in Thailand
As discussed in the previous chapter, during the 1930s the Vietnamese communist 
leadership in northeast Thailand had suffered badly because of arrests brought on by the 
SCP's policy of promoting a Siamese revolution. By the end of the decade, around a 
hundred Vietnamese communists had been imprisoned, including most of the SCP's top 
leaders. According to a Lao source, the ICP's communist cell in Thakhek (which had
Quoted by Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History o f  America's First Central Intelligence Agency
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 297.
70  Pridi, Political, p. 71.
7 1 Tran Huy Lieu, Vol. 10, op. cit., p. 53. For more details, consult: Stein Tpnnesson, The Vietnamese
Revolution o f 1945: Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War,’ (Doctorate, Oslo:
International Peace Research Institute, December 1990), pp. 145-60.
Tuyen Ngön cua Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh’ [The Declaration of the Vietnamese Independence 
League] in Tran Huy Lieu, Vol. 10, op. c it, p. 40.
Ibid., p. 96.73
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taken on added importance in the late 1930s) had also disintegrated following the arrest of 
most of its cadres in the early 1940s.74
In this context, the decision by Vietnamese leaders in 1941 to shift their emphasis from 
the ICP's formerly narrow class line to the Viet Minh's broad, united front strategy must 
have been a welcome development. However, it must be noted that news of the Viet 
Minh's new policy did not reach Vietnamese leaders in northeast Thailand until 1943 at 
the earliest.75 Sometime in this year a number of Vietnamese cadres fled to Thailand to 
escape increased Japanese and French repression in Vietnam. These Vietnamese, the first 
of them from Quang Binh province in central Vietnam, brought with them copies of the 
Viet Minh Political Programme. According to Le Manh Trinh, this was the first time the 
party cells in Thailand had been able to gain concrete information about the Viet Minh.76 
Once the political programme was available, it was spread among overseas Vietnamese 
organisations in Thailand.77
One of the most important results of this was the creation of national salvation 
associations (Hoi Ciru Quoc), mass organisations which were designed to link groups of 
Vietnamese society— artisans, Buddhists, students, etc.— into the wider Viet Minh front. 
Of those formed in Thailand, the Hoi Viet Kieu Curu Quoc (The Overseas Vietnamese 
National Salvation Association) was the most important and had the widest links to the 
overseas Vietnamese. "Within a few months," Trinh says this Overseas Vietnamese 
Association was able to attract Vietnamese members from old organisations, urging them 
to "Fight the French and Drive out the Japanese." Another Vietnamese newspaper, Doc
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Sichana Sisan, ’Kan Su Rop thi Thakhek' [The Struggle in Thakhek] in Suphot Dantrakun, op. ciL, p. 14. 
This conclusion comes from two Vietnamese sources: the veteran communist leader in Thailand, Le
Manh Trinh, CVDCQ, p. 51, and an interview with Hokng Nhät Tän, 5 May 1989, Hanoi. This was also 
the case for areas south of Tonkin where cadres knew little of the newly established Viet Minh strategy in 
northern Vietnam. David Marr has shown that between December 1940 and June 1945, there was "no 
direct contact" between the Cochinchina Regional Committee and the ICP Standing bureau in northern 
Vietnam. Marr's research has also shown that ICP cells in Quang Binh, Thua Thien, Nghe An, Birth 
Dinh, Khanh Hoa, and QuAng Ngäi provinces "remained ill-informal" of revolutionary developments in 
the north until 1943 and, in some cases, 1944. David G. Marr, manuscript. Quest for Power 
(forthcoming), pp. 26-28.
CVDCQ, p. 51. A Lao source says that the ICP branch in Thakhek began to reconsolidate its position in 
1943. See: Sichana Sisan, op. ciL, p. 14.
CVDCQ, p. 51. According to Tran Huy Lieu, concurrent with the formation of the Viet Nam Doc Lap 
Dong Minh in 1941 was the establishment of the Cao-mien Doc Lap Dong Minh [Cambodian 
Independence League] and the Ai-lao Doc Lap Dong Minh [Lao Independence League] which, together 
with the Viet Minh, constituted the Dong Durcmg Doc Lap Dong Minh [Indochinese Independence 
League]. See: Tran Huy Lieu, Vol. 10, op. cit., p. 49. While it seems likely that the Viet Minh would 
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Interestingly, in 1978 the Pol Pot-led government of Democratic Kampuchea published a Livre Noir to 
document Vietnamese historical aggression against Cambodia. In referring to the WWII years, the Livre 
Noir says that because the ICP's leadership was located in northern Vietnam and southern China, it had 
trouble dispatching cadres to Cambodia and Laos during this period, and thus had little real influence in 
these two regions until 1945. See: Departement de la Presse et de lTnformation du Minist&re des Affaires 
Strang eres du Kampuchea Democratique, Livre Noir, reprinted by Editions du Centenaire (Paris), 1978, 
pp. 17-18. French repression in the south during the early 1940s also took a heavy toll on the strength of 
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Lap (Independence), was printed in Thailand and disseminated widely among the large 
Vietnamese communities along the Mekong River. However, despite the introduction of 
the Viet Minh political programme, Trinh concedes that the Vietnamese leadership in 
Thailand was still unable to establish direct links with the Viet Minh General Bureau 
(Tong Bo) in the hills of northern Vietnam.78
Things changed, however, after the Japanese overthrew the French in Indochina in a 
coup deforce on 9 March 1945.79 This coup signalled the Japanese need to take direct 
control of Indochinese affairs in preparation for a possible Allied attack. With Germany 
defeated in Europe, the US was turning its full attention to the war in the Pacific. In mid- 
1945, the US began dispatching OSS teams to Thailand and Indochina to gather 
intelligence on downed pilots, prisoners-of-war, and Japanese troop movements. To 
both the Seri Thai and Viet Minh, US actions created favourable conditions for their 
independence movements and simultaneously gave rise to a sense of urgency in their 
activities. Although the US counselled Pridi to avoid launching an uprising, both Pridi 
and Ho stepped up their resistance operations against the Japanese, working directly with 
OSS teams, supplying them with valuable intelligence on Japanese positions and Allied 
prisoners-of-war.80 Fearing the return of European colonialism as much as the Japanese 
by this time, Pridi and Ho were aware that as the end of the war approached, they had to 
be able to demonstrate to the Allies the strength of their organisations as ones capable of 
ruling postwar, independent states.
Following the March coup, the Vietnamese were able to strengthen their resistance 
work in northeast Thailand considerably. With French intelligence no longer capable of 
monitoring Vietnamese activities along the Mekong River as closely as before, the 
Vietnamese moved more freely in the area and strengthened links between overseas 
Vietnamese organisations in Laos and Thailand. However, while French repression of 
the Vietnamese had subsided, it was allegedly replaced by a Japanese crack-down on 
Vietnamese resistance activities in Laos. There the Japanese accelerated their efforts to 
win over the support of local Vietnamese communities to the Japanese-backed Trän 
Trong Kim government. While Le Manh Trinh reports that Vietnamese resistance 
leaders along the Mekong were able to counter this effort, he concedes that they had a
CVDCQ, p. 52. Flood claims that the Hoi Viet Kieu CCru Quoc was based in Sakhon Nakhon. Flood, op. 
cit., p. 36. I have been unable to confirm this.
For more details concerning the March 1945 Japanese coup de force and its effects, see: Ralph B. Smith, 
The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945,' Journal o f  Southeast Asian Studies, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, (September 1978), pp. 268-301 and Hüynh Kim Khänh, op. c it, pp. 291-93.
On 12 May, an OSS team was parachuted into northeast Thailand to work with the Seri Thai until the 
end of the war. For more details, see: US, OSS, 'Sleeve Operational Report by John S. Holladay,' 27 
September 1945, RG 226, E154, USNA. In July, a similar OSS mission left for Indochina. See: US, 
OSS, 'Report on Deer Mission by Major Allison Thomas,' 17 September 1945, RG 226, El 54, Box 299, 
Folder 3377, USNA.
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much harder time with the pro-Japanese Dai Viet (Greater Vietnam) party, which had 
expanded its influence among the Vietnamese in Laos after the March coup*1
Even more pressing, however, was the fact that as of April 1945 Vietnamese leaders in 
Thailand had still been unable to establish direct contact with the Viet Minh headquarters 
in northern Vietnam. Without instructions from the Viet Minh General Bureau, the 
leadership in Thailand was unsure of how they were to respond to new and rapidly 
changing conditions. Guide-lines defining Vietnamese cooperation with the Seri Thai 
was an area of particular uncertainty, especially as the Seri Thai stepped up operations in 
northeast Thailand in mid-1945. Viet Minh adherents in Thailand were also in the dark as 
to how they were to work with the newly bom "national liberation movement of the Lao 
people," the Lao-pen-Lao (Laos for the Lao Movement).82
III.3. Seri Thai-Viet Minh Cooperation Begins, April 1945
According to Trinh, following the March coup deforce, the General Association of the 
Overseas Vietnamese in Thailand (Tong Hoi Viet Kieu Thäi-lan) dispatched a 
representative to northern Vietnam to establish direct relations with the Viet Minh General 
Bureau.83 A simultaneous decision was made to establish relations with the Seri Thai, 
evidently without waiting for instructions from the General Bureau. Because of this 
decision, the Vietnamese in Thailand were soon given assistance by the Seri Thai and the 
Lao-pen-Lao.84 According to the Vietnamese scholar, Hoang Nhat Tan, Piidi directed 
Seri Thai leaders to form secret "anti-Japanese resistance zones" in northeast Thailand in 
1945. As a part of this plan, Pridi contacted Nguyln Chan to request overseas 
Vietnamese assistance. Tan confirmed in an interview that the overseas Vietnamese in 
Thailand "supported Pridi" in the formation of these bases, known as chien khu 
(fighting zones) to the Vietnamese. While details are limited, Tan indicated that Pridi 
helped the overseas Vietnamese to establish a chien khu in Na Kae.85 This is confirmed 
by another Vietnamese scholar, Tran Xuän Cau, who states that the Na Kae base was 
established in April 1945.86 Nakae is a small, northeastern Thai village, located along the
81 CVDCQ, p. 52. Interestingly, in January 1945 the Japanese brought Tran Trong Kim to Bangkok,
where he stayed with some of his close associates until 29 March, when he was taken back to Vietnam by
the Japanese to set up a new government. See: Trän Trong Kim, M ot Com Gio Bui (Kien Van Luc)
[Dust Storm (A Memoir)], (npc., NXB Vlnh Som, 1969), pp. 32-42. For further evidence of Japanese 
measures against the Vietnamese in Laos, see: Dang Bi'ch Ha, et al„ Luom Sir Nu&c Lao [An Outline 
History o f Laos], (Hanoi: NXBKHXH, 1978), p. 164 and Tran Xuän Cau, Cäch Mang Thing Tarn Lao 
Näm 1945' [The August 1945 Lao Revolution], NCLS, No. 163, (July and August 1975), p. 32.
82 CVDCQ, p. 52. For more details concerning the Lao-Pen-Lao, see: Gunn, op. c it, pp. 127-31.
It seems likely that the Tong Hoi Viet Kieu differed from the Hoi Viet Kieu in that it was the headquarters. 
84 CVDCQ, p. 52.
83 Interview with Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi
8  ^ Trän Xuän Cäu, op. c it, p. 32. Le Manh Trinh also makes reference to these Seri Thai-assisted training
camps for Lao and Vietnamese youths. CVDCQ, pp. 57-58 and also see: Dang Bich Hä, op. cit., p. 163. 
This is the first concrete evidence historians have of direct Seri Thai-Viet Minh cooperation. Cäu 
incorrectly states that Na Kae was in Sakhon Nakhon province. Trinh writes in his memoir that overseas 
Vietnamese youths were given military training in such bases in June and July 1945. CVDCQ, p. 58. 
Significantly, on 7 August 1965 the Communist Party of Thailand launched its first guerilla attack on
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Mekong River south of Nakhon Phanom. It had become a Vietnamese resistance post in 
the 1920s, when it was first organised by Dang Thuc HOa and his associates.
According to Tan, the Na Kae base consisted of twenty to thirty Vietnamese youths 
who made weapons.87 Cäu wrote that in the end the Na Kae base consisted of 120 Lao 
and overseas Vietnamese, armed with rudimentary weapons.88 Tan explained that this 
cooperation between the Viet Minh and the Seri Thai only lasted "a few months" before a 
decision was made by Pridi to abandon armed fighting in these zones which, in the end, 
had accomplished "very little."89 Pridi did supply some weapons to the Vietnamese 
during this period, though the quantity remains unclear but was probably small.90
Thai sources are conspicuously quiet when it comes to discussing Thai-Vietnamese 
cooperation during WWII. However, Pridi hints in his memoir at possible Thai- 
Vietnamese cooperation.
A number of other Southeast Asian nationalists who were staying in Siam at the time 
[of the war] joined the anti-Japanese resistance movement [Seri Thai]. Their groups 
received training in the theory and practice of guerilla warfare from our resistance group 
[Seri Thai].91
Interestingly, a September 1945 article in the Viet Minh's mouthpiece, CCru Quoc 
(National Salvation), reported that during the anti-Japanese resistance the "overseas 
Vietnamese had supported the Siamese people competently in several guerilla battles."92 
Presumably, with such cooperation in mind, Trinh wrote in his memoir that from mid- 
1945, "the longtime neighbours of Vietnam, Laos and Thailand became friends in the 
struggle against the common enemy: fascist Japan."93
Besides this cooperation, Seri Thai leaders in the northeast also employed some Viet 
Minh cadres in their guerilla operations. Toward the end of the war, northeast politicians 
and leaders of the Northeastern Seri Thai Committee, Chamlong Daoruang and Tiang
Thai security forces in Na Kae. See: Robert J. Muscat, Thailand and the United States: Development, 
Security, and Foreign Aid, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 154.
87 Interview with Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi.
8 8 Tran Xuän Cau, op. c it, p. 32.
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included sten guns, detonators, machine guns, booby traps, and ammunition. See: Kachent
Dechakunchon, 'Khabuan Kan Seri Thai: Changwat Khon Kaeri [The Seri Thai: Khon Kaen Province], 
Sinlapa Watthanatham [Journal of Art and Culture], Vol. 8, No. 6, (April 1987), pp. 63-65.
90  Interview with Hokng Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi.
91 Pridi Phanomyong, Chiwit Phanphuan khong Khaophacao lae 21 Pi thi Liphai nai Sathanarat Ratsadon 
Cin [My Ever Changing Life and 21 Years of Exile in the People's Republic of China], Trans, from 
French into Thai by Camnong Phakhuanwut and Phonthip Toyai, (npc., 1974), p. 88, cited in 
consultation with an English translation o f Pridi's memoir, 'Southeast Asia's Association of Nations,' 
Bangkok Post, 28 November 1974, p. 15. I have been unable to locate the original French version of 
Pridi's memoir.
92 'Quan Doi Viet Kieu Hoat Dong & Xiem-la' [An Overseas Vietnamese Army is Operational in Siam], 
Cfru Quoc, 22 September 1945, No. 40.
93 CVDCQ.p. 53.
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Serikhan, worked directly with Viet Minh representatives in Thailand. Another 
northeastern Seri Thai official, Thongin Phuriphat, worked with Tiang to recruit Vü Hiru 
Binh into a number of Seri Thai anti-Japanese operations in the region.94 By this time, 
Binh was a Viet Minh leader working along the Mekong River. A Vietnamese 
communist member in Thailand, Mai Vän Quang, was in contact with Chamlong 
Daoruang as well. While the details surrounding their cooperation remain sketchy, they 
were reported to have been friends by a Viet Minh representative who worked out of 
Thailand in late 1945.95
Although it is unclear when exactly Vietnamese organisations in Thailand were 
incorporated into the Viet Minh hierarchy, Tan said that it occurred during the last 
months of the Pacific War. Trinh agreed, writing in his memoir that before the war 
ended, the Viet Minh General Bureau in Vietnam sent a special representative to Laos and 
Thailand to establish formal ties with overseas Vietnamese organisations. Two Overseas 
Vietnamese Special Committees (Dae uy Viet Kieu), one each in Laos and Thailand, 
were created under the "direct leadership" of the Viet Minh General Bureau and the 
General Association of the Overseas Vietnamese in Thailand before the war ended.96 
Symbolising the increasing importance of Thailand to the Vietnamese independence 
movement as the war came to an end, in mid-1945 communist party branches in Laos and 
Thailand, following earlier instructions sent from the ICP Central Committee, dispatched 
representatives to northern Vietnam to attend an upcoming National Congress in Tan 
Trao.97
94  Telephone communication with Tran Van Dlnh, 29 December 1990, Washington, DC.
Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC. It will be recalled that Mai Van Quang 
had first come to Thailand when he was in his teens and had studied under Dang Thüc HCra and Hoang 
Van Hoan. A 1968 Vietnamese communist document stated that besides cooperating with the Allies 
during WWII, Pridi also "secretly worked with the Communist Party of Thailand [CPT]." In December 
1942, the First Congress of the Party met to form the CPT and promulgate a political programme. 
According to this document, Thai communists considered this to be the official founding day of the Party, 
preferring to ignore the SCP's original formation in April 1930. See: 'NhQmg Net,' p. 37 and 'Congress 
of the Fourth Congress of the CPT,' in Weng Towicharakan, op. cit, pp. 25 and 14043. The similarity to 
the Cambodian Communist Party's attempt to rewrite its original founding day, removed from its 
affiliation with the Vietnamese, is obvious.
96  CVDCQ, p. 53.
97 Som Tung, op. cit., p. 163; Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC; and Hoang 
Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 254.
Chapter 3
War in Indochina
The period between the end of WWII and the outbreak of full-scale war in Indochina 
in December 1946 was a turning point in the expansion of postwar Vietnamese resistance 
activities in Thailand. With the war over, the Vietnamese had to consolidate their hold on 
power and simultaneously prepare for the possibility of French attempts to reinstate 
colonial rule to Indochina. In this chapter, we will turn our attention from an exclusive 
discussion of Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand to an examination of the 
Indochina-wide security threats facing the newly formed Vietnamese government during 
the last half of 1945 and all of 1946. Because French action in Indochina was the major 
factor explaining the increasing importance of Thailand to Vietnam in the immediate 
postwar period, it is necessary to outline briefly the events leading up to the outbreak of 
war in Indochina in December 1946.
In this connexion, we will turn our attention to the Viet Minh's growing interest in 
protecting its western flank through intensified cooperation with the Lao resistance 
movement. As we shall see in the following chapters, the orientation of the Viet Minh's 
security thinking toward the west would influence the subsequent development of 
Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand. As for Vietnamese resistance work in 
Thailand, we will limit our discussion here to an examination of immediate postwar Thai 
assistance to the Viet Minh during the last half of 1945. We shall also look at two 
Franco-Thai incidents along the Thai-Lao border in mid-1946 which were a part of 
Franco-Thai negotiations and in which the Vietnamese were directly involved. A detailed 
discussion of Vietnamese activities in Thailand in 1946 will be reserved for the next 
chapter.
Part I: The Strategic Situation up to December 1945
1.1. The Viet Minh Come to Power
At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the Allied powers decided that command 
boundaries in Indochina would be divided along the 16th parallel, with the Chinese in
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charge of the northern part and the British responsible for the southern section. On 13 
August, two days before the Japanese publicly accepted the Allied terms of unconditional 
surrender, a special ICP All-Country Congress opened at Tan Trao, a jungle base 
located in northern Vietnam. Three days later, Ho Chi Minh presided over a National 
Congress there during which guide-lines were set by which the Viet Minh would seize 
power, establish a provisional government, and negotiate with the Allies. On 19 August, 
before Allied troops arrived to accept the Japanese surrender in Indochina, the Viet Minh 
came to power in Hanoi. Within a week, groups pledging loyalty to the Viet Minh held 
the upper hand throughout much of the country. On 25 August, the Vietnamese emperor, 
Bao Dai, abdicated his throne, turning his symbols of power over to the Viet Minh on the 
30th. Within a week of the official formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV) on 2 September, Chinese troops began pouring into Vietnam from the north, 
while British forces landed in the south.
The challenges to the newly formed DRV were immense. Internally, the government 
was a coalition of different parties and competing interests. While the communists held 
key positions in the DRV government, Ho did not aim for a monopoly. The Vietnamese 
Nationalist Party (VNQDD), in particular, was suspicious of the communist credentials of 
several Viet Minh leaders and sought to expand its own power with assistance from its 
Chinese backers. In the south, the situation was even more complex. Immediately 
following the Japanese capitulation, the Viet Minh came to power in Saigon between 24 
and 25 August and was represented through the People's Committee of the South (Vy  
Ban Nhän Dän Nam Bö). Headed by a veteran southern communist, Tran Van Giau, 
this committee was an uneasy coalition of communists, nationalists, and religious sects. 
In September, feuds inside the Committee led Giku to resign the chairmanship. He was 
replaced by an independent, Pham Vän Bach.1
The landing of Allied forces in Indochina further threatened the Viet Minh's hold on 
power. By late September, a 150,000 man Chinese army began to arrive to accept the 
Japanese surrender in northern Indochina. Far from stabilising the situation, this army 
was a collection of regular and irregular troops, often more interested in looting and 
profiteering than in disarming the Japanese. Moreover, Chinese attempts to foster a non­
communist Vietnamese government put the Viet Minh provisional government under even 
more pressure. Yet no matter how much the Vietnamese might have detested this 
occupation by an age-old enemy, it was clear that the Chinese presence prevented the 
French from retaking northern Vietnam by force in September 1945. And as for the
Lockhart, op. cit., pp. 149-64; Tran Van Giiu, et al., Dia Chi Van Hoa, Thknh Pho Ho Chi Minh [A 
Geographical and Cultural History of Ho Chi Minh City], (Ho Chi Minh City: NXBTPHCM, 1987), pp. 
350-54; and William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1981), pp. 96-98.
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Chinese commanders in Vietnam, they preferred the Viet Minh to the French in order to 
protect their own economic and strategic interests.
The British did not share this view of the Viet Minh. Already pledged to help restore 
French authority to Indochina, in early September British and Indian troops under the 
command of General Douglas Gracey began arriving in the south to accept the Japanese 
surrender and to maintain order. Although this was the extent of Gracey's task, he soon 
took it upon himself to release and rearm French troops who had been interned since 
March and to order the Japanese to disarm the Viet Minh. Subsequent bloody clashes 
occurred between the French and Vietnamese in Saigon. On 21 September, Gracey 
declared martial law. On the 23rd the French, with British collusion, engineered a coup 
de force that forced the Viet Minh out of Saigon and into the countryside. War had begun 
in Vietnam below the 16th parallel.
From September to early 1946, the French strengthened their military positions in 
Nam Bo (the Vietnamese term referring to southern Vietnam) and southern Trung Bo 
(central Vietnam). With troop reinforcements arriving in October, the French advanced 
into the countryside, taking control of most of the main towns, roads, and ferry 
crossings. Meanwhile, the Viet Minh continued to lose important allies among the 
nationalist groups and its fragile relationship with the religious sects deteriorated further. 
In late 1945, main Viet Minh groups were forced to retreat to remote areas in the Plain of 
Reeds and areas along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border.2
As for Cambodia, on 10 October the French entered Phnom Penh and, with the help of 
the British, overthrew the newly independent government led by Son Ngoc Thach. A 
French-backed government was quickly installed; and in January 1946 King Sihanouk 
recognised French sovereignty over Cambodia.
1.2. French Action in Laos, August to December 1945
Of particular worry to leaders of the DRV immediately after the war were French 
attempts to retake all of Laos, despite the fact that most of it fell above the 16th parallel 
and was thus to be administered by the Chinese. Following the March 1945 Japanese 
coup deforce, over five thousand French colonial troops under the command of General 
Major Marcel Alessandri had fled to Yunnan province in southern China. Positioned 
along the Sino-Lao border in August, these troops were awaiting permission to return to 
Indochina to re-establish French authority to Indochina. Control of Laos would have 
provided the French with a strategic backdoor through which to attack DRV adherents in 
northern Vietnam. In addition, there were about five hundred French-led guerillas active
2 Nguyen Kien Giang, Viet-nam Nam Dau Tien Sau Cäch Mang Thäng Täm (Thäng Tarn 1945-Thäng 
Chap 1946) [Vietnam the First Year after the August Revolution (August 1945 to December 1946)], 
(Hanoi: NXBST, 1961), pp. 100-03; Lockhart, op. e it, pp. 149-63; and Duiker, op. cit., pp. 114-17.
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in the Lao countryside in August.3 Former French colonial soldiers who had remained in 
Laos after the March coup, these guerillas subsisted off the land and launched minor hit- 
and-run operations from the countryside, never seriously threatening Japanese power. 
However, with the end of the war at hand, they assumed added importance as French 
military leaders tried to use them as symbols of French colonial authority in Laos.
On 16 August 1945, French partisans were instructed to occupy immediately 
administrative centres throughout Laos, both above and below the 16th parallel.4 The 
French, with the help of the British, retook the southernmost portion of Laos falling 
below the 16th parallel, including an important airbase in Pakse. As for the area above 
the 16th parallel, the delayed arrival of the Chinese encouraged the French in their bid to 
regain control of the rest of Laos.5 In direct violation of the Potsdam agreements, on 28 
August French guerillas captured the royal capital of Luang Prabang, gained the Lao 
monarch's recognition of French sovereignty, and took over administration of the city. 
Despite orders from OSS officials demanding withdrawal of French forces in Laos to the 
area south of the 16th parallel, the French did not comply.6
Yet French efforts to regain other towns in northern Laos posed a more formidable 
task. During the last half of 1945, French guerillas were unable to retake and hold 
Vientiane, Thakhek, or Savannakhet. Though they could dispatch representatives to tend 
to French citizens in these locations, their attempts to take them by force were hindered by 
a combination of OSS and Chinese opposition and joint Viet Minh and Lao defence units.
In late September, the Chinese began to arrive in Laos, reaching Luang Prabang first 
and then slowly making their way southwards.7 In charge of accepting the Japanese 
surrender and administering affairs in Laos was the 93rd Division, a force numbering 
around twenty thousand men.8 The 93rd was a collection of regular and irregular troops, 
civilians, and stragglers who, as in Vietnam, were often more interested in profit-making 
than in attending to the matter of disarming the Japanese.9 While the Chinese allowed the 
French to remain in Luang Prabang until December, the French found Chinese 
commanders in Laos at this time unwilling to help them restore their authority to other 
Lao towns. At the end of the year, the Chinese looked the other way as Lao and Viet
Michel Caply, Guerilla Au Laos, (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1966), p. 231 and Tran Xuän Can, op. cit, p. 
33.
Caply, op. cit, p. 235-36 and 'Memorandum from the Lao National Government (dated 18 January 1946)’ 
in US, DOS, 892.00/1-3046, 30 January 1946, USNA, pp. 6-10, especially p. 8.
The Chinese arrival was delayed by heavy rains. See: Tran Xuän Cau, op. cit, p. 33 and Archimedes 
L.A. Patti, Why Vietnam? Prelude to America's Albatross, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1980), pp. 144-47.
US, OSS, 'Raven Mission to Vientiane, French Indo-China [Report by Major Bank],' 8 October 1945, RG 
226, OSS E154, Folder 3019, USNA, pp. 2-3 and 13 and Caply, op. cit, pp. 281-82.
Caply, op. cit, p. 282 and Tran Xuän Cau, op. cit, p. 33.
The figure of twenty thousand comes from three sources: Dang Bfch Ha, op. cit, p. 175; Interview with 
Trän Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC; and Caply, op. cit, p. 282.
Caply, op. cit, pip. 243-47.
War in Indochina 83
Minh armed groups encircled the small French force barricaded in Luang Prabang. 
Following unsuccessful attempts to gain Chinese intervention,10 on 4 January the French 
abandoned Luang Prabang, leaving the major towns of Laos above the 16th parallel under 
Chinese supervision, with Viet Minh and Lao resistance forces still able to continue 
strengthening their positions there. In contrast to Nam Bo, by the end of 1945 and during 
the early part of 1946 Viet Minh forces in Laos were concentrated in towns along the 
Mekong, while small, under-supplied French units were forced to take up guerilla tactics 
in the surrounding forests, waiting for reinforcements from Saigon and more favourable 
conditions for an attack on Lao urban centres.11
As in northern Vietnam, the Chinese presence in Laos during late 1945 acted as a 
safeguard for the Lao Issara and the Viet Minh.12 For one, KMT forces impeded most 
French efforts to re-instate their colonial rule to Laos above the 16th parallel. Secondly, 
the Chinese took little interest in suppressing the anti-French activities of the Viet Minh or 
Lao Issara in Laos.13 The Viet Minh was able to expand its military presence in Laos and 
to build stronger links to the Lao resistance and overseas communities, largely free of 
French interference. This was in stark contrast to Cambodia, where French reoccupation 
in October 1945 had made Viet Minh military operations and collaboration with anti- 
French Cambodian forces extremely difficult.14
1.3. The Strengthening of the Viet Minh Position in Laos
The Viet Minh's interest in strengthening its western positions in both Thailand and 
Laos can be dated back to the period before the end of the Pacific War. The first visible 
sign of this came in early to mid-1945 (probably in late April or May) when a special ICP 
representative sent to Thailand by the Central Committee instructed Party branches in 
Thailand and Laos to dispatch participants to the upcoming Congress at Tan Trao. With 
time of the utmost importance, the Thai ICP branch selected Tran Dire Vinh (also 
spelled Vinh) and another delegate known only as Khieu to go to Tan Trao,15 while the
10
l i
12
13
14
15
Tran Xuän Cau, op. ciL, p. 40; Caply, op. cit, pp. 331-32; and Brown and Zasloff, op. tit., p. 33. For a 
discussion of events in Laos at the end of WWII, see: Brown and Zasloff, op. cit, pp. 2045 .
In late November 1945, an ICP Central Committee directive pointed out the danger in Laos, unlike Nam 
Bo, was that the Lao and Vietnamese were only in control of the towns, while French guerillas operated 
unhindered in the countryside. See: 'Chi Thi cua Ban Chap Hanh Trung ITomg Ding ve "Khang Chien, 
Kien Quoc," (dated 25 November 1945)' [The Party Central Committee's Directives concerning 
'Resistance and Nation Building'], Vän Kien Ding ve Khang Chian Chong Thirc Din Phäp, Tap I 
(1945-1950) [Party Documents concerning the Resistance Against French Colonialism, Volume I (1945- 
1950)], (Hanoi: NXBST, 1986), p. 37 [hereafter cited as VKD, 1945-1950]. Though the ICP had publicly 
been self-dissolved in November 1945, it continued to function clandestinely.
Vietnamese historians of Laos have conceded this point, writing that the Chinese presence in Laos was 
"a factor blocking a French advance." See: Dang Bfch Hk, op. t i t ,  p. 176.
Tran Xuän Cau, op. cit, p. 39, makes this point as well.
This is another early and important factor contributing to the different directions which subsequently 
emerged in Vietnamese-Lao and Vietnamese-Cambodian relations.
Son Tung, op. t i t ,  p. 163; CVDCQ, p. 53; Interview with Tran Van Dinh, 20 June 1990, Washington, 
DC; and Hokng Van Hoan, op. t i t ,  p. 254. According to Son Tung, Quynh Anh was initially selected 
to attend the Tan Trko congress, but, because she did not know how to ride a bicycle and time was short,
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Lao Party branch sent Dircmg Trf Trung.16 These three immediately set out on bicycles 
for the hills of northern Vietnam. According to a ranking ICP delegate who was at Tan 
Trao, we know that Vinh and Trung made it to Tan Trao in enough time to take part in 
the ICP All-Country Congress.17 Vinh, in particular, was a notable selection. In the 
late 1920s, his father had been a communist cadre in northeast Thailand who had been 
trained by Ho Chi Minh. A party member himself, Vinh had lived and worked in 
northeast Thailand since the mid-1930s.18
Besides setting the guide-lines for taking power, during meetings at Tan Trho Ho 
also raised the possibility that the arrival of the Allies in Indochina might presage a full- 
scale French attack on Vietnam. Describing a worst case scenario, Ho pointed out the 
possibility that the French, with "the full support" of the Americans, the British, and the 
consent of the KMT, might attempt to retake all of Vietnam in the immediate wake of the 
war. Ho said that in such a case the Vietnamese must be ready both to fight and to 
negotiate.19 Concerning the possibility of a French attack, the Viet Minh were concerned 
by the presence of Alessandri's troops in southern China. With the end of the war at 
hand, Vietnamese leaders could not rule out the possibility that Allesandri might gain 
Allied permission to return his troops to Indochina.20 In such a case, the Viet Minh 
would face a threat of invasion from the west, through Laos and northwestern Bac Bo 
(the Vietnamese term referring to northern Vietnam).
This concern is evident in the resolution passed by the ICP All-Country Congress at 
Tan Trao on 15 August in which the problem of rebuilding ICP branches in Laos and 
Cambodia was singled out, with "special assistance to be given to the Lao Party 
branch."21 This would suggest that Vietnamese strategists at Tan Trao (who were mainly 
northerners) were more concerned with Laos than Cambodia at this point. Immediately 
after the congress, a "special representative" of the Viet Minh was sent to Laos to
she was unable to go. I have thus far been unable to determine the identity of Khieu, it could have been a 
pseudonym for Mai Van Quang or Nguyen Chain.
1  ^ Interview with Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 254. It will be 
recalled that Dircmg Trf Trung had studied under Dang Thüc Hua and Hoang Van Hoan in the late 
1920s. Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 41.
17 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 254. I do not know what happened to Khieu. Le Manh Trinh claims that 
these delegates left Thailand/Laos "at the end of July." However, if at least two of the delegates made it 
in time for at least part of the ICP Congress, I find it very hard to believe that they could have left in late 
July and made it to Trän Trao by 13-15 August They must have left Thailand earlier, considering the 
rugged and hilly terrain they had to cover. From the evidence available, there was no overseas 
Vietnamese representative from Cambodia at Tan Trao. It is possible that a representative had been 
selected, but, because of the distance, did not arrive in time to attend the congress. This was one of the 
reasons why there was no ranking member from the south at Tan Trao. Hoang Van Hoan joined the ICP 
Central Committee at this time and worked in the Viet Bäc zone after Tan Trao.
18 Interview with Trän Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC.
19 Hohng Vän Hoan, op. cit, pp. 255-57, especially p. 256.
20 Patti, op. cit, pp. 130, 138, and 145.
21 'Nghi Quyet cüa Toan Quoc Hoi Nghi Ding Cöng Sin Döng-Ducmg' (14, 15 thing 8 nim  1945)' 
[Resolution of the All-Country ICP Congress (14, 15 August 1945)] in Lieh Sir Ding Cong Sin Viet 
Nam, Trich Vän Kien Ding, Tap I [A History of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Extracts o f Party 
Documents, Volume I], (Hanoi: NXB Sich Giao Khoa Mac-Le-Nin, 1979), p. 399 [Hereafter, TVKD].
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establish closer collaboration with the newly formed Lao independence movement. This 
delegate was Tran Dire Vlnh, the same delegate who had attended the ICP All-Country 
Congress on behalf of the Thai Party branch.22 Ho was said to have appointed another 
representative at Tan Trao to travel to Thailand. This individual was Nguyen Dire 
Qüy, a member of the Viet Minh from Hue who had worked in northern Vietnam against 
the Japanese and rescued downed Allied pilots during the war. In making this selection, 
Ho reportedly sought to appoint a polished, effective representative of Vietnam, someone 
who was multilingual, cultured, and not openly associated with the communist party.23 
In this connexion, Qüy was a member of the Vietnamese Youth League, proficient in 
French, English, Thai, and Chinese, and a member of the non-communist Democratic 
Party (Dan Chu Dang). 24 Although it is unclear why Qüy did not leave for Bangkok 
until a year later (see chapter 4), his selection by Ho at the Tan Trao congress provides 
us with an early, postwar example of growing Viet Minh interest in Thailand.
The decision by the Viet Minh at Tan Trao to strengthen their positions in Laos was 
well calculated. General Alessandri did seek Allied permission to move his troops back 
to Indochina. And though his requests were denied by Chiang Kaishek, they 
nevertheless gave credence to Vietnamese fears of a French attack from the west. These 
concerns must have been given added weight when, as has been noted, fighting broke out 
between the Viet Minh and French forces in Laos in August and the French retook Luang 
Prabang on the 28th. In mid-September, Ho confided to an OSS representative in Hanoi, 
Archimedes Patti, that the Viet Minh were deeply worried by the French military action in 
Laos. A former Viet Minh military officer who began working in Laos in October 1945, 
said in an interview in 1989 that Ho considered Laos to be a strategic "buffer for northern 
Vietnam," protecting it from a French attack from the west after WWII.25 According to 
Patti, Ho also believed that French forces in Laos were "attempting to infiltrate northern 
Viet Nam through that rear area" and, as far as Ho was concerned, an "undeclared war" 
had begun between the French and Vietnamese in Laos 26 In response to this situation, 
the Viet Minh began "developing a plan of operations for a protracted conflict against the 
French."27 Ho ordered his new Minister of Defence, General Chu Van Tan, to 
strengthen Vietnamese forces in the "southern sector along the Mekong."28 Ho may have 
had the strategic French airbase in Pakse in mind when issuing this instruction. In early
22  Interview with Tran Vän Dlnh, 31 December 1989, Washington, DC; Hoäng NMt Tan, 5 May 1989, 
Hanoi; and CVDCQ, p. 55.
23 Interview with Tran Vän Dlnh, 31 December 1989, Washington, DC.
24  Interviews with Nguyen Due Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City; Tran Van Dinh, 31 December 1989, 
Washington, DC; and Hoäng Nhät Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi. The Democratic Party was a part of the 
Viet Minh coalition.
^  Interview with Trän Vän Dlnh, 31 December 1989, Washington, IX!. See also: David Marr, 'Vietnam 
1945: Some Questions,' Vietnam Forum, No. 6, (Summer-Fall 1985), p. 180.
2 ^  Patti, op. cit, p. 348.
27 Quoted in Ibid., p. 348. I have been unable to determine who or what, exactly, this plan involved.
28 Ibid., p .348.
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November, an article in the DRV newspaper, Dän Thanh (People's Opinion), echoed this 
concern when it pointed out that French guerilla attacks on Savannakhet represented "an 
important strategy" used by the French "to cut off Indochina."29
To consolidate defensive positions in Laos, the Viet Minh sought to widen its control 
over the thousands of overseas Vietnamese families residing there and to increase military 
cooperation with Lao resistance groups. According to Curu Quoc, on 28 August, hardly 
ten days after the Tan Trao National Congress had closed, a special representative of the 
Viet Minh General Bureau arrived in Savannakhet. Although this official was not named, 
he was almost certainly Tran Due Vinh. Whatever the case, this delegate began meeting 
with Lao leaders discussing areas where joint cooperation should be developed against 
the French, with a joint military liaison and combined defence units soon formed. On the 
night of 28 August, he presided over a meeting of Vietnamese leaders from the Overseas 
Vietnamese National Salvation Association (Hoi Viet Kieu CCru Quoc) and the Overseas 
Vietnamese Friendship Association (Hoi Viet Kieu Thin AT) from Thailand and Laos. 
Participants considered ways by which their organisations could be united into a single, 
more effective entity. After some discussion, it was decided that the old Overseas 
Vietnamese Association would be incorporated into the newer Overseas Vietnamese 
National Salvation Association. Reforms were subsequently approved to align this 
enlarged body with Viet Minh guide-lines and Vietnamese communities in both Laos and 
Thailand contributed men and money to defence forces in Laos.30
Hanoi further strengthened its ties with the Lao resistance movement through the 
assistance of the Lao nationalist leader, Prince Souphanouvong. Educated in France and 
Hanoi, Souphanouvong supported the idea of combined Vietnamese-Lao cooperation 
against the French. In early September, he was escorted to Hanoi by a Viet Minh 
representative to meet with Ho Chi Minh and other ranking Vietnamese leaders 
concerning the need for wider Lao-Vietnamese military cooperation against French
Tin T£rc Nam Bp: Dän Quän Viet-Lao Chien Dau Rat Manh M6 tai Savannakhet' [News from the South: 
The Vietnamese-Lao People's Army Fights Very Bravely in Savannakhet], Dän Thanh [People’s 
Opinion], 10 November 1945. Because planes could not reach Hanoi from Saigon without refueling, 
control of the airbase at Pakse was important tactically. This airbase would have played an important part 
in any late 1945 French attack on northern Vietnam.
'Läo-Viet Hop Täc' [Lao-Vietnamese Cooperation], Cüru Quoc, 10 September 1945, No. 39; 'Cach Day 25 
Nam’ [25 Years Ago], Nhän Dän [People's Daily], 29 August 1970; Uayphon Wanket Khroprop 80 Pi 
khong Than Prathan Souphanouvong,' [A Blessing on the Complete Cycle of the Birth of His Excellency 
Souphanouvong], Prachachon [The People], 13 July 1989 in Suphot Dantrakun, op. c it ,  p. 2; and 
CVDCQ, pp. 55-56. Le Manh Trinh says that on 23 August Tran D£rc Vinh arrived in Savannakhet 
where he began organising the overseas Vietnamese and negotiating with the Japanese. Geoffrey Gunn 
confuses Tran Van Dlnh and Tran Due Vinh on p. 122. He states that ”[j]ust prior to his journey to Laos 
from Vietnam on 6 October 1945 along with Prince Souphanouvong . . ..T ran  [which one?] had 
attended the National Congress o f the ICP at Tan Trao either as a delegate from Thailand or Laos." If he 
is referring to Tran Due Vinh, then he is unaware of the fact that Vinh arrived in Laos in late August, 
while Dlnh arrived in early October with Souphanouvong. If Gunn is referring to Dlnh in the above 
passage, then he fails to recognise that Dlnh was neither a communist party member nor did he even 
attend the ICP All-Country Congress at Tan Trao. Gunn, op. ciL, p. 122.
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colonialism.31 In a meeting with an OSS officer, Souphanouvong said that he was in 
Hanoi "to make arrangements with Ho Chi Minh to support the Viet Nam government."32 
Having been asked by Viet Minh leaders to form a joint Lao-Vietnamese military force,33 
on 30 September Souphanouvong arrived in Hue with a letter from Hanoi to the Central 
Region Resistance Administration Committee. On instructions from Ho, a small 
contingent of Viet Minh officials was chosen to escort Souphanouvong back to Laos. 
Among those selected was a young Vietnamese from Hue named Tran Van Dlnh, the 
deputy director for special operations of the Liberation Army General Staff. On 7 
October, Dlnh and Souphanouvong arrived in Savannakhet to begin work on creating a 
Lao Liberation Army.34
This was not an easy goal. Firstly, few of these men had any real military experience. 
Secondly, some Lao leaders were undoubtedly troubled by the outpouring of Vietnamese 
support for the DRV in major Lao towns following the August Revolution, a 
development which rekindled historical ethnic animosities and threatened cooperation.35 
On 30 August, in a move clearly designed to allay Lao ethnic distrust of the Vietnamese, a 
number of Vietnamese who had previously worked in the French colonial bureaucracy 
turned their jobs over to Lao counterparts.36 According to Dlnh, Thao Oun Chananikon, 
a major Lao Issara leader who had close links with the Thais, was particularly suspicious 
of Souphanouvong and his entourage of Viet Minh advisers. Having taken control of 
Savannakhet, Oun and his supporters were reluctant to turn over leadership of the Lao 
independence movement to Souphanouvong. To Dlnh, this problem left the Viet Minh 
considerably isolated from Lao forces under Oun's leadership and impeded Vietnamese 
efforts to strengthen their position in Laos through closer military cooperation with the 
Lao Issara.37
To help solve this problem, Dlnh said in an interview that he arranged a meeting 
between Oun and Souphanouvong shortly after arriving in Savannakhet, during which he
31
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'Uayphon Wanket,' p. 2 and Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC. While it is 
unclear which side initiated the contact, the Viet Minh had links to Souphanouvong through Ho Chi 
Minh's Minister of Transportation, Dao Trong Kim. Kim was said to have been a good friend to 
Souphanouvong, the two of them having studied together in France. Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 
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Interview with Prince Souphanouvong of Laos,' 19 September 1945, Office of Strategic Service China 
Theatre, SI Branch, APC 627 reprinted in Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, 9, 10, 11 May 1972, Causes, Origins, and 
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stressed the importance of unity among the Lao leadership and between the Lao and 
Vietnamese. Dlnh claims he proposed the formation of a general staff to administer to 
one, unified Lao army.38 On 8 October, at a Lao Issara congress in Thakhek, the Army 
for the Liberation and Defence of Laos was formed, with Souphanouvong and Oun's 
men forming the command and staff. Souphanouvong became the commander-in-chief 
of the army, while Oun took over as the second-in-command. As for Dinh, he became 
an adviser to Souphanouvong's Intelligence Service, a group he says soon grew "into an 
almost independent agency."39 On 12 October, the provisional government of the Lao 
Issara was formed.
As for the Vietnamese presence in Laos, it numbered in the tens of thousands and was 
concentrated in the major western towns situated along the Mekong River.40 One of 
those in charge of the Viet Minh's military operations in Laos after WWII was Vü Hihi 
Binh. Now stationed in Vientiane, Binh served as the Chairman of the Military Affairs 
Committee. Under his command, many of the 10,000 Vietnamese men and women there 
were enroled in guerilla armies and people's self-defence forces.41 Binh also worked 
directly with Lao military leaders, such as Souphanouvong and Thao Oun, whom Binh 
had come to know during his service in the Thai Army.42
In late October, the Vietnamese further consolidated their military relationship with the 
Lao through a military agreement. After discussions between Lao and Vietnamese 
officials, on the 30th, Tran Due Vinh and the Lao Prime Minister, Phaya Khammao, 
concluded a joint Lao-Vietnamese military treaty.43 Prince Souphanouvong said because 
of this agreement "Lao and Vietnamese military units would be combined to stand side- 
by-side against their mutual enemy, French colonialism."44 A Lao source says that the 
combined Lao-Vietnamese forces fielded around 600 men during this time.45
On 25 November, the Viet Minh announced a three-fold plan for strengthening the 
Overseas Vietnamese National Salvation Association in Laos and Thailand. Firstly, 
Vietnamese in these two countries were called upon to link together more closely in the 
resistance against the French. Secondly, the association was instructed to protect the
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interests of the overseas Vietnamese in Laos. And lastly, the Vietnamese were directed to 
assist the Lao independence movement.46 Although there were certainly contradictions in 
these instructions, on the 25th the ICP Central Committee nonetheless stated that the 
"strategic responsibility" of the Vietnamese in Laos was to increase the level of armed 
propaganda among the people in the countryside. In so doing, a "united Vietnamese-Lao 
anti-French front" would bring about a "guerilla war" in the rural areas.47
In November, Dlnh reorganised the Intelligence Service in order to coordinate 
Vietnamese-Lao military operations better, resulting in the creation of the Lao-Vietnamese 
Allied General Staff based in Vientiane. Dlnh became an adviser to the General Staff, 
but in reality he claims he was the "actual head."48 By the end of 1945, the Viet Minh 
had increased their control over the large Vietnamese communities in Laos and 
strengthened their cooperation with the Lao Issara's key leaders. Significantly, both of 
these tasks required the Viet Minh to run its Lao operations from western Laos, in the 
towns directly across the Mekong River from Thailand.
1.4. Vietnamese-Thai Cooperation, August to December 1945
Across the Mekong in Thailand, Pridi Phanomyong was emerging from WWII as one 
of the dominant figures in Thai political circles. Like Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, Pridi's 
most important tasks after the war were to negotiate Thailand's independence and its 
relations with the Allies.49 On 16 August, the day after Tokyo surrendered, Bangkok 
formally repudiated Phibun's alliance with the Japanese and the January 1942 
declarations of war on Great Britain and America. On 7 September, Pridi changed the 
name of the country, "Thailand," back to "Siam." As for the Cambodian and Lao 
territories Bangkok had gained in 1941, postwar Thai leaders continued to view this land 
as a rightful part of the Thai nation. As the Prime Minister, Seni Pramot, remarked in 
September 1945: France "is the last nation entitled to play the role of injured innocence 
toward us," a sentiment shared by Thai public opinion at large.50 Indeed, while Bangkok 
promised return of territories it had taken from Great Britain during WWII, 
conspicuously absent was a similar pledge to return the Indochinese territories to the 
French. It was in this context, as the French reasserted pressure on Bangkok to return 
the Thai-held Indochinese territories, that postwar Thai leaders found themselves in a
46
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position not unlike that of their Vietnamese counterparts in Hanoi. This shared antipathy 
for the French was a major factor in creating favourable conditions for Vietnamese 
resistance activities in Thailand after WWIL
There is no doubt that Pridi was one of the Viet Minh's most powerful postwar allies 
in Thailand and a key figure allowing the DRV to administer military and political 
activities in Thailand immediately. Like Ho, Pridi hoped to see an end to European 
colonialism in the region. Writing decades later, he reflected on the nationalist sentiment 
sweeping the region immediately after the war in the following terms:
After the Japanese had surrendered, the former Western colonial powers returned to rule 
their former colonies. However, upon returning they had to confront resistance 
movements led by nationalists in those formerly colonised countries. A certain number 
of these nationalist came to Thailand in order to ask for assistance from us. From the 
discussions I had with these nationalists, we came to the view that every country in 
Southeast Asia would soon have its independence.51
Aware of this sympathy, as well as Thailand's troubled relations with the French, the 
Viet Minh sent special representatives to Bangkok to determine the degree to which new 
Thai leaders would support the DRV. In Pridi's words:
At the end of the war, a Vietnamese patriot contacted me to make a request few arms. I 
allocated a certain amount of Seri Thai arms to the Vietnamese and, through khun 
Sangwon, the military police were employed to guard the loading of these arms onto a 
train and oversaw their transportation to the [eastern] border of Battambang, which at 
that time was still under Thai administration.52
Khun Sangwon was Thai Rear Admiral Sangwon Suwannanchip. During the war, he 
had been a high-level Seri Thai leader and a close confidant of Pridi in charge of all 
military police in Bangkok and the head of major naval bases. Following WWII, he 
became Deputy Minister of Defence in the caretaker government of Thawi Bunyaket and 
was subsequently appointed Adjutant General of the Armed Forces and then Chief of 
Police. He was later said to have had "absolute" control over the Free Thai arms 
"arsenal."53 Clearly, he was an important supporter for the Viet Minh to have on their 
side.
Pridi Phanomyong, Chiwit, p. 88.
Quoted by Sonsak Ngamkhaconkulakit, Khabuan Kanserithai kap Khwamkhatyaeng thang Kanmirang 
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[1988]), p. 232.
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War in Indo chi na 91
The importance of such aid was not lost upon Ho, who conveyed his gratitude to Pridi 
for the abovementioned military assistance. As Pridi describes it:
Ho Chi' Minh wrote me a letter thanking me for the arms and their transportation. He 
said that he had just formed two battalions of patriotic Vietnamese soldiers and would 
now give them the name: The Battalions of Siam.54
It remains unclear which "Vietnamese patriot" actually met with Pridi to arrange this arms 
transfer. However, Trän Vän Dlnh said in an interview that Trän Due Vinh had made 
a trip to Bangkok immediately after the war to meet with Thai officials.55 It is possible 
that Vinh met with Pridi.56 It is also possible that Mai Vän Quang contacted Pridi. As 
we know, Quang was the regional secretary of the Vietnamese communist party in Ubon 
and an associate of Chamlong Daoruang, a former Seri Thai leader and in September 
1945 the Minister of Justice in the Thawi cabinet. After the war, Quang was in contact 
with Thai leaders concerning Vietnam's desire to expand its cooperation with Thailand.57
One of the most pressing matters for the Vietnamese working in Thailand after the war 
was the acquisition and transport of arms.58 Throughout the 1930s the Thais had 
received shipments of arms from the Japanese, with a notable increase coming during the 
brief Franco-Thai border war in 1940-1941. Added to this were weapons parachuted to 
the Seri Thai by the Allies during WWII. According to one estimate, by the end of the 
war the Allies had dropped around 175 tons of arms and equipment to the Seri Thai.59 
These weapons, the bulk arriving in m id-1945, included Thompson sub-machine guns, 
grenades, British Sten guns, detonators, booby traps, and ammunition.60 With the war 
over in August, most of these arms were stockpiled by Seri Thai leaders. A recent study 
indicates that Thongin Phuriphat and Tieng Serikhan were two officials who took charge 
of large amounts of these arms, storing them in secret locations in northeast Thailand.61
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After the war, weapons and related equipment began filtering into an illicit arms trade 
in Thailand. Profiting from this arms trade were a host of characters, ranging from gun­
runners as far away as Hong Kong and the Philippines to high-level Thai civilian and 
military leaders (see chapter 6). The contraband trade was boosted further by a 
breakdown in law-and-order stemming from a combination of social and economic 
dislocation caused by wartime occupation, the subsequent disarming of over 100,000 
Japanese soldiers, the demobilisation of much of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), and the 
arrival of almost 27,000 Allied troops. To make matters worse, rampant inflation gave 
rise to conditions ripe for corruption.62
For the Vietnamese, the demobilisation of Phibun's military forces made it easier for 
Pridi and his associates to guide military assistance in their direction. The postwar 
dislocation also meant that Bangkok found it very difficult to police the remote 
northeastern region, thereby giving the Viet Minh a freer hand in their resistance activities 
along the Mekong. A "fascinating place" is how Tran Vän Dinh euphem istically  
described Thailand during the immediate postwar period.63 Another former Viet Minh 
representative, who worked in Thailand following the war, explained that because of the 
social and political disruptions after the war, "buying arms in Thailand was as easy as 
buying a beer."64 More importantly, Dinh said in an interview that in the midst of this 
turbulent postwar period, the Bangkok government "closed its eyes" to Viet Minh military 
activities in Thailand, while the provincial northeast government, almost certainly 
meaning such politicians as Tiang Serikhan, Chamlong Daoruang, and Thongin 
Phuriphat, openly supported the Viet Minh. As for what remained of the Thai army, 
Dinh claimed that it "gave full permission" to the Vietnamese to work in Thailand.65
As the war came to a close, Viet Minh representatives began crossing the Mekong into 
Thailand on arms missions in earnest. At the beginning, the overseas Vietnamese in Laos 
and Thailand provided the money for arms purchases. Later this was supplemented by 
funds from Hanoi (see chapters 4 and 6). One Vietnamese figure working with Thai
For further details, see: Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics o f  Despotic Paternalism,
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officials after WWII was Vu Htru Binh. Binh's fluency in Thai and his work with both 
the RTA and the Seri Thai during the war made him an important link for the Viet Minh to 
a broad section of Thai officialdom. On the Seri Thai side, Binh continued his wartime 
cooperation with the northeastern politicians, Tiang Serikhan and Thongin Phuriphat. 
Tiang put Binh in touch with arms dealers, Thai officials having access to arms, and 
provided the Viet Minh with military assistance. Next to Pridi, Tiang and Thongin were 
probably the Viet Minh's most important connexions at this time. In September, Tiang 
was an MP representing his home province of Sakhon Nakhon, as well as the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry in the Thawi Cabinet. Viet Minh officials working with Tiang 
often referred to him as the "Thai Political Commissaire," the "major person," as one 
former Viet Minh official put it, with whom they cooperated. Together with Chamlong, 
Tiang was said to have had contacts with Vietnamese members of ICP branches in 
Thailand after the war.66
Binh had a non-Seri Thai link in the person of Lieutenant General Phin Chunhawan, 
the former Deputy Commander of the Isan (Northeastern) Army. Although Phin was 
relieved of his post after the war, he evidently retained considerable influence in military 
circles and provided assistance to Binh. It seems that Binh's contact with Phin may 
have come through his Lao friend, Thao Oun, for it was Oun who introduced Trän Vän 
Dlnh to Phin.67 In a meeting between Dinh and Phin in November 1945, Phin agreed 
to supply the Viet Minh with a shipment of arms. At the end of 1945, Phin made good 
on this promise by delivering ten thousand rifles to the Viet Minh.68 In another meeting 
with Phin in Bangkok, Dinh was actually taken to meet the retired General at the military 
headquarters of the Thai 1st Army in Bangsue. Phin was fully aware of the fact that 
Dinh was a Viet Minh military officer and intelligence adviser to Prince Souphanouvong, 
despite his Lao alias, Thao  Somsanith.69 As a "Lao link" between the Thais and 
Vietnamese, Oun was also the one who introduced Dinh to Tiang Serikhan in November 
1945. Meeting Dinh at the Thai-Lao border, Tiang personally escorted him back to 
Bangkok to meet with Thai officials and discuss arms transfers. It was through Tiang 
that Dinh met Pridi (who also knew Dinh was a Viet Minh military adviser to 
Souphanouvong).70
In addition to this, the Thais also provided the Viet Minh with military intelligence on 
French positions in western Indochina. Arms transfers between the two sides were
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sometimes conducted by codes, known only to the two parties. Vietnamese working in 
Thailand were even allowed to wear Thai military uniforms, while Thai officials gave the 
Viet Minh helmets, medical supplies, OSS radio sets, and even supplied the soap used by 
Viet Minh officials stationed in Laos.71
Perhaps a more telling indication of the favourable conditions available to the 
Vietnamese immediately after WWII was the Thai decision to allow the Viet Minh to form 
a military fighting force on Thai soil. On 22 September 1945, Ciru Quoc published an 
article in which it announced the formation of an overseas Vietnamese "army" in 
Thailand. According to this report, the Vietnamese in Thailand "had linked together 
closely" in order to "support the Viet Minh front and the provisional government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam."72 Cüv Quoc explained that during the Japanese 
resistance Vietnamese nationals had joined the Thais in several guerilla operations. 
Because of this "fighting cooperation" and the "flexible foreign policy" of a Vietnamese 
"revolutionary" by the name of Vü-bun-Minh [Vü Hihi Binh?], "the Siamese 
government has allowed the overseas Vietnamese to organise openly an army" on Thai 
soil. This force was made up primarily of Vietnamese soldiers who had deserted to 
Thailand during the 1940-1941 Franco-Thai border war, together with overseas 
Vietnamese living in Thailand. If we can believe the Ciru Quoc report, this Thai-based 
Vietnamese force could field over one thousand men.73
The Thai government assisted this unit by returning weapons and money which had 
been confiscated by Thai authorities when Vietnamese colonial troops defected to 
Thailand during the Franco-Thai border war (see chapter 2). Ciru Quoc claimed that the 
soldiers in the overseas army in Thailand were armed well enough to defeat French 
guerillas near Savannakhet.74 This article concluded by announcing the formation of 
another detachment, called the All Siam Overseas Vietnamese National Salvation 
[Association] (Viet Kieu C&u Quoc Tokn Xiem).15
Thai government authorities also allowed the DRV to open an information office in 
Bangkok. Established sometime in August or September 1945, the Vietnam News 
Service (VNS) was located at 543 Silom Road. According to the American Ambassador 
in Bangkok in 1947, the Thai government had allocated Crown Property housing, at 
"extremely low rentals," to DRV's representatives to use for the VNS.76 The main task 
of the VNS was to disseminate information and publish a bulletin known as Vietnam
1 Ibid, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC.
72  'Quan Doi Viet Kieu Hoat Dong & Xiem-la' [An Overseas Vietnamese Army Operating in Siam], Ciru 
Quoc, 22 September 1945, No. 40.
73 Ibid.
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75 Ibid.
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News. Directing the VNS was a Viet Minh cadre named Dr. Hai.77 Hai's main task was 
to provide the international community with information on the DRV and the widening 
conflict between the French and Vietnamese. In the preface of an article written in 
English and published by the VNS in September 1945, the information-propaganda role 
of the VNS is self-evident:
Blood is being shed in South Vietnam. The situation is aggravating every hour, 
threatening the security of the Far-East.. .  False propaganda and insinuating reports [by 
the French] have disfigured the world opinion on the Vietnamese question. We wish to 
expose in the following note, the development o f the Vietnamese situation since the 
establishment of the French domination up to the present day [sic].78
Part II: The French Return to the Rest of Indochina, January 
to December 1946
II. 1. Franco-Vietnamese Negotiations and the Reoccupation of Laos
Although the scope of Vietnamese activities in Thailand had increased significantly by 
the end of 1945, 1946 was the year during which Thailand's importance to Vietnam took 
on new meaning as the French moved to retake the rest of Indochina. Having increased 
their military presence in southern Indochina by late 1945 and early 1946, the French 
stepped up their diplomatic campaign to gain Chungking's agreement to withdraw its 
troops from northern Indochina. Chiang Kaishek, competing for control of North China 
with the Chinese Communists, was increasingly receptive to a deal with the French, 
knowing it would allow him to divert much needed troops from Indochina to northern 
China. The French prodded Chungking by offering to abandon their colonial 
concessions in China. One of the first significant indications of a change came in early 
February, when the Chinese allowed around two thousand French-led troops to cross 
into northern Laos on their way towards northwestern Vietnam.79 By 8 February, the 
gravity of this security threat to Hanoi was clear as French-led troops occupied the
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northwestern town of Lai Chau.80 This was followed by a Sino-French Accord on 28 
February. In this agreement, Chungking agreed that its forces would be withdrawn from 
northern Indochina and replaced by French troops. In exchange, the French renounced 
their economic concessions and extra-territorial rights in China and granted the Chinese 
special trading privileges in Vietnam.81
In early 1946, the French adopted a two-track policy that pressed the Chinese 
diplomatically to withdraw their troops from Indochina and began political action toward 
the Vietnamese.82 The Sino-French agreement marked the culmination of the first goal. 
The second came on 6 March, when the French signed an accord with Ho Chi Minh in 
which they agreed to hold a referendum on Vietnamese unification and recognised 
Vietnam's status as a free state (£tat libre) within the French Union and the Indochinese 
Federation. The Vietnamese allowed, among other things, the French to station fifteen 
thousand troops in northern Vietnam. By placating the Vietnamese with the 6 March 
Accord, French authorities could then turn their attention to retaking Laos and forcing the 
Thais to return the Indochinese territories.
To the DRV, the signing of the Franco-Sino Accord had important strategic 
implications.83 With the Chinese agreeing to withdraw, the Vietnamese realised that one 
of the major obstacles deterring a French attack on northern Indochina would soon be 
removed. According to Vietnamese communist sources, the ICP was faced with two 
choices immediately after 28 February: either they could take up arms against the French 
or they could pursue a peaceful course of action by entering into negotiations with them. 
One reason for advocating dialogue was that the Vietnamese were militarily unprepared to 
begin armed struggle in March.84 Secondly, it was felt that if a policy of nation-wide 
resistance were adopted, it would encounter combined Franco-Sino military opposition.85 
Lastly, by gaining a reprieve through negotiations with the French in March, the Viet 
Minh could concentrate on strengthening their military and political position in Nam Bo 
and facilitating the withdrawal of the Chinese. On 5 March, a meeting of the ICP Central
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83 See: 'Chi Thi . . . "Tinh Hinh vh Chü Trucmg," VKD, 1945-1950, pp. 4 0 4 6  and Dang Bich Ha, op. cit., 
p .177.
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Committee approved a policy called "peace in order to advance" (hba de tien)ß6 The 
next day Ho Chi Minh signed the 6 March accord.
Despite the benefits derived from the "peace in order to advance" policy for the 
Vietnamese, the 6 March Accord (as well as the Sino-Franco Accord) effectively 
weakened Hanoi's "Lao buffer" in the west, to say nothing of possible negative 
repercussions on Viet Minh-Lao Issara relations.87 Four days after the 6 March Accord, 
Major General Alessandri launched an offensive on all of Laos above the 16th parallel. 
With troops, tanks, and planes from Saigon, he quickly retook Savannakhet on the 10th. 
Although Viet Minh and Lao Issara forces tried to defend the cities they had occupied 
since the end of WWII, their concentration in urban centres made them easy targets for 
superior French firepower. On the morning of the 21st, the French began an attack on 
Thakhek. According to a variety of accounts of this battle, French-flown Spitfires strafed 
the city in support of a ground attack. Thousands of Lao and Vietnamese inhabitants fled 
across the Mekong River to Thailand as Lao-Vietnamese forces attempted to hold the city, 
but to no avail. Hundreds were probably killed in this battle, many of them machine- 
gunned while trying to flee across the river to Nakhon Phanom.88
On 24 April, the French retook Vientiane, overthrew the Lao Issara government, and 
established a pro-French government in its place. With the capture of Luang Prabang by 
mid-May, the French had completed their reoccupation of Laos. In all, the offensive had 
sent around fifty thousand refugees (mostly Vietnamese) fleeing into Thailand.89 There
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Nguyen Kien Giang, op. cit., p. 170. For further details of the March "peace in order to advance" policy, 
see: Vö Nguyen Giäp, May Van De Ve Dircmg Loi Quin Sir Cua Ta [Several Problems concerning Our 
Military Policy], (Hanoi: NXBST, 1970), p. 34; 'Chi Thi cua Ban Chap Hanh Trung LTomg Däng ve 
"Hba de Tien" (9 March 1946)' [The Party Central Committee's Directives concerning 'Peace in order to 
Advance"], VKD, 1945-1950, p. 55; and Dang Bich Ha, op. cit., p. 177.
For an indication of Lao dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese signing of the 6 March accord, see: 'Letter 
2: Note on the Subject of the Resignation of Prince Souphanouvong by Katay Don Sasorith, Minister of 
Finance, May 12, 1949,' translated and reproduced by Brown and Zasloff, op. cit, p. 351.
The effect of this battle on Vietnamese activities in Thailand will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Sources for the Battle of Thakhek come from: Sichana Sisan, op. cit, pp. 17-20; The Birth,' pp. 433 and 
436; Thao Oun Chananikon, op. cit, pp. 218-20; CVDCQ, pp. 166-67; Suwannarat Chaiyawong, Than 
Prath an Suphanouvong baepyang Patiwat Khaophacao Dramsai' [President Souphanouvong as the 
Revolutionary in Whom I Believe], in Suphot Dantrakun, op. cit, pp. 196-222; US, DOS, 'Raid on Tha 
Baw and Situation Vientiane, Nong Khai,' 31 May 1946, USNA; Ciru Quoc, 6 May 1946, No. 232; and 
Gunn, op. cit, pp. 169-70. Geoffrey Gunn, who correctly points out the importance of the Battle of 
Thakhek for Lao history, incorrectly puts the date of the battle on 31 March (p. 169). Gunn seems to 
overlook the strategic implications for Laos of Franco-Vietnamese negotiations. It was probably no 
coincidence that Savannakhet was attacked by the French a few days after the 6 March Accord. 
Unfortunately, inaccuracies detract from Gunn's book, stemming in part from his considerable over- 
reliance on French intelligence sources at the expense of making more reference to Lao, Thai, US, 
and/or Vietnamese sources. For a particularly confusing explanation of his use of SuretS reports, see: 
Gunn, op. cit., p. 43.
Thai, Vietnamese, and American sources put the number of refugees fleeing to Thailand at around 
50,000. See the following sources: 'Raid on Tha Bo,' p. 15; Suphap Burnt, 29 April 1946; and Hoang 
Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 287. Peter Poole, who has done considerable research on the Vietnamese in 
Thailand, puts the number of Vietnamese refugees fleeing to Thailand in 1945 and 1946 at 46,700. See: 
Peter A. Poole, 'Notes and Comment, Thailand's Vietnamese Refugees: Can They Be Assimilated?'
Pacific Affairs, Volume 40, Nos. 3-4, (Fall-Winter 1967-68), p. 324, fn 2.
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were now only two obstacles blocking restoration of French power to all of Indochina: 
Bangkok and Hanoi.
Having signed the March Accord and retaken Laos, French attention shifted away 
from the Franco-Vietnamese conflict to the Franco-Thai dispute. In April, Thai 
representatives travelled to Dalat to discuss the future of the Indochinese territories with 
the French High Commissioner, Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu. The French 
demanded return of the Cambodian and Lao territories which Bangkok had gained 
through the help of the Japanese in 1941. The Thais, however, held out for a 
readjustment of the border according to historical considerations and proposed that a 
referendum be held to determine the future status of the disputed territories. The talks 
broke down at the end of the month. A few days later, the first of two serious incidents 
broke out along the Thai-Indochina frontier directly related to our discussion of 
Vietnamese resistance activity in Thailand.
II. 2. The Nakhon Phanom Incident, 5 May 1946
Following the battle of Thakhek, the new French commissioner in Laos had sent 
letters to the governor of Nong Khai demanding the disarmament and return of 
Vietnamese refugees who had fled to Thailand. Although the governor had informed 
refugees of the French desire to see them return, from the evidence available the Thais did 
not forcibly repatriate any Vietnamese refugees. And with vivid memories of the battle of 
Thakhek still in mind, few Vietnamese chose to go back, a decision which infuriated the 
French. At the end of April, the French commissioner warned the Vietnamese that unless 
they returned to their homes in Laos by 30 April, he would have their property 
confiscated. Most Vietnamese declined. On 1 May the French burned a number of 
Vietnamese homes in Thakhek.90
On 5 May, a group of Vietnamese and Lao resistance activists, numbering one 
hundred to two hundred, attacked the French-held town of Pak Hin Bun, returning to the 
Thai side, according to a French source, with seventy thousand piastres, firearms, and 
boats.91 On the 6th, the French Commissioner in Laos sent a letter of protest to the 
governor of Nakhon Phanom concerning the attack, warning that "the consequences 
would be grave if redress NOT given."92 At 6:30 pm on the evening of the 7th, the
US, DOS, "Nakhon Phanom Incident, Secret Control, 70,' 13 May 1946, RG 59, Indochina-Politics, 
Relations: Thai, Box 9, USNA, p. 6 and Appendix I, Items 1A-6B enclosed at the end of this document. 
The French needed the Vietnamese to fill positions in the Lao colonial bureaucracy.
'Nakhon Phanom Incident, Secret Control, 70,' pp. 1-2 (French case), 4-8 (Thai case), and 12; US, DOS, 
'Investigation of Border Fighting,' 13 May 1946, RG 59, USNA; US, DOS, 751G.92/5-1346, 'Confidential 
Telegram to Secretary of State,' 13 May 1946, USNA; 'Statement by Siamese Government on Border 
Incidents' in US, DOS, 892.014/6-2946, 29 June 1946, USNA; and US, DOS, 892.014/5-1546, 'Report of 
d'Argenlieu to US Embassy (Paris),’ 15 May 1946, USNA. The Thai governor of Nakhon Phanom 
claimed the group numbered 30 to 40.
This quote is taken from Major James Thompson, 'Nakhon Phanom Incident,' p. 2.
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French shelled Nakhon Phanom "without warning" for fifteen minutes.93 On the 8th, a 
French commander from Laos went to Nakhon Phanom to demand, among other things, 
"the definitive disarmament of the armed bands of the Viet Minh operating in Siamese 
territory." The governor asked for eight days to secure an answer from Bangkok. The 
French gave him until 8:00 pm that evening, warning that he would be responsible for 
"any reprisals" if he failed to meet the French requests.94
Although confrontation seemed imminent, it was averted due to the intervention of US 
officials.95 Pridi, who had been elected Prime Minister in March, sent a telegram to 
dArgenlieu, asking that Franco-Thai differences be solved by peaceful means. Although 
d'Argenlieu agreed, he accused the Thai government of direct complicity in the affair,96 
an allegation which Bangkok denied 97 The French Commissioner in Laos felt the Thai 
government was "completely ineffectual in curbing and handling the refugees and 
guerillas," however, he told American investigators that he did not believe Thai officials 
"had encouraged" the Vietnamese attack on Pak Hin Bun.98 On 8 May, the US Charge in 
Bangkok told the State Department that a French liaison officer in Bangkok had recently 
told the UK Minister that the French might have to take military action against the Thais 
before heavy rains began in July. The Charge took this to mean that the "French military 
may take advantage of some incident to launch [an] armed attack" on Thailand.99 The US 
Consul in Saigon shared this view reporting that d'Argenlieu's allegation of Thai 
complicity was designed "to compel return" of the disputed territories.100
II.3. The Nong Khai Incident, 24 May 1946
On 24 May another serious incident occurred along the Thai-Indochinese border. The 
site of this incident was Tha Bo, a small Thai town opposite Vientiane with a large 
Vietnamese community. On the 24th, around two hundred French troops crossed the 
Mekong and landed in positions north and south of Tha Bo in pursuit of Vietnamese and 
Lao attackers. During the three hour occupation of Thai territory in and around the town, 
five Vietnamese and a Thai customs officer were killed, buildings known to house 
Vietnamese and Lao refugees were mortared, and the town was sprayed with light 
machine gun fire. While the bulk of the French party returned to Laos thereafter, it left 
behind a rear guard in Thailand until the morning of the 25th. On the 26th, the French
93 Nakhon Phanom Incident,’ p. 2 and US, DOS, 892.014/5-1546, 'Paris (Caffery) to Secretary of State,' 15 
May 1946, USNA.
94  US, DOS, F.W. 751[G].92/5-1646, 'Aide Memoire on the Nakhon Phanom Incident,' 16 May 1946, USNA 
and US, DOS, 892.014/5-1546, 'Paris (Caffery) to Secretary of State,' 15 May 1946, USNA.
9 5 Nakhon Phanom Incident,' p. 2.
96  US, DOS, 892.014/5-1546, 'Paris (Caffery) to Secretary of State,' 15 May 1946, USNA.
97 Nakhon Phanom Incident,'p. 3.
98 Ibid., p. 3.
99  US, DOS, 751G.92/5-846, The Charge in Siam (Yost) to the Secretary o f State,' 8 May 1946 in FRUS, 
(Volume V m , 1946), p. 992.
100 US, DOS, 892.014/5-1446, 'Saigon (Reed) to Secretary of State,' 14 May 1946, USNA.
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launched similar operations against the Thai towns of Ban Mor and Ban Bassac. French 
Commander Laure, the official who ordered the raids, told an American investigator that 
these were "punitive raids in pursuit of rebels and bandits" and his troops had orders to 
kill any Vietnamese carrying arms. While the governor of Nong Khai did not rule out the 
possibility that Thais may have unofficially joined in the attack, Bangkok denied any 
official support and emphasised that it had redoubled its efforts to disarm the refugees in 
the under-policed and remote northeast.101
In the wake of these incidents, Pridi secretly asked the US Embassy in Bangkok 
whether "the time had come to resist these incursions by force." In the Thai view, the 
French had provoked the incidents in a move designed to hasten the return of the Lao and 
Cambodian territories.102 Although subsequent US intervention brought about better 
negotiations between Paris and Bangkok and the possibility of UN arbitration, another 
incident, this time in the French-controlled town of Siemreap in August, derailed Franco- 
Thai negotiations in Washington. French authorities in Saigon were able to use this 
incident as grounds for moving at least one thousand Foreign Legion troops to the Thai- 
Cambodian border, while Radio Saigon broadcasts warned that troops would retake the 
Lao and Cambodian territories by force. Faced with the real possibility of war with 
French forces in Indochina, at the beginning of October Bangkok yielded by agreeing to 
return the territories to the French in exchange for the formation of a Conciliation 
Commission to consider, at a later date, Thai historical claims to the territories. On 17 
November, an accord was signed by the two in Washington and on 9 December France 
regained yet another piece of her Indochinese colony.103 The DRV was the last 
remaining obstacle blocking the French return to Indochina.
II.4. The Outbreak of War in Indochina
The events leading up to the outbreak of war in Indochina in December 1946 have 
been covered in considerable detail in other works.104 For our purposes it is only 
necessary to outline the break-down in Franco-Vietnamese relations and French military
101 Sources for the Nong Khai incident come from: Stanley Swinton, 'One-Day "Invasion" of Siam,' Straits 
Times, 21 July 1946; 'Raid on Tha Bo,' pp. 2-14; US, DOS, 892.014/7-346, 'Formal Meeting between 
Siamese and French at Nankai [Nong Khai],' 15 June 1946, USNA; and US, DOS, 892.014/6-146, 
'Compte Rendu des Incidents de Vientiane du 24 Mai 1946' in 'Siamese-Indochinese Border Incident of 
May 24, 1946,' 1 June 1946, USNA.
102 US, DOS, 892.014/6-346, The French Embassy to the Department of State,'3 June 1946 in FRUS 
(Volume V m , 1946), p. 1010. A scathing editorial in the Thai paper, Thai Rat, gives an indication of the 
growing public sentiment against the French. Thai Rat, 29 May 1946.
103 This dicussion of the Siemreap incident and the concurrent breakdown o f Franco-Thai talks in 
Washington is based on a wide-range of US archival documents and Thai secondary sources, far too 
numerous to cite here. To my knowledge, there is no adequate published study of the 1946 Franco-Thai 
dispute in Thai, English, and/or French. The author hopes to research this topic further.
104 See: Stein Tpnnesson, 1946: Declcnchement de la guerre d'Indochine: Les vepres tonkinoises du 19 
dScembre, (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 1987; Philippe Devillers, ed., Paris-Saigon-Hanoi: Archives de 
la Guerre, 1944-1947, (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1988); and Philippe Devillers, Histoire du Viet Nam de 
1940 a 1952, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952).
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actions against the DRV, for these factors would directly inform Hanoi's interest in 
Thailand. As mentioned above, the Vietnamese had adopted a policy called "peace in 
order to advance" and reached an accord with the French on 6 March. Although the 
French were willing to make some concessions to Hanoi in March, in private French 
officials in Indochina had not abandoned plans to retake northern Vietnam by force.105 
In late May, Ho Chf Minh left for France to continue negotiations in Fontainbleau. 
During these negotiations, Vietnamese diplomats tried to hold Paris to the promises it had 
made in the 6 March Accord. However, the French position had begun to harden. Paris 
rejected the Vietnamese demand to set a date for the referendum, knowing that the DRV 
would win the overwhelming support of the people in such an election. Meanwhile, back 
in Saigon, d'Argenlieu announced formation of the Cochinchinese Republic, a move 
which was in direct violation of the March Accord but done with the approval of Paris. 
In the meantime, the Chinese pulled the majority of their troops out of northern 
Indochina.
On 10 September 1946, negotiations broke-down in Fontainbleau. Not wanting to 
leave without some sort of an agreement, Ho remained and on 14 September he signed a 
Modus Vivendi with the French. Four days later, the last remaining Chinese troops 
pulled out of Indochina and about two weeks after that the Thais agreed to return the 
Indochinese territories, thereby allowing Saigon to focus its attention on the DRV. 
French authorities in Saigon objected to Paris' agreement to the Modus Vivendi and a 
cease-fire, feeling both would undermine their position in the south. As the Norwegian 
historian Stein Tpnnesson has shown, to maintain their hold on Cochinchina, Saigon 
authorities began a more aggressive policy towards the north after the 14 September 
Modus Vivendi.106 Saigon embarked upon a policy which challenged the unity of 
Vietnam and chipped away at the sovereignty of the DRV by promoting French economic 
and military interests in northern Vietnam. D'Argenlieu and Valluy stepped up their 
efforts to fortify the Cochinchinese Republic and simultaneously to eliminate Viet Minh 
influence in Nam Bo. As for the north, on 15 October the French set up a customs 
agency in Haiphong without Hanoi's approval, while d'Argenlieu instructed his 
subordinates to draw up plans for a coup de force. On 20 November, a Chinese junk 
carrying petrol arrived in the Haiphong port in violation of the unilaterally instituted 
French licence system. The French intercepted the boat. Violence broke out when the 
Vietnamese intervened to exercise their authority in customs matters. Gun-fire was 
exchanged and some French intelligence officers were arrested by the Vietnamese. On
105 See: Tpnnesson, 1946, pp. 72-75 and The Outbreak of War,' pp. 102-05 and 339, fn. 3. In both works, 
Tpnnesson cites French archival documents showing ranking French authorities in Indochina 
considering a coup de force against northern Vietnam in April 1946.
106 The Outbreak of War,' pp. 101 and 264-66.
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the 23rd, after the French had delivered an unacceptable ultimatum to the Vietnamese, the 
French forcibly took control of the city at the cost of thousands of Vietnamese lives.107
In the wake of this incident and others,108 the Vietnamese prepared themselves 
militarily and psychologically for war, although Ho refused to close the door to a 
diplomatic solution. However, by mid-December French officials in Indochina were 
worried that unless they acted quickly to create a rupture with Hanoi which would allow 
them to move against the DRV, political changes in Paris might destroy their plans to 
retake northern Vietnam and undermine their interests in Cochinchina completely. 
Tension mounted in Hanoi as armed skirmishes proliferated and the Vietnamese and 
French anticipated the other to make an imminent attack. On the evening of the 19th, war 
broke out between the Vietnamese and French.109 That night the general resistance 
against the French was announced.
107 Tpmsson, 1946, pp. 89-106 and Nguyen Kien Giang, op. cit., p. 240.
108 Almost immediately after the Haiphong incident, another very similar incident occurred in Lang Son. 
See: Tpnnesson, 1946, pp. 106-20.
109 For a brilliant discussion of the complex events leading up to the outbreak of full-scale war in Indochina 
m 1946, see: Tpnnesson, 1946.
Chapter 4
Thailand and the Vietnamese Resistance in 1946
At this point, we shall return to January 1946 to trace the expansion of Vietnamese 
resistance activities in Thailand in relation to the political and military actions taken by the 
French in 1946. As we have seen in chapter 3, during the latter part of 1945 the presence 
of the Chinese in northern Indochina had deterred the French from retaking northern 
Vietnam and most of Laos. However, in early 1946 the strategic climate in Indochina 
began to change again. As the new year began, the security of the Hanoi-based DRV 
government and that of resistance forces located below the 16th parallel was coming 
under increased pressure as the French expanded their military control over large parts of 
southern Trung Bo and much of Nam Bo. To the southwest and east, Vietnamese 
strategists faced pincer threats following the French reoccupation of Cambodia and 
southern Laos and as the French navy increased its presence along the Vietnamese coast 
and in the Gulf of Tonkin.1 To the northwest, the decision by Chungking to allow 
around two thousand French troops to cross into northern Laos and northwestern Bac Bo 
in early February rekindled fears of a French attack from that direction. And with the 
Chinese now moving towards an agreement with the French to pull their troops out of 
northern Indochina, it must have been clear to Vietnamese resistance leaders at the outset 
of 1946 that Vietnam was becoming increasingly encircled.
Part I: West into Thailand
1.1. Thailand and the Resistance in Nam B6
To Viet Minh leaders in Nam Bo, the expansion of the French military presence in 
southern Vietnam and Cambodia raised the strategic value of Thailand in relation to the 
southern resistance. To take advantage of sympathy Thai leaders had shown for the 
Vietnamese anticolonial struggle thus far, in early 1946 several ranking members of the 
People's Committee for Nam Bo travelled to Thailand to strengthen military and political
As noted earlier, the French airbase in Pakse was tactically important to any plans to move against 
Hanoi. The Gulf of Tonkin had been mined by the Allies and the Japanese in places during WWU. As 
the US swept these mines following the war, the French were able to increase steadily their naval 
presence along the coast and in the Gulf.
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activities there. One of the first representatives sent to Bangkok by the Viet Minh was the 
former chairman of the People's Committee established in September 1945, Trän Vän 
Giäu. Arriving in early 1946 (before the 28 February Franco-Sino accord was signed),2 
Giau said in an interview in 1989 that his main tasks were to contact Pridi Phanomyong; 
to tend to the acquisition and shipment of arms and equipment back to southern Vietnam; 
to strengthen the Cambodian resistance movement; and to expand links to and to integrate 
the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand and western Indochina into Viet Minh operations.3
Pridi Phanomyong, still the dominant figure in Thai politics in 1946, was one Giau's 
most important contacts in Thailand. Both French speakers, Pridi and Giau had been 
politically active in France during the 1920s, reportedly having become friends there in 
the late 1920s.4 Upon arriving in Bangkok, Giau quickly contacted Pridi, who made the 
necessary arrangements for Giau's stay in Thailand and provided him with a large house 
in Bangkok.5 If we are to believe Giau, his friendship with Pridi was such that he could 
call upon the Thai leader "at any time he wanted." Meetings between these two were 
usually held at Pridi's home in Bangkok, where discussions covered a wide range of 
topics, but focused mainly on Thai military assistance to and cooperation with the Viet 
Minh. As Giäu put it, the Vietnamese received the "strong support" of Pridi.6 Two of 
Pridi's former Seri Thai associates, Tiang Serikhan and Thongin Phuriphat, were singled 
out by Giau as Thai officials with whom he often worked closely during his tenure in 
Thailand.7
Giau was not the only Viet Minh representative from Nam Bo to work in Thailand in 
early 1946. Joining him was Pham Van Bach, the one who had replaced Giau as the 
chairman of the People's Committee of the South in September 1945. In early 1946, 
Bach arrived in Bangkok, leaving his wife, and at least some of his children, there for 
most of the late 1940s. Although the details surrounding his work in Thailand are few, 
as a ranking member of the southern resistance his activities in Thailand were surely 
related to matters of obtaining and shipping arms and equipment back to Nam Bo, as well
This is according to an interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC.
Interview with Tran Van Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. Hoäng Nhät Tan said in an interview 
that the idea of contacting Pridi came from Tran Van Giau and not from Ho Chi Minh. Interview with 
Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi. I have been unable to confirm this. A French report said that 
Tran Van Giau was one of the first to have organised an arms trafic route between Thailand and 
Vietnam in November 1945. 'L'Approvisionnement en armes et munitions des forces vietnamiermes,' 15 
Janvier 1947.
Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC.
Ibid and Interview with Tran Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
Interview with Trän Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
Ibid, and extracts of an interview with Trän Vän Giäu by Thomas Engelbert, 8 August 1989, Ho Chi 
Minh City. I am grateful to Engelbert for providing me with a transcript of his interview with Giäu. 
Tiang was the Minister of the Interior in the Khuang Aphaiwong cabinet (January to February 1946) and 
Deputy Minister of the Interior in the Pridi cabinet (March to August 1946). In mid-1946, Phuriphat 
became Minister of Industry in the Thamrong cabinet.
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as recruiting Vietnamese in Thailand for service in the resistance against the French in 
Vietnam.8
Two other senior officials known to have been in Thailand in 1946 were Nguyln Van 
Tao and Nguyln Thanh Son (also known as Nguyen Van Tay). Tao was an 
influential ICP member who had long been active in the south. He had fled to France in 
1926 and joined the Central Committee of the French Communist Party a year later. In 
August 1945, he joined the People’s Committee of the South. He arrived in Bangkok in 
early 1946 and probably attended to tasks similar to Bach's. However, shortly thereafter 
he left Thailand for Hanoi, where he became the Minister of Labour in the DRV 
government in 1947.9 Nguyln Thanh San was a regional member of the Communist 
Party Committee in the South (X(r uy vien Dang bo Nam ky) and a member of the 
Southern Resistance Committee and Administration. After WWII, he had worked with 
Cambodian resistance leaders who had fled to Nam Bo after the French reoccupation of 
Cambodia in October 1945. In early 1946, he was still working with Cambodian 
resistance groups, but now he was doing so from bases in Thailand. In addition to this 
task, during his tenure in Thailand Son also attended to the acquisition and shipment of 
arms back to Nam Bo. He was said to have operated from two main bases, both being 
the starting points for arms routes leading back to Nam Bo. One was an overland trail 
based out of the Thai frontier town of Aranyaprathet. The other was a sea route leaving 
from the Thai port city of Khanchanaburi.10 San and other Vietnamese representatives 
were in contact with Thai officials concerning their arms dealings and other matters.11
Evidence of Bach's presence in Thailand comes from two sources: Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 
June 1990, Washington, DC and The Broadcast Statement of the Wife of Mr. Pham Van Bach, President 
of the Viet-Minh Administrative Committee in South Viet-Nam,' Vietnamese Information Bureau, 31 May 
1951, CRS A1838/2; 466/1/1, Part 3, AA. Madame Bäch lived in Thailand during the latter half of the 
1940s. In 1951, she joined the Bao Dai government in Saigon, condemning the extortion, duplicity, and 
crimes of the Vietnamese communists working in Thailand.
Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC. Besides Tao and Giau, other southern 
Vietnamese anticolonialists active in France during the 1920s included: Dircmg Bach Mai (Minister of 
Finance after the August Revolution), Phan Van Hum, Tran Van Thach (leader of the Trotskyist front in 
Cochinchina during the 1930s), and Ho HQru Tubmg (political activist of leftist tendencies). It will be 
remembered that Pridi was also living in France at the time. According to Pridi’s Thai colleagues, who 
studied with him in France in the 1920s, Pridi often met with Chinese and "especially Vietnamese 
nationalists" living in Paris during this time. It is not impossible that Pridi had met with some of these 
individuals during his time in France. See: Suphot Dantrakun, Cak Rathaburut Awuso Pridi
Phanomyong thimg Rathaburut Prem Tinsulanon [From Elder Statesman Pridi Phanomyong to 
Statesman Prem Tinsulanond] (Thonburi: Samnakphim Santitham, ndc.), p. 47 and Duen Bunnak,
Than Pridi Ratthaburut Awuso kap Phaen Setthakit Thai khon Raek [Elder Statesman Pridi Phanomyong: 
The First Thai to Put Forth an Economic Plan], (Bangkok: Photsamtonkanphim, 2517 [1974]), p. 38. 
Nguyen Hao Hung, 'Lien Mirth Chien Däu Viet Nam-Campuchia Möt Nhän To Bio Dim Thang Leri cua 
Cach Mang Campuchia trong Thai Ky Chong Phap, 1945-1954' [The Vietnamese-Cambodian Fighting 
Alliance as One Factor Securing the Success of the Cambodian Revolution during the Period of 
Resistance Against the French, 1945-1954], Hoi Nghi Khoa Hoc ve Quan he Vietnam-Campuchia trong 
Lieh sir [A Conference by the Social Sciences on Vietnamese-Cambodian Relations in Historical 
Perspective], (Ho Chf Mirth City: UBKHXHVN, 1980), pp. 14546; and Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 
20 June 1990, Washington, EXT. Other, though less known Vietnamese representatives reported to have 
been working in Thailand in 1946, included: Ly Bach Sonn, Tran Thanh Träi, Tran Mäi, Ly Hoa Vlnh, 
and Le Bien. See: The Broadcast Statement of the Wife of Mr. Pham Van Bach,' p. 2.
David Porter, 'Vietnamese Communist Policy toward Kampuchea, 1930-1970,' in David P. Chandler and 
Ben Kieman, eds., Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays, (New Haven: Yale
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1.2. Viet Minh Leaders in Laos Cross into Thailand
Meanwhile, Viet Minh officials in Laos were also beginning to pay more attention to 
the strategic importance of Thailand. As the French and Chinese moved closer to an 
agreement in February, Viet Minh strategists working in Laos above the 16th parallel 
realised that Vietnam's "Lao buffer" could no longer be guaranteed. It was clear that a 
Franco-Sino agreement would open the way to French military action against central and 
upper Laos. Thus, as the French intensified their diplomatic negotiations with 
Chungking, the Viet Minh countered by trying to postpone the Chinese withdrawal. As 
Dinh said of Viet Minh policy toward the Chinese in Laos: "We wanted their departure 
postponed, and used them to delay the return of the French and allow us more time to 
consolidate."12 Dinh does not say how they planned to do this.
Sometime in early 1946, before the conclusion of the 28 February Franco-Sino 
accord, the Party branches of the ICP in Thailand and Laos held a meeting in Thakhek to 
discuss the changing strategic environment, with particular reference to the possibility of 
a French offensive on Laos following what appeared to be an imminent Franco-Sino 
accord. Dinh, who was a Viet Minh military officer working in Thailand but not a 
communist party member or a participant in this meeting, said that ICP members Mai 
Vän Quang, Tran Due Vlnh, and Vü Huu Binh attended this conference. Besides 
these participants, Dinh said that Thai officials were also in attendance.13 In what 
appears to be a reference to the same meeting, a Lao source reports that in mid-February 
(before the Franco-Sino accord) a special meeting of the Lao ICP branch was held during 
which participants were agreed that the French were preparing to attack Thakhek and, in 
response, appropriate defensive preparations had to be taken.14 After the Franco-Sino 
accord was signed, a resolution was passed by the Lao ICP branch calling for the arming 
of Thakhek against the French. These results were reported to Souphanouvong, who 
was said to have agreed to them.15 If this is true, then it would give credence to Dlnh's 
version which says that changes were made during the Thakhek meeting to reorganise the 
military preparedness of the Viet Minh in Laos and to delay the departure of the Chinese. 
According to Dinh, Thai participants at this meeting, possibly northeastern politicians 
such as Tiang or Thongin, told their Vietnamese counterparts that in the event of a 
premature Chinese withdrawal from Laos, the Thai military would intervene to delay the 
return of the French. It is unknown what action the Thais had in mind. However,
12
13
14
15
University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 25, 1983), p. 65 and Interview with Tran Van 
Dinh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC.
The Birth,' op. cit., p. 434.
Dinh took over military tasks from Vü Hüru Binh while the latter attended this meeting. Dinh said that 
Mai Van Quang was instrumental in setting up meetings between Thai and Vietnamese officials in 
Thailand. Interview with Tran Van Dinh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC.
Sichana Sisan, op. cit, p. 17.
Ibid., p. 17.
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judging from Thailand's weak military position after the war and its delicate relationship 
with the major powers, it seems most unlikely that the Thais could have provided such 
overt assistance as military intervention.16
As we know, shortly after the Thakhek meeting and the conclusion of the Franco-Sino 
accord, the ICP adopted a policy of "peace in order to advance." On 6 March, Ho Chi 
Minh signed the March Accord, and within a few days Alessandri began his advance into 
all of Laos north of the 16th parallel.
The Vietnamese had anticipated such an attack on Laos and had met with Thai 
representatives to make contingency plans.17 Vietnamese cadres asked their Thai 
counterparts to allow Vietnamese inhabitants in Laos to be evacuated to northeast 
Thailand in the event of a French attack on Laos. Le Manh Trinh, who may have been 
involved in these negotiations, said that the Thai government "agreed with this 
suggestion."18 This was prescient, for, as we have seen, on the morning of 21 March 
the French launched their offensive on Thakhek. By the end of March, much of the 
overseas Vietnamese population in Lao towns and the Lao Issara government crossed into 
Thailand as the French took control of Laos.19
Makeshift huts went up along the Thai side of the Mekong River around Nong Khai 
and Nakhon Phanom, as 50,000 mainly Vietnamese refugees poured into Thailand. Cut­
off from Hanoi, these refugees were completely dependent on the goodwill of the Thais. 
Following the French attack the new Prime Minister, Pridi Phanomyong, chose not to 
bow to French demands for the repatriation of the refugees back to Laos. Instead, the 
Pridi government instructed provincial authorities to set up more shelters along the 
Mekong and to find jobs for Vietnamese forced into Thailand. Viet Minh adherents were 
given permission to appoint their own representatives in areas with large Vietnamese 
emigre communities; to form employment headquarters; to assemble openly; and to listen 
to news reports.20
10 Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 31 December 1989, Washington, EXT. In late 1945, Mai Van Quang had 
reportedly met with Thai leaders to discuss this matter. Prince Phetsarath has written that Seri Thai 
officials, some of whom he says were northeast politicians, helped the Lao Issara capture Vientiane after 
WWÜ. Phetsarath says that as the French prepared to retake Vientiane "the Thai said they would help by 
luring the French into a trap." See: John Murdoch, op. cit, p. 46.
17 CVDCQ, p. 64 and Sichana, op. cit, p. 17. It is possible that the Vietnamese met with their longtime 
supporter, Tiang Serikhan, who was Minister of the Interior in the February 1946 Aphaiwong cabinet. 
One of the responsibilities of the Ministry of the Interior was overseeing border and immigration matters.
18 CVDCQ, p. 64. According to Sichana, this decision was made by the ICP branch. Sichana, op. cit., p. 
17.
19 CVDCQ, pp. 64-65 and The Birth,' p. 436. See also: Dang Bich Ha, op. cit, pp. 178-79. A continuing 
problem for the Viet Minh was the concentration of Vietnamese-Lao military forces in Lao urban centres. 
As one ICP leader working in Laos and Thailand during this time bluntly described this weakness: 
”[W]e did not have regional bases, rear bases, and most importantly, we did not have the participation of 
the [Lao and minority] peasants to act as our rearguard." CVDCQ, p. 63.
20  CVDCQ, p. 67 and US, DOS, 'Secret Investigation of Border Fighting, Office of Strategic Service,' 20 
May 1946, RG 59, Indochina Politics, Folder: Relations with Thai, Box 9, USNA; US, DOS, 'Secret 
Report on the Nakhon Phanom Incident,’ 13 May 1946, RG 59, Indochina-Politics, Folder: Relations
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The acting Minister of the Interior, Tieng Serikhan, travelled to northeast Thailand to 
meet with provincial authorities concerning the means by which the government would 
assist the Vietnamese refugees. According to Trinh, Tieng informed border authorities 
that the Vietnamese refugees were entitled "to freedom of movement, residence, and the 
right to making a living."21 A Thai study of the Vietnamese in Thailand confirms that the 
Ministry of the Interior allowed these refugees to enter Thailand without having to go 
through official immigration channels. In addition, the Ministry of Communications and 
Transportation exempted the refugees from entry fees in exchange for their labour on 
highways in the northeast.22 The Thai government also permitted the Vietnamese to 
work as lumbermen in forests around Nong Khai and Ubon, while others found 
employment as carpenters and mechanics or took up jobs in business and trade.23
Another important contribution of the Pridi government was the allocation of a number 
of plots of land to Vietnamese refugees. These plots, the largest reportedly located 
outside of Ubon, were for the Vietnamese refugees to farm. Beginning around April 
1946, Hoäng Vän Hoan says in his memoir, the Overseas Vietnamese General 
Association took advantage of this Thai-allocated (presumably leased) land to establish 
what he calls overseas Vietnamese Collective Farms. Each family was assigned a certain 
amount of land within the collective for which they were responsible.24
Besides government assistance to the Vietnamese, local Thais along the Mekong River 
donated food, supplies, and clothing to the refugees.25 Buddhist priests temporarily 
housed Vietnamese in their temples and pagodas. Other Thais opened their doors to the 
Vietnamese by providing short term housing and land upon which to subsist.26 Thais 
and Vietnamese in the area even combined their efforts to form special medical centres to 
administer to the health needs of the large refugee population.27 The government 
supplemented these efforts by providing inoculations against epidemics, with the 
Provincial Director of Public Health for Nakhon Phanom administering directly to the 
health needs of the refugees at the border.28 According to two Viet Minh leaders working 
in the area at the time, Thai assistance during this period greatly ameliorated the plight of 
the refugees within a short period of time and contributed to the restrengthening of
with Thai, Box 9, USNA; US, DOS, 892.014/5-3146, 'Raid on Tha Baw and Situation [in] Vientiane 
[and] Nongkhai,'31 May 1946, USNA.
21 CVDCQ, p. 67.
22  Wichan, op. cit, pp. 42 4 3  and 'Secret Report on the Nakhon Phanom Incident,' p. 10
23 'Secret Report on the Nakhon Phanom Incident,' p. 10; CVDCQ, p. 68; and Oun, op. cit, p. 242.
24  Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 285 and Bangkok Post 8 August 1946.
25 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 287.
26 Interview with Hoang Nhät Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi and CVDCQ, p. 67.
27 Scm Tung, op. cit., p. 168.
28 US, DOS, 'Nakhon Phanom Incident, Secret Control 70,' 13 May 1946, RG 59, Indochina-Politics, Box 9, 
USNA.
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Vietnamese resistance work in Thailand.29 Also helping was the fact that the Thais made 
little effort to disarm the Viet Minh operating in Thailand. A US Embassy official, who 
was sympathetic to the Indochinese independence movements and had close contacts with 
resistance representatives in Bangkok, wrote in a secret report that the Thai government 
had not "made any real attempt to disarm the majority of the [Vietnamese/Lao] 
refugees."30
With a larger number of Vietnamese now concentrated on the Thai side of the Mekong, 
the ICP's Overseas Vietnamese Special Committee and the Overseas Vietnamese National 
Salvation Association increased their work among the Vietnamese refugee population in 
Thailand. Firstly, daily sessions were scheduled to allow organised groups of 
Vietnamese to listen to Radio Vietnam, after which short discussions were held to explain 
the situation in Vietnam and in the world in general in relation to the Vietnamese 
independence movement. Secondly, an overseas Vietnamese weekly newspaper, Doc 
Lap (Independence), was published and disseminated among the Vietnamese 
communities in Thailand (see picture next page). Letters from Ho Chi Minh, the 
government, and soldiers fighting in Vietnam were conveyed to the Vietnamese in 
Thailand. Books, such as President Ho Chi Minh in the Memory o f the Overseas 
Vietnamese, were used to increase the awareness of the Vietnamese of the national 
movement for independence. Even special educational classes were organised, including 
a session on Dang Thuc Hifa. To finance their activities and contribute toward the war 
effort, the Viet Minh administered taxes on Vietnamese communities in Thailand, while 
many Vietnamese families in the northeast sent clothes and medicines back to Vietnam.31
Despite assistance from the Thai government during this period, Vietnamese leaders in the 
area were nonetheless still careful to maintain Thai favour. Of considerable importance 
was the need to prevent racial incidents from interfering with Vietnamese resistance 
activities in Thailand. Because of the sudden influx in the number of Vietnamese coming 
into Thailand, ethnic distrust surfaced among local inhabitants in northeast Thailand who 
were worried about possible negative repercussions on them. On several occasions, local 
villagers voiced resentment about the fact that the Vietnamese often came to control 
trading and commerce in various northeastern cities. An American military observer 
recorded in his investigation of the Nong Khai incident in late May that the governor of 
Nong Khai privately feared that the Vietnamese refugees who were arriving in northeast 
Thailand "might eventually control all the business in the area as they were much more 
shrewd than the Siamese."32 Despite the close cooperation between Vietnamese and Thai
29 The Birth,' p. 436 and CVDCQ, p. 67.
30  James Thompson, 'Nakhon Phanom Incident, Secret Control, 70,' p. 11.
3 1 Wichan, op. cit, pp. 45 and 69-70 and CVDCQ, pp. 67-68. Wichan writes that the Viet Minh secretly set
up their main headquarters in Udon Thani under communist direction. Wichan, op. cit, p. 62.
32  'Raid on Tha Baw,' p. 14. The Governor felt the Vietnamese were "clanish" and probably would not be
able to "be absorbed into the native population." The Thai government was deeply worried by the
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The Overseas Vietnamese Newspaper, Doc Lap, Source: CVDCQ, p. 25.
possibility that the Vietnamese would eventually take Thai jobs and have undue influence in the 
economy. Bangkok formed a special committee to guard against this problem. See: Wichan, op. cit, pp. 
4344
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officials, at a local level Viet Minh leaders had to emphasise to their nationals repeatedly 
the importance of respecting Thai laws and ethnic sensitivities and preserving a spirit of 
cooperation in order to avoid the negative effects ethnic tension would have on 
Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand.33
An interesting interview of a Viet Minh official by Thai journalist, Kulap Saipradit, 
demonstrates this point aptly. A few weeks before the French returned to Laos, Kulap 
travelled to Battambang to interview Dr. Hai, the editor of the Vietnam News Service 
who was working in the area. Speaking in halting Thai, Hai described to Kulap the 
sacrifices of the Vietnamese and explained the righteousness of the Vietnamese 
independence movement.34 Intrigued by the discussion, Kulap asked Hai to describe to 
his readers the significance of Vietnam's new flag. Kulap recorded Hai's description in a 
frontpage article in Suphap Burnt as follows:
Dr. Hai brought the new Vietnamese flag out to show me it characteristics. The 
background is red with a five-sided yellow star in the centre. Dr. Hai explained to me 
that the red background symbolised the blood of the people and the yellow star signified 
the people of the yellow race. The five sides of the star symbolised the five types of 
people who constituted the Vietnamese nation: Soldiers [thahan], students [naksurksa], 
merchants [phokha], farmers [chawna], and workers [kammakon/,35
However, in spite of Kulap's favourable portrayal of the Vietnamese independence 
movement, Thai goodwill still could not be taken for granted by the Vietnamese. In a 
clear reassurance to Thai sceptics, Hai told Kulap that although the Viet Minh had made 
some "mistakes" in Thailand in the past, Bangkok should rest assured that the Vietnamese 
independence struggle would not culminate in an "invasion of anyone."36
For the time being, though, cooperation seems to have prevailed. Following the 
French reoccupation of Laos, representatives of the Thai and Lao Overseas Vietnamese 
Salvation A ssociations were "in close touch" with ranking leaders in the Thai 
government— specifically, Tieng Serikhan, Thongin Phuriphat, Thawi Udon, Chamlong
33 CVDCQ, p. 68. In his discussion of the Vietnamese in Thailand, Thadeus Flood makes the following
statement: "In the case of the Vietnamese (as with the largest minority group, the Chinese) there is
virtually no evidence o f spontaneous, local, popular animosity on the part of the Thai. Indeed, in the 
relations between the two groups, there is much evidence that local Thai villagers often shielded 
Vietnamese from French and Thai police during the twentieth century." While Flood was one of the very 
first to point out the important periods of cooperation between these two group», it is too much of an over­
simplification to say that "there is virtually no evidence of spontaneous, local, popular animosity on the 
part of local Thai" toward the Vietnamese. There were racial incidents, esp>ecially local resentment of 
Vietnamese control of trading in northeast Thailand. See: Flood, op. cit, p. 33.
3 4  'Sadaeng Khwammanmai nai Kanpatiwat lae Chiwaeng Withitosu khong Khana Kuissara [A 
Demonstration of the Resolution of the Revolution and the Path of the Independence Movement], Suphap 
Burnt [Gentleman], 21 February 1946, p. 1. Dinh identified Saipradit as the one who interviewed Hai 
[Hy?] in this meeting. Interview with Tran Van Dinh, 31 December 1989, Washington, DC.
3  ^ 'Sadaeng Khwammanmai,' p. 2.
36 Ibid., p. 2.
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Daoruang, and Thong Kantatham.37 In a letter to the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand on 
9 April, a Vietnamese newspaper reported that because the "lines of communication are 
unfavourable" between northeast Thailand and Vietnam, the refugees would have to 
remain in Thailand for a period of time. However, the government reassured refugees 
that it was "looking for a way to ease the difficulties." In its concluding paragraph, this 
letter praised the "Thai government and people" for the assistance they had provided to 
the Vietnamese refugees "during this difficult period."38
1.3. Viet Minh Military Activities in Thailand
Militarily, the Vietnamese were faced with several problems following the French 
reoccupation of Laos. Foremost, the Viet Minh's Lao operations had now been pushed 
into northeastern Thailand, cut-off from Hanoi by the French presence in Laos. Soldiers 
who heretofore had been stationed in Lao towns on the eastern side of the Mekong were 
now on the western side. Even the ICP's Lao Regional Committee had to be withdrawn 
to Thailand.39 Compounding the situation was the fact that the Thais were wary of letting 
the Viet Minh transfer their Lao military operations command to Thailand. It will be 
remembered that the Viet Minh had created the Lao-Vietnamese Allied General Staff in 
October 1945. Tran Vän Dlnh said in an interview that he was involved in negotiations 
with Thai officials following the French reoccupation of Laos aimed at finding an 
acceptable way to permit Viet Minh military operations to continue in Thailand.40 To 
allay Thai fears of too overt a Vietnamese military presence on their soil, Dlnh suggested 
that the Viet Minh's Lao operations command be incorporated into Souphanouvong's 
intelligence service to make it less visible and more acceptable to the Thais. Dlnh said 
the Thais agreed to this and the Lao intelligence service absorbed much of what had been 
the Viet Minh's Lao military command.41
In addition, it was in Thailand that the Viet Minh leaders who had been in Laos 
changed their military tactics. On 29 April 1946, Dlnh was instructed by the Central 
Vietnamese Resistance Committee to leave Thai towns and take up guerilla tactics in the 
countryside, in areas along the Thai-Lao border. By November 1946, Dinh says an 
undercover intelligence network was in place. This was supplemented by continued 
assistance from the Thais whose scouts and spies provided the Viet Minh military with 
valuable intelligence on French positions in western Indochina.42
37 The Birth,'p. 429, fn. 8.
38 Thu Gvri cac Viet Kieu hr Thai-lan' [A Letter to the Overseas Vietnamese in Thailand], Dan Quoc [The 
Nation], 9 April 1946, p. 2.
39 Dang Bich Hh, op. cit, p. 178.
4 0  The Birth,'p.433.
41 Interview with Tran Van Dinh, 31 December 1989 and 20 June 1990, Washington, DC.
4 2  Ibid. I am grateful to Tran Vän Dinh for allowing me to see a copy of the 29 April order.
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Meanwhile, other Vietnamese resistance leaders along the Thai-Cambodian border 
were organising mobile combat units to supply arms and young men to the anti-French 
resistance in Nam Bo. The first military team formed out of Thailand was said to have 
been a well-armed battalion called Tran Phü (named after a young Vietnamese who had 
helped form the ICP). Giau says that this battalion numbered around five hundred to six 
hundred troops. It was recruited from among Vietnamese emigres in Thailand and 
western Indochina and was initially stationed in the Thai-administered Battambang 
province. According to Nguyen Dire Qüy, the Tran Phü unit was outfitted from 
among Vietnamese communities in remote parts of eastern Ubon Ratchathani province.43 
The Trän Phü operation sent young overseas Vietnamese men to Nam Bo to join the 
resistance against the French. Another mobile fighting unit that was set up by Viet Minh 
officials in Thailand was called Quang Trung, named after the late 18th century Tay Son 
leader. This group was based out of the area north of the Tonle Sap in Cambodia. It 
moved between that point and northeastern Nam Bo, with the dual tasks of transporting 
weapons back to southern Vietnam and engaging the French in guerilla fighting.44
In addition to these troops, in 1946 DRV representatives working from Thailand 
presided over the formation of two multi-unit combat groups designed to transport 
weapons and equipment back to Nam Bo and to fight the French. These teams were 
referred to as the Mekong I and Mekong II (Ciru Long I  and Cmi Long II).45 Mekong I 
was said to be a sea operation which went around the coast of Cambodia to southern Nam 
Bo. Its main task was to transport weapons acquired in and through Thailand to the 
southern resistance. Mekong II was an overland route which originated in the area south 
of the Tonle Sap and travelled from Pursat and Battambang to Komgpong Thom and then 
into Nam Bo. It reportedly numbered around three hundred persons and transported 
weapons and equipment back to Vietnam and engaged the French.46 According to Giau, 
it was later "almost completely decimated by the French."47 Another combat unit was 
known as That Son, named after the seven mountain border region, but the details of its 
operations remain unknown.48
43
44
45
46
47
48
Interview with Nguyen Dire Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. Quynh Anh says that the small town 
of Phimun in Ubon had a large Vietnamese population which had sent many youths back to Vietnam to 
fight the French. Qiiy may be referring to this town. Another village in Ubon Ratchathani which served 
Vietnamese resistance efforts was Phang Khon. Son Tung, op. cit., p. 169.
Evidence concerning these combat groups comes from the following sources: Interviews: Tran Van
Gihu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Nguyen Dürc Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and 
published sources: Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 286-87; and Nguyen Hao Hung, op. cit, pp. 14546. 
Hoan says that the Tran Phü unit was company size.
Interview with Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City; Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 287; and 
Nguyen Hao Hung, op. cit., pp. 14546.
Interviews: Tran Van Gihu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Nguyen Dürc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi 
Minh City.
Interview with Tran Vän Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
Interview with Nguyen Dure Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
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Giau said in an interview that two more combat units, Mekong III and IV, were also 
created under Viet Minh supervision. Mekong III, left from Battambang, crossed 
Siemreap, Kompong Thom, and Kongpong Cham and ended in Tay Ninh province in 
southern Vietnam.49 It is unclear which course Mekong IV took, although its tasks were 
probably similar to the others (see Map IV). Considering the military importance of these 
units to the Nam Bo resistance, it seems certain that Viet Minh officials present in 
Thailand in 1946, such as Nguydn Thanh Son, Pham Vän Bäch, and Nguyln Vän 
Tao, joined Giau in organising and directing these military groups and their operations. 
Pridi facilitated their work by allowing them to work from Thai soil and through 
continued military assistance. In one case in 1946, he made available 20 tonnes of 
carbines to the Viet Minh.50
1.4. Strengthening the Cambodian Resistance out of Thailand
Besides fighting the French and delivering arms to Vietnam, these Viet Minh mobile 
combat units also worked with Cambodian resistance groups operating in eastern 
Thailand and western Cambodia.51 As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, up to the end of the 
Pacific War, Vietnamese cadres in Thailand had paid little, if any, attention to building 
bases among overseas Vietnamese communities in western Cambodia, let alone working 
with the Cambodians. Indeed, it was the Thais who had presided over the formation of 
the first Khmer Issarak group in late 1940. By early 1941, a considerable number of 
Cambodians had joined in this Thai-dominated partnership to oust the French. Five years 
later, with open hostilities with the French underway in southern Vietnam, the 
Vietnamese now hoped to begin a similar relationship with the Cambodians. Yet because 
the orientation of the Cambodian resistance had been toward the west since 1940 and 
because Vietnamese resistance organisations in northeast Thailand prior to 1945 had been 
orientated toward northern Vietnam, Vietnamese resistance organisations in Thailand had 
no real links with Cambodians or overseas Vietnamese enclaves in western Cambodia 
such as they had in Laos. As a result, at the end of WWII, the Vietnamese found 
themselves considerably isolated from Cambodian resistance groups operating in eastern 
Thailand and western Cambodia.
At the outbreak of war in southern Vietnam in September 1945, the Regional 
Committee of the ICP in Nam Bo dispatched a representative to Cambodia with orders to 
increase the Viet Minh's cooperation with the Cambodian resistance.52 However, within
Interview with Trän Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
Ben Kieman, How Pol Pot Came to Power A History o f Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975, 
(London: Verso, 1985), p. 52.
Nguyen Hao Hung, op. cit, p. 145-46.
Ibid., p. 144 and Livre Noir, p. 18. The Livre Noir says that Vietnam sent envoys to Cambodia 
immediately after the August Revolution.
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weeks the French reoccupation of Cambodia sent Cambodian revolutionaries fleeing in 
two directions: one group went to southern Vietnam, while the other sought refuge in 
Thailand.53 According to several Vietnamese experts on Cambodia writing with the 
events of the late 1970s in mind, some of those Cambodians who went to Nam Bo were 
helped by the Viet Minh's Southern Resistance Administrative Committee and the 
southern ICP branch in the creation of the Cambodian Independence Committee (CIC). 
This Nam Bo-based committee was said to have had 100 Cambodian members who 
received military, political, and financial aid from the Southern Committee, as well as the 
support of the large Khmer population residing in southern Vietnam.54 This coincided 
with an ICP directive calling for the "immediate establishment of a joint Vietnamese- 
Cambodian military commission" which would bring about "a guerilla war on Cambodian 
soil."55 It appears this never materialised and at the end of 1945 the CIC fell apart.56
Without access to Cambodian sources, it is impossible to explain definitively why the 
CIC disintegrated. Although French advances in southern Vietnam in late 1945 certainly 
put the CIC under great pressure, as the Vietnamese claim, there was also internal friction 
between Vietnamese and Cambodian cadres of which we know very little. As early as 
October 1945, the ICP's mouthpiece, C a Giai Phong [Liberation Flag], published an 
article in which it reported that the Cambodian government led by Son Ngoc Thach 
wished to see Nam Bo (Kampuchea Krom in Khmer) returned and the ICP also noted the 
deaths of overseas Vietnamese in Cambodia at the hands of Cambodians. Ca Giai 
Phong criticised these developments, saying that "the Cambodian people always forget 
that it was the French bandits who had given away one-third of Cambodia to Siam ..  ."57
Whatever the case, the failure of the CIC helps explain why, in early 1946, a number 
of Cambodian resistance leaders left Nam Bo and went to Thailand where the Khmer 
Issarak was active.58 As has been mentioned, the Khmer Issarak got its start in Bangkok 
in 1940. In 1941, Phra Phiset Phanit claims that he presided over the formation of a 
second Khmer Issarak movement that continued to function into the postwar period.59
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Thanh Dam, op. cit., p. 75 and Kieman, 'Khmer Communism,' p. 164.
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David Chandler has written that in 1945 the Khmer Issarak was set up with a 
government-in-exile in Bangkok.60 To the Viet Minh leaders in Nam Bo, the 
disintegration of the CIC, the departure of Cambodian resistance leaders to Thailand, and 
the rapidly expanding French military presence in the south must have left them isolated 
from Cambodian resistance groups in Thailand at the very time they needed their 
cooperation most. If true, this would also go far to explaining why Tran Vän Giäu and 
Nguyln Thanh San, in particular, went to Thailand in early 1946 with instructions to 
build better ties with the Cambodians.
Trän Vän Giäu explained in a 1989 interview that by dispatching him to Thailand, 
the Viet Minh had instructed him "to organise the Cambodian resistance movement in 
Cambodia and the Lao movement in a part of southern Laos."61 In December 1945, the 
communist Party journal, Sii That (The Truth), echoed this concern writing that the 
French used control of Vietnamese-Lao-Cambodian road (route des trois frontiires) to 
attack Nam Bo.62 To Vietnamese strategists, without a viable Khmer resistance 
movement in Cambodia, the French had a free hand in Cambodia to attack Nam Bo from 
its western flank.63 As Giau described the Viet Minh's thinking:
The Viet Minh wanted to organise a resistance in Cambodia to allow the Cambodian 
people to rise up as well as to divide the strength of the French in Nam Bo. To prevent 
the French from concentrating their forces in this southern region any more, we needed 
to organise a resistance in Cambodia with an aim to helping the Cambodian people 
make a revolution as much as to strengthening [the security of] Nam Bo.64
While some Vietnamese may have wanted to help the Cambodians "rise up," the main 
Vietnamese interest in building better relations with the Cambodians was based on the 
need to counter French military actions in southern Vietnam. Ironically, with most of the 
major Cambodian resistance leaders now working from Thailand and western Cambodia, 
the Vietnamese found Thailand to be a much more favourable location than Nam Bo for 
building cooperation with the Cambodian resistance. The sympathy of the Thai 
government for Viet Minh resistance activities in Thailand made this alternative all the 
more attractive, especially in light of Bangkok's opposition to concurrent French 
demands for return of Cambodian territories lost to Bangkok in 1941. Moreover,
60 David Chandler, A History o f Cambodia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 176.
61 Interview with Trän Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and 'Bäi cua Dong Chf Kieu Minh, Can 
Bö Dai SCr Quän Viet Nam tai Nöng Penh Noi ve Pön Pot vä Ding cua No von Dban Can Bö Ban 
Nghien C£ru Luän Trung Uong tai Dai Sir Quän Viet Nam' [A Report by Comrade Kieu Minh, a 
Cadre of the Vietnamese Embassy in Phnom Penh, to a Committee of the Central Committee's Theoretical 
Research Commission at the Vietnamese Embassy on Pol Pot and his Party], Hanoi, 10 May 1980, p. 1M.
62 See: 'Mät Tran Buön-Ma-Thuot' [The Buön-Ma-Thuot Front], Sir That, 20 December 1945 in Cuoc
Khing Chien Than Thänh cüa Nhan Dan Viet-Nam, Tap I, (Tir 23 Thing chin 1945 den thing chap 
1947) [The Sacred Resistance of the Vietnamese People, Volume I, (From 23 September 1945 to December 
1947)], (2nd Edition; Hanoi: NXBST, 1958), p. 35.
63 Interview with Trän Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
64  Ibid.
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because the Thais still controlled the Cambodian territories of Battambang, Sisiphon, and 
a considerable portion of Siemreap, these territories were, by and large, safe from direct 
French military interference. Lastly, by working with the Khmer resistance in Thailand, 
the Viet Minh would have access to the financial and military resources which the 
Vietnamese communities in Thailand and western Indochina could provide. From the 
outset, Giau said, Viet Minh leaders in Thailand had relied upon the Vietnamese 
population in Thailand and Cambodia to support their efforts to build a stronger 
Cambodian resistance movement.65 These communities provided money, supplies, 
recruits, and bases for the Vietnamese and Cambodian fighters who would come to work 
in the area.66 All of these factors combined to make Thailand a favourable location from 
which the Viet Minh could intensify their cooperation with Cambodian resistance fighters.
According to Vietnamese sources, sometime at the beginning of 1946, after meetings 
between DRV and Cambodian resistance representatives in Bangkok, the Khmer National 
Liberation Committee (Kana Cheat Mouta Keaha Mocchim Nokor Khmer, KNLC) was 
set up in Thai-controlled Battambang. With the assistance of the Viet Minh and "overseas 
Vietnamese resistance forces" operating in the area, the KNLC was designed to help the 
Cambodians organise an effective resistance force to fight the French in conjunction with 
the Viet Minh.67 The KNLC was reportedly led by Acan [professor] Duong, Son Ngoc 
Minh, a Khmer Issarak member, Me Muon, and possibly Dap Chhuon.68 Hoang Vän 
Hoan tells us in his memoir that when this Committee had consolidated its strength 
enough, it "brought its forces into Cambodia to work in the areas of Tonle Sap, 
Battambang, and the area of northwestern Cambodia."69 When it was actually active in 
Cambodia, it sought to develop links with the peasants in the countryside and in the 
mountaineous regions. However, it appears that until the Committee could stand on its
65
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own feet, it remained on Thai soil, probably in Thai-controlled Battambang or 
Siemreap.70
In Jure 1946, Vietnamese links with the Cambodians were further strengthened by the 
establishment of a Vietnamese communist party cell in Battambang province. According 
to Nguydn Thanh Scm, this cell was to play a part in the defence of the Vietnamese 
nation and to contribute to the "process of constructing the People's Revolutionary Party 
of Cambodia," although Scm does not tell us what this "Party" was.71 The Vietnamese 
sought to use the Battambang cell to contact the Khmer Issarak in an effort "to link 
together in the struggle against the French," suggesting that the Viet Minh had not won 
over the support of all Cambodian resistance activists. Step-by-step the Khmers were 
able to strengthen their positions in Siemreap, Trakotoum, and Ampil in western 
Cambodia, receiving assistance from the Viet Minh in the formation of combined 
Vietnamese-Cambodian military command.72 A Vietnamese source says the Mekong I 
and Mekong II combat units helped the Cambodian resistance through this joint military 
liaison.73 Hoang Vän Hoan seems to support this, writing in his memoir that overseas 
Vietnamese combat units went to Cambodia to conduct resistance activities and to assist 
the Cambodians in the fight against the French. These groups established bases in the 
mountaineous areas around Dangrech and along the Thai-Cambodian border, and were 
linked to one of the Viet Minh's Cambodian Working Bureaus (Ban Can Sir Mien) 
under the direction of the Nam Bo Resistance Committee.74
Vietnamese and US sources confirm that in early August 1946, 300-400 fighters, a 
combination of Khmer Issarak, KNLC, and Viet Minh adherents, briefly occupied the 
French-administered town of Siemreap before being repulsed by French troops sent from 
Saigon (see chapter 3).75 Giau, who said he was directly involved in the Siemreap 
operation, explained that in this manoeuvre the attacking force was following behind the 
Viet Minh's Quang Trung group on a mission across Siemreap. The French were aware
70
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of the Quang Trung operation and pursued it, evidently leaving the town of Siemreap 
vulnerable to combined Vietnamese—Khmer fighters.76 Nguydn Thanh San claims 
that the Mekong I and II units participated in this attack, marking what he sees as the first 
example of combined Viet Minh-Cambodian resistance efforts and the beginning of the 
Cambodian "armed uprising" against the French 77 However, this attack may not have 
been the success Son would have us believe. A Bangkok Post investigation revealed that 
many Khmer Issarak partisans failed to pull the pins out of their grenades when they 
attacked and did not know how to use the weapons at their disposal.78 Hoan says that 
the KNLC soon crumbled because of internal fighting, without making any mention of 
the state of Vietnamese-Cambodian relations.79
I. 5. Vietnam and the Franco-Thai Dispute
It is not exactly clear what actions Vietnamese resistance leaders in Thailand took from 
June until August 1946, a time during which the Thais were involved in extremely tense 
negotiations with France over the Lao and Cambodian territories Bangkok gained in 
1941, the same territories in which the Viet Minh were working. By this time, the Thai 
government had instructed Vietnamese resistance leaders in Thailand to desist from 
launching any attacks on French forces in western Indochina from Thai soil.80 Besides 
giving French military forces a pretext to enter Thailand in pursuit of the Vietnamese, 
such attacks could also be used by the French to break off negotiations with Bangkok in 
Washington concerning Thai claims to the territories. This is exactly what French 
authorities in Indochina did in early August following the Siemreap incident. It also 
seems likely that while the Viet Minh continued their work in eastern Thailand and in the 
Thai-held Cambodian provinces during this time, they were also closely following the 
course of Franco-Thai negotiations. Because Viet Minh leaders in Thailand were almost 
certainly aware of the negative ramifications which would stem from failed Franco-Thai 
negotiations, its seems likely that instructions were sent to field commanders to desist 
from making attacks on the French from Thai soil that might undermine Franco-Thai 
negotiations. Strategically speaking, continued Thai control of the Cambodian territories 
was in Vietnam's interest.
It is worth noting that two Vietnamese-language newspapers published in Hanoi in 
1946 took very sympathetic views of Bangkok's claim to the Indochinese territories. In 
mid-July, as the Thais tried to take their case to the United Nations, heretofore
76  Nguyen Hao Hung, op. cit, pp. 14546 and Interview with Tran Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh 
City.
Nguyen Hao Hung, op. cit., p. 144, especially fn. 2 and pp. 14546 and Ben Kieman, 'Khmer 
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79 Ho&ng Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 306.
80  Wichan, op. cit, pp. 4243 .
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straightforward summaries of the Franco-Thai dispute in these papers were suddenly 
replaced by surprisingly pro-Thai editorials, all published within the same week. On 19 
July, Doc Lap (Independence), printed an editorial entitled The Franco-Siam Dispute: A 
Look Into the Past. This article briefly reviewed the 1940 Franco-Thai conflict before 
turning its attention to French efforts to force Thailand to return the territories in 1946. 
The writer of this article noted that the timing between France's consolidation of power in 
Laos and the outbreak of border incidents between the Thais and French in May may not 
have been coincidental.
After France had re-established its rule in Cambodia and Laos, the French colonialists 
suddenly looked for a way take revenge on Thailand. On the one hand, they demanded 
return of the territories and, on the other hand, they launched many invasions into 
Thailand.81
On 21 July, Doc Lap published a second, frontpage editorial in which it hinted that 
rumours in Thailand that the French might have been behind the alleged assassination of 
the Thai King in June could not be dismissed. As for the Franco-Thai dispute, this writer 
considered the Thai case against the French to be a "truly reasonable, clear-cut, and 
deserving one."82
On closer examination, the situation is becoming increasingly more tense between 
Siam and France. On the one hand, the French, without rhyme or reason, have invaded 
Siam in order to demand return of several territories which the French had formerly 
forced Siam to concede to Cambodia. . . .  On the other hand, in order to deal with the 
hard-line taken by the French, Siam has brought the dispute directly to the attention of 
the United Nations for arbitration.83
On 25 July, the Vietnamese newspaper, Dän Chü, published the first of a two-part 
editorial series on the Franco-Thai dispute. This essay was entitled Why is there a 
Franco-Thai Dispute? and was signed by T.L. At the outset, the author stated that 
because the Thais had taken the Franco-Thai dispute to the Security Council, the matter 
was of interest to Vietnam. In discussing the capitulation of France to Germany in 1940, 
the T.L. wrote that "naturally Thailand took advantage of this rare opportunity to realise 
its programme called 'The Pan Thai Movement.'" Commenting on Franco-Thai 
negotiations in 1946, T.L. urged Thailand to bring the dispute before the UN, dismissing 
as groundless French claims that they attacked Thailand in May in order to suppress
° 1 T hai Luän: Cuoc Xung Dot Phäp-Xiem-Nhin Vao Qüa Khtir' [Commentary: The Franco-Siamese
Dispute: A Look into the Past], Ddc Lap, 19 July 1946, No. 201, p. 1. Doc Lap was a paper of the 
Vietnam Democratic [Party] which was in the Viet Minh coalition.
8 2 Ibid.
83 T hai Luän: Xiem va Phap' [Commentary: Siam and France], Doc Lap, 21 July 1946, No. 203, p. 1.
Thailand and the Vietnamese Resistance in 1946 121
guerillas. Ridiculing this French allegation, T.L. wrote that "whenever France wants to 
occupy an area, there will undoubtedly be guerillas to suppress!"84
In the second part of this series, the pro-Thai line became even more remarkable. This 
editorial, entitled The Franco-Siam Conflict: 'Where is It Going?', was signed by 
"H.H." In the opening paragraph, H.H. stated that there was nothing wrong with the 
Thai decision in 1941 to reclaim the Lao and Cambodian provinces which the French had 
forced them to cede earlier. It was only now that the Japanese had surrendered that the 
"French wanted to steal these territories" back from the Thais. H.H. challenged the 
French line of argumentation that because Thailand had collaborated with the Japanese 
during WWÜ, Bangkok therefore had no rightful claim to the provinces:
That is an extremely weak position to take, for numerous detestable Frenchmen opened 
the door to welcome warmly the Japanese into Indochina and the whole of the Pacific.
If one speaks of who committed the greater crime in its relations with Japan, then 
France is still more to blame than Siam.85
H.H. also wrote that French military action against the Thais in May had been designed to 
provoke an incident with Bangkok rather than to suppress insurgents operating out of 
Thailand. H.H. scorned the French claim that they had only brought weapons to the 
Thai-French Indochina border in order to fight guerillas. To this author: "That was just a 
threatening deceit."86
On 20 October, as the Thais prepared to return the Indochinese territories, CiTu Quoc 
published an article expressing concern about the very large number of overseas 
Vietnamese living in the Thai-controlled province of Battambang, asking what would 
happen to them if the Thais returned this province to the French. The piece concluded by 
calling on Hanoi to get in touch with the the Bangkok government.87
Part II: The DRV's Diplomatic Office in Bangkok
In mid-1946, while Ho Chi Minh was engaged in negotiations in France, the 
Vietnamese Minister of the Interior, Vö Nguyln Giäp, cleared the way for the dispatch 
of the DRV's new diplomatic representative to Thailand, Nguydn Dire Qüy. Travelling 
on a Chinese passport, Qüy, along with another Vietnamese representative, Pham Ngoc
Tai Sao C6 cuoc Xung Dot Phap-Xiem?' [Where is there a Franco-Siamese Conflict?], Dan Chu 
[Democracy], 25 July 1946, No. 275.
'Sur Rac Roi Phap-Xiem SS Di Däu?' [Where is the Franco-Siamese Disturbance Leading?], Dan Chu, 26 
July 1946, No. 276. I have been unable to determine how Cambodian resistance groups felt about these 
matters.
Ibid. Further comments by H.H. on the May incidents have been deleted by a censor.
Curu Quoc, 20 October 1946, No. 381.
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Thach, left for Thailand. In August, as the French were sending troops to the Thai 
border, Quy and Thach arrived in Bangkok to begin discussions with Thai leaders 
concerning the DRV’s desire to expand its diplomatic activities in Thailand.88
As we saw in chapter 3, Nguyln Dtic Qüy had reportedly been selected by Ho Chi 
Minh during the Tan Trao Conference a year earlier. He was a non-communist and a 
member of the Democratic Party. Thach, on the other hand, was a clandestine ICP 
member from the south, as well as Ho Chi Minh's personal doctor and a trusted 
adviser. In September 1945, he was a member in the People's Committee for the South 
and presided over the Vanguard Youth League. Fluent in French and proficient in 
English, Thach travelled to Bangkok as the DRV's Under-Secretary of State.89
II.l. Thailand's Strategic Position
The reasons underpinning Hanoi's decision to send two ranking officials to Bangkok 
in mid-1946 were largely strategic. Firstly, Chiang Kaishek had pulled most of his 
troops out of Indochina in June, thereby removing one of the major obstacles blocking 
French military action against northern Vietnam. Secondly, Chiang had also closed off 
the "China Road" to the Vietnamese in 1946 by denying them important rearbases in 
southern China. Although the Chinese Communists were able to make contact with DRV 
representatives through the north, it appears to have been very limited until the Chinese 
Communist achieved major victories in Manchuria in late 1948.90 Thirdly, the French 
were strengthening their military positions in the meantime at key strategic points along 
the Sino-Vietnamese border in accordance with the 6 March agreement. Fourthly, by 
mid-May the French had further threatened the DRV's security by retaking all of Laos, a 
development which put the French on Hanoi's western flank. Taken together with the 
threats mentioned at the opening of this chapter, by mid-1946 Vietnam's security was 
under pressure from every direction.91
Compounding this situation was Hanoi's difficulty in contacting the international 
community. Hbang Nhat Tan, who worked in Thailand after WWII, pointed out that 
because of the disbanding of the Comintern in 1943, it was very difficult for Hanoi to
88
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Chen says that in Yunnan the Viet Minh were able to gain access to certain Chinese border cities under 
the control o f Lu Han, who had worked with Ho earlier and was not hostile to the Viet Minh. See chapter 
6 .
In separate interviews, Nguyen DCrc Quy and Hoang Nhat Tan singled out the encircled position of the 
DRV as a key strategic reason explaining the expansion of the DRV's diplomatic activities in Thailand 
in mid-1946.
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contact the Soviet Union.92 Communication with the Asian region and the West was also 
difficult. Without up-to-date information and intelligence on changes in international 
affairs, the Vietnamese decision-making process was under-informed at a time when 
French authorities in Indochina had begun to take a more aggressive line toward Hanoi, 
especially after the signing of the September Modus Vivendi. If Vietnamese leaders were 
going to keep negotiations on track and counter French attempts to gain international 
support, then they needed better access to Western and Asian governments, the 
international media and information services, and some sort of diplomatic representation 
abroad.
Bangkok offered such favourable conditions. Firstly, most Western nations had 
diplomatic representation in Bangkok immediately after the war. Secondly, newly 
independent Asian nations had or were in the process of establishing diplomatic relations 
with Thailand. Thirdly, Bangkok was geographically located at the centre of Asia, close 
to Hanoi, and linked to the rest o f the world by air, sea, and international 
telecommunications systems. Considering the support of postwar Thai leaders for the 
Vietnamese thus far, the DRV obviously hoped to take advantage of the favourable 
conditions in Thailand to establish an outlet to the region and the world, without having to 
fear direct French interference as in Indochina.
Upon arriving in Bangkok, Qiiy and Thach, together with Trän Van Giau (and no 
doubt others), entered negotiations with Thai officials concerning the possibility of 
establishing diplomatic representation in Bangkok. Pham Ngoc Thach forwarded a 
letter from Ho Chi Minh to Pridi and discussed the matter of establishing a delegation 
and the need for stepped-up cooperation against colonialism.93 At the time, the Thais 
were involved in very tense negotiations with the French and a related bid to join the UN, 
and were thus apparently reluctant to risk upsetting their fragile negotiations with Paris by 
recognising the DRV officially. However, they did agree to recognise the DRV 
unofficially by allowing the Ho Chi Minh government to establish an office in Bangkok, 
known as the Representational Office of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ( Vän 
Phbng Dai Dien Viet Nam Dan Chu Cong Hba).94 This office was also referred to as 
the Vietnam Delegation for South East Asia and shared the premises of the VNS on Silom 
Road at the outset.95
92  Interview with Hoang Nhät Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi.
93 Ibid.
9 4 Hbang Van Hoan uses this title in his memoir and refers to Qiiy as the "representative of the Democratic 
Republic o f Vietnam." He also uses the terms "representational office" (vän phbng dai dien) and the term 
"delegation" (phäi dban) interchangeably. So did Qiiy in my interview with him in April 1989. Strictly 
speaking, these terms, "delegation" and "representational office," imply unofficial recognition. The 
DRV's delegation in Thailand was neither a legation nor an embassy; both these terms would have 
meant official Thai recognition.
9 5 Australia, DEA, 'Letter from Nguyen Dire Qiiy to the Australian Foreign Minister, H.V. Evatt,' 22 May 
1948 in CRS A1838/2; 381/1/3/1, AA.
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The Thai decision to allow the Vietnamese to establish a delegation in Bangkok was 
very propitious. By the time the delegation was actually functioning sometime in October 
or November 1946, French authorities in Indochina were making preparations to retake 
northern Vietnam. A number of Vietnamese officials who worked in Thailand during this 
period pointed out in interviews in 1989 that the Thais were among the very first to 
recognise—though unofficially—the DRV.96
II.2. The Delegation
According to Nguyln Dtic Qiiy, five officers formed the core of the DRV delegation 
in Bangkok. Proficient in English, Thai, French and Chinese, Qiiy was the President of 
the delegation and the ranking Vietnamese official based in Bangkok.97 In addition, Qiiy 
was also designated the DRV's representative to Southeast Asia. Trän Vän Giäu 
focused his work on military matters and also played a part in directing Vietnamese 
military operations from Thailand and western Indochina, as well as assisting the Lao and 
Khmer resistance movements. Le Hy (alias Vinh Leri) was chief of the Vietnam News 
Service (VNS). Nguyln Vän Trong was a Colonel in the DRV's army, responsible for 
purchasing military equipment and arms. Lastly, Bao An, a Vietnamese Buddhist priest 
who had long lived in Thailand, tended to overseas Vietnamese affairs.98
Besides this group, there were other important members as well, some assigned 
directly to the delegation, others peripherally linked from their posts in northeast 
Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia. Pham Ngoc Thach, whom we have mentioned already, 
worked in the delegation in Bangkok as the DRV's shuttle diplomat. Also working on 
diplomatic affairs was Dr. Tran Vän Luän. He met with foreign diplomats, published 
articles in the VNS and Bangkok Post supporting Vietnam's case against the French, and 
represented the DRV at international conferences. Another Vietnamese who merits 
mention is Nguyln Vän Long. A native of central Vietnam, Long was said to have been 
fluent in Thai and Lao as well as French and English. In 1945, he was the communist
As of 1946, the Soviet Union had not yet recognised the DRV. This would not happen until 1950. 
According to an agreement in the 6 March Accord, the French allowed the DRV to administer a non­
official delegation in Paris. Hoang Minh Giarn, Under-secretary of the Interior, was in charge of the 
delegation at the beginning. In November, Tran Ngoc Danh took over. See: The Outbreak of War,’ p. 
I l l ;  Philippe Devillers, op. c it , p. 451; and Interview with Hoang Nhät Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi.
After WWH, the DRV dispatched a number of diplomatic representatives to Asia and the West. 
Representing the DRV government in India and Burma was Mai The Chau; Malaya, Nguyen Ngoc Vy; 
Singapore, Phan Vän Phüc; the US, the Secretary of the Vietnam-American Friendship Association, 
Pham Duy Am; Great Britain, Nguyen Vän Nhän; and France, Tran Ngoc Danh. There was also a 
representative in Czechoslovakia and most probably several in Moscow.
Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. Citing French intelligence, the 
Australian historian, Ben Kieman, incorrectly states that Tran Van Giau headed the DRV delegation in 
Bangkok. Kieman, How Pol Pot, p. 52. Bruce Reynolds made the same mistake in his article: Thailand 
and the Southeast Asia League' in Relations between Thailand and other Countries, (Proceedings of the 
International Thai Conference, August 22-24 1984, Thai Studies Program, Chulalongkom University), p. 
9. Brown and Zasloff incorrectly put Le Hy at the head o f the delegation. Brown and Zasloff, op. c it, p. 
36.
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Secretary-General of the Overseas Vietnamese General Association and was instrumental 
in setting up guerilla camps along the Lao-Kengtung border. According to Alan Loomes, 
the Australian Consul-General in Bangkok in 1951, during his service in Thailand in 
1946 and 1947, Long "cemented firm contacts" with "influential" Thai police officers, 
government officials, Thai intellectuals, and even "senior" Thai princes."
Members of the delegation were in touch with many Thai government and military 
officials. If we can believe Qüy, from the time of his arrival in Bangkok he could "meet 
with any Thai minister he wanted." Naturally, one of the most important Thai leaders 
with whom Qüy met was Pridi. Even though Pridi had resigned in August 1946, he had 
remained an important power-behind-the-scenes over the course of the next year. Tieng 
Serikhan, the Deputy Minister of Interior, also continued to be leading Thai ally of the 
DRV.100
The new cabinet formed under the leadership of Rear-Admiral Luang Thamrong 
Nawasawat in August was also favourably inclined toward the members of the 
delegation. Qüy met with Thamrong on at least one occasion to discuss the state of Thai- 
Vietnamese relations. The Minister of Industry, Thongin Phuriphat, was a longtime 
Vietnamese supporter who continued to provide the Vietnamese with military assistance. 
It was Thongin to whom Qüy delivered his letter of authorisation from Vö Nguyln 
Giäp. Other longtime allies of the Viet Minh from WWII days included: the Acting 
Minister of Commerce, Chamlong Daoruang and ministers without portfolios, Thawi 
Udon and Thong Kantatham. While the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime 
Minister, Direk Chaiyanam, did not allow the Thai government to recognise the DRV 
formally, Qüy said that Direk nevertheless "sympathised" with the DRV and did not 
oppose the formation of the delegation. Before leaving for Europe, even the young Thai 
King granted Nguyln Dire Qüy an audience in 1946.101
Long went to France in the 1920s where he received a Doctor in Laws from the Sorbonne. During his 
study in France, he joined the French Communist Party and thereafter he travelled to Moscow for further 
study. In the mid-1930s, he returned to Indochina and during WWII worked as a reporter for the 
Singapore Herald. Loomes said that Long's contacts with the Thai court stemmed from his extensive 
knowledge o f classical dance and oriental arts. Australia, DEA, 'Letter from Alan Loomes to T.K. 
Critchley, Office of the Australian Commissioner for Malaya, Singapore,'27 June 1951, CRS A5019/1; 
100/8/1 Part 2, AA and article by James Taylor, 'AAP-Reuter Mailer-Situationer' [no date given], enclosed 
in 'Letter from Loomes.'
1 Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
101 Ibid, and Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, DC. Not long after his arrival in 
Thailand, Quy met with the Vice-President of the National Assembly and Minister of Education, Duen 
Bunnak, the former Chief of Police and Minister of Defence and now the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Thai Armed Forces, General Adun Decharat, and the Chief of Police as well as the Minister of the 
Interior, Colonel Chuang Chawengsak Songkhram. Khuang Aphaiwong, a native of Battambang 
province and the leader of the opposition party, Prachatipatai (Democracy), also met with Quy. 
Interestingly, his brother, Chaowalit Aphaiwong, was, according to French intelligence, the Chef 
nominal du mouvement Khmer Issarak. Kukrit Pramot, another important member of the opposition with 
royal connections, also met with Quy in Bangkok. Interview with Nguyen Due Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho 
Chi Minh City and US, DOS, 751G.92/4-248, 'Memorandum of Conversation between Aphaiwong and 
Stanton,' 2 April 1948, USNA, p. 1.
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Besides the Thais, the delegation also provided the DRV an important contact point to 
the US Embassy in Bangkok through which the Vietnamese could channel important 
information to Washington. Vietnamese government representatives in Bangkok were in 
touch with the US Ambassador Edwin Stanton, Military Attache, Lt. Col. William Law, 
and General Attache, Col. James Thompson, who sent gifts (through Qiiy) to Ho Chf 
Minh on the President's birthday. Following the outbreak of full-scale war in 
Indochina, this link was particularly important. In April 1947, Pham Ngpc Thach 
delivered two important memos to Stanton through Law concerning Franco-Vietnamese 
negotiations and the events leading to the outbreak of war in December 1946, as well as a 
request to General MacArthur expressing Vietnam's claims to Indochina's gold held in 
Tokyo since WWII.102 In May 1947, there was even talk between Stanton and the State 
Department concerning a possible trip by the US Consul at Saigon, Charles Reed, to 
Bangkok where he could meet with Tran Van Giau and Nguyen Dire Qtiy.103
Similarly, the delegation in Bangkok also acted as an important link for DRV leaders to 
the international press. This was particular true in light of the fact that major news 
services assigned correspondents to Bangkok to cover Southeast Asia after WWII. On 
numerous occasions, the delegation relayed questions to Ho Chi Minh from foreign 
journalists and made press statements according to government instructions. On 18 
August 1946, representatives from twenty Thai-based newspapers convened at the 
Bangkok opera house to celebrate the Vietnamese national day. These journalists were 
joined by representatives from Thailand, Great Britain, and China. After speeches by 
Vietnamese delegates, the journalists drafted and sent a telegram to the DRV wishing it 
the best on national day.104
II.3. Tasks of the Delegation
From the outset, the delegation in Bangkok was subordinate to the central government 
in Hanoi. However, it appears it was also linked to the Southern Resistance Committee. 
According to Hoan, internal to the delegation were a number of secret supply
102 US, DOS, 851G.00/4-1747, The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State, 17 April 1947 in 
FRUS, (1947, Volume VI), p. 87. Stanton, who later became staunchly anti-communist, did not 
acknowledge Thach's letters in writing, but he did instruct Law to inform Thach orally that they had been 
received and relayed to the State Department The US Embassy stayed in touch with Thach for a period of 
time thereafter. Stanton considered Thach to be an important source of information about internal 
developments in the DRV government Stanton told Washington in May that Law was his main contact 
with the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian resistance movements working out o f Thailand. Law had 
allegedly begun making "informal and personal" contacts with these groups around December 1946. 
See: Ibid., pp. 88 and 93.
l ^ 3 US, DOS, 851G.00/5-747: Telegram, The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State,' 7 
May 1947 in FRUS, (1947, Volume VI), p. 93.
I®4 'Chaw Wiatnam Pet Chumnum Yindi Wan Chalong Wan Chat' [The Vietnamese Open a Meeting to 
Celebrate their National Holiday], Suphap Burnt, 20 August 1946 and Ter B io  & Xiem Chao Mumg Ntircrc 
Viet Nam trong Ngay Quoc Khanh' [Newspapers in Siam Congratulate Vietnam on the Occasion of its 
National Day], C(ru Quoc, 29 August 1946, No. 331, p. 1.
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arrangements for the Nam Bo resistance, which were under the direction of the Southern 
C om m ittee.105 Giau referred to this supply bureau as the "Nam Bo Supply 
Committee."106
The tasks of the DRV delegation can be divided into five general categories, although it 
must be kept in mind that there was considerable overlap between them. They are: 1) 
Intelligence gathering and the dissemination of information and propaganda; 2) Overseas 
Vietnamese affairs; 3) Diplomatic affairs; 4) Military affairs; and 5) Cooperation with 
the Lao and Khmer resistance organisations.107 We shall discuss the first two tasks here, 
reserving a detailed discussion of point three for the next chapter and points four and five 
for chapter 6.
11.3-1. The Vietnam News Service: Intelligence and Information
As editor of the VNS, Hy was an important member of the delegation. He was an ICP 
member from the south, a former editor of a resistance newspaper in Vietnam who had 
been active in Nam Bo in 1945 and travelled to Thailand when hostilities broke out 
there.108 He had worked with Thai correspondents, such as Kulap Saipradit, Snoh 
Tanbunyun, a former Thai correspondent for the BBC and a professor at Chulalongkom 
University, and Chawala Sukamanchand, a Thai reporter for The Bangkok Post and later 
for the Associated Press.109
Under Hy's guidance, the VNS underwent a significant restructuring programme 
sometime in mid- to late 1946. Specifically, the quality of the VNS' weekly publication, 
Vietnam News, was improved and the circulation was increased as well. Pictures were 
increasingly used and a new lithographic process was begun, giving the paper a more 
professional appearance.110 For the most part, VNS publications included news items, 
speeches, editorials, letters, and essays. At a cost of about five baht, VNS pamphlets 
were printed primarily in English and French. Franco-Vietnamese negotiations and the 
war in the south were the top stories. Editorials usually explained the Vietnamese 
position in the Franco-Vietnamese conflict, targeting both Western and Asian readers. 
From Bangkok, publications were sent to embassies, governments, and overseas
10~* Ho&ng Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 295.
106 Interview with Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
107 Interviews with Nguyen EXrc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City; Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi
Minh City; and Hoang Nhät Tän, 5 May 1989, Hanoi, cited with reference to Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit.,
p. 295.
108 'Vietnam Weekly Published Secretly Aboard Sampans,' Bangkok Post, 9 October 1946. If Hy arrived in 
Thailand after war broke out in Nam Bo in September 1945, it would suggest that he may have been the 
"Hai" we referred to in chapter 3 as the head of the VNS in 1945.
1 °9  Interview with Tran Van Dinh, 31 December 1989, Washington, EXT.
110 'Mot T a Bao Viet Nam Xuat B in  b  Vong-cac' [A Vietnamese Paper is Published in Bangkok], Curu
Quoc, 8 September 1946, No. 366.
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destinations.111 Assisting Hy in his English translations was an Australian communist 
whom Pham Ngoc Thach had brought from Singapore to work at the delegation (see 
picture next page).112
The editor of the Bangkok Post and a former OSS officer in Thailand at the end of 
WWII, Alexander MacDonald, often reprinted VNS stories in his English language daily 
and even used his facilities to print certain VNS publications.113 Thai papers also 
reprinted a number of VNS news stories.114 On other occasions, representatives from 
Chinese newspapers in Bangkok arrived at the VNS office to inquire about the policies of 
the DRV.115 Besides its English language publications, the VNS printed special articles 
in Vietnamese for the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand, informing them of changes in 
Vietnam, the policies of the government, and urging greater "unity" in the resistance 
against the French.116
Vietnamese delegates in Thailand established an additional public news organ called 
the International Liaison Centre of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Ban Lien Lac 
Quoc Te cua Viet Nam Dan Chu Cong Hoa). While it is unknown exactly what the 
function of this centre was, its title would suggest that it was an additional means by 
which the Vietnamese disseminated and gathered information to and from the international 
community.117
All of these improvements in the VNS underscored a growing interest on the part of 
Hanoi in the appearance, quality, and effectiveness of its diplomatic representation 
abroad. This was not without reason, considering French military actions in Indochina in 
late 1946.118 Hokng Vän Hoan said that because of the location of the delegation and 
the VNS in Bangkok, the government was able to contact "fellow [communist] Parties, 
countries within the socialist camp, and democratic peoples." In Hoan's words, Thailand 
had become a "gateway to the world" for Vietnam during this time. He writes:
111 Interview with Nguyen Dire Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. The VNS had a link to the US 
through an American known as Mr. Vangly. He ran the Vietnam-American Friendship Association and 
disseminated many of the VNS'documents to US subscribers.
112 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 298. This was probably Alexander Brotherton.
113 For evidence supporting the conclusion that MacDonald printed and published VNS documents, see: 
Vietnam: A New State in Her History, (Bangkok: Vietnam News, June 1947). At the very bottom of the 
last page of this document are the following words in small print: "Printed and published by Alexander 
MacDonald at the Post Publishing Co., Ltd. Krung Kasem Road, June 1947." For evidence of 
MacDonald's support of the Vietnamese and Thais, see: Alexander MacDonald, Bangkok Editor, (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 214.
114 Suphap Burnt and Mahachon were two, of many, papers to reprint VNS stories.
11  ^ Interview with Nguyen Dire Qüy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
116 'Mot Ter Bao Viet Nam,' Ciru Quoc, 8 September 1946, No. 366.
117 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cil, p. 301.
118 Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi. As has been pointed out, the Vietnamese did have a similar 
representational office in Paris. However, it was much smaller and limited in its ability to function free 
of French interference. The DRV also had a representational office in Prague, Czechoslovakia; however, 
this office did not have near the manpower or the access to western countries which Bangkok could offer.
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If Vietnam wanted to win over the support of outside world, to make the French people, 
as well as the people of the world, clearly understand the meaning of the Vietnamese 
resistance, and to [make them] oppose the terrible invasion by the French imperialists, 
then we had to guard this international gateway.11^
II.3-2. The Delegation and the Overseas Vietnamese
Besides the VNS, Hanoi's other asset in Thailand was access to the large overseas 
Vietnamese community in Thailand. As we have already mentioned, the original number 
of permanent overseas Vietnamese in Thailand (around 30,000) had been increased 
significantly with the arrival of another 50,000 mainly Vietnamese refugees following the 
French reconquest of Laos. Hanoi realised that thousands of Vietnamese, strategically 
located in northeast Thailand and favourably inclined toward the DRV, was a force not to 
be overlooked. With a delegation established in Bangkok, the government now had a 
direct link to Vietnamese organisations located in northeast Thailand. According to 
Nguyln Duc Qüy, upon setting up the delegation one of his main tasks was to assist the 
large Vietnamese communities in northeast Thailand and to tend to the needs of those 
refugees who had fled there after the French reoccupation of Laos.120 A number of 
organisations were established to channel funds from the overseas Vietnamese in 
Thailand back to Vietnam, some of which included: The National Federation of 
Assistance to the Vietnamese People, Fund for Assistance of State, Vietnam Mutual 
Assistance Committee, and the Naval Revictualing Committee of Nam Bo.121
Links were formed between the delegation in Bangkok and overseas Vietnamese 
organisations in Udon, Ubon and other locations in Thailand, western Laos, and 
Cambodia.122 Unfortunately, the details of the relationship between the delegation and 
Vietnamese Communist organisations in northeast Thailand remains, to a large extent, a 
mystery (see chapter 6).
Since early 1946, we know that Tran Vän Gihu and others had sought to gain the 
support of the overseas Vietnamese communities in anti-French operations. Vietnamese 
communities in Thailand provided the Viet Minh with places to live, money, recruits, and 
supplies. One of the most important uses of overseas Vietnamese financial contributions 
was the purchase of arms. Much of the money donated by foreign nationals was 
forwarded to the delegation's arms purchaser, who used the money to buy weapons from
110 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 289.
120 Interview with Nguyen EXrc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. For copies of cables sent from the 
overseas Vietnamese in support of the DRV, see: 'Dien Van cua Kieu Bao ir Xiem Guri Chrnh Phu [A 
Telegram Sent by the Overseas Vietnamese in Siam to the Government], Dan Chu, 10 August 1946, No. 
313, p. 1 and Dan Chu, 12 October 1946, No. 340 and Cuu Quoc, 13 October 1946 [circa], No. 374.
121 BP, 13 October 1948 and 'Broadcast Statement of Madame Bach,' 31 May 1951.
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[This advertisement is entitled: "Opening Day of the Siamese-Vietnamese Federated 
Bank," published in Doc Lap, 11 June 1946]
122 Interviews: Nguyen Dure Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Tran Van Dinh, 31 December 1989, 
Washington, EXT.
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the numerous arms dealers in Thailand.123 In April 1947, the VNS reported that in 
February and March of that year alone the Vietnamese in Thailand had contributed a total 
of 421,346 Ho Chi Minh piastres to the National War Fund and "countless other 
items."124 In February 1947, Vietnamese workers in Nong Khai donated 1,800 baht to 
the Vietnam War Fund.125 According to French intelligence in late 1946, Tran Vän 
Giau had two million in piastres at his disposal for the purchase of arms, equipment, and 
their shipment back to Vietnam. On 10 October, the French reported that 150 guns, 
twelve boxes of ammunition, and 400 grenades had been shipped from Thailand to 
Vietnam. On 15 October, 30 guns, two boxes of ammunition, and 80 grenades went to 
Vietnam. And between 15 October and 5 November 600 rifles, 50 boxes of ammunition, 
and 1,600 grenades left Thailand bound for Vietnam.126
The gamering of resources from the overseas Vietnamese by the delegation was not 
limited to Thailand. Donations to the Resistance Fund came from Vietnamese nationals as 
far away as France, America, Taiwan, Japan, and Great Britain.127 In August 1946, an 
Overseas Vietnamese-Siamese Federated Bank (Viet-Xiem Kieu Lien Ngän Häng) was 
set up on Gia Long street in Hanoi (see picture previous page). According to the 
advertisement for this bank, overseas Vietnamese in Thailand and the rest of the world 
were invited to transfer their donations to Vietnam via this bank's facilities. Money could 
be wired to the bank, sent overland, or delivered by ship or plane.128 It seems possible 
that because this was a joint Vietnamese-Thai bank, the Vietnamese intended for Bangkok 
to serve as the conduit for all money transfers coming from Thailand and elsewhere 
bound for the DRV. According to Le Manh Trinh, during the first months of the 
resistance, Thailand was the major linking point between Vietnam and overseas 
Vietnamese communities abroad.129
On 30 November, in the midst of the Haiphong and Lang Son incidents, Cmi Quoc 
announced in a front page story that a DRV government representative was in Thailand on 
a special visit to Vietnamese communities living there.130 During these meetings, this 
delegate thanked the overseas Vietnamese on behalf of the government for their support
123 Interview with Nguyen Dire Qiiy, 5 April 1946, Ho Chi Minh City.
124 'News about Vietnam Residents in Siam,' VNS, 5 April 1947. One baht equalled two Ho Chi Minh 
piastres at this time.
125 'Vietnamese in Nong Khay [Khai] with the Independence of Vietnam,' VNS, [New York], 28 February 
1947.
126 SHAT, Carton 102, File No. 24, Trafic d’Armes,' Saigon, 2 Decembre 1946.
127 Interview with Nguyen EKrc Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. In September 1948, the VNS reported 
that Vietnamese nationals in New York had contributed US $600 to the Resistance Fund. The 
contribution was forwarded to the DRV delegation in Bangkok from the Secretary General of the 
American Friendship Association in New York. See: 'Vietnam Nationals in New York Contributed to 
the Resistance Fund, VNS, 14 September 1948, p. 2.
128 Doc Lap, 8 June 1946, No. 167. See also: Issues 168 and 169.
129 CVDCQ, p. 68.
130 This may have been Pham Ngoc Thach.
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and sacrifices. After reminding them of their responsibilities in the independence 
movement, the government's representative then outlined five specific guide-lines for the 
Vietnamese in Thailand in light of the increasingly volatile situation in Vietnam. It was 
agreed that the Vietnamese in Thailand would fully support the President of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the following ways:
1) by standing ready to obey the government's orders; 2) linking together closely 
(doän ket chät che) and fighting resolutely for national independence and unification; 3) 
opposing the repression launched by the reactionary French in Nam Bo, southern Trung 
Bo, and the provocations of the French army in B^c Bo; 4) demanding that the French 
government implement the September Modus Vivendi; and 5) hailing the heroic 
fighting spirit of the nation.131
By the time full-scale war broke out between the French and Vietnamese on 19 
December 1946, the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand clearly had a place in Viet Minh 
strategic thinking.
131 Quoted in Thai Vien Chmh Phu Viet Nam Thäm Kieu Bho & Xiem' [A Vietnamese Government Delegate 
Visits the Overseas Vietnamese in Siam], Cuu Quoc, 30 November 1946, No. 422, with reference to Kieu 
Bao Xiem' [Overseas Nationals in Siam], Khäng Chieng [Resistance], 3 December 1946, No. 1, p. 2.
Chapter 5
Vietnam and the Southeast Asia League
With a delegation in operation in Bangkok by the end of 1946, the DRV was able to 
expand markedly their diplomatic contact with the international community. Of growing 
interest to the Vietnamese following the outbreak of war in Indochina were the emerging 
nations in Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular. Despite appeals by Indonesian and 
Indochinese leaders calling on the UN to prevent the return of European colonialism, it 
was clear to a growing number of Southeast Asian nationalists by 1947 that the western 
powers attached more importance to postwar Western European reconstruction than to 
Southeast Asian decolonisation. In this context, many anticolonialists in the region began 
discussing the possibility of forming a regional organisation to oppose European 
colonialism, with Thailand frequently put forward as an appropriate site for its 
headquarters. To DRV officials working in Bangkok, the possibility of a Southeast 
Asian regional organisation based in Thailand corresponded especially well with their 
diplomatic activities. In September 1947, the Southeast Asia League came to life under 
Thai and Vietnamese direction, surviving for a few months before falling victim to 
political changes in Thailand and the arrival of the Cold War to Southeast Asia. 
Nevertheless, because Vietnamese representatives stationed in Bangkok were the driving 
force behind the formation of this regional body, the League will serve as a useful vehicle 
to understand better the diplomatic work of the DRV in Thailand as the Vietnamese 
looked to the Southeast Asian region, Asia, and the world as a whole immediately after 
WWII.
Part I. Background to the Southeast Asia League
1.1. Southeast Asian Opposition to the Return of European Colonialism
Leading the call for the creation of Southeast Asian regional organisation in the 
postwar period was Vietnam. Of the newly independent nations in Asia immediately 
following WWII, Vietnam faced formidable obstacles to securing its national 
independence. Days after the French coup deforce in Nam Bo in September 1945, Ho 
Chi Minh expressed his hope to Archimedes Patti that the US "would restrain the French
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in their colonial obsession" in Vietnam. In this connexion, Ho also told Patti that he had 
given thought to the necessity of forming a "pan-Asiatic community" consisting of 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaya, Greater Burma (including Bengal), India, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines. These nations, Ho said, would promote "political and 
economic programs for the common good" and live in peaceful co-existence with the US, 
Great Britain, and France.1
Although Ho held out the hope that the US would help Vietnam, he recognised that 
both the West and the Soviet Union balked at the idea of risking French support in 
Europe by supporting the DRV’s case. It was probably in this context that Ho took 
action on his pan-Asia idea in late 1945, signalled by a discernible shift in Vietnamese 
foreign policy towards improving relations with Asian neighbours. One nation which Ho 
targetted in particular was Indonesia, a nation whose struggle for independence from the 
Dutch was very similar to Vietnam's fight against the French. In November, he wrote a 
letter to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Sutan Sjahrir, proposing that 
"Viet Nam and Indonesia make a public declaration of their complete solidarity in their 
present struggle for freedom." Ho asked Indonesia to join Vietnam in appealing to 
"India, Burma, and Malaya and all the subject peoples of Asia to join us in a common 
front."2 In his letter to Sjahrir, he also included a "Proposed Text of Common 
Declaration by Viet Nam and Indonesia." In this document, Ho said that because of the 
failure of the "Great Powers" to prevent France and Holland from re-establishing their 
colonial rule by force, "we must depend on ourselves and ourselves alone to win our 
freedom." To the Vietnamese, promises made by the Allies during the war opposing the 
return of colonialism were empty unless the French and Dutch were stopped. With this 
not forthcoming, Ho urged the Indonesians to join him in calling upon India, Burma and 
Malaya to create a Preparatory Commission, aimed at "creating a Federation of Free 
Peoples of Southern Asia." According to this proposal, the Federation would represent a 
"common front" against colonialism and would play a part in the building of a "common 
future" for Asia.3
To Ho's disappointment, some in the Indonesian nationalist leadership were apparently 
reluctant to support his proposal. Despite contrary advice from his advisers at the time, 
Sjahrir chose not to answer Ho's letters. According to the recollection of an associate 
who discussed this issue with the Prime Minister, Sjahrir was worried that if Indonesia 
cooperated with the DRV, the Dutch would try to use the Viet Minh's communist core to 
taint the Indonesian independence movement. Sjahrir felt that the Indonesians would
Patti, op. cit, p. 368. According to Patti, "Ho regarded the United States as the avant garde of such a 
movement."
'Letter from Ho Chf Minh to the President of the Republic of Indonesia,' 17 November 1945 in Hanna 
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Minh's 1945 Call for a Free Peoples Federation,' Indonesia, No. 49, (April 1990), p. 142.
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succeed in their independence struggle, but concluded that "if we ally ourselves with Ho 
Chi Minh, we will weaken ourselves and delay independence."4
Despite this set-back, the Vietnamese continued in their bid to gain increased Asian 
support. In March 1946, an editorial in a DRV newspaper, Doc Lap (Independence), 
picked up the regional grouping theme. Referring to a call by Pandit Nehru for a meeting 
of Asian nations to consider the formation of a Pan Asian Union, this article read in part:
. .  . [T]he Pan Asia Union's strength would derive from the unification of every Asian 
nation, especially the small and weak nations. It would seek to attain freedom for every 
oppressed nation in Asia and build mutual prosperity for all of Asia. At a time when 
independence movements are breaking out throughout Southeast Asia, the Pan Asia 
Union will certainly be welcomed by every nation in Asia. Unlike the fascist Japanese 
'Co-Prosperity Sphere,' the Pan Asia Union would be just and in accordance with the 
trend in human evolution towards freedom and happiness.5
Throughout 1946, the regional idea was was taken up increasingly by Indochinese 
resistance leaders. As tension mounted in December 1946, the DRV, Khmer Issarak, and 
Lao Issara set up a Mixed Commission to co-ordinate their military cooperation and 
foreign policies. Significantly, this Mixed Commission also sought to form what it 
referred to as a Southeast Asian Federation. This grouping was intended to include 
Thailand, Burma, Indonesia and Malaya as well as the three members of the 
Commission.6 On 22 December, the desire of the Mixed Commission to form an 
organisation to stand against the European colonial powers was communicated to the 
Thai, Burmese, and Indonesian governments and the "nationalist group of Malaya."7 
This discussion may not have been unrelated to two directives approved in the 22 
December Vietnamese "Resistance Programme" which called for "linking up with the 
Cambodians and Lao" and closer relations with the "Chinese [with no distinction made 
between Nationalist and Communist], Siamese, Indians, Burmese, [and] Indonesians."8
This quote is as recalled by Soedjatmoko, cited by Hanna Papanek, 'Note on Soedjatmoko's Recollections 
of a Historical Moment,' op. c it, p. 144, cited with reference to Evelyn Colbert, 'Reconsiderations: The 
Road Not Taken: Decolonization and Independence in Indonesia and Indochina,' Foreign Affairs, 
(April 1973), p. 608.
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1946, No. 111. It will be remembered that the Viet Minh's political programme of 1941 did mention the 
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with fellow Southeast Asian revolutions." During the war, the Viet Minh had reportedly asked the 
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Japan and its lackeys." See: Tran Huy Lieu, Vol. 10, op. cit., p. 40 and pp. 96-97 and Chapter 2 of this 
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Nakon San, 15 July 1947. Nakon San published parts of the letter which the editors received from the 
Foreign Minister of the Lao Issara, Prince Souphanouvong.
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Ban Nghien Ciru Lieh Sur Quän Doi Thuöc Cue Chihh Tri, Lieh Sir Quin Dpi Nhän Dän Viet Nam [A 
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On 1 January 1947, representatives from the DRV, Khmer Issarak, and the Lao Issara 
held a meeting in Bangkok to discuss the formation of a Southeast Asian Federation. 
Like (or possibly as a reiteration of) the 22 December proposal, this Federation was to 
consist of Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia without 
making any reference to the Philippines.9 Indochinese leaders also decided at this 
meeting that a document describing the goals of the Federation would be sent to 
Washington via the US Embassy in Bangkok so that US policy-makers would know of 
its agenda. In the same document, an appeal was made to the US and UN to "intervene 
without delay in [the] situation [in] Indochina."10 A change occurred, however, when 
the Indochinese representatives asked the American Ambassador, Edwin Stanton, to 
channel the document to the United Nations and not to Washington as intended earlier. 
On 7 January, Stanton informed Washington of this matter, advising that the document be 
relayed to the UN Secretary-General.11
The State Department responded on 8 January, instructing Stanton to return the 
document to the three Indochinese representatives in Bangkok and desist from forwarding 
any messages to the UN on behalf of the Indochinese.12 US officials maintained that the 
State Department was not the "proper channel [to] transmit memoranda to the Security] 
C[ouncil] from 'free' groups claiming [to] represent nationalist movements [in] 
Indochina."13
Undeterred, representatives of the Indochinese nationalist governments in Bangkok 
continued in their efforts to win international sympathy, with a continued focus on Asia. 
In January, Ho Chi Minh sent letters to the leaders of Nationalist China, India, and 
Burma in which he described French efforts to disrupt peace in the region, pointing out 
that as "a part of the great Asian family," Vietnam's "fate is intimately linked to the 
destiny of all Asian peoples." Ho ended his letters to his Asian counterparts by 
representing the French attack on Vietnam as a threat to all of Asia: "French colonialism 
seeks to crush Vietnam, that is, it wants to destroy the great Asian family."14
Thi cua Ban Chap Hanh Trung LTcmg Ding ve Toän Dän Khäng Chien" [The Party Central 
Committee's Directives concerning 'National Resistance'], VKD, 1945-1950, p. 90.
Khonthi Sukamonkhon, Kanwithesobai khong Thai [Thai Foreign Policy], (Bangkok: Thammasat
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Ibid., p. 450 and US, DOS, 851G.00/1-747, 'Confidential Telegram from the Minister in Siam (Stanton) 
to the Secretary of State,' 7 January 1947 in FRUS (1947, Volume VI), p. 56.
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Such pleas did not go unnoticed by leaders in the region. In early January, the former 
premier of Burma, Dr. Ba Maw, announced that a Burmese voluntary expeditionary force 
would go to Indochina to help the Vietnamese in the struggle against France. The leader 
of this expeditionary force, Colonel Bo Yan Naing, told a Reuters correspondent that his 
contingent would number about one-hundred Burmese volunteers, adding that this force 
"will symbolize Burmese support for the Vietnamese cause."15 In a subsequent letter to 
the Burmese independence leader, Aung San, Ho personally thanked him for "the things 
which you have done and will do" for the Vietnamese resistance.16 Shortly thereafter, 
Ho wrote a similar letter to Nehru, wishing India the best on its independence day and 
calling for closer cooperation between the two countries.17 Two days after that, it was 
reported that a decision had been made by Bo Yan Naing and Sarat Chandra Bose (a 
member of Nehru's cabinet and brother to the deceased leader of the Indian National 
Army, Subhas Chandra Bose), to dispatch a joint Indo-Burmese volunteer force to 
Indochina to fight the French "provided that necessary facilities were available."18
Malaya also supported the Vietnamese against the French. With banners reading 
"Long Live the DRV" waving in the wind, a crowd estimated at five-thousand met in 
Singapore in early February to show its support of Vietnam against the French. Speeches 
were made by representatives of the Malay Nationalist Party, the Malaya Democratic 
Union, the Malayan Communist Party, Lumbaga Kesatuan Melayu Johore, and the 
Malaya Trade Union. The leader of the Malayan Democratic Union said that "the future 
of Malaya is bound up with the fate of Vietnam and we must not allow the Vietnamese to
instructed a representative to ask the Indian government for assistance. See: D.R. SarDesai, Indian
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be attacked," calling for aid and volunteers to travel to Vietnam as well as a domestic 
boycott of French goods and steamers arriving in Malaya.19
The sympathy which some Asians held for the Vietnamese struggle against the French 
was in contrast to the slowness with which the UN, the US, and the USSR had moved to 
support Southeast Asian claims to independence from the European colonial powers. 
This tardiness—often interpreted by nationalists as unwillingness—left many Southeast 
Asian leaders increasingly frustrated, questioning the sincerity of the West's intentions 
and wartime promises. In March, a Bangkok Post editorial made this point bluntly: 
"Rightly or wrongly, people of Southeast Asia began to decide that it is the UN's policy 
that their battles have no place on the agenda."20 Prince Souphanouvong concluded in a 
letter to the Thai paper, Nakon San, that "we cannot rely on the western powers, who 
have to rely on the help of France in their politics in Europe, and thus we have to rely on 
ourselves and our Asiatic brethren."21
Souphanouvong was not the only one of this opinion. On 1 March 1947, Filipino 
Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo, the Philippine delegate to the UN, told the 
Philippine Academy of Foreign Affairs and Manila's delegates to the upcoming Inter- 
Asian Conference in New Delhi that he fully advocated the foundation of a Pan Asian 
Union, pointing out that the conference would show Asia's "new surge of power that has 
been latent for years" but checked by the "restraint of a subject race."22 Romulo, who 
had met Ho Chi Minh before WWII,23 pointed out that "Vietnam too struggles for the 
independence the Philippines has but recently achieved."24 Like the Vietnamese and 
Indonesians, the Philippines looked to the Inter-Asian Conference to "focus attention on 
Asia and to give impetus to the fight to free Asia from colonialism."25
Days before the conference opened, another editorial appeared in the Bangkok Post, 
calling on Thailand to take the lead in the formation of a Southeast Asian regional 
organisation of some sort. Entitled Toward Unity, this editorial noted the "natural 
sentiment" among Southeast Asians to form a federation, asking:
Why should not Siam take the lead in uniting Southeast Asian nations? This country 
cannot be suspected of trying to dominate neighbouring giants like Burma and India.
Siam does not have commercial infiltration built up in neighbouring lands. Siam could
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call representatives together without any accusations that she is trying to set up another 
"co-prosperity sphere". . . Siam should not only take part, but should assume some of 
the leadership of the cause.26
The New Delhi conference, this editorial argued, would provide the impetus for 
Southeast Asian regionalisation.
1.2. The Inter-Asian Conference
The Indochinese and the Indonesians, in particular, held out the hope that an Asian- 
sponsored conference would assist them in their fight against European colonialism. In 
preparation for the conference, the Indochinese Mixed Commission tried unsuccessfully 
to organise a meeting of representatives from Southeast Asian nations.27 On 23 March 
1946, a ten day Inter-Asian Conference (also known as the Asian Relations Conference) 
was convened in New Delhi. This was an unprecedented meeting, attracting over 230 
delegates from all over Asia to discuss Asian problems. Delivering the opening address 
of the conference, Nehru told the delegates that the overwhelming response from each 
country demonstrated the Asian desire to "meet together and advance together."28
Dr. Tran Van Luän, a Vietnamese official in charge of foreign affairs at Bangkok, 
led the DRV delegation to the conference, consisting of Nguyen Dire Qüy, Trän Van 
Giau, and Mai The Chau.29 After almost failing to send any delegation at all, four 
civilians represented the Thais at New Delhi: Phya Anuman, Sukit Nikhamein, Chaluey 
Kanchankom, and Manot Wutthitya.30 The Philippines dispatched Manuel Enverga of 
the Institute of Foreign Affairs, while Indonesia sent a high-level delegation consisting of 
such officials as Sjahrir, the Prime Minister, Hadji Agus Salim, the Vice-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Major-General Abdul Kadir of the National Army, and Abu Hanifah.31 
The Chinese and Indians also had high-profile delegations at the conference. To the
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disappointment of the DRV delegation, however, the organisers of the New Delhi 
Conference also allowed the French-backed governments in Cochinchina, Laos, and 
Cambodia to send representatives to the conference.32
The conference aimed to discuss a wide range of topics, "providing a cultural and 
intellectual revival and social progress in Asia, independent of all questions of internal as 
well as international politics."33 Care was to be taken to avoid domestic issues or 
political and military problems.34 But this was an obvious problem, especially when one 
considers the eight specific subjects which were to be examined in roundtable 
discussions: 1) National Movements for Freedom in Asia; 2) Racial problems (with 
special reference to racial conflicts); 3) Migration and the Status of Immigrants; 4) 
Transition from Colonial to National Economy; 5) Agricultural Reconstruction and 
Industrial Development; 6) Labour and Social Services; 7) Cultural Problems; and 8) 
The Status of Women and Women's Movements in Asia.35
After some preliminary debate it was agreed that there could be no discussion of the 
"National Movements for Freedom" topic, in particular, without touching upon political 
matters.36 This group's agenda was focused on examining the independence movements 
in Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Indonesia, Malaya, and Vietnam. In this discussion, 
delegates were for the most part agreed that freedom movements in Asia had received 
greater importance since the outbreak of WWTI. Delegates also agreed that Japan's "Asia 
for the Asiatics," though designed to profit Japan, had given incentive to Southeast Asian 
struggles for independence from European colonialism.37 According to an Australian 
observer at this roundtable discussion, "considerable sympathy and admiration was 
expressed by delegates from various countries for the struggles for freedom now going 
on, particularly in Indonesia and Vietnam."38
As for the attitudes expressed at the Conference, the Thai delegation was reported to 
have "deliberately refrained from intervening in debate except twice to affirm their 
independent status."39 However, leaders from Malaya, Indonesia, and Burma called on 
their Asian colleagues to refrain from aiding in any way the colonial powers in their
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attempts to reoccupy their former colonies.40 While India and China never seriously 
entertained the thought of militarily involving themselves against the Europeans, the 
Vietnamese had nevertheless hoped that an Asian conference would tangibly back up their 
struggle against the French.41 DRV representatives pressed India to provide material 
assistance, to recognise their country diplomatically, and to take up their case at the 
UN 42 Together with Indonesia, Vietnam pressed the conference for concrete support of 
their independence movements against the French and Dutch, appealing for the creation of 
an organisation to aid Asian countries struggling for independence. When Nehru said 
that a Malayan suggestion calling for the creation of a Neutrality Bloc was a futile idea, a 
Vietnamese delegate retorted that a fighting federation would perhaps be more effective 43 
As the DRV's paper to the National Freedom Movements Committee bluntly put it: "We 
have used enough words about Asian unity. Now let us act."44
Yet action on the part of large Asian nations was slow in coming. In reply to 
numerous requests for assistance against the Europeans from smaller Asian nations, 
Nehru said that such aid would "have the effect of enlarging the area of conflict" and the 
only form of aid he could envision was "moral support."45 Emphasising that political 
goodwill was not enough, the Vietnamese asked Nehru directly what he would do 
concerning French military operations in Vietnam. An Indonesian delegate agreed with 
his Vietnamese counterpart that sympathy was not enough when the Europeans could 
obtain arms 46 In an afternoon session, a Vietnamese delegate made a specific request for 
weapons from Nehru. Nehru responded that such a request could not be met and that 
India maintained friendly relations with France and could not supply arms or troops 
unless under UN auspices 47
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With one of the conference's main goals of forming a Pan Asian Union undermined by 
competing Indian, Chinese, Soviet, and Australian interests,48 and an unwillingness on 
the part of India and China to aid independence movements effectively against the Dutch 
and French, several Southeast Asian leaders left New Delhi convinced that the only way a 
regional organisation could succeed was if it were a wholly Southeast Asian body. 
Vietnam and Indonesia were clearly the two countries most disillusioned by the failure of 
the Inter-Asian Conference. Before leaving New Delhi on 6 April 1947, the Vietnamese 
and Indonesian delegations expressed their displeasure by announcing a joint five-point 
plan against colonialism. In this statement, the DRV's representative from Bangkok, Dr. 
Trän Vän Luän, and one of Indonesia's delegates, Mr. Abu Hanifah, announced five 
points for joint action by Asian nations "to prevent colonialism from re-establishing its 
position as suppressor of Asian peoples."49 The points were:
Firstly, the Asian nations who are members of the UNO should put the question of 
colonial people in general, and of Vietnam in particular, on the agenda of the Security 
Council; secondly, Asian nations should recognise the Governments of Indonesia and of 
Vietnam; thirdly, Asian nations have to enforce the withdrawal of all foreign troops 'the 
cause of many miseries and troubles in Asia'; fourthly, Asian peoples and nations 
should not allow reinforcements of imperialist Powers in Vietnam, Indonesia, etc; 
fifthly, Asian nations and peoples should send medical aid, missions and volunteers to 
every battlefield where a struggle against imperialism is going on.50
In an obvious signal to Nehru, the statement continued:
The appeasement policy and doubtful attitude of many big countries and neighbour 
countries have so far enhanced the danger of colonialism, as proved by the bitter 
experience of Vietnam. Actual support shall not enlarge or broaden the field of 
hostilities, as many people believed and feared.51
Although this statement said the Conference symbolised a "good start," there could be 
no doubt in the minds of Southeast Asian leaders fighting the French and Dutch that the 
Inter-Asian Conference could do little more, effectively, than the UN.
For evidence of the competing interests undermining a possible union, see: 'Australian Observers'
Report,' p. 20 and Australia, DEA, 'Memorandum for Secretary of Department of External Affairs from 
Gerald Packer,' 24 April 1947, CRS A1068; M47/9/6/15, Part 2, AA.
'Five-Point Plan to End Colonialism: Call for Joint Action by Asian Nations,' Statesman [New Delhi], 6 
April 1947.
Statesman, 6 April 1947 and Australia, DEA, 'Australian High Commissioner, New Delhi, to External 
Affairs,' 7 April 1947, CRS A1068; M47/9/6/15, Part 2, AA. See also: 'Proposal Made for Aiding Java, 
Vietnam Causes,' BP, 7 April 1947.
Statesman, 6 April 1947.
144 Chapter 5
1.3. Plans for a Southeast Asia Organisation are Accelerated
Realising that they would get little tangible help from larger Asian nations, private 
conversations began among Southeast Asian representatives at the New Delhi conference 
concerning the importance of forming some sort of a federation of their own.52 
Immediately following the conference, a number of Southeast Asian delegates stopped 
over in Rangoon at the invitation of Burmese leader U Aung San to discuss the formation 
of a Southeast Asian organisation and to begin a related effort to accelerate the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations among regional states.53 During a luncheon for the 
Thai delegation to the Inter-Asian Conference, Aung San announced that a goodwill 
mission would soon be dispatched to Bangkok to begin negotiations for the establishment 
of diplomatic relations.54 Aung San also told the Thai delegation in a speech before a 
record crowd on the Burmese New Year day that he favoured the formation of a 
Southeast Asian Union with members from Indonesia, Thailand, Indochina, and 
Malaya.55 Shortly thereafter, the Indonesian delegation to New Delhi, led by the Prime 
Minister Sutan Sjahrir, stopped over in Bangkok to meet with Thai officials and discuss 
the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations between the two nations.56 The Thais 
had thus far been non-committal towards recognising the Republic of Indonesia.
While the Thai government remained silent on the regional idea, numerous Thai 
newspapers began to call for more active leadership by Thailand in Southeast Asian 
affairs. Sharing this opinion, the president of the DRV's delegation in Bangkok, 
Nguyen Duc Qüy, told the US Assistant Military Attache in Bangkok that he felt Pridi 
was the "natural leader" of a Southeast Asia bloc with Thailand as its headquarters.57 It 
seems the ICP also backed this trend towards greater Southeast Asian solidarity. In a
52  For evidence of this, see: 'Manifesto by Representatives of the Countries of South-East Asia
League,'VN5, 29 September 1947; US, DOS, 892.00/5-2347, 'Fortnightly Summary of Political Events in 
Siam for the Period April 16-April 30, 1947,' 23 May 1947, USNA; Thatsana khong Chaw Wiatnam To 
Panha Kancattang Sahaphan Esia Akhene' [The Vietnamese View of the Problem of Establishing a 
Southeast Asian Federation], Mahachon [The Masses], 20 July 1947; and Interview with Tran Van Giau, 
3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
53 John C. Campbell et al., The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948, (New York: Harper and Row,
1948), p. 236 and VNS, 29 September 1947. In early 1947, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Burma told 
an Australian diplomat that Burma's foreign policy was based on three main principles: 1) friendship
with all countries; 2) loyal support of the UN; and 3) the strengthening of relations with other countries 
of Southeast Asia and the development of a Southeast Asian regional grouping. The Australian diplomat 
reported to Canberra that the Burmese Minister was closest to the idea of developing "a greater degree of 
unity in S.E. Asia." See: Australia, DEA, 'C.M. Despatch No. 6 to External Affairs from Australian 
Commissioner, Singapore,' 11 February 1947, CRS A4231/2; Singapore 47, AA.
54 US, DOS, 892.00/5-2347, 'Fortnightly Summary of Political Events in Siam for the Period April 16-April 
30, 1947,’ 23 May 1947, USNA.
55 US, DOS, 845C.9111 RR/4-1947, 'Secret Telegram from the Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the 
Secretary of State,' 19 April 1947 in FRUS (1947, Volume VI), p. 22. Again, it is unclear why the 
Philippines was omitted.
56 US, DOS, 892.00/4-2147, 'Summary of Political Events,’ 21 April 1947, USNA, p. 3.
57 Ibid., p. 3.
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resolution passed by a plenum of Central Committee cadres in early April, the need to 
gain Southeast Asia's sympathy for the Vietnamese resistance was singled out.58
From the outset, Thai and Vietnamese officials in Bangkok were the major architects 
of what would become known as the Southeast Asia League. According to Trän Vän 
Giäu, the Vietnamese had discussed the need for a regional organisation with Pridi in 
Bangkok before the New Delhi conference.59 However, it was following the failure of 
the New Delhi conference to support Indonesia and Vietnam effectively, that Vietnamese 
representatives in Bangkok, most notably, Nguyen Duc Qüy, Trän Vän Giäu, Trän 
Vän Luän, and Le Hy, began pressing the Thais to take the lead in forming a regional 
bloc. Whether or not the idea of a Southeast Asian regional organisation was initially 
Thai or Vietnamese in its conception is less important than the fact that the DRV 
representatives in Thailand pushed the notion hardest, with contributions coming from the 
Thais and other Southeast Asian representatives, though to a lesser degree.60 It was 
agreed that the aim of a regional organisation should be to unite the countries of Southeast 
Asia into one regional grouping of nations opposed to the return of European colonialism. 
The Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations were used as guiding models 
during these preliminary discussions.61 Moreover, because of Thailand's independent 
status and its favourable geographic position, it was increasingly seen as the natural 
headquarters of Southeast Asian regional organisation. The Thai paper, Suwannaphum, 
made this point in July 1947:
Southeast Asia is composed of small nations which, realising that they cannot help 
themselves, naturally seek to cooperate with each other some way or another. Siam, 
being situated in the centre of the group and the only independent country so far, 
naturally will be looked up to as an 'elder brother' nation 62
Despite the chauvinism, this statement was near the mark. The geographical factor 
was all the more obvious considering that Bangkok had became a meeting place for 
representatives from governments and nationalist groups from almost every country in
58
59
60
61
62
*Nghi Quyet Hoi Nghi Can B6 Trung LTcmg, tir Ngay 3-4-1947' [Resolution of the Plenum of Central 
Committee Cadres, 3 April 1947], VKD, 1945-1950, p. 100.
Interview with Tran Van Giau; 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
In September 1980, immediately following the Vietnamese overthrow of the Pol Pot regime, the 
Vietnamese journal, NCLS, published a diplomatic memorandum (dated 26 August 1980) by the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussing Thai-Vietnamese relations. In reviewing 
the history of Thai-Vietnamese relations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that "Pridi was the 
first person to put forward the idea of a Southeast Asia League (Lien Minh cac Nu&c Dong Nam A)." 
See: Thai Lan trong Quan He von Viet Nam, Lao, va Campuchia' [Thailand and its Relations with 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia], NCLS, No. 194, (10 September 1980), p. 4. Tran Van Giau said in an 
interview that the Southeast Asia League was his idea, while Nguyen Due Qiiy maintained that it was 
Pridi's.
For evidence of the influence of the Atlantic Charter and the UN, see: 'A Manifesto Issued by the
"Southeast Asia Countries' Representatives,' VNS, 25 August 1947, p. 3, especially Articles 4-7. 
Suwanaphum, 11 July 1947. In his memoir, Pridi cites the geographical location of Thailand as one of 
the reasons which led him to permit the Southeast League’s headquarters to be based in Bangkok. See: 
Pridi, Chi wit, p. 89.
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Southeast Asia. For instance, the 20,000-strong Indonesian community in Bangkok had 
established an Indonesian Independence League in 1946 to provide better information 
about the Indonesian revolution and to push for Thai recognition of the newly 
independent Indonesian government.63 By mid-1947, Burma and the Philippines joined 
Indonesia in discussing the establishment of diplomatic relations with Thailand. And, as 
we know, the DRV, Khmer Issarak, and Lao Issara all had representation in Bangkok by 
1946. In Bangkok, these representatives could contact diplomats representing India, 
Burma, or Indonesia. As the President of the DRV delegation in Bangkok, Nguyen Due 
Qüy, met Southeast Asian nationalists such as Indonesia's Vice-President (under 
Sukarno), Mr. Hatta, and the Indonesian diplomatic representative, Dr. Soedarsono.64 
In the meantime, DRV officials continued meeting with the Thais concerning a regional 
organisation. In June 1946, Pham Ngoc Thach reportedly met with Pridi in Bangkok 
concerning the importance of a forming a Southeast Asian regional grouping.65
1.4. A French Counter Move: The Pan Southeast Asia Union
The Vietnamese need for the rapid formation of the League was made all the more 
urgent when the French publicly proposed in mid-1947 to establish their own regional 
organisation, the Pan Southeast Asia Union. Modelled on the recently formed Pan 
American Union in the Americas, Paris formulated this idea sometime in early 1947 as a 
means by which it could tackle a number of problems. Firstly, by denying admission to 
Ho Chi Minh's government, as well as to the govemments-in-exile of the Khmer Issarak 
and Lao Issara, the French sought to isolate their opposition. Georges-Picot, one of the 
French officials in charge of the regional proposal, explained to an American diplomat, 
Abbot Low Moffat, the French motives for proposing the union. As Moffat wrote of the 
conversation:
Georges Picot expressed the view that the development of an organisation like the Pan 
American Union with its seat in Bangkok and first membership of Siam, Cambodia and 
Laos would go far to meet Siamese aspirations. Such an arrangement he thought also 
would be beneficial in French dealings with Vietnam by its significant omission of 
Vietnamese membership.66
63 Omar Farouk Bajunid, The Indonesia Independence League in Bangkok: A Profile,' Jebat, No. 14
(1986), pp. 119-20.
64 Interview with Nguyen Dure Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. Dr. Soedarsono was the Indonesian 
Minister Plenipotentiary to India and Pakistan in 1947. In 1950, Hatta told the American Ambassador in 
Indonesia that he had known a number of the present Indochinese leaders when he was a student in 
Holland and that they "were genuinely Nationalist." US, DOS, 751G.02/1-1150, The Ambassador in 
Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State,' 11 January 1950 in FRUS, (Volume VL 1950), p. 693.
65 US, DOS, 892.00/6-2447, 'Fortnightly Summary of Political Events in Siam,' 24 June 1947, USNA and 
US, DOS, 851G.00/5-747, Telegram, The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State,' 7 May 
1947 in FRUS, (1947, Volume VI), p. 93.
66 US, DOS, 892.014/4-3047, 'French-Siamese Conciliation Commission,'30 April 1947, USNA.
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Secondly, the French proposal was designed to counter the growing sense of 
Southeast Asian unity which had emerged since the end of WWII and especially since the 
New Delhi conference. It seems likely that the considerable Asian support shown for the 
Vietnamese at the Conference and public announcements by Burma, Malaya, and India 
that they would help the Vietnamese, made the idea of an anti-colonial Southeast bloc a 
worrisome thought to the French, particularly when one considers the French inability to 
defeat the Vietnamese quickly in the battlefield and the DRV's ability to increase its links 
with the region through diplomatic representatives in Bangkok.67
Thirdly, besides worrying about Vietnam, the French were concerned by Thai 
historical claims on French Indochina. By raising the Pan Southeast Asia idea at a 
meeting of the Franco-Thai Conciliation Committee, a committee which had begun talks 
in April to consider Thai claims to territories in Laos and Cambodia, it was clear that Paris 
hoped to side-track Thai demands for a review of the Thai-French Indochina border.68 
According to the French plan, the Pan Southeast Asia Union would initially consist of 
France, Thailand, and the French-backed governments of Laos and Cambodia. By 
offering Bangkok the main role in this union, Paris hoped to appeal to Bangkok's historic 
interests in these two countries without making any real territorial concessions on the 
Thai-Indochinese border.69 Later, it was envisioned, the union would be expanded to 
incorporate every Southeast Asian nation into the regional union which "would have a 
better chance of economic progress."70
According to a six page communique issued by the Thai government on the French 
proposal, Bangkok had dispatched Pridi Phanomyong as a special emissary to discuss 
this proposal with Picot in Washington in late April. In this meeting, Picot told Pridi that 
it was best to consider the French Pan Southeast Asia Union instead of border 
readjustments then under negotiation in the Conciliation Committee. Pridi said that the 
two issues were separate and insisted on the independence of Laos and Cambodia as a 
prerequisite for Thai participation in the French Pan Southeast Asia Union. When talks 
broke down over this matter, Pridi left Washington for further talks in Paris. However, 
the Quai d'Orsay was equally unwilling to compromise on Lao or Cambodian
0 1 According to a US diplomatic observer, in February 1947 the French were increasingly worried about the 
"unrest stirred up in India, Burma, Ceylon and Singapore over Indochina and [the] threat to [their] line 
of communications." See: US, DOS, 851G.00/2-747, The Charge in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to 
the Secretary o f State,' 7 February 1946 in FRUS (1947, Volume VI), p. 70.
68 'Nai Pridi Discussed Proposal,' BP, 1 July 1947.
69 See: US, DOS, 892.014/4-3047, 'French-Siamese Conciliation Commission,’ 30 April 1947, USNA and 
'Government Tells Background of Southeast Asian Union Talks,' BP, 7 July 1947. Geoffrey Gunn 
incorrectly states that the French Pan Southeast Asia Union was Pridi's idea. See: Gunn, op. cit., p. 175.
70  'Government Tells Background,' BP, 7 July 1947. According to this plan, France would represent Laos 
and Cambodia in the Union because they were French protectorates.
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independence. Pridi returned to Thailand, where his refusal to participate in the French 
Southeast Asia union brought a sigh of relief from the Vietnamese.71
Pridi's rejection of the French proposal also won widespread praise from the Thai 
press. In a 6 July editorial, the Thai daily, Siam Nikon, wrote that to France
the union may serve as an outlet to its present difficulties in Indochina, where she has 
been trying in vain to regain her pre-war influence through force, with the result being 
that she is losing the economic benefits which she used to get from that country 72
In an 8 July commentary in Thai Mai, one writer wrote that
the various countries in Southeast Asia should become independent before there could 
be any negotiations for the establishment of a Pan-Southeast Asia Union. . . It might 
also be possible that, in proposing the union, France is trying to make Bangkok a 
centre of communications between her and her dependencies with whom she is finding it 
extremely difficult to negotiate directly. In that case Siam will be in a very odd 
position, indeed, should she accept the proposal 73
Suwannaphum, another Thai paper, published an editorial in which it said that the 
Union was possible on one condition: "The really important point is: 'Before such a 
union can be established, the countries to become its members must first have their 
independence."'74 The Thai daily, Si Krung, condemned the French proposal, pointing 
out:
The pan-Southeast Asia Union proposed by France is evidently to distract public 
attention from the frontier problem. . . . However, we must not forget that such a 
union can only be established between independent countries. We cannot help but 
praise Nai Pridi Phanomyong for his wit in encountering the French with this question 
to which they are at a loss to reply. If Siam cooperates with France in setting up the 
union, it will be tantamount to our joining another co-prosperity sphere on the same 
basis as the Japanese co-prosperity sphere in which our duty was to grow rice to feed 
the Japanese 75
' 1 For the details of Pridi's negotiations on the French proposal, see: 'Proposal Not Taken by France,' BP, 5 
July 1947 and 'Government Tells Background of Southeast Asian Union Talks,' 7 July 1947 and 
Raingan Kanprachum Saphaphuthaen [Minutes o f the Meetings of the House of Representatives], 
Khrang thi 30/2490 [1947], 30 August 1947, Vol. 2, pp. 2,738-39. For evidence that there was relief that 
the Thais didn't join the French, see: 'For a Free Union,' 7 July 1947 and 'Proposal Not Taken by France,' 
5 July 1947.
72  Siam Nikon, 6 July 1947.
73 Thai Mai, 8 July 1947.
7 4  Suwannaphum, 11 July 1947.
7 5 Si Krung, 11 July 1947.
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Mahachon, a paper of the Thai Communist Party, execrated the French Southeast 
Asian plan, saying that it had to grant Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia independence before 
even suggesting such a union.76 In an article entitled Establishing a Southeast Asian 
Federation, a Vietnamese representative in Bangkok was asked to comment on the French 
Pan Southeast Asia Union. The Vietnamese writer explained that the French were not the 
originators of the Southeast Asia regional idea, rather it had been discussed during the 
Inter-Asian Conference in New Delhi by Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, and 
Indonesia, all of which were "nations of Southeast Asia." A similar commentary by the 
Bangkok-based VNS called the French Pan Southeast Asia union "nonsense," asking 
what the French could do for Southeast Asia, not being of the region.77
Part II. The Birth of the Southeast Asia League
II.1. Efforts towards a Union are Accelerated, July to September 1947
Following the French announcement of the French Pan Southeast Asia Union and in 
the wake of increased military action by both the French and Dutch in mid-1947, DRV, 
Lao Issara, and Khmer Issarak representatives and local residents from Indonesia, 
Malaya, and Burma in Bangkok began meeting to discuss concrete steps to establish an 
alternative regional organisation of their own. Leading this push for a Southeast Asian 
regional organisation were DRV diplomatic officials working in Bangkok. In a lengthy 
letter to the editor of the Bangkok Post on 7 July, one such delegate, Ngo Ha, stressed 
the need for a Southeast Asian regional organisation. It is worth quoting this letter in part 
to get a better idea of the Vietnamese thinking about Southeast Asian regionalism. As 
Ngo argued:
Geographically and ethnically, Southeast Asia has many similarities with Balkan 
Europe. That it may be a generator of prosperity, or of conflagration, depends on the 
degree of union of the native peoples. . . . Situated between China and India, the 
nations of Southeast Asia having common interests must be united to facilitate the 
solution to their internal problems, to support each other in the struggle for freedom, to 
safeguard their independence and thus, to contribute to world peace and prosperity.. . .
Without a union, or a fighting union, how can we re-win and strengthen our right to be 
masters of our own land? Let us oppose our "united and free" to their "divide and rule".
. .  Southeast Asian countries are amongst the richest regions of the East with their rice,
'Kancattang Sahaphan Esia Akhene’ [Establishing a Southeast Asia Federation], Mahachon, 20 July 
1947. This Vietnamese spokesman was probably Le Hy. Also see the editorial: 'Rop Wethi Kan Muang' 
[Political Struggle], Mahachon, 13 July 1947 and Suphot Dantrakun, Prasert Thrapsunthon, op. c it, p. 8. 
The Establishment of the South East Asia Federation,’ VNS, 4 August 1947. This appears to be a longer 
version of the article which appeared in the previously cited Mahachon article.
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quinine, rubber, tin, oil and other precious minerals. United they will make themselves 
respected and prosperous; divided they have no hope but that of being dark slaves 
producing cheap raw materials and buying expensive manufactured products.78
Significantly, Ngo recognised that long-standing ethnic animosities might hamper the 
formation of such a union. Echoing what Dr. Hai had told Saipradit a year earlier, Ngo 
sought to allay such fears by insisting that Vietnamese nationalism "was not a narrow 
one" and stated that the Vietnamese did not make a distinction between imperialism, 
regardless of whether it "comes from the West or from the East." Lastly, he concluded 
that historical concerns over "minorities" and "hegemony" had to be overcome if the rich 
resources of the region were to lead to a regional organisation based on strength.79
On 12 July, an important meeting was held at the VNS during which the Vietnamese, 
Lao, and Cambodians pressed the Thais to take the lead in the formation of a Southeast 
Asian organisation. Addressing guests during this meeting (a number of whom were 
journalists), Tran Vän Giau pointed out that the Vietnamese considered the French- 
sponsored Pan Southeast Asia Union to be a creation designed to isolate Vietnam from 
Laos and Cambodia. Giäu added that the French regional plan was unworkable unless it 
granted independence to its members, asking what business France had in forming such a 
union when she "cannot give economic help" and had failed to defend Vietnam's shores 
"because she could not defend her own borders" during WWII.80
During this meeting Vietnamese representatives released a six-point statement listing 
their position on the matter of Southeast Asian regionalism. Though it was written in 
poor English, it is worth reproducing parts of point six here:
In the fields o f geography, history, econom ics], culture as well as [in] political and 
military [matters] we feel Viet Nam is less bound to France than to her neighbours in 
South East Asia, [of which] indeed Siam is [at] the center, and the only country that 
maintains its independence. The reasons lie there, [as to] why we approve [of a leading 
role for] Siam in the establishment of the South East Asia Federation. Such [an] 
organization must be [based upon] the following line: no hegemony for any country 
[or] any people . . . [instead it should be] based on similar interests and common 
aspirations [sic].81
To the Vietnamese, there was no contradiction between membership in a Southeast 
Asian regional body and the French Union. DRV representatives made it clear during this
7 8 'Letter from Ngo Ha to the Editor of the Bangkok Post,' BP, 7 July 1947. It is unclear who "Ngo Ha" was.
It may have been a pen name for any one of the DRV delegates working in Thailand.
79  Ibid.
8 0 'Siam's Neighbours Urge Sponsorship of Southeast Asia Union,' BP, 12 July 1947.
8 1 The Establishment of the South East Asia Federation,' VNS, 4 August 1947, p. 4. Statement number six.
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meeting that if the French respected Vietnam’s independence, "the establishment of [a] 
Southeast Asia Federation is not [in] the least in contradiction with the policy by which 
our Government [is] pledged to remain in the French Union."82
But in the end, if a Southeast Asian regional organisation were to be formed, Thailand 
had to be willing to take the lead. As we have mentioned already, Thailand was the only 
safe place, independent, and located at the heart of the Southeast Asian region that could 
act as a headquarters. Moreover, the Vietnamese sought to take advantage of the 
sympathy and support which the Thais had shown for their independence movement thus 
far. In his address to this meeting, Giau had Thailand's importance to the formation of a 
regional organisation firmly in mind when he concluded:
The Pan Southeast Asia Union is [the] private property of Southeast Asia. Let us keep 
it so. Siam's leaders must sponsor this union.83
Prince Souphanouvong and his Cambodian and Indonesian counterparts joined Giau 
in calling on Thailand to take the first step. The Thai representative at this meeting, and 
also a delegate to the Inter Asian Conference, Manot Wutthitya, expressed his desire to 
see this happen.84 On 14 July, an editorial in the Bangkok Post joined in, asking why 
Thailand had not taken the lead as Giku and Souphanouvong had urged. The Post 
pointed out that a regional organisation at this time did not have to be "a tightly cohesive 
federation" instead it could be a "regional body for the exchange of policies" on 
agriculture, communications or trade. This editorial said that "Siam should encourage it. 
Siam should accept the proffer of leadership that has been made."85 On the 17th, a letter 
to the Post from the DRV delegation lauded the Post's 14 July editorial, agreeing that "it 
is possible, nay, even necessary, to start at this time some form of organization which 
will enable us to have the way and lay down the foundation of our projected union."86
Up to this point in time the Thais had done relatively little relating to the formation of a 
Southeast Asian regional body. In contrast to Vietnam and Indonesia, Bangkok had sent 
a low-level delegation to the Inter-Asian conference and had remained reluctant to 
recognise the Republic of Indonesia. A possible reason explaining Bangkok's reluctance 
to lead a Southeast Asian union was that the Thais would clearly have had more at risk in 
presiding over the formation of a bloc of Southeast Asian nations, based in Thailand, and 
hostile to the European colonial powers. Such a union could easily have been construed
82  Ibid.
83 'Siam's Neighbours Urge Sponsorship of Southeast Asia Union,' BP, 12 July 1947. See also: 'Pour une 
Union de L'Asie du Sud-est,' Le Monde, 15 July 1947 and US, DOS, 892.00/7-2547, 'Fortnightly Summary 
of Political Events in Siam for the period July 1-July 15 1947,’ 25 July 1947.
84 Le Monde, 15 July 1947. Souphanouvong said: "Siam is in the very heart of Southeast Asia. She must 
not remain in selfish isolation. Her neighbours look up to her to lead." See: BP, 12 July 1947.
85 BP, 14 July 1947.
86 BP, 17 July 1947.
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as the making of an anti-European bloc. Alternatively, and perhaps a more likely 
possibility, is that the Thais were unwilling to push the idea of a regional organisation too 
quickly, for fear of undermining delicate negotiations with the French over Bangkok's 
claims to Indochinese territories. These talks had begun in April, as the New Delhi 
Conference was closing and as Vietnamese representatives based in Bangkok stepped up 
their calls for a truly regional organisation led by Thailand. Bangkok's slowness in 
responding to the regional idea may have been motivated by a desire to delay the 
formation of such a regional organisation until negotiations with the French had ended 
satisfactorily. As the Thais knew well from earlier experience, the French would have 
had no qualms about using Thai support of a Southeast Asian bloc as a pretext to suspend 
negotiations (see chapter 3).87
Conversely, the Vietnamese, already at war with the French, had little to lose and 
everything to gain through a regional union, a fact made all the more urgent by French 
attempts to hijack the Southeast Asian regional idea. Diplomatically, the Vietnamese 
needed the Thais much more than the Thais did the Vietnamese.
In mid-August, weeks before a Southeast Asian organisation was actually formed, 
Franco-Thai relations deteriorated dramatically following the decision made by the 
Conciliation Committee upholding French claims to the contested Lao and Cambodian 
territories. Since November 1946, when the Thais had agreed to return territories they 
had regained from the French during WWII, Bangkok seems to have held the genuine 
belief, backed by assurances from the Americans, that Paris would consider seriously 
Thai historical claims to certain parts of western Laos and Cambodia. The ruling in 
favour of the French appears to have left the Thais stunned.
A few excerpts from the Thai press leave no doubt as to the degree of Thai bittemess 
over the loss of their claims to the Indochinese territories. A commentator in Si Krung 
noted soberly that the "main reasons for our present loss of the four border provinces to 
France are 1) that we are a defeated nation and 2) we are weaker than France 
militarily."88 In what could have easily been a quote from Phibun or Wichit Wathakan in 
the late 1930s, this editorial concluded:
We can only make this affirmation: that Siam will get back every inch of her 
territories lost to France if the third World War comes and ends with the defeat of France 
and with Siam on the side of the victors. Otherwise, we cannot see any way 
whatsoever.89
Reuters quoted Pridi as saying during his visit to France in 1946 that Siam did not want to be "mixed up 
in the events in Indochina." See: BP, 7 January 1947.
Si Krung, 22 August 1947.
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This tendency to look to other powers to support Thai interests, rather than taking up 
arms, pointed up trends in Thai foreign policy which became more pronounced in the 
post-WWn period, and which marked a major difference between Thai and Vietnamese 
external policies at the time. While the Vietnamese were busy fighting the French, a Thai 
editorial commented on Thailand's case against the French in the following terms:
It is useless that members of Parliament should argue and try to throw the 
responsibility on each other during the sessions of Parliament on the border issue on 
August 12 . . .  As a matter of fact the honourable members would do better to get 
together and consult on what further step to be taken, for they knew well that it 
[regaining the lost territories] was a matter of trying to get back a sugar cane from the 
mouth of an elephant, and that no success could be expected even if angels were 
appointed to represent Siam at the negotiations.90
Hardly a coincidence, a Southeast Asian organisation was set up in Bangkok a few 
weeks after the breakdown in Franco-Thai border negotiations.
II.2. The Southeast Asia League is Formed, September 1947
On 2 September 1947, a gathering of Vietnamese in Bangkok celebrated the DRV's 
independence day, followed by an afternoon reception at the home of Nguyln Dure Qiiy 
in Bangkapi. Attending this celebration were "Thai cabinet ministers, members of 
parliament, government officials, and other distinguished guests," including university 
lecturers and journalists. During an address to the guests, a message from Ho Chi Minh 
was read.91 On the 6th, The Malaya Tribune published a lengthy editorial, entitled South 
East Asian Bloc, in which it argued for the creation of a regional organisation:
The Southeast Asia bloc could include Burma, Siam, Indo China, Malaya and 
Indonesia. . . The danger to Southeast Asia may not be apparent just yet. But with its 
tremendous potential and great riches, it would tempt the powerful. It behoves the 
leaders of Southeast Asia to call a conference at the earliest possible moment to draft a 
long-term plan which will enable this part of the world to stave off any threat, political 
or economic, that might arise in the future 92
Two days later, on 8 September 1947, 60 persons met at the Ratanakosin Hotel in 
Bangkok to inaugurate the Southeast Asia League.93 This was followed by a standing-
90  Chat Thai, 17 August 1947,
Prachakon, 4 September 1947 and 'Vietnam Observes Independence Day,' BP, 2 September 1947,
92 'South East Asian Bloc,' The Malaya Tribune, 6 September 1947.
US, DOS, 892.00/8-2647, 'Fortnightly Summary of Political Events in Siam for the Period August 1- 
August 15, 1947,' August 26, 1947, USNA.
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room only public opening at the Thai Fine Arts Theatre.94 Representatives from Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaya were present. For reasons still 
unknown, Burmese and Filipino delegates did not attend the founding meeting, although 
slots were held open for each. As we shall see, the Vietnamese, Lao Issara, Khmer 
Issarak, and the Thais assigned ranking officials to the body, while the Indonesians, 
Burmese, and Malayans were only represented by unimportant civilians residing in 
Bangkok. According to Article 8 of the Southeast Asia League's constitution, the official 
founding members were: Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Malaya, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines.95 Pridi allowed the League to be based in Bangkok and 
provided initial start-up funds.96
To mark the formation of the Southeast Asia League, Mahachon published a front page 
drawing showing a tree, entitled the Southeast Asia League, being tended to by the 
members of the organisation, depicted as the gardeners of this "Southeast Asian" tree (see 
picture on previous page). Tapping into the spirit of the United Nations, the League's 
emblem was a picture of the globe, supported by two hands, with the focus on Southeast 
Asia.
In the beginning, the Southeast Asia League was an unofficial, provisional body 
which was designed to give way eventually to a "lasting and effective official organization 
known as the South East Asia Federation."97 Writing decades later, Pridi said that at its 
inception the League was neither a "federation" nor a "confederation" because each 
member state maintained full control over their internal and external affairs. Instead, Pridi 
wrote that this organisation was more of an "entente cordiale" between member states, 
providing for mutual assistance and opposition to European colonialism.98 But until the 
League was officially recognised by the national governments of Southeast Asia, it 
remained a non-binding organisation. In fact, upon its establishment, the League was not 
accorded official recognition by any Southeast Asian government. As its manifesto read, 
the primary goal of the Southeast Asia League was
the achievement of a unity among the various peoples of South East Asia which will 
eventually be of such tangible and substantial nature that official recognition will be
94 GB, PRO, F.O. 371/69686 XC/A 55667, The Southeast Asia League,' 12 January 1947.
95 Constitution of the South East Asia League (S.E.A.L.),’ (Bangkok; 8 September 1947), p. 8 and 'South 
East Asia League Formed,' BP, 9 September 1947, pp. 18-19. I would like to thank Dr. Robert Cribb for 
providing me with a copy of the League’s constitution.
96  Chi wit, p. 89.
97 'Constitution of the South East Asia League,' p. 6.
98 Chi wit, p. 89 and 'South East Asia League Formed,' BP, 9 September 1947, pp. 18-9. It appears that Pridi 
used the French word "entente cordiale" in his original memoir, which was written in French, for the BP 
uses the French word in its English translation. It also appears that Pridi used the French words, 
"Federation" and "Confederation," in the original French version, for these two words are included as 
footnotes in the Thai translation. I feel the Thai version has incorrectly translated "Federation" as 
"Sahaphap." "Sahaphap" is closer in meaning to "Union," whereas "Sahaphan" would be a more accurate 
translation for "Federation."
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accorded it by [the] organization of a Federation o f South East Asia, which materializes 
the union of the various governments and peoples of the area."
Despite its unofficial status, the formation of the League did point up new currents of 
thinking flowing through the region. The opening paragraph of the League's constitution 
captures, with striking perceptiveness, the extent of world-wide changes underway after 
WWII:
With the achievements of modem science, the countries of the world are each day being 
drawn closer and closer together. Modem means of transport have completely 
annihilated the old conceptions of time and space so that the world is fast moving 
toward the visionary's ideal of one community.. .  [T]he peoples of South East Asia are 
convinced that their freedom, their well-being and their security will be more effectively 
assured by uniting their efforts for the achievement of their common ideals and 
aspirations.100
The specific goals of the League were as follows: 1) the promotion and the
development of good understanding and fraternal relations between the peoples of 
Southeast Asia; 2) the realisation of the genuine aspirations to full nationhood of the 
peoples of Southeast Asia and the raising of the economic, social and cultural standards 
of the peoples of Southeast Asia; 3) the promotion of universal peace, respect for human 
rights, and the implementation of principles set forth by the charter of the UN; 4) the 
promotion of study, research and interchange of information on Southeast Asia; 5) the 
publication and distribution of matters of cultural, social, economic, and scientific 
interests relating to Southeast Asia; and 6) the establishment of a South East Asia 
Federation,101
The League was made up of a Central Executive Committee (CEC), which would hold 
Extraordinary General Meetings and Central Executive Meetings. The CEC consisted of 
fifteen members, with seven specific positions reserved for the President, Vice-President, 
General Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Treasurer, Librarian, and Public Relations 
officer. These seven formed a sub-group of the CEC known as the Permanent 
Committee (PC). Leaders were elected to these positions at a General Meeting 
irrespective of nationality. The remaining eight positions on the CEC were filled by a 
representative from each of the eight Southeast Asian member countries.
'Manifesto o f the Southeast Asia League,' 8 September 1947. This manifesto was signed by Manot 
Wutthitya and Snoh Tanbunyuen (Thailand); Le Hy (Vietnam); Prince Souphanouvong (Laos); Ta Ta S. 
Bhonsat (Cambodia); Aswi Marmo (Indonesia); U. Hua La Pee (Burma); and Marmud Noeh (Malaya). 
For a copy of this document, see: VNS, 29 September 1947.
100 'Foreword o f the Constitution of the South East Asia League,' p. 2.
101 'Constitution of the South East Asia League,’ pp. 7-8. Italics in the original. For a comparison of
Southeast Asian regionalism between the end of WWII and the arrival of the Cold War to Southeast Asia 
and the period during the demise of the Cold War in 1989-90, see: Christopher E. Goscha, 'Could
Indochina Join ASEAN?' Bangkok Post, 24 November 1990.
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The President of the Central Executive Committee of the League was an associate of 
Pridi and one of the chief Thai negotiators during the recent Franco-Thai border 
negotiations, Tiang Serikhan. The Vice-President was Trän Van Giäu. Le Hy was the 
Treasurer and Prince Souphanouvong was the General Secretary. Manot Wutthitya was 
Assistant Secretary and Sukit Nikhamein was the Librarian. Thawi Udon, the manager 
of Thai Industrial Development Co. and a member of the House of Elders, was Public 
Relations Officer. Other CEC members included: Dr. Tran Van Luän, Prince 
Narodhom (Cambodia), Prince Suvannaphouma (Laos), Aswis Marmo (Indonesia), 
M.H. Noeh (Malaya), and Dusit Boontham, a Thai member of Parliament.102 For still 
unknown reasons, there was no representative from the Philippines on the CEC. The 
Thai members— Tiang Serikhan, Thawi Udon, Dusit Buntham and Sukit Nikhamein— 
were prominent leaders in Pridi's Sahachip (Cooperative) Party and most, as we have 
shown, had long been in touch with Vietnamese resistance leaders.103
Thai-Vietnamese domination of the CEC was obvious, symbolised by the election of a 
Thai as President and a Vietnamese as the Vice-President. A document from the British 
Foreign Office, citing Manot Wutthitya as its source, reports that it had been agreed 
before 8 September by the Organising Committee (OC) that a Thai would be president 
and a Vietnamese national would be the vice-president.104 The OC was said to have been 
unanimous that Nguyln Dire Quy would be the CECs nomination for Vice-president. 
However, at the time of the inaugural meeting on the 8th, Qiiy was not in Bangkok and 
Le Hy had already been elected secretary of the CEC. According to this source, the only 
other Vietnamese official present was Trän Vän Giäu, leaving the OC with no other 
choice but to elect Giäu vice-president even though delegates did not want a "prominent 
communist" on its board.105 Despite these problems, Thai-Vietnamese dominance 
remained intact, underscored by the fact that the mailing address for the League was 543 
Silom Road, the premises of the VNS in Bangkok.106
102 Ibid., p. 17. The members of the Organising Committee of the League, the group which actually made the
League a reality, included: 1) Thailand: Manot Wutthitya and Snoh Tanbunyuen; 2) Vietnam: Le
Hy; 3) Laos: Prince Souphanouvong; 4) Cambodia: Ta Ta Rafatipvongse; 5) Indonesia: Aswi
Marmo; 6) Burma: U Hua La Pee; 7) Malaya: Marmud Noeh. Five members of the OC were on the 
CEC. See: Ibid., p. 17.
103 US, DOS, 892.00/9-2347, 'Fortnightly Summary of Political Events in Siam for the Period September 1- 
September 15, 1947,' 23 September 1947, USNA.
104 According to John Coast, it was felt that a strong president was needed from among Pridi associates to 
make it more effective and hopefully make it easier for the League to gain "real support" from the Thai 
government The League's architects looked toward some kind of open recognition or official 
authorisation to collect funds to promote the League. For these reasons, Tiang Serikhan was selected. 
Although some doubted his integrity, they were comforted by the fact that they could vote him out of power 
at the end of the year, by which time they hoped to have official recognition. See: GB, PRO, F.O. 
371/69686 XC/A 55667, John Coast, The South-East Asia League,' 12 January 1948.
105 Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City; GB, PRO, F.O. 371/69686 XC/A 
55667, 'Note on the Election of Tran Van Giau.'
106 The Indonesian Independence League was also reported to have had its mailing address at the VNS.
See: Australia, DEA, 'Letter from Eastman to Francis Stuart, Australian Commissioner, Singapore,' 6
July 1948, CRS A1838/2; 466/1/1, Part I, AA.
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Moreover, because the Indonesians, Malayans, and Burmese were unwilling to take a 
prominent role in the League, leadership tended to reside even more in the hands of the 
Thais and Vietnamese. The Indonesian representative in the League, Aswis Marmo, was 
only a student living in Bangkok who soon left the country. The Malayan and Burmese 
representatives were also relatively unimportant residents in Bangkok. This was in 
marked contrast to the considerably higher ranking officials selected by the Thais, 
Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodians. Tieng Serikhan was a member of parliament, a 
former Deputy Minister of the Interior, and a wartime leader of the Seri Thai. Prince 
Souphanouvong was the Lao Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the Cambodian, Ta Ta 
Rafatipvongse, was a Deputy Prime Minister of the Khmer Issarak.
A possible reason explaining the low-profile taken by the Indonesians, Burmese, 
Malayans was the fear that by participating in the League relations with the Dutch and 
British would be exacerbated at a time when these nations were engaged in tense 
negotiations to gain their independence. The Indonesians were careful not to give the 
Dutch grounds for alleging the Indonesian resistance was communist tainted. The ill- 
advised appointment of Tran Vän Giau, a Vietnamese leader known by western 
intelligence to have studied in Moscow and to be a communist, did little to allay 
Indonesian fears of possible western calumination of the League and its members.107 
During a visit by Indonesian officials to Bangkok in late 1947, the Indonesians reportedly 
made every effort to avoid contact with the Vietnamese. According to John Coast, this 
was "bluntly explained to the Vietnamese as being Indonesian determination not to give 
the Dutch even the faintest chance of labelling them Communists."108 However, it must 
be noted that on 21 November the Bangkok Post quoted Dr. Soedarsono, an Indonesian 
envoy visiting Bangkok, as saying that the "Indonesian Republic will certainly give the 
League support."109
II.3. The Wider Aims of the League
In forming the League, Southeast Asian leaders also envisioned the wider goal of 
creating an economic bloc. Having been subjected to European colonialism for decades, 
Southeast Asians sought to tap the wealth of the region for their own benefit. Burma's 
independence leader, U Aung San, had made this point clear earlier in the year when he 
told a Thai delegation in Rangoon that one of the League's important goals would be the 
promotion of regional "economic solidarity."110 Indeed, the opening sentence of the
107 GB, PRO, F.O. 371/69686 XC/A 55667, The Southeast Asia League,' 12 January 1948.
108 Ibid. According to Coast, the Vietnamese delegation in Bangkok recognised this problem and informed 
the DRV o f the need to recall Tran Van Giau. Giau remained in Thailand well into 1948.
109 ’Indonesian Envoy on Bangkok Visit,’ BP, 21 November 1947.
110 US, DOS, 845C.9111 RR/4-1947, Telegram from the Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the 
Secretary o f State,' 19 April 1947 in FRUS (1947, Volume VI), p. 22.
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League's manifesto confirmed this, recognising that "South East Asia is one of the richest 
areas of natural resources in the world." The manifesto went on to state that the League 
symbolised "an increasing sentiment among countries of South East Asia to join in an 
effort toward a regional development of common interests."111 During its opening 
meeting on 8 September, the League targetted the need for economic recovery in 
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, and Thailand.112 An 
Associated Press correspondent reported from Bangkok that in the long term the founders 
of the League hoped to coordinate the economic life of the region so as to "avoid conflict 
and competition between the often non-complementary economies of the member 
states."113
It also merits mention that the Southeast Asia League did not include China or India. 
Pridi wrote in his memoir that the exclusion of these two Asian powers was not an 
oversight, but rather it was quite intentional. Describing the meetings he had with 
Southeast Asian nationalists leaders concerning the formation of the League after WWII, 
Pridi said that even though it was clear each country would have to gain its independence,
we would still have had to confront the two giants: Nationalist China, which had 
emerged victorious after the defeat of the Japanese, and India, which had recently won its 
independence from Britain. Therefore, in the event that each country and people in this 
region [Southeast Asia] were to gain their independence in an isolated fashion, then it 
would be difficult for each to protect itself in the event of an invasion by these two 
giants.114
It seems that as Southeast Asian leaders took a stand against the return of European 
colonialism, they simultaneously had their eyes focused on a post-colonial future, one in 
which they would like to prevent neighbouring, larger Asian powers from replacing the 
dominant positions left by the Europeans.
Possibly reading more into the League than it merited at the time, Pridi wrote in his 
memoir much later that the League had the long-term goals of mutual assistance and 
defence.115 However, a November 1947 report by the AP's Stanley Swinton seems to 
support Pridi's assertion, listing as one of the long-range goals of the League the "control
111 'Manifesto of the South East Asia League,' 8 September 1947.
112 'Sannibat Esia Akhene' [The Southeast Asia League], Mahachon, 14 September 1947. It is unclear why 
Malaya was not mentioned.
113 'Southeast Asia League,' BP, 22 November 1947.
114 Chiwit, pp. 88-89.
115 Ibid., p. 89. In his memoir, published in 1974, Pridi refers to the League as the the "Southeast Asian 
Association of Nations." It is clear that he is referring to the Southeast Asia League, and it appears that 
by using the word "association" instead of "league," Pridi might have been trying to take credit for the 
idea of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), which had been formed during the late 
1960s. He mentions ASEAN when bringing up the topic of the League in his memoir.
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and organisation of regional defense."116 Whether this was actually targetted at the outset 
by the League or merely mentioned as a long-term possibility remains unclear.
II.4. The Short Life-span of the Southeast Asia League
Following the Conciliation Committee's decision against Bangkok's border case in 
August, Thai officials began to voice publicly their support of Southeast Asian 
independence movements. In mid-September, the Thai Foreign Minister, Luang Arthkit, 
declared in a speech to the General Assembly of the UN that Thailand fully supported the 
Indonesian independence struggle against the Dutch.117 In a letter to Prime Minister 
Thomrong, the League praised this action as a "milestone along the road to the 
establishment of the Southeast Asia Federation."118 The League also thanked the Thais 
for their support of "Indonesian freedom."119 This letter also lauded Pridi's earlier 
insistence that Laos and Cambodia be granted their independence before joining a French- 
backed union.120 In language that appears to be designed intentionally by the League to 
prod the Thais to the forefront, this letter said that Thailand had shown "a deep sympathy 
with her less favored neighbors, and has rightly taken the position of leadership in 
representing those voiceless millions."121
On 23 September, Direk Chaiyanam, the former Thai Foreign Minister and now the 
Ambassador to Great Britain, made a speech supporting the Vietnamese independence 
movement at a gathering in New York celebrating the second anniversary of the birth of 
the DRV.122 On the 29th, another letter was sent by the League to the Thai delegation at 
the UN thanking the Thais for their "sympathy towards South East Asia freedom 
m ovem ents."123 And in a letter to the editor of the Post, the general secretary of the 
Southeast Asia League had Thailand in mind when he wrote: "It is now no longer 
possible for other countries, particularly neighbouring countries of Vietnam, to overlook 
the far-reaching consequences of this war [in Vietnam]."124
116 Southeast Asia League, BP, 22 November 1947.
117 US, DOS, 892.00/8-2647, 'Fortnightly Summary of Political Events in Siam for the Period August 1- 
August 15, 1947,' 26 August 1947 and 'Southeast Asia League Applauds Siam's Action,' BP, 25 
September 1947.
118 BP, 25 September 1947.
119 VNS, 14 October 1947.
120 BP, 25 September 1947.
121 Ibid.
122 'Second Anniversary o f the Viet Nam Republic Observed in the United States,' VNS, 29 September 1947. 
Also attending this celebration in support of the Vietnamese were such well-known figures as Pearl S. 
Buck, Harold Isaacs, editor of Newsweek, and a number of other Asian representatives from the UN and 
a former OSS agent who had worked with the Vietnamese during the war.
123 'South East Asia League Supports Siamese U.N.O. Delegation,’ VNS, 5 November 1947. This letter was 
signed by Prince Souphanouvong.
124 'Letter to the Editor from the Southeast Asia League,' BP, 22 October 1947.
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It remains unclear whether the Southeast Asia League as an organisation actually 
provided any military aid to the Indonesian or Indochinese independence movements. 
One reason possibly explaining why the League may not have given military assistance 
was its short life-span. Another possibility is that if the League had openly provided 
military support to the Indochinese and Indonesians, then it would have implied a 
Southeast Asian military alliance in opposition to the French, Dutch, and, to a lesser 
degree, the British and Americans. With open conflicts underway in Indochina and 
Indonesia in 1947, it is possible that Thailand, Burma, the Philippines or Malaya could or 
would not run the risk of openly involving themselves, militarily, against the Europeans 
by providing weapons or "volunteer forces" while in the process of consolidating their 
own independence.125 On the effectiveness of the Southeast Asia League, Tran Van 
Giau said that it "was a political organisation and not a military one," but he also 
concluded that "as for military matters, Thailand was already aiding us."126 This was 
certainly true (see chapters 3, 4, and 6).
II.5. The Fall of the League and the Onset of the Cold War, 1948
Before Pridi was ousted from power in a November 1947 military coup, the League 
attempted to convene a special meeting of the Southeast Asia League to discuss foreign 
policy matters and the changing regional and international situation. The Indonesian and 
Burmese representatives in Bangkok, as well as leaders of the resistance governments 
from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, were ready to meet when the November coup took 
place.127 The meeting was never held and the future of the Southeast Asia League was 
cast into doubt as Pridi went into hiding and Phibun Songkhram, backed by increasingly 
powerful military and police officials, began his return to power.
The Vietnamese were clearly worried by this development. On 10 February 1948, 
General Nguyen Binh, commander-in-chief of Vietnamese forces in Nam Bo, personally 
wrote a letter in French to Phibun. In this letter, Binh sent Phibun his "congratulations 
and best wishes for the realisation of your noble aim—the prosperity of the Siamese 
people and the defence of Siamese national integrity against foreign aggression."128 One
125 While I have no direct evidence to support this possibility, Indonesian leader, Dr. Sutan Sjahrir, backed 
the idea of a Southeast Asian regional body, but qualified it by saying that '1 do not use the term 'bloc' as 
this suggests an idea of power conflict What I mean by regional organisation is simply an effort from 
Asia toward a world order." See: 'Southeast Asia Union' [Editorial], BP, 7 May 1948.
1 2  ^ Interview with Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
127 Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Qüy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Stanley Swinton (AP), 'Southeast 
Asia League,' BP, 22 November 1947.
128 'Vietnam General Urges Southeast Asia Unity,' BP, 20 February 1947. Nguyen Binh also sent a message 
to the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand in which he and the President of the National Union of Vietnam 
praised the overseas Vietnamese support of the DRV. See: 'Viet Nam Leaders Send Greetings to Viet 
Nam Nationals in Siam,' VNS, 3 March 1948. At the same time, Nguyin Binh also sent a letter to Pandit 
Nehru. See: "Letter to Pandit Nehru from General Nguyen Binh,' 8 March 1948, VNS.
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of the ways Binh said this could be done more effectively was through closer ties 
between Vietnam and "Siam and all South-East Asian countries." As Binh told Phibun:
In the Southeast Asia bloc, the geographic situation and the historical bonds between 
our two peoples require that Siam and Vietnam be closer united. If we maintain 
stronger relationships between our two countries and tighten the friendly ties between 
ourselves, and every other people of Southeast Asia, we can defeat all manoeuvres of 
aggression by foreigners.129
On 23 April, a letter from the Acting President of Vietnam's delegation in Bangkok, Le 
Hy, to Phibun was published in the Bangkok Post. Hy sent best wishes to Phibun on 
behalf of the "Government and the people of Vietnam."130 Continuing, Hy said:
Vietnam as a neighboring country has every desire to see political and economic 
stability brought about in Siam, and it is felt that under your leadership this goal will 
be achieved. I take this opportunity of reaffirming the feelings of sincere friendship of 
the Vietnam government and the Vietnam people and of the loyalty of Vietnam 
nationals resident in Siam towards the Siamese government131
On 27 April, Phibun answered Le Hy in a letter sent to the Vietnamese Delegation in 
Bangkok. Phibun's response:
. . . [I]t gives me great pleasure to feel that Vietnam desires to see political and 
economic stability brought about in Siam . . .  I avail myself of this opportunity to 
wish Viet Nam speedy success in her struggle for independence and full nationhood.132
But Phibun's sympathy did not last for long. Political changes in Bangkok and the 
emergence of the Cold War in the region soon altered Phibun's view of the Vietnamese 
independence struggle, as we shall see in the next chapter. In 1948, Thai critics of Pridi, 
individuals often more concerned with their own political ambitions than with accuracy, 
pointed to the League as evidence of a communist plan to infiltrate Southeast Asia. 
Writing in 1950, Luang Kat Songkhram, one of the chief planners of the November 1947 
military coup, included the military's fear of a Southeast Asian communist union among 
the listed reasons for the coup. Under item thirteen, Kat confuses, perhaps intentionally, 
the League and the French Pan Southeast Asia Union:
129 BP, 20 February 1947. DRV officials must have channelled this letter to MacDonald at the BP in a 
deliberate move to make it public, and thereby demonstrate Vietnam's good intentions in a public forum 
as well as to play off Phibun's anti-French sentiments in a move to gain his support of their considerable 
resistance activities in Thailand. Considering the wide-range of Vietnamese activities in Thailand, 
Phibun was almost certainly aware the importance of Thailand to Vietnam.
1 For a copy of this letter, see: Message from Vietnam Delegation to Premier Phibun Songkhram,' VNS, 
23 April 1947 or BP, 24 April 1947.
131 'Message from Vietnam Delegation to Premier Phibun Songkhram,' VNS, 23 April 1947.
132 TNA, H.l. 0201.37.6, Phibun to Vietnamese Government Delegation,' 27 April 1948.
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13. Excessive Red Ideology. The powerful have gone and allowed Thailand to become 
a member of the Southeast Asia Union together with Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, all of 
which are French colonies.133
Kat and others pointed to Pridi's leftist views and his leading role in the League as 
evidence of growing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.134 Pridi rebutted these 
accusations, asking how the League could be a communist machination when it included 
members of the Lao Royal family. But the charges continued, spurred on by western 
diplomats, journalists, and the distortions created by the Cold War.135
While it is certainly true that Pridi held leftist ideas throughout his political career, it 
does not follow that he would necessarily bow to Moscow at the expense of the region's 
own interests. From the evidence available, the allegations that Moscow somehow 
exercised influence within the League or over Pridi in 1947 and 1948 are hard to support. 
John Coast, a balanced source and a correspondent who had close contacts with some of 
the members of the League, wrote that the Southeast Asia League
is first local in character, then international. It is a defensive organisation. It is 
definitely not now, or in its beginning, under any Communist influence. Where it may 
end up will largely depend on the colonial policies followed by Russia, America, and 
ourselves [Great Britain], At the moment, both Indonesians and Viet-Namese will say 
to you: 'Anyone that helps us is our friend. So far the Russians have done absolutely 
nothing to assist us either at the United Nations or in any other sphere.'136
Immediately following WWII, Moscow had very little influence in Southeast Asia, 
refusing to recognise both Thailand and the DRV, for fear of upsetting its relationship
133 'Cotmai lae Banthirk Suantua khong Phontho Kat Katsongkhram: Rurang Sähet Haengkantham
Rathaprahan, 8 PS 90' [Letter and Documents of Lieutenant General Kat Katsongkhram: The Origins of 
the 1947 Coup d’Etat] in Suchin Tantikun, Rathaprahan PS 2490 [The 1947 Coup], (Bangkok: 
Samakhom Sangkhomsat Haeng Prathet Thai, 1972), p. 147.
134 Chi wit, p. 90.
133 Ibid., p. 90. In 1947, US officials considered the League to be a nationalist, anticolonial organisation. 
However, as the Cold War made its way in the region things began to change. In a confidential March 
1948 State Department memo on the "Possible Formation of a Bloc of Eastern Peoples," the League was 
singled out by ranking US policy-makers as a symbol of Soviet designs in the region. As one official 
bluntly wrote, "Representatives from the various countries of Southeast Asia have established a Southeast 
Asia League, which is a Communist organization, at Bangkok." US, DOS, 'Possible Formation of Bloc 
of Eastern Peoples,' RG 59, Southeast Asia 1950, Communism, Box 5, USNA.
136 GB, PRO, F.O. 371/69686 XC/A 55667, John Coast, The Southeast Asia League,' 12 June 1948. My 
discussion of the Southeast Asia League differs from previous discussions of this organisation and its 
significance. See: John Coast, Some Aspects o f Thai Politics, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1953), p. 38; Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1964), pp. 94-95; David A. Wilson, The United States and the Future o f Thailand, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 30; Charles Keyes, 'Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand,'
SEADP, No. 65, (1967), pp. 31-32; Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy o f Southeast Asia, 1945-1948, (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 340 and others who have relied on these sources. Bruce Reynolds is 
the notable exception. Although my account differs from his too, he has nonetheless made a fme 
contribution to a better understanding the League, one of the few historians to have studied it in any 
serious detail. See: Bruce E. Reynolds, op. cit, pp. 1-18.
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with France. In fact, although Moscow recognised the Phibun government in 1948, it 
would take two more years before establishing diplomatic relations with Ho Chi Minh’s 
government. And, with similar national interests in mind, India, Indonesia, and Thailand 
were also very cautious in joining the DRV in anticolonial regional organisation. In the 
end, while there may have been vague notions of "Southeast Asian-ness" after WWII, the 
evidence suggests that the Southeast Asia League meant the most to the Vietnamese. 
With war underway with the French, DRV officials working in Bangkok saw Southeast 
Asian regionalism as a further means by which they could counter the French. They had 
little to lose and everything to gain.
Chapter 6
The Western Front and its Demise, 1947-1949
While DRV representatives in Thailand were working in 1947 to counter the French 
diplomatically, they simultaneously continued to strengthen their military activities from 
Thailand. In this, our final chapter, we will show that following the outbreak of full- 
scale war in Indochina in December 1946 until the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, 
Thailand continued to hold a unique position in the Vietnamese resistance against the 
French. During this period, it served as a key source of arms, equipment, and medicines, 
as well as a rear area for military training and recruiting of young overseas Vietnamese. 
The First part of this chapter demonstrates how conditions in Thailand were most 
favourable for the administration of these activities during the period prior to the 
November 1947 coup in Bangkok. In the second part of this chapter, we will show that 
although resistance programmes continued into the post coup period, Phibun's return to 
power changed the terms guiding Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand, forcing the 
ICP to make changes in the the administration of their operations in Thailand in 1948. 
With the French on the move in Indochina and the victory of the Chinese Communists 
still over a year away, access to Thailand remained an important priority. However, in 
the end, these changes had little time to take effect. In 1949, Thailand's importance came 
to an abrupt end as the victory of the Chinese Communists opened more important 
northern bases and provided the Vietnamese with large-scale Chinese aid. Further 
detracting from Thailand's value to the Vietnamese by 1949 was Phibun's increasingly 
stringent crack-down on Vietnamese activities in Thailand.
Part I: Thailand and the Outbreak of War in Indochina
1.1. The Formation of the Western Front
Shortly after the outbreak of full-scale war in Indochina in December 1946, a meeting 
of the Overseas Vietnamese General Association was held in Udon. Attending this 
meeting were ICP representatives in Thailand and delegates sent from Vietnam, including 
a ranking communist, Cao Hong Länh. During this meeting, Ho Chi Minh's call for 
nation-wide resistance was studied and ways were discussed to implement it among the
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overseas Vietnamese in Thailand and western Indochina.1 At the same time (or possibly 
during this same meeting), the ICP Central Committee directed its Overseas Party branch 
in Thailand to begin assisting the Lao and Cambodian resistance movements from the 
west, meaning from bases in Thailand and western Indochina.2 One of the first concrete 
results of this directive was the formation in early 1947 of the Western Front Military 
Committee (Vy Ban Quän Sir Mat Tran Mien Tay) by Vietnamese cadres working 
from Thailand. Vü Hüu Binh was in charge of the committee's military affairs, while 
Trän Vän Giäu and Le Him Quän tended to political matters. Vietnamese officials, 
referred to only as X6, Khanh, and Cung by Hoan, were also said to be members.3
A special military zone in western Indochina, known simply as the Western Front 
(Mat Tran Mien Tay), was soon established under the supervision of the Western Front 
Military Committee. This zone ran along both sides of the Mekong River from upper 
Laos south to northwestern Cambodia. It was part of the overall Viet Minh military 
command structure, linked to the other war zones into which Vietnam had been 
partitioned. Sub-divided into five smaller sub-zones, the Western Front was under the 
joint direction of the ICP's Overseas Vietnamese Special Committee in Udon and the 
DRV delegation in Bangkok, although the degree of coordination between these two was 
problematic as we shall see.4
The survival of the Western Front was dependent upon continued Vietnamese access 
to Thailand. As a part of the Front's operations, military training camps were set up in 
northeastern Thailand to train overseas Vietnamese recruits and, to a lesser degree, Lao 
and Cambodian fighters. Some of the Front's main covert training camps were in the 
forests of Ubon Ratchathani.5 Arms production teams and weapons repair facilities were 
also formed in secret locations in northeast Thailand and western Indochina. Not 
surprisingly, the overseas Vietnamese played an important role in financing and
Son Tung, op. cit, pp. 167-68 and CVDCQ, p. 68. Quynh Anh and Ba Doc are known members of the 
Overseas Vietnamese Party Branch in Thailand at this time. While one can only speculate, it seems likely 
that other members included: Vü Hüru Binh, Mai Van Quang, Nguyen Vän X6, Nguyen Chan, Le Manh 
Trinh, and Tran Dire Vlnh among others.
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 305. Of the twelve points listed in the 22 December "Resistance 
Programme," point four called for "linking up with the Cambodians and Lao." See: Lieh Sir Quän Dgi 
Nhän Din, p. 254.
Hoang Van Hoan, op. ciL, p. 305. Xo may be a reference to Nguyen Vän X6, who was a member of the 
ICP Lao Regional Committee and a representative of the Party branch at the Macao Congress in 1935. 
Hoäng Vän Hoan, op. cit., p. 72 and T.C., *Nhin Lai . . .  op. cit, p. 24. Tran Vän Dinh also referred to a 
certain Nguyen Vän X6 as a colleague of Mai Van Quang. Interview with Trän Vän Dinh, 20 June 
1990, Washington, DC. French intelligence refers to a certain Dinh Van Khanh as the head of the 
Vietnamese resistance organisation in Udon. See: Haut Commissariat de France poure Llndochine, 
Bureau Federal de Documentation, Etude des Activities V.M. (pour la period du 15 au 31 Oct 1948), 
Saigon 8 Nov. 1948.
Hoäng Vän Hoan, op. cit, p. 305. Le Manh Trinh also mentions the active role of the Overseas 
Vietnamese Special Committee (Dac uy Viet Kieu) in Vietnamese activities in Thailand during this time. 
See: CVDCQ, p. 67 as well as chapter 2 of this thesis. Two known members of this highly secret but 
powerful committee were a certain Khanh and Binh, almost certainly Vü Hüru Binh and possibly Dinh 
Vän Khänh. Hoäng Vän Hoan, op. cit, p. 297.
Interview with Nguyen EXrc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
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supporting the activities of the Western Front. Following the outbreak of war in 
Indochina, Hoan says "several thousand" overseas Vietnamese youths volunteered for 
military service to fight the French on battlefields of Indochina. In addition, the 
Vietnamese in the region donated "several million bac" (Vietnamese for units of money, 
probably referring either to bahts or piastres) to the resistance, of which a large amount 
was reportedly allocated to the Western Front.6 Even a Soldier Recovery Station of the 
Western Front was set up in Ubon Ratchathani province under the supervision of Quynh 
Anh.7 Close to the battlefields of Indochina, but largely safe from the threat of direct 
French military interference, "Thailand became the rear guard for the 'Western Front.'"8
1.2. Thailand as a Source of Military Assistance
The effectiveness of the Western Front was strengthened significantly by continued, 
secret Thai military assistance to the Vietnamese after the outbreak of war. Thai 
government and military officials made available boats, trains, and were even ready to 
lease DRV adherents airplanes to transport weapons from Thailand back to Indochina. 
The Thai Navy allocated boats to the Vietnamese to take weapons, ammunition, 
equipment, and medicines procured in Thailand back to points in southern Vietnam and 
Cambodia. Oftentimes military hardware was loaded onto Viet Minh vessels in the port 
of Bangkok and clandestinely shipped out by night to avoid detection by French spies. 
From there, specially appointed cadres guided the vessels along designated sea routes 
(see chapter 4). Between Thailand and Nam Bo, these boats stopped over at hidden 
check-points on the islands of Koh Chang, Koh Kut, and Phu Quoc. The boats then 
made their way to destinations in southwestern Nam Bo and Cambodia where they were 
met by specially appointed resistance agents who unloaded the arms and distributed them 
to military units fighting the French.9
In addition, since the end of WWII Thai officials, including such ranking figures as 
Pridi Phanomyong and Navy Rear Admiral Sangwon Suwannanchip (see chapter 3), had 
arranged "special trains," more likely special freight cars, to transport by rail Vietnamese- 
procured arms and equipment to Thai frontier towns such as, Ubon and Surin. After
Hoang Van Hoan, op. tit., p. 287. See chapter 4 for more details concerning the scale of Vietnamese 
Emigre contributions to the resistance.
Som Tung, op. c it, p. 168. By renting some land from Thai friends in Ban Khon (Ubon province), 
Quynh Anh began planting vegetables and built a convalescent centre to tend to sick and wounded 
soldiers coming from the Western Front zone. According to Anh, there were usually seven to eight 
soldiers recovering here at any given time, usually suffering from malaria and scabies. The Thai town of 
Phimun also acted as a recovery station for injured soldiers coming from Laos. It had a large Vietnamese 
population and had sent a large number o f youths to Fight in Vietnam. Anh's son fought in the Western 
Front zone. Ibid., pp. 168-69.
This quote is taken from Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 287, writing decades later. Western Front' is 
included in quotations marks in the original by Hoan.
Interviews with Nguyen Dure Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and a former Viet Minh cadre who 
ran arms shipments by land and sea from Thailand to Vietnam after WWII, 20 June 1989, Hanoi 
[hereafter cited as "a former Viet Minh official, 20 June 1989, Hanoi"]. For a confirmation from a French 
source, see: 'L'Approvisionnement en armes et munitions des forces vietnamiennes,' 15 Janvier 1947.
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having secretly loaded arms and equipment on to these trains, Viet Minh adherents 
accompanied the shipments to the Thai-Indochinese border, escorted by Thai military 
police and, on certain occasions, even Thai ministers (probably northeastern Thai 
politicians such as Tiang Serikhan and Thongin Phuriphat). Arriving at the Indochinese 
border, Thai border authorities were often under direct instructions from Bangkok to 
permit Vietnamese cargoes to be transferred across the border without inspection. From 
the Indochinese frontier, mobile combat units were probably in charge of transporting 
these arms back to Vietnam (see chapter 4).10 Geopolitically speaking, the combination 
of a railway system connecting Bangkok to its key northeastern outposts along the 
Indochina border and a postwar Thai government making available large quantities of 
arms gave Thailand increased strategic value to the Vietnamese resistance during this 
period.1 1
Perhaps most interesting was an alleged secret agreement between the Thais and DRV 
representatives in Thailand whereby Thai airplanes were to be leased to the Viet Minh to 
bring gold, opium, and other goods out of Indochina to Thailand to sell. With the money 
earned from such sales, the Viet Minh would purchase weapons, ammunition, medicines, 
and equipment in Thailand (and from elsewhere) to fly back to Indochina to use in the 
resistance against the French. Nguyln Due Quy said in an interview that these planes 
were to be flown by Thai pilots, with the understanding being that in the event of a fatal 
accident, the Vietnamese would have to provide for the family of the deceased pilot. 
While I have been unable to confirm whether any shipments were actually made by air, 
Qüy implied in an interview that they had.12
According to a French report in January 1947, following the outbreak of full-scale 
hostilities in Indochina, Thailand became "the principal source of rebel arms." Although 
the author of this document was unable to determine from where exactly the arms were 
being acquired, it said that in January 1947 a Viet Minh delegate in Bangkok had 
purchased an "important amount of rifles and ammunition," including light anti-tank 
weapons which were to be sent to southern Vietnam.13 Chinese Nationalist documents 
reported that in two purchases in 1947 the Viet Minh acquired 6,000 rifles, 400 machine- 
guns, 5 anti-aircraft guns, 200 mines, and 1,000 grenades.14 To operate buying missions 
and coordinate the transfer of this large amount of arms coming from the interior of 
Thailand, the Viet Minh stationed cadres in northeastern frontier towns, such as Ubon,
10 Interviews with Nguyen Due Quy. 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City; Tran Van Giku, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi 
Minh City; and a former Viet Minh official, 20 June 1989, Hanoi.
11 Until early December 1946, the Viet Minh had been able to transport these weapons by train well into 
western Cambodia because of Thai control of the Cambodian territories. This advantage was lost in mid- 
December when the territories were turned back over to the French by the Thais. See chapter 3.
12 Interview with Nguyen Due Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
13 SHAT, Carton 102, Trafic d'Armes, 1’Approvisionimement en armes et munitions des forces 
Vietnamiennes,' Saigon, Janvier 1947.
14 Chen, op. tit., p. 189.
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Aranyaprathet, Udon, Nong Khai, and Nakhon Phanom.15 In what appears to be a 
reference to the Viet Minh's mobile combat units, French intelligence conceded in 1947 
that "well armed groups" had been coming from Cambodia, the recently ceded territories, 
and Thailand on their way to Vietnam, although the amount of material transported 
overland was said to be relatively small. However, it was acknowledged that the amount 
of arms going by sea was much larger, with the French Navy being "totally insufficient in 
its ability to stop the main source of the material transported by sea."16 By 1949, the 
Secretary of Britain's Joint Intelligence Agency (Far East) seems to have shared the 
French view, writing that "at present the main supplier of arms to the Viet [M]inh is 
Siam, from which country a regular traffic is maintained."17
French intelligence also reported that Nguyen Thanh San was trying to procure 
negotiable goods from southern Vietnam which could be sent to the DRV mission in 
Thailand to be sold and the proceeds used to purchase weapons in Thailand. The arms 
would then be brought back to Indochina and distributed to General Nguyen Binh and 
others.18 In other instances, rice was transported to Thailand from Laos and Cambodia to 
sell in the Thai market,19 while opium, spices, pepper (again much of it grown in Viet 
Minh-controlled areas in Laos and Cambodia), vegetables, and other products were 
transported to Thailand by the Viet Minh to buy arms and supplies.20 Also financing 
these activities was money that continued to be sent to representatives in Thailand from 
Vietnam. In February 1947, a Viet Minh official in Nakhon Phanom was sent 500,000 
piastres. In another case, 16,000 piastres was said to have been shipped to the DRV 
delegation in Bangkok to buy radio receivers.21 Besides going toward the purchase of 
arms, these funds also bought much needed pharmaceuticals and medicines (such as 
penicillin and sulfur-drugs), surgical instruments, metals, electrical equipment, paper, 
chemicals, maintenance equipment for their arms industries, and weaving machines.22
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
SHAT, Carton 101, Trafic d'Armees et Activities du Siam au 15 Fevrier 1947.'
SHAT, Carton 102, Trafic d'Armes, l'Approvisionnnement en armes et munitions des forces 
Vietnamiennes,’ Saigon, Janvier 1947.
GB, JIC(FE)5502/3-{48)17, 'Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East),' 18 January 1949 in CRS 
65377T1; SEATS 1 [Southeast Asia Top Secret], AA.
SHAT, Carton 101, 'Armes Trafic and activites du Siam au 15 Fev 1947.'
Paul Gey, 'Regression du Vietminh au Nam bo,' Indochine Sud-est Asiatique, No. 9, (Aoüt 1952).
Claude Guigues, 'Le Vietminh au Laos,' Indochine Sud-est Asiatique, No. 12, (Novembre 1952); SHAT, 
Carton 108 (Opium), Hanoi, 7 August 1951, 'Bulletin de Renseignements,' and J. Despuich, Le Trafic des 
Piastres, (Paris, 1953), pp. 135 and 140.
SHAT, Carton 101, 'Armes Trafic and activites du Siam au 15 Fev 1947.’ The DRV delegation 
exchanged these French piastres for Francs in Bangkok. Officials at the DRV delegation in Bangkok 
and elsewhere in Siam were also in radio communication with posts in zone 8 and others areas in 
Cochinchina concerning arms shipments and instructions. See: SHAT, Carton 101, File No. 121,
"Armee VM. Liaison Transmission 1947 a 1954, Juin, Julliet, Aoüt 1947.'
Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City; Despuich, op. cit., p. 135; and 'Armes 
Trafic and activites du Siam au 15 Fev 1947.' In June 1948, the VNS reported that the DRV delegation in 
Bangkok had received medical supplies valued at 1,260,000 baht from the Indian Red Cross. See: 'Gift 
from Indian Red Cross Received by Vietnam Delegation,' VNS, 15 June 1948.
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Even US Embassy officials in Bangkok made some radios and medicines available to 
DRV officials in Bangkok.23
Besides being a source of arms and equipment for the Viet Minh, Thailand was also an 
important intermediary for arms shipments coming from Europe, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Hong Kong, and China. The participation of ranking Thai military and 
civilian leaders in the arms trade and their willingness to work with the Vietnamese 
facilitated this process. As late as 1950, Nguyen Vän Long, who has been noted 
already as an important Viet Minh official working in Thailand after WWII, arranged 
twelve shipments of Czech arms which were sent via Italy to Jakarta, and then on to the 
southeastern Thai coast from where they were subsequently shipped to Nam Bo by a sea 
route.24 In 1947, Vietnamese arms buyers in Thailand were negotiating with a European 
arms dealer concerning the purchase of Swedish Bofors surface-to-air weapons and 
30,000 Japanese rifles.25 It was understood by the Australian Consul General in 
Bangkok in 1951 that Italian and Swedish arms still continued to reach the Viet Minh 
through Thailand.26
Because Vietnamese access to rear bases in southern China and cooperation with the 
Chinese Communists still remained very difficult at this time, Thailand served as the 
DRV's major supply route during this crucial period. Somewhat ironically, during this 
same period Thailand seems to have been one contact point between Vietnamese and 
Chinese communist officials. In mid-1946, Chinese General Hsiang Ying, former 
deputy-commander of the Communist New Fourth Army, arrived in Siam to direct 
Chinese communist activities in Indochina. During his service in Thailand, he was in 
contact with Vietnamese representatives there and helped arrange the purchase and 
transport of arms to northern Vietnam. Sometime during the last half of 1947 he was 
transferred to work in northern Vietnam.27
23
24
25
26
27
Interview with Nguyen EXrc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
'Letter from Alan Loomes,' 27 June 1951. In his letter to Critchley, Loomes said that he had "positive 
proof o f the continued shipment of Czechoslovakian and Philippine arms to the Viet Minh." Long was 
known to have been shipping arms from the Philippines through Thailand as well.
'Bulletin de Renseignements: Trafxc d'Armes-Vente de 30.000 fusils japonais,' 12 au 24 Janvier 1947. By 
1950, the US listed Thailand and the Philippines as the two main sources through which arms and war 
material were reaching the Viet Minh. See: US, DOS, 484A.008/5-1150, The Ambassador in Thailand 
(Stanton) to the Secretary of State,' 11 May 1950 in FRUS (Volume VI, 1950), pp. 92-93; US, DOS, 
492.00234/5-1150, The Acting Secretary o f State to the Embassy in Thailand,' 23 May 1950 in Ibid., pp. 
96-98; and US, DOS, 492.00234/6-1750: Telegram, The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the
Secretary o f State,' 17 June 1950 in Ibid., p. 102.
'Letter from Alan Loomes,' 27 June 1951. Even when Phibun was in power, Loomes reported that he was 
"sure beyond reasonable doubt" that Nguyen Van Long had a "private pipe-line into the Thai cabinet." 
Loomes felt that the Vietnamese had a link to the Thai cabinet through Luang Prom Yothi.
Chen, op. cit., p. 189.
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Part II: Vietnamese Activities after the November 1947 Coup
II.l. The Impact of Changing Thai Political Conditions
From both Thai and Vietnamese sources, we know that former Seri Thai cadres now 
holding senior government positions provided the Viet Minh with access to arms which 
had been stockpiled since the end of WWII. Trän Van Giäu said that just prior to the 
November 1947 coup in Bangkok, he (and no doubt other DRV officials) concluded an 
agreement with some of these Thai officials whereby the Vietnamese would take over a 
large (though unspecified) quantity of arms. While it is unclear which Thai officials 
arranged this arms transfer, it must have been approved at a high-level if we can believe 
Giau's statement that this was a very sizable shipment.28
A 9 December article in the Thai newspaper, Siang Thai (The Voice of Thailand) may 
not have been unrelated to Giau's arms agreement, when it reported that ten thousand 
helmets had been found by Thai military authorities in a house in Bangkapi following the 
November coup. This house was being rented by Thong Kantatham, a former Seri Thai 
partisan and Deputy Minister of the Interior from the northeast who had worked with the 
Viet Minh since at least 1945 (see chapter 3). Also found in the house were two 
Vietnamese who told Thai military authorities that the helmets had been purchased by 
them to be taken back to Vietnam to use in the war against the French and not to be used 
in a revolution against the Thais. The two Vietnamese were said to have been former 
officers in the Vietnamese army now in Bangkok as buying agents for the Vietnamese 
army.29 In what may have been another related development, "a group of Vietnamese" 
presented the Thai Ministry of Defence with a claim to the arms and ammunition seized by 
military authorities from the residence of Thongin Phuriphat, a former Minister of 
Industry and Seri Thai associate of Pridi. The Vietnamese said they could produce 
evidence proving their claim to the arms.30
Concerning the acquisition of the Vietnamese-claimed arms by Thai military authorities 
following the November coup, Nguyln Due Qiiy said that "Thai Army Generals" 
arrived at his home in Bangkapi to question him as to the provenance of these weapons.
As we know from chapter 3, Tieng Serikhan, Thongin Phuriphat, and Chamlong Daoruang were three 
men who had taken charge of these weapons after WWII came to an end. No doubt, Pridi was aware of 
the destination of these arms as well. See chapters 3 and 4.
Siang Thai, 9 December 1947. The helmets had been made from the metal of 200 litre capacity fuel oil 
drums. According to a former Viet Minh officer who transported arms from Thailand to Indochina, 
weapons were sometimes stored in Pridi Phanomyong’s home. Interview with a former Viet Minh 
official, 20 June 1989, Hanoi.
Suwannaphum, 13 December 1947 and US, DOS, 751G.92/4-248, 'Memorandum of Conversation 
between Aphaiwong and Stanton,' 2 April 1948, USNA, p. 1. Tran Van Giku was in contact with 
Thongin shortly before and after the November coup. Interview with Tran Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho 
Chi Minh City.
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Qüy explained in an interview in 1989 that the arms which the Thai military confiscated 
from the Vietnamese had been purchased from former Seri Thai officials by DRV 
representatives working in Thailand. Qiiy assured the Thai generals that the arms were 
not to be used against the new government in a coup; instead they were to be transported 
back to Vietnam to use in the fight against the French.31
While there are few details available concerning the rate of Vietnamese arms transfers 
from Thailand to Indochina after the November coup, to DRV officials working in 
Thailand it must have been clear from the abovementioned incidents that their work in 
Thailand would not operate as smoothly as it had during the pre-coup period. The 
November 1947 coup which toppled the Thamrong government, exiled Pridi 
Phanomyong and many of his political allies, and paved the way for Phibun 
Songkhram's return to power in April 1948 had changed the rules governing Vietnamese 
operations in Thailand, posing a potentially formidable threat to Vietnamese activities 
there. No longer did the Viet Minh have former Seri Thai allies holding top positions in 
Thai government.
The implications for the Vietnamese of the political changes underway in Bangkok 
after November 1947 did not go unnoticed by the ICP. Nowhere can this be seen better 
than in the dispatch to Thailand of Hokng Van Hoan, an individual whom we first met in 
chapter l .32 In March 1948, Pham Ngoc Thach returned to the hills of northern 
Vietnam from Thailand to inform the ICP Central Committee of a request by Vietnamese 
officials in Thailand that Hoan be dispatched to Thailand. Thach explained in a meeting 
with Hoan, Ho Chi Minh, and Tnrcrng Chinh that although Vietnamese cadres in 
Thailand had accomplished much in Thailand since the end of WWII, work among the 
overseas Vietnamese remained deficient and the links between officials working at the 
DRV delegation in Bangkok and those cadres working in the northeast were less than 
acceptable. As for the delegation in Bangkok, its members were said to have "not taken 
adequate interest in activating Vietnamese nationals in northeast Thailand."33 In what
Interview with Nguyen Duc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
In his memoir, A Drop in the Ocean, published in 1986, Hoan dedicates twenty-three pages to a 
discussion of the reorganisation of Vietnamese activities in Thailand which, he claims, he presided over 
on behalf of the ICP between 1948 and 1949. Of this, he dedicates ten pages to a discussion of the 
problems Vietnam had in its relations with the Cambodians and Lao resistance movements operating 
from Thailand during this period. Although difficult not to cite Hoan's memoirs at length, I have not 
assumed that Hoan provides a complete and un-biased account of the state of Vietnamese activities in 
Thailand during 1948-49. In discussing Vietnam's relations with the Lao and Cambodians in the 
postwar period in his memoir, Hoan must have had the events of the late 1970s in mind. As has been 
mentioned, in mid-1979 Hoan, a ranking Vietnamese communist, defected to China where he singled 
out Hanoi's Cambodia policy for particular criticism. Unfortunately, Vietnamese communist publications 
are as quiet in their discussion of Thailand's importance during the 1947-1949 period as Hoan is vocal in 
his memoir. For example, Le Manh Trinh and Quynh Anh (both veteran ICP leaders who worked in 
Thailand into the 1950s) skip over almost completely the 1947-1949 period! Keeping in mind the danger 
o f relying on only one source, the sections I have used from Hoan's memoirs have been matched, where 
possible, against the interviews of former DRV representatives who worked in Thailand during the late 
1940s. In some cases, where I have been unable to cross-check Hoan's memoir with the interviews, I have 
been able to draw upon Thai sources.
Hoang Van Hoan, op. c it, p. 281. Truong Chinh was the Secretary General of the ICP.
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appears to be a reference to communist members who had worked in northeast Thailand 
since the 1920s and 1930s, Thach said that many comrades who had been working in 
Thailand for many years knew Hoan and wanted the ICP Central Committee to send him 
to Thailand in order to re-establish more effective resistance activities.34
After discussions with Ho and Trucrng Chinh, Hoan says he agreed to go to 
Thailand. Ho appointed him a representative of the ICP's Central Committee and 
empowered him to administer to all affairs relating to work among the overseas 
Vietnamese in Thailand. In addition, Ho approved documents making Hoan the Special 
Overseas Representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.35 In May 1948, twenty 
years after making his first trip to Thailand, Hoan returned for a second time. Hoan's 
work in Thailand entailed the re-organisation of activities among the overseas Vietnamese; 
the re-organisation of the work of the delegations in Bangkok and Rangoon; and the re­
organisation of Vietnamese assistance to the Lao and Cambodian revolutions.36
Upon arriving in northeast Thailand, Hoan travelled to Ubon where he met with 
Nguyen Due Quy, who reported on Phibun's return to power and the negative effects 
this was having on Vietnamese activities in Thailand. Before leaving Vietnam, Ho had 
instructed him to replace Qüy as the President of the DRV delegation in Bangkok. 
However, after further observation Hoan says he kept Quy in place for fear of drawing 
the attention of the Thais, and thereby running the risk that the Phibun government would 
use such a change as an opportunity to reject the DRV delegation altogether since 
Thailand had never officially recognised it. Hoan says that he chose to work from 
behind-the-scenes, taking charge of policy matters, Party work, and helping cadres with 
projects among the Vietnamese emigres in Thailand.37
From Ubon, Hoan went to Udon to meet with officials in the Overseas Vietnamese 
Special Committee and the Overseas Vietnamese National Salvation General Association. 
One of his impressions during travel in the northeast was that since the outbreak of war in 
Indochina, the Vietnamese in Thailand had displayed their activities much too openly, to 
the point where they now attracted the attention of a Thai government increasingly hostile 
to Vietnamese activities, to say nothing of possible negative repercussions on local 
opinion. Hoan also criticised cadres for not reading Thai newspapers, from which it was 
clear the Phibun government was preparing to crack-down on Vietnamese activities and 
had already begun a policy of spreading rumours and slandering the Vietnamese. In a 
move to address such serious problems, Hoan says he suggested to the Special 
Committee that a Congress be convened to draw together leaders from Party branches and
34 Ibid., p. 281.
35 Ibid., p. 281 with confirmation from Tran Van Giau [interview], 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
36 Hoäng Vän Hoan, op. c it, pp. 282-83.
37  Ibid., p. 284.
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oversea; Vietnamese committees from all over Thailand and western Indochina.38 
Significmtly, Hoan does not mention in his memoir having invited representatives from 
the DR'' delegation in Bangkok.
On 15, 16, and 17 August 1948, this Congress was held in Udon. In addressing 
delegates, Hoan reviewed the favourable conditions that had been available to the 
Vietnanese in Thailand since the end of WWII.39 Attention was then turned to a 
discussbn of the changing political climate in Bangkok, the overt displays of Vietnamese 
activities in Thailand, and the negative effects this was having on Vietnamese work in 
Thailanl. Hoan stressed that such actions violated Thai law, citing such examples as the 
public tisplay of the Vietnamese flag on Thai soil and Vietnamese soldiers from the 
Westen Front who flaunted arms in Thai towns for all to see. Hoan also pointed out that 
some Vetnamese openly advertised their communist credentials through the publication 
of communist materials and papers which were sold in a store called the "New 
Thailanl."40
Judgng from a Thai editorial published even before the November 1947 coup, Hoan 
may net have been exaggerating the potential negative effects of such overt actions on 
Thai piblic opinion. In a lengthy commentary entitled Vietnamese Communists in Siam . 
.. by a Siamese, one critic wrote in a Thai daily as follows:
Siam has opened her doors out of compassion for fellow human beings to the 
Vietnamese refugees, but unfortunately it has turned out that these refugees . . .  are 
Communists who seek to spread Communism in Siam, too. This minority is not only 
enjoying equal rights with the Siamese, but is also trying to exercise special rights, 
unsuitable to foreign residents in a fully independent country. . . In Nakhon Phanom 
they have their own legislative body whose members are openly elected by the 
Vietnamese in that provinee. They also have their own administrative body for the dual 
purpose of restoring Vietnamese independence and propagation of the Communist 
doctrine . . .  The Vietnamese have better rights to defend themselves than the Siamese, 
as every day we can see Vietnamese walking in the streets carrying rifles or sub­
machine guns without being molested. Any Siamese who does so is liable to be 
arrested.. . .  Thus it can be seen that these Vietnamese Communists are enjoying better 
rights than the true owners of the land . . .  [and] spread unmeritorious propaganda about 
the Siamese people and Siamese officialdom. The Siamese people should realise how 
harmful it is for us to be too generous in admitting foreigners and giving them special
3 8 bid., p. 286.
bid., p. 286. In his memoir, Hoan reviewed the accomplishments of the Vietnamese in Thailand, citing 
ue formation of Mekong I and EL, Tran Phü, the Western Front, and the establishment of training camps 
aid arms production teams on Thai soil. See: Ibid., p. 287 and chapter 4 of this thesis. 
bid., pp. 287-93 and Interview with Nguyen Dire Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.40
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rights. As to the government, we think if it is not too weak it would do well to take 
appropriate steps in this matter immediately.41
Naturally, the future course of Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand was a 
priority topic on the agenda of the Udon meeting, with Thailand's important strategic 
position to the resistance being one of the most important factors to be kept in mind. 
Writing decades later, Hoan summarised the main points of his address to this 1948 
meeting in his memoir as follows in part:
From the day our [Indochinese Communist] Party was established, the Overseas 
Vietnamese Party branch in Thailand has made many important contributions, most 
importantly during the period when the Indochinese Assistance Section was in operation 
following the destruction of the Soviet Nghe-Tinh high point In addition to this was 
the period during which the overseas Vietnamese in Laos and Thailand participated in 
the 1945 Lao revolution. These days our people's national resistance is in a difficult 
stage. With Vietnam surrounded on four sides, the Overseas Vietnamese Party branch 
in Thailand has a very important role to play. Because there are many overseas 
Vietnamese bases with individuals of a profound revolutionary spirit in Thailand and 
because in the previous few years a progressive Thai government created favourable 
conditions for overseas Vietnamese patriotic activities, Thailand has become the sole 
corridor (cira ngO duy nhat) to the international community for the Vietnamese and 
Indochinese resistance movements.42
With China's communist victory still over a year away, Hoan stressed the crucial role 
Thailand continued to play as a major supply route. As he wrote in his memoir:
If one wanted to supply the Vietnamese resistance with essential arms and equipment, 
then it was necessary to guard the Thai corridor. For these reasons, Thailand's 
geography had an exceedingly important (vo ciing quan trong) strategic position in 
relation to the Vietnamese and Indochinese revolutions during this period [1946-1948].
And also for that reason the responsibility of every cadre, party member, and overseas 
Vietnamese national was to preserve our strong position in Thailand.43
Speaking in separate interviews in April 1989, Tran Van Giku and Nguy6n Due 
Quy agreed that Thailand had an exceedingly important strategic position in relation to the 
Vietnamese resistance against the French during this period, citing Chiang Kaishek's
'Special Article: Vietnamese Communists in Siam . . .  by a Siamese,' Warasap, 23 September 1947.
Hofcng Van Hoan, op. c it, pp. 288-89. It appears that Hoan did not have access to a copy of his original 
speech given to the Udon Congress in 1948 while preparing his memoir for publication following his 
defection to China in 1979.
Ibid., p. 289. It will be recalled that in 1969 US Ambassador Leonard Unger described Thailand's 
importance to the US as "exceedingly important."
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denial of bases to the Vietnamese in southern China and French military action against 
Vietnam from all directions.44
One concrete suggestion Hoan says he made at this meeting was aimed at preserving 
Vietnamese activities in Thailand through the promotion of strict adherence to Thai laws, 
a theme which had first been advocated by Dang Thuc Htia and Ho Chi Minh decades 
earlier. To this end, he developed what he called a policy of Vietnamese-Thai Friendship 
(Viet-Thai Than Thien). This policy emphasised the need to respect Thai laws and 
customs and was designed particularly to win over the continued sympathy of Thai 
authorities in the northeast at a time when it was felt that the Bangkok government was 
preparing to suppress the Vietnamese. If a number of these officials remained 
sympathetic to the Vietnamese cause, despite the change of government in Bangkok, the 
Vietnamese could still continue their activities under favourable circumstances. As a 
result, the "open displays" were quickly brought to an end: Vietnamese flags were not 
flown in public and Western Front troops were reportedly banned from carrying their 
arms in open on Thai soil45
In addition to trying to increase Vietnamese compliance with Thai law, also discussed 
during the August congress was the need to widen resistance influence among the 
overseas Vietnamese. Stressing the recurrent need for more "linking together," Hoan and 
other cadres sought to re-strengthen resistance activities as quickly as possible and to 
prevent the destruction of political work which had already been completed. Efforts were 
also made to increase the secrecy of political and military work in the region. Hoan says 
the actions agreed upon at the Udon meeting were well-timed, for at the end of August 
Thai authorities began some of their first searches of Vietnamese homes in the northeast, 
but were allegedly frustrated by their failure to find incriminating communist evidence.46
II.2. Re-organising the DRV Delegation in Bangkok
Besides setting out a clear line for resistance work among the overseas Vietnamese in 
northeast Thailand, Hoäng Vän Hoan was also worried by the failure of a number of 
cadres in northeast Thailand to support the work of the DRV delegation in Bangkok. 
Cooperation between the leaders of the overseas Vietnamese in northeast Thailand and the 
delegation in Bangkok was marred by mistrust on both sides. Vietnamese cadres 
working in the austere northeast were upset by the relatively posh lifestyle enjoyed by 
their counterparts in Bangkok. Hoan says in his memoir that he had to dedicate a great 
deal of time to convincing leaders in the northeast that despite the better living conditions
4 4  Interviews with Nguyen D£rc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Tran Vän Giäu, 3 April 1989, Ho 
Chi Minh City.
4 5 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 289-91 and Interview with Hoang Nhat Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi.
4 6  Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 294 and also Interview with Nguyen DCrc Quy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh
City.
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at the delegation, these diplomats served a very important function for the nation. 
Without providing any details, Hoan only says that after discussions with northeastern 
cadres concerning this problem, relations improved between the two sides.47
While more research remains to be done before we can say anything more definitive 
about this matter, there must have been other, more serious reasons for the lack of 
cooperation between the two sides. After all this was one of the main reasons that led to 
the high-level dispatch of Hoan to Thailand. It is worth considering the possibility that 
there were two different directions informing Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand 
that came to a head by 1948. One was run by activists in the northeast concerned with 
events in northern Vietnam, while the other was administered by cadres working from 
Bangkok, the majority of whom were probably more concerned with the course of events 
in southern Vietnam. As we know from chapter 1, the Vietnamese leadership in the 
northeast was dominated by cadres from Nghe-Tinh. They had worked and lived in 
spartan conditions in northeast Thailand since the late 1920s and 1930s and were in firm 
control of Vietnamese organisations in the area. Because their resistance activities had 
historically been orientated toward northern Vietnam and southern China (and not toward 
southern Vietnam or Vietnamese communities in Cambodia), these cadres were probably 
ill-informed about the activities of their southern counterparts after WWII. Secondly, 
ranking southern communists were unable to attend the Tan Trao congress, and were thus 
probably unaware of the guide-lines directing the work of Viet Minh adherents in Laos 
and northeast Thailand after WWII. Moreover, they had their own agenda, quite different 
from their northern counterparts. Because war broke out in Nam Bo in September 
1945—over a year before it did in northern Vietnam—southern leaders in Thailand were 
much more interested in assisting the war effort in the south, and in so doing effectively 
altered the direction of resistance activities in Thailand away from its previous northern 
Vietnamese orientation. As we know, throughout 1946 a number of high-ranking 
southern officials were working in Thailand, in charge of arms shipments, contacts with 
the Thai government and military, the outfitting of combat units, and cooperation with the 
Cambodian resistance movement. In many respects, by mid-1946 southerners had 
already established a western corridor linking eastern Thailand to Nam Bo through routes 
crossing Cambodia and by sea.48 In this context, it is possible that following the 
outbreak of war in all of Vietnam in December 1946, the ICP did not give any clear 
directions to cadres in Thailand concerning the administration of these two different 
components of Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand. Both sides may have been 
competing for limited resources. This might explain why some cadres, almost certainly 
those in the northeast, finally had to ask Hoan (a northerner and veteran communist who
47 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 294-95. Unfortunately, we have no other sources against which to 
compare Hoan's account.
48 It will be recalled that ICP bases in northeastern Thailand up to this time had been concentrated in bases 
along the Thai-Lao border and not the Thai-Cambodian one.
178 Chapter 6
had worked in Thailand in the late 1920s and 1930s) to come there to reorganise 
resistance activities.49
Whatever the case, Hoan arrived in Bangkok sometime during the latter half of 1948 
and says he set about re-organising the work of the delegation. Upset by what he saw as 
haphazard and casual administration, Hoan argued that, as a diplomatic office, the 
delegation had to maintain a dignified and professional appearance.50 He also felt that 
members of the delegation had fallen out of touch with activities in the northeast because 
of "careless" operation. Hoan discussed these problems with Qüy and members of the 
Overseas Vietnamese Special Committee. Thereafter, Hoan says he asked permission 
from the ICP Central Committee to establish a new body, separate from the delegation, 
called the Central Committee Working Overseas Office (Ban Can Sir Trung Ucrng cr 
Hai Ngoai). This committee took over the leadership "of all work which had to be 
implemented in Thailand." These tasks included: 1) the organisation and mobilisation of 
the overseas Vietnamese in Thailand in order to increase their patriotic unity, support for 
the resistance, and to guard the Thai "gateway" to the international community; 2) the 
reorganisation of assistance to the Lao and Cambodian resistance movements from the 
west; 3) the organisation and administration of supply matters; 4) the administration of 
foreign affairs, consisting of international propaganda efforts and the activities of 
government representatives in Thailand and Burma; and 5) strengthening cooperation 
with officials in France and Czechoslovakia.51
Hoan became the secretary of the Overseas Office, while Qüy took over as the deputy 
secretary.52 A certain Hong and Song Tung were members of the Office who also 
served in the Overseas Vietnamese Special Committee. Joining them from the Western 
Front General Staff were a Khanh and Bmh (almost certainly Vü Hihi Binh), while Cao 
Hong Linh (Lanh) and Dung Vän Phuc represented the Vietnamese supply and 
procurement section in Thailand on this Commission.53 Almost all of these individuals 
were ICP members.
Unfortunately, we have very little information about how this Overseas Office 
worked. However, we do know that one of the delegation's problems in relation to the
49
50
51
52
53
Commenting on the leadership of Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand after WWÜ, Tran Van 
Dlnh said in a June 1990 interview that Tran Van Giau realised in Thailand the ramifications for his 
work there of not having attended Tän Träo. Dlnh, who was working from Bangkok during this period 
and was not a communist, claims that Giau was not an insider of the communist leadership in Thailand. 
Interview with Tran Van Dlnh, 20 June 1990, Washington, D.C. I have been unable to confirm this.
The timing of this matter coincided with stepped up efforts by the French to win over international and 
regional recognition of Bao Dai.
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 296; Interviews with Nguyen Dtirc Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City 
and Interview with Tran Van Giau, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. Both Quy and Gihu agreed that 
these five points were introduced.
Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 297. 
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 297.
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overseas Vietnamese during this period was enlisting young men to serve in the resistance 
in Vietnam. While many Vietnamese in Thailand joined combat units set up in Thailand 
since late 1945 (see chapters 3 and 4), recruitment was by no means a popular policy ' 
among all the Vietnamese in northeast Thailand. Those officials in charge of enlisting 
young Vietnamese nationals, such as Trän Van Giäu, often encountered hostility during 
recruiting trips to northeast Thailand. Giäu explained in an interview that he was far 
from popular among some Vietnamese families, especially among women in the northeast 
who were not keen on losing their loved ones on faraway battlefields in Vietnam.54 In a 
statement in support of the French-backed Bao Dai government in 1951, the wife of 
Pham Vän Bach mentioned this matter specifically in a scathing attack on Vietnamese 
activities in Thailand. She opposed what she saw as the forced, communist recruitment 
of young overseas Vietnamese men and their dispatch to Vietnam in overseas fighting 
units. Madame Bach said that those who refused to join could be charged with treason 
and killed by the Vietnamese communist organisation in Thailand, citing the murders of a 
Ly Hoa Vinh and Le Bien.55 Not surprisingly, published communist Vietnamese sources 
make no mention of such matters, and interviewees are less than forthcoming, so it has 
thus been impossible to confirm this allegation.
Another problem was the existence in Bangkok of the International Liaison Centre of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (see chapter 4). As we have noted earlier, this was 
another information service (possibly an appendage of the VNS) used to disseminate 
information on the DRV to the international community. To western journalists, 
however, this centre was suspected of being a communist front and was often referred to 
as the Comintern’s office in Southeast Asia. Hoan claims he advised that this centre be 
dismantled immediately in order to transfer much needed manpower to foreign affairs 
duties and to avoid attracting the attention of the Phibun government.56
Concerning the need to improve the delegation's appearance and effectiveness, Hoan 
and others rented a villa to separate the delegation from the VNS. This villa could house
Interview with Tran Van Giki, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City.
The Broadcast Statement of the wife of Mr. Pham Van Bach,' Vietnam News Bureau, 2 June 1951. While 
this statement must be used with care, Madame Bach, who worked in Thailand for at least four years 
(1946-1950), singles out her disagreement with Vietnamese communist activities in Thailand as one of 
the reasons leading her to switch over to supporting Bao Dai. There is evidence from other DRV officials 
who worked in Thailand during this time indicating that violent breaks did occur among the Vietnamese 
leadership in Thailand in the late 1940s. One former Vietnamese official who wishes to remain 
anonymous told the author in an interview that there were severe conflicts among the Vietnamese 
leadership in Thailand during the late 1940s and there was even talk of assassination plots. Another 
former ranking DRV official in Thailand during this period told the author that concerning Vietnamese 
affairs in Thailand in the late 1940s, there are "many stories which still remain secret and should not be 
discussed."
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 299. I have been unable to determine whether this was a communist 
organisation.
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ten to thirty cadres and was a more appropriate site for a diplomatic office. It was located 
on Sathom road, ironically positioned between the Soviet and American Embassies.57
Sometime at the end of 1948 or the beginning of 1949, the Central Committee 
Working Overseas Office convened a meeting in Bangkok for cadres conducting foreign 
affairs work abroad. When addressing the meeting, Hoan stressed the importance of 
supporting the DRV's policies and the need to avoid "free manifestations of 
individualism" and "diversions from the DRV's line and policies."58 Once again, Hoan 
emphasised the importance of maintaining a high standard of protocol. While he does not 
say it, it seems clear that Hoan and others must have had political changes in the region in 
mind— most probably attempts by the French, and increasingly the Americans, to win 
over regional support for the Bao Dai regime.59
II.3. Relations with the Lao and Cambodian Resistance in Thailand
The French and Americans were also competing with DRV officials in Thailand for 
influence over the Cambodian and Lao resistance groups based there. The Vietnamese 
were well aware of these efforts, and responded by trying to forge better cooperation with 
their resistance counterparts operating from Thailand. Again, our discussion of this topic 
is restricted greatly by the fact that there is little information available concerning 
Vietnamese relations with the Cambodian and Lao resistance leaders located in Thailand 
between 1947-1949. Nonetheless, with the French in control of much of Laos and 
Cambodia and with many of the major resistance leaders of these two countries operating 
from Thailand, Thailand must have been a key contact point for the DRV with its Lao and 
Cambodian resistance partners. As we have seen in chapters 3 and 4, following the 
French reoccupation of Cambodia (September-October 1945) and Laos (March-May 
1946), a number of Cambodian and Lao resistance leaders had gone westward into 
Thailand to continue their anti-French activities. Together with the ICP's Overseas 
Vietnamese Special Committee based in northeast Thailand, the DRV delegation in 
Bangkok was responsible for assisting the Lao and Cambodians against the French.
5 ' Working from its office in Bangkok and with the permission of Burmese government officials, the DRV 
established another delegation in Rangoon in early 1948. This office was under the leadership of Dr. 
Tran Vän Luän, a former member of the delegation in Bangkok. 'Vietnam Diplomatic Representative 
Arrives in Burma,' VNS, 9 March 1948 and Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 302.
58 At about the same time the Overseas Commission was being put together, Hoan says that Le Hy, the head 
of the Vietnam News Service, mysteriously left Bangkok without informing his superiors. At first it was 
thought he had either tired of his work and took leave for some place in Thailand or he had been arrested 
by the Thai police. However, within a short period of time, the Soviet delegation in Bangkok informed 
DRV officials that Le Hy had arrived in Moscow safely. Hoan claims he was greatly worried by this 
incident, fearing that Hy might have some hidden political agenda explaining his "undisciplined" action. 
Immediately the Soviet government and Central Committee were informed by the Vietnamese that Hy's 
actions were in no way condoned by the ICP Central Committee. Hoan says it was soon learned that Hy 
"had been influenced by the incorrect ideology" of Tran Ngoc Danh, the president of the DRV delegation 
in Paris. Both had allegedly objected to the Party's slowness in implementing socialist policies, such as 
land reforms and an official announcement opposing the imperialist bloc, and had hoped the Soviet 
communists would somehow be helpful. See: Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 298-99.
59 Ibid., pp. 303-04.
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Immediately after the outbreak of full-scale war in Indochina in December 1946, the ICP 
Central Committee had directed its Overseas Party branch in Thailand to support the Lao 
and Cambodian resistance groups from the west.60 Nguyen Dire Qüy said in an 
interview that upon setting up the DRV delegation in Bangkok in mid-1946, he was 
instructed to assist and build cooperation with the Lao and Cambodian resistance leaders 
operating in Thailand, albeit the extent of Vietnamese aid was limited by a paucity of 
funds.61 Qüy said that he mainly provided the Lao and Cambodians with information on 
military and political developments in Indochina and the course of Franco-Vietnamese 
negotiations.62
Militarily, the delegation served as liaison for implementation of some Lao- 
Vietnamese-Cambodian anti-French activities in northeastern Thailand and western 
Indochina. According to a French intelligence report dated June 1948, a combined 
Vietnamese-Lao-Cambodian staff was based in Bangkok. It was reportedly led by a 
certain Cambodian named Song Sarik, with Prince Phetsarath and Thao Oun representing 
the Lao Issara and Tran Van Dinh acting as the Viet Minh's representative.63 In charge 
of a separate Cambodian-Vietnamese Mixed Staff was Vü Hiru Binh.64
Of course, most important to Vietnamese strategists in terms of their interest in 
expanding links with the Lao and Cambodian resistance movements based out of 
Thailand was the course of French military operations in Vietnam during this period. On 
the northwestern flank, Vietnamese military leaders were very worried by French military 
movements along the Vietnamese-Lao border. As we saw in chapter 3, in February 1946 
the Chinese allowed French troops from southern China to move into northeastern Laos
60
61
62
63
64
Ibid., p. 305 for the quote, cited with reference to Interviews with Nguyen Ehre Qüy, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi 
Minh City; Tran Van Giau, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City; and Hoang Nhät Tan, 5 May 1989, Hanoi. 
As we have noted, one of the twelve points of Ho Chi Minh's 22 December 1946 Call for Nationwide 
Resistance was "solidarity with the Lao and Cambodians." See: Lieb Sur Quin Doi, pp. 253-55.
It appears that Souphanouvong, whose relationship with other Lao nationalists in Bangkok was 
increasingly rocky by 1949, was working closely with DRV representatives in Bangkok concerning the 
need for financial assistance. In one instance, Katay Don Sasorith cites "a high Vietnamese official" in 
Bangkok telling him that Souphanouvong had received 20,000 ticals (Baht) from the DRV delegation in 
Bangkok. See: ’Letter 2: Note on Subject of the Resignation of Prince Souphanouvong . . in Brown 
and Zasloff, op. tit., pp. 349 and 352.
Interview with Nguyen Dure Qiiy, 3 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City. During his stop-overs in Bangkok, 
Pham Ngoc Thach also met with Lao resistance leaders to win over their support. US, DOS, 892.00/5- 
2347, 'Fortnightiy Summary of Political Events in Siam for the Period April 16-April 30, 1947,' 23 May 
1947, USNA, p. 3.
'Organisation de l'Autorite Politico-Militaire Adverse en Indochine, Juin 1948. This report listed 
Vietnamese leaders of the Oubon committee as Nguyen Nhir, in Surin, Mai Van Quang; in Udon, Dinh 
Van Khanh. Tran Dure Vlnh was president of the Overseas Vietnamese National Salvation Association 
in Thailand and incorrectly referred to as the former head of the Delegation. Le HQru Hong was said to 
be in charge of war coordination matters at the DRV delegation, while Nguyen Van Long was reportedly 
administering to population matters, which probably meant administering to overseas Vietnamese 
organisations. The President of the Khmer Issarak delegation was Pok Kun, with the nominal head of 
the organisation being Chawalit Aphaiwong, the brother of the former Thai Prime Minister Khuang 
Aphaiwong.
Hoang Van Thai, ed., Tran Dinh Ba Mircri Nam, Ky Sir Lieh Sir [The Thirty Year War, A Historical 
Chronicle], (Hanoi: NXBQDND, 1983), p. 338. This staff was probably located somewhere in western 
Indochina.
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and northwestern Vietnam, where they soon occupied the towns of Lai Chau and Scm La 
and eventually took Nghia Do and Lao Cai by early 1948. In February 1947, the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Defence-General Staff had already instructed soldiers in 
northwestern Vietnam to assist the Lao in operations against the French.65
To the south, the Vietnamese felt that the French would use Cambodia as a 
springboard from which to attack northern Vietnam.66 Following the outbreak of war, 
the French not only seized most towns in northern Vietnam, but also began moving up 
the coast from Da Nang in 1947, taking control of strategically important towns, roads, 
and communications points in the Binh-Tri-Thien area (the three central provinces of 
Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thira Thien). According to one Vietnamese source, 
because the French took control of this area, the ICP had to assign the Regional 
Committee of Nam Bo the important task of "reverse supplying." This meant that arms 
and equipment were brought out of Nam Bo to the "Cambodia-Thai-Lao Road" in order 
to be distributed to other areas to the north.67 Worried by French control of the narrow 
Binh-Tri-Thien hinge of Vietnam, in m id-1948 the ICP instructed cadres to widen 
cooperation with the Lao and Cambodians to increase the number of battles with the 
French, and thereby disperse and weaken their forces (see Map V).68 In early 1948, the 
Khmer Issarak formed the Khmer People's Liberation Committee which worked closely 
with the Viet Minh.69
As a ranking ICP Central Committee member, Hoang Vän Hoan must have had these 
factors in mind when working to increase military cooperation with Cambodian and Lao 
resistance leaders in Thailand in m id-1948. In Hoan's opinion, while Vietnamese 
assistance to the Lao and Cambodians from Thailand had had successes, a number of 
problems were seriously affecting the ability of the Vietnamese to work with its resistance 
counterparts. On one occasion Nguydn Due Qiiy informed Hoan that Prince
65
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hid., p. 292 and Cam Trong, op. cit, pp. 52141.
For evidence o f this fear, see: Hoang Van Thai, op. cit, p. 139, quoting from a letter from the ICP to 
cadres in Nam Bp found in the Vietnamese Communist Party Office Archives, C l, Q2, 9a.
Nguyen Hao Hung, op. cit., pp. 14546 for evidence of the reverse supplying and Lieh Sir Quin Sir, pp. 
286-88 and 352-61, for more details concerning Vietnamese view of French action in Binh-Tri-Thien 
area By the end of 1946, Vietnam had been divided into twelve war zones. See Lockhart, op. cit, pp. 
162 and 199 for a list and map of the zones, respectively.
Hoang Van Thai, op. cit, p. 323 and Lieh Su Quin Dpi, pp. 352-61 used in conjunction with Lockhart, 
cp. cit, pp. 186-93, especially p. 193. In July 1950, Trircmg Chinh reviewed the strategic situation o f the 
Vietnamese resistance against the French. At the outset of his discussion, Chinh pointed out how the 
French had moved to "organise the Cambodians and Lao into two separate battlefields" and had 
concluded an agreement with the Phibun government to protect the western borders of those two 
countries. In response, Trircmg Chinh said that the Vietnamese had expanded their bases and developed 
guerilla war in Cambodia and Laos in an effort to restrict the military activities of the French to the Binh- 
Tri-Thien area where the French were targeting their military efforts. Laos and Cambodia would become 
two rear areas from which the Vietnamese would attack the French in central Vietnam. See: Trircmg 
Chinh, 'Chüng Ta Dä Lam Gi va Con Phii Lam Gi De Chuyen Sang Giai Doan Mcri?' [What We Have 
Done and What Must we Still Must Do in order to Move to a New Period?], Tap Chi Cong San [The 
Communist Review], August 1950, No. 2 in KCTT, Vol. 2, p. 407. 
iCieman, How Pol Pot p. 58 and Nguyen Hao Hung, op. cit, p. 147.
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Souphanouvong wanted to leave Bangkok to reside in a different place.70 After an 
investigation of the matter, Hoan claims it became clear that the problem stemmed from 
"undisciplined” actions taken by a Vietnamese military unit operating in southern Laos 
which had taken arms from a Lao unit in order to make better use of them. This had led 
to a serious clash between the two sides, leading Souphanouvong to lose faith in 
Vietnamese intentions. While the problem was evidently solved successfully, the 
Vietnamese continued to pay close attention to the importance of maintaining good 
relations with the Lao and the Cambodians and remained worried by competing French 
and the Americans efforts in Thailand to win over their support.71
After this incident, Hoan says that he focused his attention on ways by which 
Vietnamese aid to the Lao and Cambodians could be improved. At the end of 1948, the 
Central Committee Working Overseas Office organised a Congress of the Western Front 
to fix a number of priorities concerning Vietnamese assistance to the Lao and Cambodian 
revolutions. Delegates came from Bangkok and the zones comprising the Western Front. 
During this meeting, it was allegedly agreed that cadres in the Western Front had 
neglected their duties of organising the masses, building regional bases, and training 
soldiers and cadres for the Lao and Cambodians. Secondly, the emphasis on military 
matters had been too heavy and that on politics too light. Soldiers had carried out 
propaganda in Laos and Cambodia in order to provide themselves with places to fight the 
French, without recognising the importance of creating revolutionary bases among the 
Lao and Cambodian masses. Another point this congress discussed was the 
inappropriate way by which Viet Minh officials working in the Western Front applied 
Vietnamese models too rigidly in Laos and Cambodia, without taking into account the 
different conditions and characteristics of these areas and their peoples. As a result, a 
number of Lao and Cambodians who finished Viet Minh training classes "had doubts and 
moved further away from us."72
However, in the end it is doubtful if any of Hoan's recommendations had time to be 
implemented. Indeed, Thailand's position as a meeting place for the Vietnamese with the 
Lao and Cambodians was about to come to an end, for rapidly changing events in China 
were realigning Vietnamese strategic interests toward the north. Following the fall of 
Manchuria to the Communists in late 1948, the Chinese Communists made big military 
gains against Nationalists forces and cooperation with Viet Minh forces along the Sino-
Hokig Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 306.
Ibid., pp. 306-07. See: Nakhon San, 20 August 1947, Chat Thai, 22 August 1947, Prachachon, 7 August 
1947, and Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao, (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 39 for evidence of French attempts to woo the Lao Issara back to 
Laos. See: Nakhon San, 3 August 1947 and 7 August 1947 for evidence of similar attempts to win over 
the Cambodians. Dap Chhuon wrote a letter to the Thai paper, Kiatisak, condemning French efforts to 
bring Phra Phiset Phanit over to their side. See: Kiatisak, 16 August 1947.
Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 309. I have been unable to confirm this with other accounts; and until more 
evidence comes to light, we cannot accept Hoan’s version as the last word. Again, a lack of information 
prevents us from examining the military importance Thailand must have had during this time.
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Vietnamese border began to increase markedly.73 Within a few months, Hoan left 
Thailand for Moscow and Peking.
II.4. Changes in Thai Policy toward Vietnamese Activities in Thailand
Further detracting from Thailand's value to the Vietnamese was the tougher line being 
taken by Phibun toward Vietnamese resistance activities in Thailand. While DRV 
partisans did their best to maintain his favour (see chapter 5), there was little they could 
do about it. By late 1949 and early 1950 the arrival of the Cold War in Southeast Asia 
and domestic Thai political changes saw Phibun adopt policies more in line with 
converging French and US interests aimed at preventing the Ho Chi Minh-led 
government from gaining power in Vietnam. By 1950, Phibun had disavowed all claims 
to the very Lao and Cambodian territories for which he had committed troops a decade 
earlier. He also bowed to French and US pressure to suppress Viet Minh activity in 
Thailand and stem the flow of arms coming from and through Thailand to the Vietnamese 
resistance.74 More damaging still, in 1950 Phibun launched a severe crack-down on 
Vietnamese activities in Thailand, a policy which eventually resulted in the repatriation of 
thousands of Vietnamese from northeast Thailand to southern Thailand and eventually 
back to the DRV in the late 1950s.75 Lastly, the return to power of Phibun Songkhram 
saw the demise of the influence of the Seri Thai, many of its leaders having been long­
standing DRV supporters. No where could this be seen better than in March 1949, when 
the mysterious deaths of Thawi Udon, Chamlong Daoruang, and Thongin Phuriphat at 
the hands of the Thai police saw three of the DRV's strongest Thai supporters eliminated 
in one stroke. A few years later, Tiang Serikhan mysteriously "disappeared," never to be 
seen again. In the meantime, the Viet Minh's staunchest backer, Pridi Phanomyong, had 
gone into exile in China following a failed attempt to overthrow the Phibun-led 
government.
Phibun's determination to recognise the Bao Dai government, one which was 
remarkably similar to his own in terms of its political rehabilitation, marked the end of 
Thai sympathy for Vietnamese resistance work on Thai soil. Although this decision was 
strongly opposed by a range of Thai statesmen and caused a deep split within his own 
cabinet, on 28 February 1950 Phibun emerged victorious as Thailand became the first
Chen, op. tit., pp. 195-200. Chen says that by the end of 1948 three local Chinese Communist units 
arrived at the Sino-Vietnamese border.
See: ’Premier States Indochinese Border Issue Now Closed,’ BP, 27 May 1948 and US, DOS, 484A.008/5- 
1150, T he Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State, 11 May 1950 in FRUS (1950, 
Volume VI), pp. 92-93; US, DOS, 492.00234/5-1150, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in 
Thailand,’ 23 May 1950 in FRUS (1950, Volume VI), pp. 96-98; and US, DOS, 492.00234/6-1750, The 
Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State,' 17 June 1950 in FRUS (1950, Volume VI),
p. 102.
The details of the Thai suppression of the Vietnamese in the 1950s is a separate topic, outside of the scope 
o f this thesis, but deserving of serious investigation. More details can be found in Le Manh Trinh, 
CVDCQ; Wichan Champisi, Yuan Opphayop . . .  op. tit.; and Peter A. Poole, The Vietnamese in 
Thailand . . .  op. t i t
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Asian state to recognise Bao Dai.76 And in a further showing of his anti-communist 
credentials, a few months later Phibun offered ground troops to the UN in support of 
US-led forces in Korea.
DRV officials in Bangkok did their best to counter attempts by the Bao Dai regime to 
gamer international recognition. In one instance, Phibun was informed that a message 
had been sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Ho Chf Minh addressed to various 
governments of Southeast Asia arguing that DRV was "the only legal government" and 
asking to establish diplomatic relations with any government which respects the rights of 
equality.77 In another case, the Prime Minister's office had received twenty four petitions 
from overseas Vietnamese in Thailand concerning Thai moves toward recognising Bao 
Dai.78 On 1 September, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an announcement saying 
that the recognition of the Vietnamese government in Saigon "does not extend to 
individual leaders in the government, but rather is a recognition of the government which 
the French have allowed to be formed . . ."79 According to a communication from the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of the Prime Minister, this response was 
made to allay domestic Vietnamese critics of Thailand's recognition of Bao Dai. 
However, at the same time, the government decided to act more stridently against those 
Vietnamese who openly supported Ho Chf Minh.80
Sometime after the Thai recognition of Bao Dai, a Cadillac carrying the powerful Chief 
of Police, Phao Sirayanon, pulled up to the kerb in front of the National Assembly where 
Qüy was standing. Qiiy was told to get inside, where Phao informed him that he would 
have to leave Thailand—he was to be deported. Shortly thereafter, Qiiy packed his bags 
and, along with six other members of the delegation, left Thailand for Rangoon.81 While 
Vietnamese activities in Thailand would not be eradicated entirely during the decades that 
followed, Quy's deportation from Thailand symbolised the effective end of the western 
front and the importance of Thailand to the Vietnamese resistance against the French. By
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77
78
79
80
81
The Thai cabinet split over Thai recognition of B4o Dai, with the Thai Foreign Minister, Pote Sarasin, 
resigning in opposition. For a fairly helpful, inside Thai account of the Bao Dai problem, see: Khonthi, 
op. cit, pp. 451-60.
TNA, ff. 1.0201.37.6/Folder 11.1, 'Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister,' 26 January 1950.
TNA, ft.7.0201.37.6/Folder 11.1, 'Secretary of Prime Minster's Office to Assistant Director of Police,' 31 
July 1950. These petitions were no doubt written at the behest of Vietnamese activists working in 
Thailand.
TNA, ff.1 .0201.37.6/Folder 11.1, "Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,’ 1 September 1950.
TNA, f(.1.0201.37.6/Folder 11, 'Ministry o f Foreign Affairs to Secretary of Prime Minister,' 18 September 
1950. Interestingly, on 19 October 1950, the Secretary of the National Security Council informed the 
Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office that Ho Chi Minh’s forces were well organised, widely supported, 
and may defeat the French. Such an eventuality, it was stated, may cause local Vietnamese to oppose the
Thai government. TNA, ft. 7. 0201.37.6/Folder 11.1, 'Secretary of the National Security Council to 
Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, 19 October 1950. For more information concerning this fear, 
see: Konthi, op. cit., p. 451.
Interview with Nguyen Dtirc Qiiy, 5 April 1989, Ho Chi Minh City and TNA, ft.7 .0201.37.6/Folder 11.1, 
'Director of Police to Prime Minister,' 5 July 1951. Qiiy's home was near the Assembly.
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this time, the Vietnamese had already shifted their attention to the north as the victory of 
the Chinese Communists opened key northern rear areas and provided large amounts of 
military aid. In Peking in January 1950, Ho Chi Minh and Hoang Vän Hoan met to 
discuss the rapidly changing strategic environment. After having heard Hoan report on 
the deteriorating conditions in Thailand, Ho told Hoan that with the Chinese now aiding 
the Vietnamese resistance, priorities would now be shifted from Thailand to China.82
82 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, p. 327. Many of the cadres who had worked in Thailand were soon moved to 
China. Ibid., p. 331.
Conclusion
In this study, we have traced the development of Vietnamese resistance activities in 
Thailand from 1885 to 1949. Although Thailand's relative importance to the Vietnamese 
resistance movement did not increase at a constant rate throughout this period, but rather 
fluctuated in response to several factors, it has been shown that there was an overall 
increase in its strategic significance to the Vietnamese struggle against the French. This 
was most notable in the immediate post-WWII period. Since there are no alternative 
studies examining this topic against which we can compare the present work, let us 
conclude briefly by considering a few of the major themes which have emerged from our 
discussion in the previous six chapters.
A number of factors combined to make Thailand an attractive rear base to the 
Vietnamese resistance during the period under study. Most importantly, because 
Thailand was geographically close to Vietnam but simultaneously positioned just outside 
the direct French colonial reach, it could act as an effective western rearguard for the 
Vietnamese resistance. An added inducement was the large number of overseas 
Vietnamese residing in Thailand, in the northeastern part in particular. Thirdly, having 
been forced by the French to abandon claims to large tracts of territory in Laos and 
Cambodia, Bangkok shared the Vietnamese antipathy for French colonialism, a factor that 
worked in the Vietnamese favour at key points during the anticolonial movement. This 
can be seen in the permission the Thai royal family gave to scholar-patriots to reside in 
Ban Tham at the turn of the century; the backing northeastern Thai authorities gave to 
Vietnamese efforts to build their own hamlets and schools in the 1920s; Bangkok's 
favourable policy changes toward the Vietnamese resistance during the Franco-Thai war, 
and the large-scale military and diplomatic support which the DRV received from Thai 
civilian and military officials in the wake of WWD.
This thesis has also shown that there was a linkage between anticolonial programmes 
in northeastern Thailand and those in southern China from 1885 to 1949. Although 
Vietnamese resistance activities in southern China took long-term precedence over those 
in Thailand, evidence has been presented in this study demonstrating that there were 
certain periods when Thailand assumed a more important role. This occurred when 
Vietnamese resistance projects in China could no longer operate effectively, forcing 
anticolonial leaders to shift their attention to Thailand, the only other rear area available on
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the outskirts of Indochina. This was the case in the late 1880s when Phan Dinh Phiing 
sent partisans to Thailand to seek aid. Choosing again between China and Thailand in 
1908, Phan Boi Chau subsequently went to Bangkok three times. It was after learning 
of the 1911 Chinese Revolution that Chau left Thailand for southern China to set up the 
Quang Phuc Hoi. However, realising the continued importance of Thailand's 
geographic position, he immediately sent cadres there to establish subsidiary branches. 
Little over a decade later, Ho Chi Minh followed in this pattem when, after forming the 
Thanh Nien in Canton in 1925, he dispatched adherents to Thailand to set up subsidiaries 
organisations there. A few years later Ho himself arrived in Thailand, symbolising the 
increased importance of Thailand to the Vietnamese resistance in the wake of the violent 
break between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists in 1927. Thailand remained a 
key rearguard to Vietnamese communists when they set up the Indochinese Assistance 
Section in bases in northeast Thailand in the early 1930s to serve as recovery and training 
centres for cadres fleeing the French repression of the Soviet Nghe-Tinh uprisings. 
Lastly, with Chiang Kaishek making it much harder for the Vietnamese to work out of 
southern China as war engulfed Indochina after WWII, Thailand assumed unique 
importance to the DRV as a major source of arms and equipment, a crucial link to the 
international community, a contact point to Lao and Cambodian resistance groups there, 
and a close rear base providing training camps and access to the financial resources of the 
large Vietnamese communities in Thailand. It is in this context that the interplay between 
Thailand and China became an important component of the Vietnamese resistance against 
the French during the period under study.
Another benefit deriving from Thailand's favourable position in relation to Vietnam 
was the opportunity it afforded Vietnamese revolutionary leaders during the pre-WWII 
period to set up cadre-training camps relatively safe from French interference. Between 
1912 and 1916, Dang Thüc Hfra took advantage of such circumstances to set up small 
youth camps in Ban Dong, turning this into a policy after WWI. Following in this 
tradition in the late 1920s, leaders of the Thanh Nien set up a number of Cooperative 
Associations in Thailand to give revolutionary training to youths sent from Vietnam. 
During his stay in Thailand, Ho Chi Minh introduced cadres to the works of Marx and 
Engels and helped Thanh Nien organisations in Thailand make the change over to 
communism and presided over formation of the SCP. In the 1930s, more than one 
Vietnamese communist has referred to bases in northeast Thailand as "Universities" 
where they received important training and experience among the Thai and overseas 
Vietnamese communities, the training grounds for these revolutionary laboratories. 
Consider just a few of the prominent names listed among those who tended to 
revolutionary work in Thailand in the 1920s and 1930s: Pham Hong Thai, Le Hong 
Phong, Le Tan Anh, Ho Tung Mau, Ho Chi Minh, Phüng Chi Kien, former Major
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General Hoang Sam, Hoang Vän Hoan, Vö Tung, Dang Thai Thuyen, and Le 
Manh Trinh.
Interestingly, almost all of these individuals came from the northern central Vietnamese 
provinces of Ha Tinh and Nghe An, both of which are renowned for the large number 
of famous anticolonialists they have produced since 1885. The fact that the birthplaces of 
these major resistance figures were located little over 100 kilometres from northeast 
Thailand and because many of their relatives and friends had fled to Thailand following 
the destruction of the Can Vircrng movement, these individuals were well aware of 
Thailand's favourable proximity. Indeed, looking back at the strategic thinking of the 
major Vietnamese resistance leaders active during the period under study, Thailand 
figured into their anti-French plans in one way or another. This helps to explain why the 
leadership of Vietnamese resistance programmes in Thailand was dominated by cadres 
from Nghe-Tlnh. Of the major figures responsible for building resistance projects in 
Thailand during the period prior to WWII, the following were all from these two 
provinces: Phan Dinh Phiing, Tran Hiru Lire, Phan Boi Chau, Dang Thuc Hira, 
Quynh Anh, Ho Tung Mau, Ho Chi Minh, and Hoang Van Hoan.
Considered together with the China-Thailand linkage, the dominant Nghe-Tlnh 
component of the Vietnamese resistance leadership in Thailand goes far to accounting for 
the orientation of Vietnamese programmes in Thailand toward northern Vietnam and 
southern China during the period prior to WWII. During the early 1920s, Dang Thuc 
Hira predicated his work on constructing better contact with posts in northern Vietnam 
and China, providing rest-stops to cadres coming from China and Vietnam (i.e. Nghe- 
Tlnh), and setting up a system whereby students could be sent out of Vietnam (again, 
Nghe-Tlnh) to Thailand to study or to await subsequent dispatch to China. Between 
1920 and 1925, Hua set up a network of bases in the northeastern Thai provinces of 
Nong Khai, Nakhon Phanom, Sakhon Nakhon, and Udon Thani. All of these provinces 
were sites where the majority of Vietnamese fleeing French colonial expansion into 
northern central Vietnam in the late 1880s and 1890s had settled and they were also 
provinces located in upper northeast Thailand, areas parallel to Nghe-Tlnh. This linkage 
between upper northeast Thailand and Nghe-Tlnh was evident in the early 1930s, when 
Vietnamese communists used bases Hira had set up earlier to support the Indochinese 
Assistance Section and its task of sheltering cadres fleeing French suppression of the 
Nghe-Tlnh uprisings.
As a corollary, the concentration of these Vietnamese bases in upper northeast 
Thailand also led Vietnamese organisations there to pay more attention to Laos' strategic 
importance and less to that of Cambodia. Beginning with the Thanh Nien in the mid- 
1920s, and then expanded by Ho Chf Minh in the late 1920s and the communists in the 
early 1930s, revolutionary bases were set up in major Lao towns along the Thai-Lao
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frontier to act as contact points between Vietnamese resistance bases in Thailand and 
outposts in Vietnam. By the early 1930s, Vietnamese activists had linked Nong Khai to 
Vientiane, Nakhon Phanom to Thakhek, and Mukdahan to Savannakhet. However, there 
is no evidence showing anyone connecting Aranyaprathet to the Cambodian border town 
of Poipet or Chanthaburi to Pailin, suggesting that there was little resistance activity in the 
lower northeastern Thai provinces bordering Cambodia, such as Ubon or Surin (see map 
III). Obviously, Laos' geopolitical position between Vietnamese resistance positions in 
northeast Thailand and posts in Vietnam and southern China made it more important to 
northern-orientated anticolonialists working in Thailand prior to WWII. And, unlike 
Laos, Cambodia's main cities were located in the interior, far from potential Thai-based 
resistance organisations along the northeastern Thai border. This made contact with 
Vietnamese emigre communities in Cambodia more difficult for Thai-stationed 
Vietnamese activists than was the case in Laos. From the evidence available, the 
Vietnamese leadership in Thailand took little interest, if any at all, in building contacts 
with southern Vietnamese resistance organisations or building bases among Vietnamese 
nationals in Cambodia (to say nothing of a lack of interest in working with the 
Cambodians).
This northern orientation had important ramifications in the post-WWII period. As the 
war came to an end, giving way to a complex series of events discussed in chapter 3, the 
connexions resistance organisations in Thailand had to the Vietnamese communities in 
Laos gave the Viet Minh a considerable foothold in Laos—a political base from which to 
influence events and negotiations and a factor which helped the DRV in enlisting the 
support of the overseas Vietnamese and, to a lesser degree, Lao forces in the defence of 
Vietnam. In this sense, resistance bases in northeast Thailand contributed to protecting 
Vietnam's western flank. In contrast, the failure of Vietnamese resistance leaders in 
Thailand to build contact with large overseas Vietnamese communities in Cambodia and 
their failure to establish any lasting cooperation with the Cambodian resistance groups 
that had worked out of lower northeast Thailand since 1940 was one reason the Viet Minh 
were much more isolated from events in Cambodia than they were in Laos at the end of 
WWII. This is also an important reason for the dispatch to Thailand in early 1946 of 
southern Viet Minh cadres, such as Nguyin Thanh Scm and Trän Vän Giäu, who 
were instructed to build cooperation with the Cambodian resistance groups operating 
there.
The key to the ability of the Vietnamese to administer to large-scale activities in 
Thailand after WWII was the support they received from the Thais. Although we have 
seen that there were certainly periods of Thai suppression, at the outset of the 1940s a 
growing antipathy for the French saw a range of Thai political camps giving the 
Vietnamese increasing degrees of support. As we have shown, this widening assistance
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was a function of weakening French power in the wake of the outbreak of WWII. 
Following the fall of France to Germany in June 1940, Thailand relied on Japan to help it 
regain territories lost to the French decades earlier. One of the products of this was a new 
view of the Vietnamese resistance on the part of the Phibun-led government, one which 
sought to gain Vietnamese support of the Thai case against the French. It was in this 
context that Phibun met with VQ Hiru Binh and relaxed regulations of the Vietnamese in 
Thailand, contributing to a small, though important, revitalisation of Vietnamese activities 
in Thailand. A more important relationship developed, however, at the end of the Pacific 
War, when Viet Minh cadres in Thailand joined their Seri Thai counterparts in guerilla 
operations against the Japanese. While this cooperation was short-lived and very limited, 
it nevertheless was an extremely important link that laid the foundation for the close 
degree of cooperation that emerged in the immediate postwar period between DRV 
representatives in Thailand and Seri Thai leaders now assuming top leadership posts in 
Thai government. Without the support of such key figures as Pridi Phanomyong, Tiang 
Serikhan, Thongin Phuriphat, or Chamlong Daoruang, the Vietnamese would certainly 
have found their ability to supply the Vietnamese war effort much more difficult during 
the crucial period between 1945 and 1949.
During this same period we have seen that the complex strategic climate created by the 
Allied division of Indochina along the 16th parallel directly effected the development of 
postwar Vietnamese activities in Thailand in several important ways. The French 
reoccupation of southern Vietnam and all of Cambodia during the last half of 1945 left 
southern Viet Minh leaders looking to Thailand as their only major source of arms and 
rearguard safe from the French. The outbreak of hostilities in southern Vietnam, over a 
year before full-scale war broke out in the north, accounts for the unprecedented level of 
southern Vietnamese participation in resistance activities in Thailand in 1946. 
Throughout this year, ranking southerners working in Thailand presided over stepped up 
cooperation with Cambodian resistance groups operating there, procured a large amount 
of arms and equipment, and recruited and outfitted combat units, such as the Mekong I- 
IV, Quang Trung, and Trän Phu forces, to take these arms back and to fight the French. 
These groups worked along secret routes originating from bases along the lower 
northeastern Thai-Cambodian border and running across Cambodia and the Gulf of Siam 
to end points in southern Vietnam. This postwar southern track in the Vietnamese 
resistance targetted, for what appears to be the first time in the history of Vietnamese 
resistance work in Thailand, overseas Vietnamese communities in Cambodia and 
resistance posts in eastern Thailand, the Thai-held Cambodian territories, and western 
Cambodia.
Meanwhile, the pre-WWTI northern track in Thai-based activities did not remain static 
after WWII, especially as the strategic climate in northern Indochina began to change in
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early 1946. The first major change came after the 28 February Franco-Sino and 6 March 
Accords, when the French reoccupied all of Laos and sent the Viet Minh's military 
operations in Laos, as well as 50,000 mainly Vietnamese refugees, fleeing into Nakhon 
Phanom and Nong Khai provinces. With a go-ahead from the Thais, the Viet Minh 
continued administering military operations from bases along the northeastern Thai-Lao 
border.
The importance of all these operations increased markedly after the outbreak of full- 
scale war in Indochina in December 1946. This was symbolised best by the formation of 
the Western Front, a Vietnamese military zone that ran along both sides of the Mekong 
from upper Laos down to northwestern Cambodia. In effect, the Western Front reached 
southwards just far enough to link up with the southern operation of the Mekong I-IV, 
Quang Trung, and Trän Phu operations, thereby forming a continuous line of 
Vietnamese resistance bases extending down the length of the northeastern Thai frontier. 
With full-access to bases in southern China and large-scale military aid from the Chinese 
Communists not available to the Vietnamese until late 1949 at the earliest, this long string 
of Vietnamese bases linked to corresponding points in Vietnam pointed up the fact that 
Thailand held an important strategic position in the Vietnamese resistance against the 
French.
Looking back at the violence that has engulfed Indochina for over half a century, it 
seems that while different actors have come and gone, one constant has been the 
geographic importance of Thailand in relation to the wars that have plagued Indochina for 
so many decades. Though the Vietnamese may have been the first to recognise the 
strategic importance of Thailand in relation to Vietnam and war in Indochina, they were 
certainly not the last. It should not come as such a surprise now to recall that US 
Ambassador Leonard Unger described Thailand's "exceeding importance" to the US in 
relation to the Vietnam War in much the same words that Hoäng Vän Hoan explained 
Thailand's significance to the Vietnamese in an address to cadres in Udon in 1948. 
Indeed, as Vietnamese troops poured into Cambodia in late 1978 and early 1979, ranking 
Khmer Rouge leaders must have been thinking in very similar terms when they crossed 
into Thailand and began operations against the Vietnamese army from some of the same 
areas in northeastern Thailand that the Vietnamese had first used as rearbases decades 
earlier.
Appendix I
A Love of Community Ballad (Ca Af Dokn)
By: Phan Boi Chau
Our love should turn toward our community 
Let someone sing a song to express this feeling. 
Without a community we are like swallows pierced by arrows, 
An abandoned nation, frightened in the storm.
With a community we can now gather together.
But how must our love be for each other?
The community is like an inseparable body,
Despite five continents and four seas we remember each other. 
Separated we cannot live,
Gathered together we are strong and prosperous.
There must be love of nation in our community,
Be of one heart, I ask you not to go separate ways.
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Appendix II
[Untitled Poem by an overseas Vietnamese in Siam]
The five continents are darkened in chaos of red dust,
Like birds frightened in a storm, so are the Vietnamese people. 
Because our houses have been destroyed, we have a common enemy.
Yet as guests in a foreign country, we must expose ourselves.
Often we were on the slopes and in the passes of mountains.
Snow and fog encase our tents, our company: the trees and grass. 
Bitterness I consider to be as sweet as sugar.
Just as mountains are made of stones, so are our hearts loyal.
Our swords and bows wait, our hammers and hatchets the same.
We wipe sweat from our heads, laughing as we look at each other. 
While the mountains exist, there is a country, debts to life, and 
we still have to make sacrifices.
Late at night together we share the shadow of the lamp.
We made promises that we would fight together.
Looking towards my home, I see vast silvery clouds of one colour.
I miss my people, thinking of my compatriots, I become sorrowful.
We should think of how to unite the people firmly,
Wait until the people are spirited, the organisation stable.
Raise the flag high as we lead the people forward,
Take the lead, stand in front, with the youth taking the initiative for the nation.
Oh God in Heaven how could you do this to your people?
I wander through a sad rain and a mournful wind in a foreign land.
I tried to carry the country, but the pole broke at mid-way,
We are marching forward but it is a pity I have to hurry to say goodbye.
Now I will sleep a hundred years.
My revenge and debts to the nation I leave it to you brothers. 
Someday we will pay for good deeds and debts.1
l This poem can be found in Le Manh Trinh, CVDCQ, p. 88. The writer of this poem was a member of a 
cooperative team who died from sickness in the forest outside of Sakhon Nakhon in 1928.
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Letter to the Central Committee of the Siamese Communist Party from a 
Delegate of the First Congress of the Indochinese Party, 31 March 1935.2
Comrades!
As the delegate at the First Party Congress of the Indochinese Communist Party and on 
behalf of class proletarianism and all the working masses and the working peoples in the 
Indochina region, I send ardent communist greetings to the Siamese Communist Party, 
the vanguard of the Siamese proletarian class, and the people who are organising and 
leading the revolutionary struggle of the Siamese working masses to throw off the yoke 
of imperialist domination and the native militaristic feudalists. We ask that the Siamese 
Communist Party lead the revolutionary struggle of the Siamese working masses 
enthusiastically and develop it fully.
The revolutionary activities in every region are a part of the world revolution. All are 
class brothers in the capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial regions. You have our 
warmest support in the revolutionary struggle of the courageous worker-peasants and 
among the working Siamese masses.
Indochina and Siam are two neighbouring regions. This local revolution is intimately 
linked and influenced by the regional revolution there; so there should be ever more 
fraternal links between the Indochinese Communist Party and the Siamese Party. The 
revolutionary activities in every region are a part of the world revolution. All are class 
brothers in capitalist regions, colonial, and semi-colonial regions. You have our warmest 
support in the revolutionary struggle of the courageous worker-peasant and among the 
working Siamese masses.
During the time of the creation of the Indochinese Communist Party you gave your 
utmost to help our Party in all aspects. Our Congress recognises these actions of the
2 Thu Gui cho Trung LTcmg Dang Cong Sin  Xiem,' [Letter to the Central Committee of the Siamese 
Communist Party] in Ding Cong Sin Viet-Nam Ban Chap Hanh Trung LTcmg, Van Kien Ding: 
1930-1945, Tap I [Party Documents: 1930-1945, Volume I], (Hanoi: Ban Nghien Curu Lieh Su Ding 
Trung LTcmg Xuat Bin, 1977), p. 572.
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Siamese Communist Party, which were truly in the spirit o f revolutionary 
internationalism and correctly followed the principles of the Comintern. Our Congress is 
sure that the Siamese Communist Party will often help our Party, and will bring the 
Siamese working masses to struggle and support the Indochinese revolution.
Our Congress pledges that our Party will do everything in its power to help the Siamese 
Communist Party and appeal to the generosity of all the Indochinese working masses to 
struggle and support the Siamese revolution.
Long live the Siamese revolution!
Long live the Siamese Communist Party!
Oppressed masses in Indochina and Siam unite!
[signed] The Delegate of the First congress of the Indochinese Party,
31 March 1935
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